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Moody's to downgrade Bangladesh's 'Ba3' rating

Exactly. This is a temporary global phenomenon. It is futile to read too much into bond rating fluctuations in this volatile situation.

The Fed tightening policy is more dangerous than Russian war effect for developing countries. I predict Russian-Ukraine war will be quite long but the energy prices will not likely exceed those in March-June 2022 period, so the war IMO will not likely effect inflation anymore since the energy prices will be stable despite will likely be relatively high due to supply chain disruption (Western sanction on Russia). This will likely stop The Fed tightening policy in second Quarter 2023
 
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Bangladesh doesn’t borrow from the open market hence it’s less prone to the whims of the rating agencies.

It’s a problem for countries that borrow from the open market.

BD problem is more due to export-import matter, high energy prices make the trade deficit jump. Slowing Western economies makes the export gets slower as well. BD gets less USD to pay the import

The problem is the same like Pakistan, so the solution is to decrease non-essential import.

Any way, BD can solve the payment issue quicker if BD government send more workers to Malaysia that currently facing huge labor shortage. They lack around 1.5 million migrant workers

Building industry to decrease trade deficit needs long time, the fastest route to get more USD is to get more remittance by sending more workers to Malaysia that is currently in dire needs of blue color work force
 
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I don't know why Bangladeshis are discussing India in a Bangladesh thread. Pathetic intellectually corrupt.


Can we stick to the title of this thread?


Can we stick to the title of this thread?

Lol - you want to smear Bangladesh but can't handle a mirror to your face?

If you did your research you would know that India was ALREADY DOWNGRADED in 2019! From Baa2 to Baa3.

 
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Lol - you want to smear Bangladesh but can't handle a mirror to your face?

If you did your research you would know that India was ALREADY DOWNGRADED in 2019! From Baa2 to Baa3.


Hinduvta turd should have done his cow cola research 🤣🤣🤣
 
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This is the Moody's Report in detail. Seems primarily due to Hasina's pathetic management of the reserve scenario.

"Widening current account deficit due to unfavourable terms of trade, as well as Bangladesh Bank's attempt to defend the Taka, have eroded foreign exchange reserves by around $11 billion for the last 12 months."



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Rating Action:

Moody's places Bangladesh's Ba3 ratings under review for downgrade​


09 Dec 2022

Singapore, December 09, 2022 -- Moody's Investors Service ("Moody's") has today placed the Government of Bangladesh's Ba3 long term issuer and senior unsecured ratings on review for downgrade. Short term issuer ratings are affirmed at Not Prime and the outlook was stable before being placed under review.

The decision to place the ratings on review for downgrade is driven by Moody's assessment that Bangladesh's deteriorating external position raises external vulnerability and government liquidity risks in a way that may not be consistent with its current rating. This assessment also reflects governance weaknesses in the ability of institutions to take credible measures to arrest the deterioration of reserves adequacy. While Moody's expects the agreement on the Extended Credit Facility/Extended Fund Facility and the Resilience and Sustainability Facility with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to provide some external financing, programme conditions have not been finalised, raising uncertainties around the government's ability to meet them and their economic and social impact. Risks to reserves adequacy are compounded by uncertainty around the composition of reserves.

Bangladesh's foreign exchange reserves are declining at a rapid pace, largely driven by rising costs for energy imports and moderating growth in export earnings. The rise in food and fertilizer prices has also inflated the subsidy bill for the government. While the Taka devaluation and softening of some commodity prices could improve terms of trade in the medium-term, Moody's expects the energy crisis to exacerbate balance of payments and liquidity risks in the near-term.

The sovereign's financing options remain narrow due to the absence of international issuance and limited domestic capital markets, while FDI are very limited. Although Bangladesh has modest debt payments due to the concessional nature of its external debt with long maturities, weak debt affordability – with interest payments absorbing a widening share of the government's narrow revenue base – poses further risks.

The rating review will focus on understanding the scope and conditions under which IMF support will be provided. Moody's will assess the government's willingness and ability to consistently meet the IMF programme's requirements, given the challenging social conditions that have been intensified by recent fuel and energy shortages, as well as the support that the IMF programme can facilitate from other international institutions. In addition, the review will seek to refine the assessment of reserves adequacy, given uncertainty around the composition of the sovereign's foreign currency reserves.

Concurrently, Bangladesh's local-currency (LC) and foreign-currency (FC) ceilings have been lowered to Ba1 and Ba3 from Baa3 and Ba2, respectively. The LC ceiling is placed two notches above the sovereign rating, reflecting weak predictability and reliability of government institutions and high external imbalances, which raise risks for the garment export sector's contributions to government revenue; balancing a relatively small government footprint. The FC ceiling is placed two notches below the LC ceiling, reflecting low capital account openness, weak policy effectiveness, and some degree of unpredictability surrounding capital flow management, taking into account low external indebtedness.

RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR INITIATING THE REVIEW FOR DOWNGRADE

Bangladesh's declining foreign exchange reserves adequacy, acute energy crisis, and dollar liquidity shortage have raised concerns about the government's ability to service external debt payments. The inability of the government to arrest the deterioration of reserves, despite the Taka devaluation and implementation of unorthodox policy measures highlights the severity of the situation.

The widening current account deficit due to unfavourable terms of trade, as well as Bangladesh Bank's attempt to defend the Taka, have eroded foreign exchange reserves by around $11 billion for the last 12 months. Although reserves remain at relatively high levels, the import coverage ratio has declined significantly. As of November 2022, foreign exchange reserves (excluding gold and SDRs) fell to $30 billion or around 4 months of imports from 8 months in January 2021 – despite import restrictions and energy rationing. While the devaluation of the Taka will ease balance of payments pressures in the medium-term, as will an expected rebound in remittances, Moody's assesses that the import coverage ratio will continue to weaken towards 3 months of imports, while current account will remain wide (around 4%) over the next few years.

Risks to reserves adequacy are heightened by uncertainties around the composition of reserves. Bangladesh Bank currently includes assets from the Export Development Fund (EDF), swap lines with the Government of Sri Lanka, and other assets with questionable liquidity as part of its official reserves. In Moody's view, reserves adequacy will be materially weaker if these assets do not meet liquidity requirements.

Bangladesh's long-standing weak fiscal revenues and rising energy costs complicates the government's immediate policy choices, with increasing subsidy costs putting pressure on the government's fiscal metrics. Moody's expects the fiscal deficit to remain wide, around 5.0-5.5% of GDP over the next few years, increasing the debt burden to above 40% of GDP. The devaluation of the Taka weakens debt affordability, with interest payments expecting to consume almost 25% of revenues. The energy crisis also exacerbates Bangladesh's weakening macroeconomic environment – with high inflation undermining consumption and slowing exports and remittances impacting growth – as energy shortages may affect garment production.

While Moody's expects that Bangladesh will continue to secure official financing through international financial institutions, with the IMF programme expected to unlock further financing, the financing options available to the government to stabilise the balance of payments remain limited. Bangladesh has no established access to international financial markets and domestic markets remain very shallow. Foreign direct investment flows are weak at 0.5% of GDP in fiscal 2022. The limited foreign exchange liquidity has also affected banks and companies operating in Bangladesh with the need of cross-border transactions. Therefore Moody's assessment of government liquidity risk has worsened.

Finally, capital flow management measures introduced by Bangladesh Bank such as increased margins against import letters of credit (LCs), increased monitoring of LCs, and import restrictions have failed to arrest the deterioration of reserves. Such inefficient measures, in addition to the implementation of unorthodox, distortive monetary policy tools such as a multiple exchange rate regime, has lowered Moody's assessment of the institution's monetary and macroeconomic policy effectiveness.

GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 7,044 (2021) (also known as Per Capita Income)
Real GDP growth (% change): 6.9% (2021) (also known as GDP Growth)
Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 5.6% (2021)
Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -3.7% (2021) (also known as Fiscal Balance)
Current Account Balance/GDP: -1.1% (2021) (also known as External Balance)
External debt/GDP: 19.6% (2021)
Economic resiliency: ba3

Default history: No default events (on bonds or loans) have been recorded since 1983.

On 06 December 2022, a rating committee was called to discuss the rating of the Bangladesh, Government of. The main points raised during the discussion were: The issuer's institutions and governance strength, have materially decreased. The issuer's fiscal or financial strength, including its debt profile, has materially decreased. The issuer has become less susceptible to event risks.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS

The ratings would likely be confirmed at their current level if pressures on Bangladesh's external position were to ease durably, for example due to effective policy measures that would rebuild foreign exchange reserves to adequate levels and a credible financing plan to address the wide current account deficit. Additionally the implementation of fiscal reforms that would increase revenue mobilisation in particular, leading to a material narrowing of fiscal deficits in the next few years and contributed to bolstering debt affordability, would also support a confirmation of the rating.

The rating would likely be downgraded if pressures on Bangladesh's external position were to keep building, with an enduring erosion of foreign exchange reserves and uncertainty surrounding financing sources, while the energy crisis continued to put pressure on external and fiscal metrics.

ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, GOVERNANCE CONSIDERATIONS

Bangladesh's very highly negative (CIS-5) ESG Credit Impact Score reflects very high exposure to environmental and social risks, and weak governance which, together with low financial capacity, constraint the sovereign's ability to adjust to environmental and social risks.

The exposure to environmental risk is very highly negative (E-5). As a low-lying country with large coastal areas, Bangladesh is highly prone to flooding, which disrupts economic activity and raises social costs. Low incomes and weak infrastructure quality compound the impact of weather-related events on the economy, and in turn, associated fiscal costs. In addition, the magnitude and dispersion of seasonal monsoon rainfall also influence agricultural sector growth, generating some volatility and raising uncertainty about rural incomes and consumption. As a net energy importer, exposure and risks related to carbon transition are not present.

We assess Bangladesh's exposure to social risks as very highly negative (S-5). Low incomes stem in part from physical and social infrastructure constraints to economic development that will take time to address. That said, per capita incomes have grown strongly over the past decade and poverty rates have declined sharply, thanks to high and stable economic growth. This has also delivered improvement in access to basic services, although Bangladesh's challenges related to improvements in educational opportunities and outcomes, health and safety, and labor force inclusion remain areas of social risk.

Bangladesh's weak institutions and governance profile constrain its rating, as captured by a highly negative governance issuer profile score (G-4). Challenges in control of corruption and rule of law weaken existing institutions, while the credibility of legal structures is also limited. These governance challenges have in part contributed to asset quality issues in the banking sector. Besides, a deteriorating monetary policy framework undermines macroeconomic stability, while challenging fiscal prudence.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Sovereigns published in November 2022 and available at https://ratings.moodys.com/api/rmc-documents/395819. Alternatively, please see the Rating Methodologies page on https://ratings.moodys.com for a copy of this methodology.

The weighting of all rating factors is described in the methodology used in this credit rating action, if applicable.

REGULATORY DISCLOSURES

For further specification of Moody's key rating assumptions and sensitivity analysis, see the sections Methodology Assumptions and Sensitivity to Assumptions in the disclosure form. Moody's Rating Symbols and Definitions can be found on https://ratings.moodys.com/rating-definitions.

For ratings issued on a program, series, category/class of debt or security this announcement provides certain regulatory disclosures in relation to each rating of a subsequently issued bond or note of the same series, category/class of debt, security or pursuant to a program for which the ratings are derived exclusively from existing ratings in accordance with Moody's rating practices. For ratings issued on a support provider, this announcement provides certain regulatory disclosures in relation to the credit rating action on the support provider and in relation to each particular credit rating action for securities that derive their credit ratings from the support provider's credit rating. For provisional ratings, this announcement provides certain regulatory disclosures in relation to the provisional rating assigned, and in relation to a definitive rating that may be assigned subsequent to the final issuance of the debt, in each case where the transaction structure and terms have not changed prior to the assignment of the definitive rating in a manner that would have affected the rating. For further information please see the issuer/deal page for the respective issuer on https://ratings.moodys.com.

For any affected securities or rated entities receiving direct credit support from the primary entity(ies) of this credit rating action, and whose ratings may change as a result of this credit rating action, the associated regulatory disclosures will be those of the guarantor entity. Exceptions to this approach exist for the following disclosures, if applicable to jurisdiction: Ancillary Services, Disclosure to rated entity, Disclosure from rated entity.

The ratings have been disclosed to the rated entity or its designated agent(s) and issued with no amendment resulting from that disclosure.

These ratings are solicited. Please refer to Moody's Policy for Designating and Assigning Unsolicited Credit Ratings available on its website https://ratings.moodys.com.

Regulatory disclosures contained in this press release apply to the credit rating and, if applicable, the related rating outlook or rating review.

Moody's general principles for assessing environmental, social and governance (ESG) risks in our credit analysis can be found at https://ratings.moodys.com/documents/PBC_1288235.
under the law applicable to credit rating agencies in the UK. Further information on the UK endorsement status and on the Moody's office that issued the credit rating is available on https://ratings.moodys.com.

Please see https://ratings.moodys.c

At least one ESG consideration was material to the credit rating action(s) announced and described above.



The Global Scale Credit Rating on this Credit Rating Announcement was issued by one of Moody's affiliates outside the EU and is endorsed by Moody's Deutschland GmbH, An der Welle 5, Frankfurt am Main 60322, Germany, in accordance with Art.4 paragraph 3 of the Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on Credit Rating Agencies. Further information on the EU endorsement status and on the Moody's office that issued the credit rating is available on https://ratings.moodys.com.

The Global Scale Credit Rating on this Credit Rating Announcement was issued by one of Moody's affiliates outside the UK and is endorsed by Moody's Investors Service Limited, One Canada Square, Canary Wharf, London E14 5FA

om for any updates on changes to the lead rating analyst and to the Moody's legal entity that has issued the rating.

Please see the issuer/deal page on https://ratings.moodys.com for additional regulatory disclosures for each credit rating.

Camille Chautard
Analyst
Sovereign Risk Group
Moody's Investors Service Singapore Pte. Ltd.
71 Robinson Road #05-01/02
Singapore, 068895
Singapore

JOURNALISTS: 852 3758 1350
Client Service: 852 3551 3077

Marie Diron
MD - Sovereign Risk
Sovereign Risk Group

JOURNALISTS: 44 20 7772 5456
Client Service: 44 20 7772 5454

Releasing Office:
Moody's Investors Service Singapore Pte. Ltd.
71 Robinson Road #05-01/02
Singapore, 068895
Singapore

JOURNALISTS: 852 3758 1350
Client Service: 852 3551 3077
 
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Not good news obviously, but clearly a temporary thing.

However silver lining BD does not borrow from anyone except institutions, so this has little actual meaning.

BD did not go on a borrowing spree when it was upgraded only last year.

Additionally borrowing from IMF and others are their for liquidity support. BD will first use own reserve and will only call on facility if needed. Not a single cent of IMF or other funding has been used to date and there is every chance it wont be.

Its more than a storm in a tea cup but everything remains in control. Doomsayers hope wont come true.
 
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