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SUMMITS like to have broad agendas. But they can rarely focus on more than one big thing. NATOs meeting in Chicago this week was dominated by the need to unite behind plans for an orderly retreat from Afghanistanmore politely labelled as a transition to Afghan responsibility for the countrys own security.
The alliance had other pressing issues too, such as smart defence (an attempt to pool capabilities to get a bit more bang for the euro), pressing on with a European ballistic-missile defence system (in the face of much angry growling from Moscow) and politely brushing aside the hopes of politically inconvenient applicants (partly because of wanting not to annoy Russia still more). But finding a respectable exit from the ten-year conflict against the Taliban and its allies has become the over-riding priority.
Rather than plotting a convincing path to that goal, Chicago showed how difficult it will be to reach. A troubling sideshow was the failure to get an agreement with Pakistan to reopen the NATO-led coalitions southern supply route. This was abruptly closed last November, after a disastrous error led to the killing of 24 Pakistani soldiers by American air strikes.
Pakistans embattled (and deeply unpopular) president, Asif Ali Zardari, was invited in the expectation that he would seal a deal to get the trucks rolling again. But although he showed up, his demands were deemed so unreasonable that Barack Obama refused to meet him more than fleetingly. Mr Zardari wanted an apology from America for the deaths of his soldiers (Mr Obama has offered his condolences but not said sorry); a tax of $5,000 for each truck passing through Pakistan to Afghanistan (NATO is prepared to pay $500, double the previous amount); and an end to drone attacks on militants in Pakistans lawless tribal areas (drones deserve much of the credit for the decline of core al-Qaeda and remain central to Americas counter-terrorism strategy).
Mr Zardaris position doubtless leaves room for haggling. But his apparent lack of negotiating space reflects both his own weakness and the virulence of anti-American sentiment among ordinary Pakistanis. For NATO, reopening the southern route is now less about supplying forces in Afghanistan than easing the logistical burden of getting vast quantities of materiel out by the end of 2014, when combat operations are meant to have ended.
The summit also laid bare NATOs need to please three different audiences. Mr Obama and his European counterparts are desperate to persuade their voters, weary of war and austerity, that the expenditure of much blood and even more treasure on what many now count as a hopeless cause really is coming to an end. At the same time, they also want to reassure Afghans, a large majority of whom dread the return of a resurgent Taliban, that the world is not going to abandon them to civil war after 2014. That is what happened when the Soviet Union threw in the towel two decades ago. Third, they need to show the Taliban (and some of Afghanistans unhelpful neighbours) that, even when most Western combat troops will have gone, the government in Kabul will still have the support it needs to survive.
To that end, Mr Obama and the other 27 NATO leaders agreed to a modified version of the plan coming out of the Lisbon summit in 2010. The aim is for Afghan forces to take the lead security role in three-quarters of the country before the end of this year and the other, most contested areas by the middle of 2013. They will then have 18 months to hone their abilities and learn from their mistakes while still having support from Western (mainly American and British) combat troops.
Checks in the mail
Thereafter, America and other donor countries have agreed to provide $3.6 billion a year for the Afghan national security forces (ANSF), with the Afghan government chipping in $500m, for a further ten years. Some doubt whether this will be enough. NATO will also keep an unspecified number of military trainers in the country (around 2,000), and, under an agreement reached last month, America will keep up to 20,000 military personnel in Afghanistan, to provide the Afghan army with the battlefield enablers it lacks. These include close air support, logistical back-up, medical evacuation and aerial surveillance.
Although Mr Obama concedes that the Taliban is still a robust enemy and the gains are still fragile, he also describes the road map to responsibly wind down the war as irreversible. So far, the transition has gone fairly well, but the last two phases will be much more testing. They will see the ANSF take over responsibility for former Taliban strongholds, such as Kandahar and Helmand, and volatile provinces in the wild east of the country. Senior Afghan politicians worry that if they cannot cope, they have no Plan B.
The Lisbon summit witnessed much talk about the importance of a comprehensive approach that linked security with development and governance. Neither of these got much mention in Chicago. The economy will suffer from the withdrawal of Western forces, in particular the winding down of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). These contained military officers, diplomats and development experts and were seen as crucial to the NATO-led mission. Afghan ministers fear a vicious circle in which PRT projects come to an abrupt end, the legitimacy of provincial governors is undermined and security then deteriorates. NATO may have agreed on a plan, but an inflexible timetable and dangerous pennypinching have made it a lot riskier than it should be.
The NATO summit: NATO
The alliance had other pressing issues too, such as smart defence (an attempt to pool capabilities to get a bit more bang for the euro), pressing on with a European ballistic-missile defence system (in the face of much angry growling from Moscow) and politely brushing aside the hopes of politically inconvenient applicants (partly because of wanting not to annoy Russia still more). But finding a respectable exit from the ten-year conflict against the Taliban and its allies has become the over-riding priority.
Rather than plotting a convincing path to that goal, Chicago showed how difficult it will be to reach. A troubling sideshow was the failure to get an agreement with Pakistan to reopen the NATO-led coalitions southern supply route. This was abruptly closed last November, after a disastrous error led to the killing of 24 Pakistani soldiers by American air strikes.
Pakistans embattled (and deeply unpopular) president, Asif Ali Zardari, was invited in the expectation that he would seal a deal to get the trucks rolling again. But although he showed up, his demands were deemed so unreasonable that Barack Obama refused to meet him more than fleetingly. Mr Zardari wanted an apology from America for the deaths of his soldiers (Mr Obama has offered his condolences but not said sorry); a tax of $5,000 for each truck passing through Pakistan to Afghanistan (NATO is prepared to pay $500, double the previous amount); and an end to drone attacks on militants in Pakistans lawless tribal areas (drones deserve much of the credit for the decline of core al-Qaeda and remain central to Americas counter-terrorism strategy).
Mr Zardaris position doubtless leaves room for haggling. But his apparent lack of negotiating space reflects both his own weakness and the virulence of anti-American sentiment among ordinary Pakistanis. For NATO, reopening the southern route is now less about supplying forces in Afghanistan than easing the logistical burden of getting vast quantities of materiel out by the end of 2014, when combat operations are meant to have ended.
The summit also laid bare NATOs need to please three different audiences. Mr Obama and his European counterparts are desperate to persuade their voters, weary of war and austerity, that the expenditure of much blood and even more treasure on what many now count as a hopeless cause really is coming to an end. At the same time, they also want to reassure Afghans, a large majority of whom dread the return of a resurgent Taliban, that the world is not going to abandon them to civil war after 2014. That is what happened when the Soviet Union threw in the towel two decades ago. Third, they need to show the Taliban (and some of Afghanistans unhelpful neighbours) that, even when most Western combat troops will have gone, the government in Kabul will still have the support it needs to survive.
To that end, Mr Obama and the other 27 NATO leaders agreed to a modified version of the plan coming out of the Lisbon summit in 2010. The aim is for Afghan forces to take the lead security role in three-quarters of the country before the end of this year and the other, most contested areas by the middle of 2013. They will then have 18 months to hone their abilities and learn from their mistakes while still having support from Western (mainly American and British) combat troops.
Checks in the mail
Thereafter, America and other donor countries have agreed to provide $3.6 billion a year for the Afghan national security forces (ANSF), with the Afghan government chipping in $500m, for a further ten years. Some doubt whether this will be enough. NATO will also keep an unspecified number of military trainers in the country (around 2,000), and, under an agreement reached last month, America will keep up to 20,000 military personnel in Afghanistan, to provide the Afghan army with the battlefield enablers it lacks. These include close air support, logistical back-up, medical evacuation and aerial surveillance.
Although Mr Obama concedes that the Taliban is still a robust enemy and the gains are still fragile, he also describes the road map to responsibly wind down the war as irreversible. So far, the transition has gone fairly well, but the last two phases will be much more testing. They will see the ANSF take over responsibility for former Taliban strongholds, such as Kandahar and Helmand, and volatile provinces in the wild east of the country. Senior Afghan politicians worry that if they cannot cope, they have no Plan B.
The Lisbon summit witnessed much talk about the importance of a comprehensive approach that linked security with development and governance. Neither of these got much mention in Chicago. The economy will suffer from the withdrawal of Western forces, in particular the winding down of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). These contained military officers, diplomats and development experts and were seen as crucial to the NATO-led mission. Afghan ministers fear a vicious circle in which PRT projects come to an abrupt end, the legitimacy of provincial governors is undermined and security then deteriorates. NATO may have agreed on a plan, but an inflexible timetable and dangerous pennypinching have made it a lot riskier than it should be.
The NATO summit: NATO
