pakistani342
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Must read aritcle by none other than Bhadrakumar, article here, excerpts below:
Ghani, who made a three-day visit to the U.S. last week, took almost six months after he took over as president to come to the U.S. Strangely, he has undertaken many foreign visits during this period – to China, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – but kept the U.S. visit pending. His main compulsion was that he needed to convince the U.S. that the unprecedented national unity government in Afghanistan is for real, is functioning and could be a meaningful interlocutor for Washington.
Ghani, who addressed a joint session of Congress, may have succeeded only partly. He took along Afghan Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah with him to the U.S., which helped to display that their alliance, which was midwifed by the U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry personally, has been holding.
Whether he succeeded in convincing Obama we do not know. Surely, Obama knows that Ghani is yet to complete his cabinet formation because consensus is lacking between the various factions and power brokers in Kabul.
...
Interestingly, before undertaking the visit to the U.S., Abdullah held two below-the-radar consultations – in Moscow in February and in Delhi in mid-March. (Ghani is yet to visit Russia or India.)
...
Obama cannot be unaware of the political rumblings in Kabul, of restive elements representing disparate interests (including prominent figures who served under former president Hamid Karzai) voicing dissenting opinions over Ghani’s policies. Obama was circumspect about praising the Ghani government’s performance so far and instead urged him to complete the cabinet formation quickly. Suffice it to say, an editorial by the New York Times couldn’t have summed up better:
“Mr. Ghani has big visions. He told Congress he aims for the country to be self-sustaining, and weaned of international assistance that now is central to the economy, within this decade. He talked of Afghanistan’s being an Asian hub crossed by pipelines, rail lines and modern telecom and banking services. These are worthy goals, but they are still based mostly on hope,” the Times wrote.
...
The manner in which Obama justified the decision to freeze the troop withdrawal through 2015, needs to be noted carefully. It was not even remotely meant to be a political endorsement. Obama was detached, clinical, and coolly pragmatic:
---> love Obama!!!
Before meeting Obama, Ghani had harped on a looming threat from the Islamic State to Afghanistan. Ghani wrote in an op-ed in Washington Post, “Afghanistan has become the eastern wall standing against the butchery of ISIL … Because Afghanistan must never again become a launching ground for terrorist attacks, we want to continue to work with the United States … A continued security partnership … will ensure that we will be an important ally in the decades to come.” But Obama wouldn’t be drawn into the topic.
...
Obama added the caveat, “Reconciliation and a political settlement remain the surest way to achieve the full drawdown of US and foreign troops from Afghanistan in a way that safeguards international interests and peace in Afghanistan, as well as US national security interests.”
...
The big question is: Will this satisfy Pakistan? An element of strategic ambiguity has crept into the Pakistani stance. Indeed, Ghani is the best interlocutor that Pakistan could hope to have in Kabul. He has been quite receptive to the Pakistani demand that the Afghan intelligence broke its nexus with the Pakistani Taliban (which would enable the Pakistani military to effectively control the internal security situation) and, secondly, that Kabul severely delimited India’s presence and role in Afghanistan.
...
Meanwhile, Pakistan is making a few cosmetic moves now and then in the direction of facilitating tentative contacts between Ghani’s people and the Taliban – just enough to keep the pot boiling and to ensure Ghani remains engaged. But how long can this charade continue without Ghani getting impatient? He is already looking rather foolish and naïve in the Afghan bazaar.
...
Now, when the Taliban leaders are caught up in an internal debate on the ABC of any peace talks with the established government in Kabul, how can Pakistan force march them to the negotiating table? Sounds logical, isn’t it?
It seems smoke and mirrors all over again. In the Pakistani calculus, the priority lies in extracting the most out of Ghani while the present power-sharing arrangement in Kabul lasts. Pakistan never quite trusted Abdullah. Pakistan knows that Ghani’s drive for reforms and good governance – revival of the economy, crackdown on corruption, eradication of drugs and narcotics, elimination of warlordism, etc – is a long haul and popular disenchantment is setting in.
..
Why should Pakistan commit itself – and the Taliban – to genuine peace talks unless there is clarity about the way things are going? This may seem like a chicken-and-egg situation but nothing can be done about it when there is a real danger that the current dispensation in Kabul could collapse under the combined weight of economic, political or military stress.
...
As the spring arrives and the ‘fighting season’ begins, Taliban can be expected to make a strong bid to damage the credibility of the Afghan Army and test its capacities. The continued U.S. troop presence gives an alibi to continue with the fighting and Pakistan will plead helpless and try to pass the buck.
Ghani, who made a three-day visit to the U.S. last week, took almost six months after he took over as president to come to the U.S. Strangely, he has undertaken many foreign visits during this period – to China, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – but kept the U.S. visit pending. His main compulsion was that he needed to convince the U.S. that the unprecedented national unity government in Afghanistan is for real, is functioning and could be a meaningful interlocutor for Washington.
Ghani, who addressed a joint session of Congress, may have succeeded only partly. He took along Afghan Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah with him to the U.S., which helped to display that their alliance, which was midwifed by the U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry personally, has been holding.
Whether he succeeded in convincing Obama we do not know. Surely, Obama knows that Ghani is yet to complete his cabinet formation because consensus is lacking between the various factions and power brokers in Kabul.
...
Interestingly, before undertaking the visit to the U.S., Abdullah held two below-the-radar consultations – in Moscow in February and in Delhi in mid-March. (Ghani is yet to visit Russia or India.)
...
Obama cannot be unaware of the political rumblings in Kabul, of restive elements representing disparate interests (including prominent figures who served under former president Hamid Karzai) voicing dissenting opinions over Ghani’s policies. Obama was circumspect about praising the Ghani government’s performance so far and instead urged him to complete the cabinet formation quickly. Suffice it to say, an editorial by the New York Times couldn’t have summed up better:
“Mr. Ghani has big visions. He told Congress he aims for the country to be self-sustaining, and weaned of international assistance that now is central to the economy, within this decade. He talked of Afghanistan’s being an Asian hub crossed by pipelines, rail lines and modern telecom and banking services. These are worthy goals, but they are still based mostly on hope,” the Times wrote.
...
The manner in which Obama justified the decision to freeze the troop withdrawal through 2015, needs to be noted carefully. It was not even remotely meant to be a political endorsement. Obama was detached, clinical, and coolly pragmatic:
---> love Obama!!!
Before meeting Obama, Ghani had harped on a looming threat from the Islamic State to Afghanistan. Ghani wrote in an op-ed in Washington Post, “Afghanistan has become the eastern wall standing against the butchery of ISIL … Because Afghanistan must never again become a launching ground for terrorist attacks, we want to continue to work with the United States … A continued security partnership … will ensure that we will be an important ally in the decades to come.” But Obama wouldn’t be drawn into the topic.
...
Obama added the caveat, “Reconciliation and a political settlement remain the surest way to achieve the full drawdown of US and foreign troops from Afghanistan in a way that safeguards international interests and peace in Afghanistan, as well as US national security interests.”
...
The big question is: Will this satisfy Pakistan? An element of strategic ambiguity has crept into the Pakistani stance. Indeed, Ghani is the best interlocutor that Pakistan could hope to have in Kabul. He has been quite receptive to the Pakistani demand that the Afghan intelligence broke its nexus with the Pakistani Taliban (which would enable the Pakistani military to effectively control the internal security situation) and, secondly, that Kabul severely delimited India’s presence and role in Afghanistan.
...
Meanwhile, Pakistan is making a few cosmetic moves now and then in the direction of facilitating tentative contacts between Ghani’s people and the Taliban – just enough to keep the pot boiling and to ensure Ghani remains engaged. But how long can this charade continue without Ghani getting impatient? He is already looking rather foolish and naïve in the Afghan bazaar.
...
Now, when the Taliban leaders are caught up in an internal debate on the ABC of any peace talks with the established government in Kabul, how can Pakistan force march them to the negotiating table? Sounds logical, isn’t it?
It seems smoke and mirrors all over again. In the Pakistani calculus, the priority lies in extracting the most out of Ghani while the present power-sharing arrangement in Kabul lasts. Pakistan never quite trusted Abdullah. Pakistan knows that Ghani’s drive for reforms and good governance – revival of the economy, crackdown on corruption, eradication of drugs and narcotics, elimination of warlordism, etc – is a long haul and popular disenchantment is setting in.
..
Why should Pakistan commit itself – and the Taliban – to genuine peace talks unless there is clarity about the way things are going? This may seem like a chicken-and-egg situation but nothing can be done about it when there is a real danger that the current dispensation in Kabul could collapse under the combined weight of economic, political or military stress.
...
As the spring arrives and the ‘fighting season’ begins, Taliban can be expected to make a strong bid to damage the credibility of the Afghan Army and test its capacities. The continued U.S. troop presence gives an alibi to continue with the fighting and Pakistan will plead helpless and try to pass the buck.
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