Pakistan's Dilemma with Cellphones as a Militant Tool
STRATFOR
August 24, 2012 | 1015 GMT
Summary
The Pakistan Telecommunication Authority on Aug. 19 ordered mobile phone service providers to temporarily block service in several Pakistani cities, including Lahore, Quetta, Karachi and Multan. Interior Minister Rehman Malik said authorities enacted the ban to disrupt a plot by Pakistani militants to stage attacks on that date, during the Muslim holiday of Eid al-Fitr. Mobile services were intermittently suspended between 8 p.m. on Aug. 19 and 11 a.m. on Aug. 20. After the suspension, Malik said the Subscriber Identification Module card verification system would be strengthened. Fraudulent SIM cards would be banned, Malik said, and pre-paid mobile services should be banned altogether.
Militants in Pakistan have often used fraudulently registered SIM cards to communicate under false identities in order to avoid electronic surveillance by the government. They have even used mobile phones to remotely detonate improvised explosive devices. Malik's call for a strengthened SIM registration system and a ban on pre-paid phones is intended to remove this tool for militants. However, given the extremely widespread use of pre-paid cellphones and the government's inability to effectively control their use, militants will be able to acquire fraudulent SIM cards even if reforms proceed.
Analysis
SIM cards are interchangeable microchips used in some mobile phones to identify a subscriber and provide a telephone number for a phone. While SIM cards can be used in both pre-paid and contract-service mobile phones, Malik's ban, if implemented, would apply only to pre-paid phones. Since pre-paid service is much more cost-effective and does not involve long-term financial obligations, it is a popular choice for mobile phone users in poorer countries such as Pakistan. Pre-paid service is convenient for mobile service providers in developing countries, since it removes the need to enforce payment plans arranged in contracts.
Because SIM cards are easily transferred between phones, mobile service subscribers can switch phones with little effort while maintaining the same mobile service. Most countries, including Pakistan, require SIM cards to be registered or paired to the identity of a user. In order to avoid identification by law enforcement and intelligence agencies during communications, both criminals and militants in Pakistan frequently use SIM cards registered under another identity. Malik has repeatedly called for new measures to reduce the number of fraudulent SIM card registrations, which he claims amount to half of total registered SIM cards in Pakistan; his calls have routinely been ignored by mobile service providers.
Communicating with cellphones registered under a false identity is among the most basic and essential tactical tools for militants operating in Pakistan. Cellphones are used to plan or coordinate many if not most attacks, as seen most recently in the Aug. 16 attack on an air force base in Kamra that Pakistani authorities said was coordinated via cellphones. Militants will therefore continually look for new ways to evade identification by the Pakistani government during communication.
Militants are aware of law enforcement and intelligence agencies' efforts within Pakistan to monitor militant communications and have found several ways to circumvent the government's requirement for properly registering SIM cards. These methods include theft, registering new SIM cards using false documentation and bartering for SIM cards already in use. Along with frequent changes in mobile service providers, these tactics allow militants to continue communicating with one another and complicate the government's efforts to track communications.
For Pakistan, requiring mobile service users to communicate with a phone or SIM card legally registered in their name could allow law enforcement to monitor the communications of known militants much more effectively; but a reform of that magnitude is extremely unlikely. If Malik's estimate is accurate, and half of the SIM cards in use are registered under a false identity, the reform would require mobile service providers to block half their pre-paid consumers -- a significant financial loss for the companies. Additionally, telecommunications are a significant source of government revenue, second only to the energy sector at approximately 120 billion rupees (about $1.2 billion) a year, which means the government would also take a financial hit if it banned pre-paid phones.
Pre-paid mobile phones are far more popular in Pakistan than are contract service phones, even among government and military officials. Because of their prevalence, militants will still be capable of stealing, trading or purchasing already registered SIM cards to coordinate their violent activities against the state, despite any measures taken by mobile service companies or the Pakistani government.