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In order to understand why it is so difficult to institutionally 'kill off' the A-10, as in removal from force, it helps to understand the 'close air support' (CAS) concept in the first place.
Here is an excellent doc for that initial understanding...
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a570047.pdf
But to sum it up, there are two main concepts regarding the use of air forces to support ground forces: Close Combat Attack (CCA) and Close Air Support (CAS).
In execution, the two concepts have similar and overlapping responsibilities and they are similar enough that the interested laymen often get the two ideas mixed up, resulting in complex and emotionally heated debates on who should be responsible for CAS and which platform(s) to use.
When air power became available, the Army naturally wanted control of it. CCA is NOT CAS despite some similarities in execution.
Here is what the doc said about CCA and CAS subtle differences...
CAS is not for preemptive attacks but to use air forces as supporting combat actions already underway.
CCA is about using air forces as highly maneuverable units and coordinate the 3rd dimension attacks with ground forces attacks.
Now for the technical reasons why it is so difficult to institutionally and operationally 'kill off' the A-10, and highly likely that the A-10 is the apex design of the platform for CAS, in other words, nothing can replace the A-10 in terms of versatility for the CAS mission.
To use the Army's premier direct combat helo, the AH-64, as example...
https://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/ah-64.htm
- Speed: Cruise is 145 mph.
- Armament: Up to 16 Hellfire missiles.
- Combat radius: 100 miles or longer with external fuel tanks but reduced armament.
https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104490/a-10-thunderbolt-ii/
- Speed: 450 nautical miles per hour (Mach 0.75)
- Armament: One 30 mm GAU-8/A seven-barrel Gatling gun; up to 16,000 pounds (7,200 kilograms) of mixed ordnance on eight under-wing and three under-fuselage pylon stations, including 500 pound (225 kilograms) Mk-82 and 2,000 pounds (900 kilograms) Mk-84 series low/high drag bombs, incendiary cluster bombs, combined effects munitions, mine dispensing munitions, AGM-65 Maverick missiles and laser-guided/electro-optically guided bombs; infrared countermeasure flares; electronic countermeasure chaff; jammer pods; 2.75-inch (6.99 centimeters) rockets; illumination flares and AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles.
- Combat radius: 300 miles and longer with air refueling.
The -64 is superior to the A-10 when there is a need for 'danger close' fire support. The -64's ability to hover allows for more surgical delivery of missiles and guns.
On the other hand, the A-10's superior speed made it a more desirable platform for responses, either to multiple combat actions in one area or to a combat area outside of the -64's combat radius. Its wings allows greater tonnage and flexibility for armaments.
The AH-64 is a scalpel. The A-10 is a sledge hammer.
As much as the USAF's lower priority for CAS in its budget and conceptual thinking, the USAF really have no credible replacement for the A-10.
- The cannon can be pod mounted, but that design would reduce rounds carried, which would render the A-10's long loiter time practically useless. The cannon has to be installed in the fuselage. The low altitudes mission and closer to ground battles favors semi autonomous weapons which made an onboard radar less important.
- Straight and broad wings made excellent maneuverability while carrying a variety of armaments, as well as reduced runway length. The wing's area enables controlled flight even if half of the wing is lost. The wings' low fuselage location reduces armament loading efforts. Twin vertical stabs increased survivablity because the aircraft can have controlled flight with just one.
- High mounted twin turbofan engines reduce IR visibility. Their locations on the aircraft does not affect rearmament and refuel operations for quick turnaround. The engines can be kept running while rearms and even pilot exchanged.
- Redundancies in vital flight controls and fuel systems increased survivability.
- High cockpit allows pilot view of the combat area in all directions.
Once all the major and minor requirements are summed, the A-10's current design made it difficult to envision an alternative. If the USAF increases the priority level for CAS, it is possible for a new design, but probably the new design would not deviate much from the current A-10. The problem for the Army is that it cannot afford to lose a sledge hammer but the Army does not want to maintain runways and related infrastructures, and the USAF is reluctant to remain in the CAS arena.
The odds of a new CAS platform is low.
Here is an excellent doc for that initial understanding...
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a570047.pdf
But to sum it up, there are two main concepts regarding the use of air forces to support ground forces: Close Combat Attack (CCA) and Close Air Support (CAS).
In execution, the two concepts have similar and overlapping responsibilities and they are similar enough that the interested laymen often get the two ideas mixed up, resulting in complex and emotionally heated debates on who should be responsible for CAS and which platform(s) to use.
When air power became available, the Army naturally wanted control of it. CCA is NOT CAS despite some similarities in execution.
Here is what the doc said about CCA and CAS subtle differences...
Close Air Support (CAS): “Close air support is air action by fixed-wing (FW) and rotary-wing (RW) aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces, and requires detailed integration of each air mission with fire and movement of those forces.”1
Close air support is indirect fires from aircraft near soldiers that requires detailed coordination to prevent fratricide or civilian casualties. The person calling for fire is responsible for the fire’s effects.
Close Combat Attack (CCA): “A hasty or deliberate attack by Army aircraft providing air-to-ground fires for friendly units engaged in close combat. Due to the close proximity of friendly forces, detailed integration is required.”2
The definition of close combat attack is similar to close air support; the main difference is the consideration of close combat attack by the Army as a direct fire weapon system in which the aircrew is responsible for their fires.
To put it simply: The Army sees the helos as essentially airborne infantry units and conceptually uses them accordingly.Close air support is indirect fires from aircraft near soldiers that requires detailed coordination to prevent fratricide or civilian casualties. The person calling for fire is responsible for the fire’s effects.
Close Combat Attack (CCA): “A hasty or deliberate attack by Army aircraft providing air-to-ground fires for friendly units engaged in close combat. Due to the close proximity of friendly forces, detailed integration is required.”2
The definition of close combat attack is similar to close air support; the main difference is the consideration of close combat attack by the Army as a direct fire weapon system in which the aircrew is responsible for their fires.
CAS is not for preemptive attacks but to use air forces as supporting combat actions already underway.
CCA is about using air forces as highly maneuverable units and coordinate the 3rd dimension attacks with ground forces attacks.
Now for the technical reasons why it is so difficult to institutionally and operationally 'kill off' the A-10, and highly likely that the A-10 is the apex design of the platform for CAS, in other words, nothing can replace the A-10 in terms of versatility for the CAS mission.
To use the Army's premier direct combat helo, the AH-64, as example...
https://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/ah-64.htm
- Speed: Cruise is 145 mph.
- Armament: Up to 16 Hellfire missiles.
- Combat radius: 100 miles or longer with external fuel tanks but reduced armament.
https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104490/a-10-thunderbolt-ii/
- Speed: 450 nautical miles per hour (Mach 0.75)
- Armament: One 30 mm GAU-8/A seven-barrel Gatling gun; up to 16,000 pounds (7,200 kilograms) of mixed ordnance on eight under-wing and three under-fuselage pylon stations, including 500 pound (225 kilograms) Mk-82 and 2,000 pounds (900 kilograms) Mk-84 series low/high drag bombs, incendiary cluster bombs, combined effects munitions, mine dispensing munitions, AGM-65 Maverick missiles and laser-guided/electro-optically guided bombs; infrared countermeasure flares; electronic countermeasure chaff; jammer pods; 2.75-inch (6.99 centimeters) rockets; illumination flares and AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles.
- Combat radius: 300 miles and longer with air refueling.
The -64 is superior to the A-10 when there is a need for 'danger close' fire support. The -64's ability to hover allows for more surgical delivery of missiles and guns.
On the other hand, the A-10's superior speed made it a more desirable platform for responses, either to multiple combat actions in one area or to a combat area outside of the -64's combat radius. Its wings allows greater tonnage and flexibility for armaments.
The AH-64 is a scalpel. The A-10 is a sledge hammer.
As much as the USAF's lower priority for CAS in its budget and conceptual thinking, the USAF really have no credible replacement for the A-10.
- The cannon can be pod mounted, but that design would reduce rounds carried, which would render the A-10's long loiter time practically useless. The cannon has to be installed in the fuselage. The low altitudes mission and closer to ground battles favors semi autonomous weapons which made an onboard radar less important.
- Straight and broad wings made excellent maneuverability while carrying a variety of armaments, as well as reduced runway length. The wing's area enables controlled flight even if half of the wing is lost. The wings' low fuselage location reduces armament loading efforts. Twin vertical stabs increased survivablity because the aircraft can have controlled flight with just one.
- High mounted twin turbofan engines reduce IR visibility. Their locations on the aircraft does not affect rearmament and refuel operations for quick turnaround. The engines can be kept running while rearms and even pilot exchanged.
- Redundancies in vital flight controls and fuel systems increased survivability.
- High cockpit allows pilot view of the combat area in all directions.
Once all the major and minor requirements are summed, the A-10's current design made it difficult to envision an alternative. If the USAF increases the priority level for CAS, it is possible for a new design, but probably the new design would not deviate much from the current A-10. The problem for the Army is that it cannot afford to lose a sledge hammer but the Army does not want to maintain runways and related infrastructures, and the USAF is reluctant to remain in the CAS arena.
The odds of a new CAS platform is low.
