Rafael
RETIRED MOD
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The recent book by a former chief of the general staff of the Pakistan Army has only added to what was generally known in informed circles, and once again there are calls for a commission on Kargil. This, however, is unlikely even if Nawaz Sharif comes into power for the third time since it would expose his ineptitude in being tricked into this misadventure by the military. But if there is one, it must look into the structural weaknesses and flaws in the working of our higher defence organisation, which has caused immense harm to the country through repeated military follies over a span of half-a-century.
The principal task of the armed forces is to deter and defeat armed attacks on Pakistani territory without relying on combat support forces of other countries. This entails evolving strategies to enable them to control our air and sea approaches against credible adversaries, to the extent required to safeguard our territory, populations and infrastructure. Such strategies have to be based on certain assumptions.
However, a cursory glance at some of the assumptions made in the past in strategising our defence planning paints a dismal picture. It was assumed that Ayub Khan launched Operation Gibraltar in Kashmir in 1965 in the belief that India would not retaliate across the international border; the military establishment believed that the defence of East Pakistan lay in the defence of West Pakistan; East Pakistans terrain was not suitable for armour and heavy artillery operations and therefore there was no need to deploy such formations there; there is no need to demarcate Siachen beyond point NJ9842, even though a treacherous neighbour had just dismembered the country; Afghanistan is the strategic depth of Pakistan.
And then Gen Musharraf about launching a tactical action in Kargil with strategic effects, with nearly two battalions of Northern Light Infantry troops, and expecting that it will not end up into a full-blown crisis in a wobbly domestic political environment and an international order intolerant of overnight tactical surprises, brilliant or not.
The less said about any of these stratagems the better, as some of them did eventually set off well-known chain reactions of their own. But what emerges clearly is that at the heart of it all lies the failure of the higher defence organisation to have a clearer view of how much strategic risk the country can bear or is prepared to bear. This failure is caused by the ugly phenomenon of monopoly on wisdom in the psyche of the upper echelon, which discourages deeper professional discourse both in depth and breadth.
This malaise is so deep that in Kargil the other two service chiefs were not taken into confidence even though the operation eventually spilled over to require air power coming into play. In 1965, Gen Musa Khan had not considered it appropriate to take Air Vice Marshal Nur Khan into confidence about Operation Gibraltar until much later. And it bears repetition that in 1971, the commander-in-chief of the navy learnt about the outbreak of war from Radio Pakistans broadcasts. This state of affairs needs serious reappraisal as surely this is not how any country should go to war.
Defence planning, by its very nature, is a complex and long-term business and is driven by the nature of military technology. It should be clear to us by now that actions taken in one time span have the potential to affect our sovereignty and freedom of action for decades to come. Even developed countries get it wrong every now and then if they err in risk-management issues. Joint warfare, more than ever before, has become the most effective and economical response to external threats as states in conflict vie to achieve destruction of the adversary first and relegate the physical capture of the territory to a later stage.
After the debacle of 1971, the headquarters of the three services were moved to the twin cities of Rawalpindi/Islamabad and a Joint Staff Headquarters (JSHQ) was established at great expense to the taxpayer. The purpose of this relocation was to bring all the three services under the umbrella of the JSHQ and create environments where the countrys armed forces could work closely and achieve a greater degree of coordination.
The nature of different demands on the personnel of the army, navy and the air force and the need to balance their roles towards a common objective was also intended to be served by this move. Towards that end, planning and, more importantly, the execution of defence strategies could be better achieved through regular periodic tri-services exercises rather than the current trend where the army and air force validate their own concepts in the deserts of Bahawalpur and the navy conducts its exercises independently in the North Arabian Sea.
A more empowered JSHQ would also have ensured that no single service undertakes military operations in a manner that could be detrimental to the interests of the country. The relevant rules permitted that the office of chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee could be rotated between the three services for reasons which are quite obvious. A higher defence organisation along these lines would have enabled the countrys armed forces to put up an integrated and coordinated defence in war, and not of the Swiss cheese variety with holes abundant in the planning and execution, as had been evident time and again in the past.
Despite these lofty objectives set over forty years ago, the Joint Staff Headquarters continue to remain largely an ineffective organisation. It would be prudent to shed lesser individual service considerations and strengthen the JSHQ in line with what was originally envisaged. If that is asking too much, then serious consideration should be given to abolition of this organization altogether as it is serving very little purpose in its present form. Strengthening the JSHQ, though, is not a panacea for our many failings as the recent book has thrown up some other important issues as well.
In response to his ex-CGS on a private TV channel, Gen Musharraf described his former colleague as a person of unstable mind (actually he went well beyond that, but it need not be repeated here). If that indeed is the case, and not just fulminations from an angry relative, then it is valid to question the promotion system which favours such people to higher ranks. Ironically, Musharrafs remark lends credence to a perception in the armed forces that there are many one-star officers who should have risen to the rank of general any day, and many in the higher echelon who shouldnt have gone beyond the rank of lieutenant colonel.
As one sage explains this phenomenon: It is all in the tongue. Some people talk too much and suffer, while others keep mum and prosper. True or not, the promotion system, especially to higher ranks, needs to be rationalised, so that professionally competent and brilliant officers are not wasted just because they give their honest opinions when it is most needed. More freedom of speech in the armed forces should be considered as its organisational strength, not a symptom of disloyalty.
Whenever one looks back, it is always difficult to dismiss the thought that if the two former democratically elected prime ministers, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Mian Nawaz Sharif, had followed the seniority rule in appointing the chiefs of the army staff during their tenures, the trajectory followed by Pakistan in the last four decades would have been different. They both abused the discretion clause in the constitution at a heavy price to the country and to themselves. That clause should be abolished as the politicians will always remain tempted to apply it to serve their own whims.
The damage done as a result of the Kargil misadventure cannot be undone, nor can the dead be brought back to life, but it will be very unfortunate if we do not learn the right lessons for the future. If one has to choose one important lesson from the many at hand, it should be never again to allow monopoly on wisdom to a handful at an exorbitant cost and sufferings to millions.
The writer is a retired vice admiral. Email: tajkhattak@ymail.com
Monopoly on wisdom - Taj M Khattak
The principal task of the armed forces is to deter and defeat armed attacks on Pakistani territory without relying on combat support forces of other countries. This entails evolving strategies to enable them to control our air and sea approaches against credible adversaries, to the extent required to safeguard our territory, populations and infrastructure. Such strategies have to be based on certain assumptions.
However, a cursory glance at some of the assumptions made in the past in strategising our defence planning paints a dismal picture. It was assumed that Ayub Khan launched Operation Gibraltar in Kashmir in 1965 in the belief that India would not retaliate across the international border; the military establishment believed that the defence of East Pakistan lay in the defence of West Pakistan; East Pakistans terrain was not suitable for armour and heavy artillery operations and therefore there was no need to deploy such formations there; there is no need to demarcate Siachen beyond point NJ9842, even though a treacherous neighbour had just dismembered the country; Afghanistan is the strategic depth of Pakistan.
And then Gen Musharraf about launching a tactical action in Kargil with strategic effects, with nearly two battalions of Northern Light Infantry troops, and expecting that it will not end up into a full-blown crisis in a wobbly domestic political environment and an international order intolerant of overnight tactical surprises, brilliant or not.
The less said about any of these stratagems the better, as some of them did eventually set off well-known chain reactions of their own. But what emerges clearly is that at the heart of it all lies the failure of the higher defence organisation to have a clearer view of how much strategic risk the country can bear or is prepared to bear. This failure is caused by the ugly phenomenon of monopoly on wisdom in the psyche of the upper echelon, which discourages deeper professional discourse both in depth and breadth.
This malaise is so deep that in Kargil the other two service chiefs were not taken into confidence even though the operation eventually spilled over to require air power coming into play. In 1965, Gen Musa Khan had not considered it appropriate to take Air Vice Marshal Nur Khan into confidence about Operation Gibraltar until much later. And it bears repetition that in 1971, the commander-in-chief of the navy learnt about the outbreak of war from Radio Pakistans broadcasts. This state of affairs needs serious reappraisal as surely this is not how any country should go to war.
Defence planning, by its very nature, is a complex and long-term business and is driven by the nature of military technology. It should be clear to us by now that actions taken in one time span have the potential to affect our sovereignty and freedom of action for decades to come. Even developed countries get it wrong every now and then if they err in risk-management issues. Joint warfare, more than ever before, has become the most effective and economical response to external threats as states in conflict vie to achieve destruction of the adversary first and relegate the physical capture of the territory to a later stage.
After the debacle of 1971, the headquarters of the three services were moved to the twin cities of Rawalpindi/Islamabad and a Joint Staff Headquarters (JSHQ) was established at great expense to the taxpayer. The purpose of this relocation was to bring all the three services under the umbrella of the JSHQ and create environments where the countrys armed forces could work closely and achieve a greater degree of coordination.
The nature of different demands on the personnel of the army, navy and the air force and the need to balance their roles towards a common objective was also intended to be served by this move. Towards that end, planning and, more importantly, the execution of defence strategies could be better achieved through regular periodic tri-services exercises rather than the current trend where the army and air force validate their own concepts in the deserts of Bahawalpur and the navy conducts its exercises independently in the North Arabian Sea.
A more empowered JSHQ would also have ensured that no single service undertakes military operations in a manner that could be detrimental to the interests of the country. The relevant rules permitted that the office of chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee could be rotated between the three services for reasons which are quite obvious. A higher defence organisation along these lines would have enabled the countrys armed forces to put up an integrated and coordinated defence in war, and not of the Swiss cheese variety with holes abundant in the planning and execution, as had been evident time and again in the past.
Despite these lofty objectives set over forty years ago, the Joint Staff Headquarters continue to remain largely an ineffective organisation. It would be prudent to shed lesser individual service considerations and strengthen the JSHQ in line with what was originally envisaged. If that is asking too much, then serious consideration should be given to abolition of this organization altogether as it is serving very little purpose in its present form. Strengthening the JSHQ, though, is not a panacea for our many failings as the recent book has thrown up some other important issues as well.
In response to his ex-CGS on a private TV channel, Gen Musharraf described his former colleague as a person of unstable mind (actually he went well beyond that, but it need not be repeated here). If that indeed is the case, and not just fulminations from an angry relative, then it is valid to question the promotion system which favours such people to higher ranks. Ironically, Musharrafs remark lends credence to a perception in the armed forces that there are many one-star officers who should have risen to the rank of general any day, and many in the higher echelon who shouldnt have gone beyond the rank of lieutenant colonel.
As one sage explains this phenomenon: It is all in the tongue. Some people talk too much and suffer, while others keep mum and prosper. True or not, the promotion system, especially to higher ranks, needs to be rationalised, so that professionally competent and brilliant officers are not wasted just because they give their honest opinions when it is most needed. More freedom of speech in the armed forces should be considered as its organisational strength, not a symptom of disloyalty.
Whenever one looks back, it is always difficult to dismiss the thought that if the two former democratically elected prime ministers, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Mian Nawaz Sharif, had followed the seniority rule in appointing the chiefs of the army staff during their tenures, the trajectory followed by Pakistan in the last four decades would have been different. They both abused the discretion clause in the constitution at a heavy price to the country and to themselves. That clause should be abolished as the politicians will always remain tempted to apply it to serve their own whims.
The damage done as a result of the Kargil misadventure cannot be undone, nor can the dead be brought back to life, but it will be very unfortunate if we do not learn the right lessons for the future. If one has to choose one important lesson from the many at hand, it should be never again to allow monopoly on wisdom to a handful at an exorbitant cost and sufferings to millions.
The writer is a retired vice admiral. Email: tajkhattak@ymail.com
Monopoly on wisdom - Taj M Khattak
