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New offensive launched in Tehsil bara.

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Frontline Pakistan by Ihsanullah Tipu Mehsud | Asian Correspondent
 
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Pakistan Army launches website on IDPs | AAJ News

Pakistan Army launches website on IDPs
By APP

The Pakistan Army has launched its website - South Waziristan Rehabilitation for providing necessary information regarding rehabilitation and developmental process of IDP in the area. According to spokesman of Army, the website would also apprise those Mehsood tribesmen residing abroad, regarding the rehabilitation process, relief operations besides various economic and uplift projects in the area. A special cell has also been established on special directives of Operational Commander, Major General Asim Salim Bajwa to update the website.
 
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Limited Goals, Limited Gains: The Pakistan Army's Operation in Kurram

By Reza Jan, Sam Worby

September 6, 2011


Operation Koh-e-Sufaid in Kurram agency, Pakistan.

INTRODUCTION
On July 4, 2011, the Pakistani military launched its latest offensive against Taliban militants in northwest Pakistan in Kurram, an agency within the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Dubbed Operation Koh-e-Sufaid (White Mountain), the offensive targeted militants in central and lower Kurram with the principal objective of securing and reopening the Thall-Parachinar road, a major thoroughfare through Kurram that had come under repeated attack by Sunni militants, the blocking of which had left Kurram’s Shia population effectively under siege for the last several years.

Pakistani military commanders declared on August 18 that the operation had been successfully completed and the principal objectives attained. While that may be the case, it must be noted that the military operation was limited in its scope, duration and objectives. The area in which operations took place, the size and makeup of the forces involved, the militant organizations targeted, the tactics implemented, and the statements of senior officers and commanders on the ground all attest to the operation’s inherently limited nature. The effective area of operations was no larger than 80 square kilometers and excluded key parts of Kurram agency that have been plagued by militant violence in the past. Only 4,000 troops, supported by heavy artillery, armor units and airpower, participated in the operation.[1] The military expected the operation to last less than two months and, from the very beginning, stated that its primary objective was to secure and open the Thall-Parachinar road—not to take on the variety of militant groups that hold sway in the region.[2] Indeed, the military almost exclusively targeted one militant group, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), to the exclusion of others that are known to have a presence in the area.

Furthermore, although the completion of the operation may bring some respite to Kurram’s population, it may also have negative externalities for long-term stability for Pakistan and for operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan if its gains are not followed up on. This primer will discuss and analyze the forces used in the operation, the groups targeted, the form the operation took, the mass displacement of Kurram residents, and the operation’s implications for the war in Afghanistan and for the larger fight against militancy in Pakistan.

THE BUILDUP TO HOSTILITIES
Kurram agency has suffered a world of misfortune at the hands of militants since 2007. Located between the FATA’s North Waziristan and Khyber agencies, the agency has a “parrot’s beak” shape that protrudes deep into Afghanistan, giving it a strategic importance that has been taken advantage of by guerrilla fighters for decades.[3] The Thall-Parachinar road running through the length of the Kurram river valley provides the shortest transit route between any point in Pakistan and Afghanistan’s capital, Kabul. During the Soviet-Afghan war of the 1980s, Kurram served as a key safe haven for, and launching pad for attacks by, the anti-Soviet mujahideen fighters.[4]

Kurram is also home to a significant Shia population: of the agency’s 500,000 inhabitants, around 40 percent are Shia, mostly concentrated in upper Kurram.[5] While Shia tribes there have periodically clashed with Sunni tribes from Sunni-dominated central and lower Kurram, conflicts were usually limited in intensity and short-lived.[6] Since 2007, however, the amplification of the anti-state Taliban insurgency inside Pakistan, and an influx of Taliban militants and anti-Shia militant groups into the region, impregnated ongoing Sunni-Shia strife with a virulence that begat a state of civil war between Shia tribesmen and militant-backed Sunni tribesmen in much of the agency.[7] The militant problem was exacerbated when TTP militants, fleeing Pakistani military operations in their traditional safe havens in Swat and South Waziristan, joined their affiliates based in Kurram and neighboring Orakzai agencies.[8] Sunni militants blocked the Thall-Parachinar road, the only significant artery allowing Shias in upper Kurram to reach the rest of the country, essentially besieging the Shias. Shia tribesmen were frequently forced to undertake long, arduous and perilous journeys into and through Afghanistan in order to reach other parts of Pakistan.[9] Previous attempts at peace deals between the Sunnis and Shias failed to hold, and limited attempts by the Pakistani military to target militants in the agency remained ineffective in lifting the state of siege for any appreciable amount of time.[10]

In February 2011, however, a new peace deal was signed between Sunni and Shia tribesmen. This latest treaty held particular promise because it had been mediated by the al Qaeda-affiliated and Afghanistan-focused Haqqani Network and promised to bring on board spoiler groups like the TTP.[11] Ever since the intensification of the U.S. drone campaign in North Waziristan and Special Operations Forces activity in traditional areas of Haqqani dominance in neighboring Afghanistan, the Haqqani Network had been searching for a new safe haven inside Pakistan and unobstructed transit routes into Afghanistan and, in particular, to Kabul. Kurram made eminent strategic sense. While Shia tribesmen had refused access to the Haqqanis for several years, by 2011, conditions had changed: Worn down by constant fighting, the siege of the Thall-Parachinar road, and the perception that the Pakistani government was not particularly serious in solving the problem, the Shias acquiesced to a Haqqani-brokered deal that gave the network access to and transit through Shia areas into Afghanistan in exchange for peace with Sunni tribesmen and a guarantee that the Thall-Parachinar road would be opened to unimpeded traffic.[12]

The deal held for over a month until, on March 25, TTP militants ambushed a Shia convoy near Baggan, killing 13 people and taking hostage as many as 45 more.[13] Continued attacks, and a failure to mediate for the hostages’ release or the prevention of future attacks brought the deal into abeyance. Fazal Saeed, a local TTP commander in Kurram agency loyal to TTP leader Hakimullah Mehsud, likely carried out the attack.[14] While the attack contradicted Saeed’s previous promises to personally observe and enforce the peace treaty, he, like Hakimullah, is strongly anti-Shia and likely had the backing of the TTP leadership.[15] Prior to his ascension to the TTP leadership, Hakimullah cut his teeth in the organization by demonstrating his brutality against Kurram’s Shias during his time as the TTP’s main commander in Kurram. The TTP has frequently played the role of a spoiler group in the agency’s peace negotiations.

The sullying of the deal played to the disadvantage of both the Pakistani state and the Haqqani Network, to mention nothing of the beleaguered Shias. The government was once again assailed with accusations of indifference to the plight of the Shias and of failing to exercise control over its territory. The Haqqanis saw their hard-won agreement with the Shias slowly unraveling. Increasingly severe urgings by the operational head of the Haqqani Network, Sirajuddin Haqqani, to Hakimullah to desist from attacking the Shias failed to have an effect and exacerbated what appeared to be a growing rift between the TTP and Haqqani Network.[16] By May, the Pakistani government had resolved to launch a military operation into Kurram to open the road and to flush out militants not adhering to the peace deal.[17] Negotiations between Fazal Saeed’s group and the Haqqani Network, possibly involving the Pakistani government, were almost certainly underway; on June 27, days before the military was to swing into action, Saeed announced his defection from the TTP and the formation of his own group, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Islami Pakistan (TTIP).[18] He promised to adhere to the February 2011 peace deal and foreswore attacks on the Pakistani state.[19]

Saeed is closely linked to the Haqqani Network, and his disassociation from the TTP may have been an effort to emphasize the distinction between the two groups before the operation.[20] In his announcement, Saeed claimed that he disagreed with the TTP’s use of “suicide attacks against mosques, markets and other civilian targets” and preferred a focus on combating the U.S. and NATO presence in Afghanistan—an stance more in line with the Haqqanis than the TTP.[21] Saeed even recently began referring to himself as Fazal Saeed “Haqqani,” a practice common among graduates of the infamous Dar-ul-Uloom Haqqania madrassa in Akora Khattak.[22] Moreover, in praising the truce, Saeed, a native of Kurram, was aligning himself with the Haqqani Network and the Pakistani government, both of whom value stability in the agency.[23]

His defection also brought the TTIP into line with several other militant groups in the FATA, such as those of Maulvi Nazir in South Waziristan and Hafiz Gul Bahadur in North Waziristan, both of which cut deals with the Pakistani military prior to the launch of a major operation against the TTP in South Waziristan in 2009.[24] Such groups are allowed to exercise influence in their own areas and launch attacks on NATO forces in Afghanistan unmolested by the army so long as they do not participate in attacks against the state.

On July 4, Pakistani troops advanced against and engaged TTP militants in the start of Operation Koh-e-Sufaid.

COMBATANTS
BLUE FORCES: About 4,000 troops were involved in the prosecution of the operation in Kurram.[25] This number is slightly smaller than that of the force used in the offensive to clear neighboring Orakzai agency in 2010. The Orakzai agency operation, headed by the paramilitary Frontier Corps (FC), was itself an economy of force operation to begin with.

The forces involved include battalions cannibalized from two to three army brigades in the region.[26] While the battalions came from different parent brigades, they operated as part of XI Corps (Peshawar) under a unified command for the purposes of the operation.[27] So far, infantry battalions from the Frontier Force regiment, the Northern Light Infantry, the Punjab Regiment and the Sindh Regiment are all known to have been involved in various aspects of the operation.[28] The army units are supported by several wings of the FC, including the Thall Scouts and Kurram Militia, which have their headquarters in the region, as well as reinforcements brought in from Khyber Rifles, Chitral Scouts and Dir Scouts.[29] The infantry forces are supported by heavy artillery batteries, armor units, Cobra gunship helicopters, Mi-17 heavy-lift helicopters, and, reportedly, close air support from Pakistan Air Force (PAF) jets when required.[30]

Later in the operation, local tribal militias known as lashkars, primarily from the Masuzai tribe of central Kurram, also participated in the fight against the TTP. These lashkars battled militants chiefly in the Masuzai and Neka Ziarat areas, although they operated largely independent of the military.

RED FORCES: A number of militant groups operate in Kurram Agency. In addition to the aforementioned TTP, TTIP, and Haqqani Network, other groups, such as Sipah-e-Sahab Pakistan (SSP), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), are also present in the region.[31] The SSP, LeJ and JeM, all Sunni militant groups, have been involved in anti-Shia violence in Kurram throughout the past several years.[32]

The military operation, however, primarily targeted the TTP with the intention of securing the Parachinar-Thall road.[33] The TTP and Sunni militants affiliated with the TTP have been the biggest violators of the Haqqani Network-facilitated Sunni-Shia truce. Moreover, unlike the Haqqani Network, the TTP opposes and carries out attacks against the Pakistani state, making them a far less complicated target for the Pakistani government to engage.[34]

According to “official estimates” by government forces, there were only a limited number of enemy forces present in the area. Only 600 militants were believed to be present at the start of the operation, including 250 fighters local to Kurram and “dozens” of foreign fighters including Arabs, Uzbeks, Chechens and others, some of whom were reportedly disguising themselves in army and FC uniforms.[35] The main TTP factions in Kurram are those under the command of Maulvi Noor Jamal, also known as Mullah Toofan, and Tariq Afridi, both senior commanders in the TTP.[36] A new commander reportedly appointed by the TTP to replace Fazal Saeed, Maulana Zahir, is also likely to have commanded enemy forces in the agency.[37] Both Toofan and Afridi moved their operations to Kurram and some parts of upper Orakzai after being squeezed out of their traditional strongholds in Darra Adam Khel and other areas of neighboring Orakzai.[38]

Fazal Saeed’s break from the TTP at the eleventh hour weakened the enemy fighting force. It not only allowed the Pakistani military to narrow its operational goals but also robbed the TTP of close to 800 additional fighters that would have faced off against the army.[39] Previous operations in the FATA have usually faced much greater concentrations of enemy strength. Even in the limited operation in Orakzai in 2010, between 2,000 and 2,500 enemy fighters were reported killed by the end of hostilities, far more than the military believed it would face in Kurram at the start of Operation Koh-e-Sufiad.[40]

THE OFFENSIVE
Central and lower Kurram agency consist of two major valleys, both running northwest to southeast, linking up near the town of Sadda before running jointly on to Parachinar in upper Kurram. The western branch of the valley is more heavily populated and hosts the central and lower Kurram portions of the Thall-Parachinar road. The offensive appears to be limited mostly to the eastern branch of the valley between Sadda in the northwest and Tora Warai in the southeast. According to Pakistani military sources, this eastern branch has been the center of TTP activity and housed the main TTP supply depots and command and control centers.[41]

The operation officially began on July 4, although PAF strike aircraft had starting bombing TTP positions in the valley on June 24.[42] According to Brigadier Basharat Ahmed, the sector commander for forces in the southwest and the officer in overall command of the operation, the offensive was launched from five separate directions.[43] It appears, however, that most of the kinetic activity took place over two main axes of advance: the first heading southeast from Sadda through the Ali Sherzai tribal area of the valley, and the second moving northwest up the valley from Tora Warai in Hangu district with the intention of linking up with the opposing pincer.

The operation commenced with infantry battalions from the Sindh regiment (SR) and the Northern Light Infantry (NLI), a specialized mountain warfare unit, advancing from Sadda in central Kurram eastwards into the Ali Sherzai tribal area and the entrance to main valley system.[44] The Ali Sherzai area in particular served as a haven for a number of TTP militants. Geographically, it not only allowed them to easily cross back and forth between havens in Orakzai and Khyber, but also gave them easy access into central Kurram from where they were able to threaten the Thall-Parachinar road.

Troops advanced under the cover of gunship helicopters and artillery batteries based in Sadda.[45] Units reported little enemy resistance and were able to quickly take several TTP command centers, including Gawakai, Murghan and Manatu.[46] Soldiers moved into and cleared a number of government buildings, schools and healthcare facilities that militants had used for accommodation, ammunition storage, training facilities and private prisons.[47] According to locals, some of the towns taken in central Kurram had not seen the presence of Pakistani troops for over four years.[48] Manatu, the main Taliban command and control hub in the valley, was the only town where any notable Taliban resistance was encountered. On July 6, as many as 40 TTP militants died in fierce clashes that also left two soldiers injured.[49] After these early gains, the SR and NLI battalions moved eastwards in an attempt to link up with forces advancing from Tora Warai. By July 13, the pincer had reached Mandan.[50] By July 24, forces were “days” away from linking up with units that had advanced from the southeast and were now in Dumbakai and Sper Kot.[51]

The units operating in the south and southeast include the 42 FF (42nd Battalion, Frontier Force Regiment), the 42 PR (42nd Battalion, Punjab Regiment), and the FC’s Kurram Militia and Thall Scouts. These units were supported by tanks and heavy artillery including a 155mm battery part of the 72nd MED, an artillery unit based near Tora Warai.[52] Troops in this sector advanced from the direction of Tora Warai westwards up the valley, battling Taliban resistance along the way. Forces advanced up to and took TTP locations in Khalwat, Pungai, Kurt and Dumbakai, a major TTP command center, by July 6.[53] 42 PR, operating further south and west of the main assault force, captured a major TTP stronghold in Tanna.[54] 42 FF made a push to secure the Sper Kot ridge on the valley’s northern wall, near the border with upper Orakzai. According to the colonel in command of the force, securing the ridge would allow the military to sever or severely degrade the Taliban’s ability to traverse south from Orakzai through Kurram towards the Thall-Parachinar road and then south to North Waziristan.[55] By securing the sector, the colonel argued, the Taliban would be forced to rely on moving on foot and using small trails as opposed to being able to use vehicles to move rapidly and in large numbers.[56] One of the drawbacks to this approach is that the Pakistani military, in order to secure such heights, tends to establish semi-permanent outposts at the top of strategic features. These outposts are static and require frequent resupply. This task is made more difficult by the fact that transport helicopters have come under Taliban attack and the resupply of these outposts require effort-intensive means, such as ground forces moving up the mountain.[57]

In a positive development for the operation, about two weeks into the offensive, reports emerged of local lashkars participating in the fight against militants.[58] Tribesmen, primarily from the Masuzai tribe, formed a lashkar that began operating primarily in the Masuzai and Neka Ziarat areas and was on several occasions involved in large clashes with militants. The involvement of lashkars in the fight against the Taliban is one of the most important steps in inoculating an area to a Taliban re-infiltration. That the Masuzai, a Sunni tribe, chose to take up arms against the Taliban is significant, as the Taliban have previously co-opted or coerced Kurram’s Sunni tribes into attacking Shias.[59]

Pakistani military movement from the southeast was much slower and more calculated than the rapid advance seen from the northwest.[60] Few major clashes occurred over the course of the operation.[61] Most engagements appear to have taken place over long distances with troops, travelling in convoys, coming under frequent sniper and rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) attack. The army tended to return fire at enemy combatants over long ranges using artillery and armor.[62] TTP militants used harassing tactics, using fighters at distances of up to 500 meters from each other taking potshots at advancing forces before diving back into hideouts in caves. According to one soldier, troops were under orders not to pursue militants fleeing into mountain caves as they had previously faced difficulties and suffered casualties trying to clear them.[63]

For their part, the Taliban do not appear to have presented battle in any serious manner during the campaign. Many fighters simply harassed oncoming troops with long-range fire before melting away. According to locals, most of the militants had fled the area well before the operation had started, moving to safe havens in neighboring Orakzai or Khyber agencies.[64] Taliban resistance in Kurram appeared to be a rearguard action, at best. Enemy forces have likely learnt from the experiences of previous operations such as those in Swat and South Waziristan that concerted resistance to conventional assaults can only be upheld for a limited period and at very high cost. The ability to steal away to safe havens in neighboring agencies also makes resistance an unattractive option. Only around 200 militants were killed by the end of the campaign, with a fifth of those casualties occurring in a single battle in Manatu.[65]

By August 18, Pakistani officials declared the operation complete, much earlier than the end-of-the-month termination date initially floated by Corps Commander Peshawar Lt. Gen. Asif Yasin Malik.[66] The army declared victory and stated that it had succeeded in eliminating enemy positions in the agency and that it had secured the Thall-Parachinar road. Interestingly, while the ultimate objective of the operation was, ostensibly, to open the Thall-Parachinar road, no operations took place in or around the areas lining much of the road. While forces had been operating near Sadda in central Kurram, there have been no reports of troop movement or clashes with militants anywhere near the road in lower Kurram, including in Baggan, the area where militant groups originally launched attacks on Shia convoys in violation of the February peace deal.

One possibility for this is that Taliban militants either abandoned or never maintained permanent positions in the towns and villages along the road and relied on their strongholds in the eastern valley as bases from which to temporarily erect checkpoints along, and raid vehicles on, the Thall-Parachinar road. The more likely explanation is that the road in question, particularly in lower Kurram, runs through areas in the grip of Fazal Saeed’s TTIP militant faction which split off from the TTP days before the launch of the operation and pledged to adhere to the Kurram peace deal.[67] Given the narrow objectives of the operation—to open and secure movement along the main road—this factor would have made it easy for the military to exclude the TTIP from its list of targets.[68] Whether ignoring Saeed’s group jeopardizes the long-term success of the operation remains to be seen, but the prognosis is not encouraging: the operation’s success now hinges upon the continued good behavior of the TTIP. Guaranteeing such good behavior will be difficult given that Saeed was responsible for the initial violation of the February peace deal, despite earlier avowals that his group would adhere to, and help enforce, the terms of the agreement. For now, only FC-escorted traffic has been authorized for travel along the road.[69]



INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDPs)
Even before hostilities commenced in Kurram, locals began fleeing areas expected to come under attack.[70] At the onset of the operation, Arshad Khan, Director General of the FATA Disaster Management Authority (FDMA), estimated that 8,000 to 12,000 families could be displaced, but this number turned out to be closer to 21,000.[71] As of July 27, the operation in Kurram had displaced around 100,000 residents of the agency, nearly one-fourth of the agency’s population.[72] The number far exceeded Pakistani government expectations and led to shortages of relief materials for the IDPs.[73]

IDP flows to relief camps varied depending on where families were fleeing from. The majority of IDPs who ended up in camps went to the New Durrani IDP camp, located approximately 2.5 miles from Sadda, and likely fled areas in the upper sections of the eastern Kurram valley, such as Murghan, Manatu and the Ali Sherzai area.[74] Those in the lower valley, including large numbers fleeing fighting near Kurt, Khalwat, Dumbakai and Dand, escaped across the border to adjacent Hangu district, where they took up residence in smaller camps in Togh Sarai, Tora Warai, Doaba, Naryab and Darsamand.[75] The vast majority of IDPs, however, did not flee to a camp but stayed with relatives in Sadda or Hangu.[76]

The FDMA expected that near 4,000 families would take refuge in the New Durrani Camp.[77] As of July 31, 2,500 families and 12,736 total individuals, including 5,981 under 12-years-old, had arrived at the New Durrani camp where 2,900 tents had been provided with only 2,185 being used.[78]

Worryingly, UN and international aid workers reported being barred by the Pakistani government from entering some relief camps in upper Kurram due to safety concerns following reports that militants had infiltrated the camps and were hiding among IDPs.[79] Many IDPs complained that “the same militants who used to terrorize them are now living with them inside the camp.”[80] The operation’s skeptics argue that the humanitarian crisis brought on by the operation has enabled militants to hide among the IDPs and allowed them to escape being targeted by U.S. drones.[81]

With the conclusion of the operation, the FDMA announced that phased IDP repatriation would begin on August 25, with the first phase involving the return of some 700 families, and that the UN would assist with transport and relief supplies.[82] How long it will take to repatriate all of Kurram’s displaced remains to be seen, and the speed of the repatriation will have a critical effect on the long-term success of the operation.

LESSONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The latest operation in Kurram proves instructive on several counts. First, it provides observers with an idea of the kind of force and tactics the Pakistani military believed would be necessary to employ against an enemy of defined strength over a certain size of battlespace. The military employed a brigade-strength infantry force infused with armor units and supplemented by gunship helicopters, artillery and fixed-wing close air support against an estimated enemy strength of 600 fighters spread out over 80 square kilometers and hiding in a mix of semi-urban and mountainous environments.[83]

Second, the operation is enlightening in that it highlights the fact that TTP militants increasingly refuse to present battle against conventional forces. Large numbers of militants fled well before the operation commenced. Fazal Saeed’s forces made peace with the government once the launch of an operation seemed inevitable. Even those that stayed mainly seemed to engage oncoming forces from a distance, and in small numbers.[84] Militants positioned at great distances from each other made frequent use of caves in order to take intermittent shots at soldiers before returning to cover, possibly under the assumption that the military was unlikely to go to the trouble of assaulting such positions to kill individual fighters.

As a result, only a fraction of the militants who originally afflicted the affected area were killed. Most of them were able to flee to alternative safe havens. In order to make military gains permanent in such circumstances, the army will need to take further action. It will need to infuse the area with a larger force and maintain overwatch for a significant amount of time in order to prevent militant re-infiltration, and/or it will need to rapidly repatriate the IDP population and convince it to cooperate with government forces in either taking on militants themselves, or providing intelligence against them. In this respect, the military has had more success in some places than in others. While such an approach proved fairly successful in the Swat valley, the military is still having trouble fully repatriating IDPs from South Waziristan and getting them to agree to the idea of assisting them in the fight against militants in their areas.[85] A drawn-out repatriation process could further disaffect tribes impacted by the operation from the Pakistani government.

CONCLUSION
In a narrow sense, the military’s operation in Kurram was successful. The operation: fulfilled the popular demand for action against those elements that were violating the February 2011 peace deal; eliminated TTP strongholds that threatened the Thall-Parachinar road; disrupted a frequently traveled route that allowed militant fighters to easily and quickly traverse between Orakzai and Khyber agencies and North Waziristan agency; strong-armed Fazal Saeed and his new TTIP into discontinuing attacks upon Shia travelers on the road; and created the conditions for the reopening of traffic along the Thall-Parachinar route, the key demand from Kurram locals.

Yet the manner in which the above was achieved has opened the door to a number of negative externalities, both for Pakistan and for stability in Afghanistan. While the army may have reinstated the peace deal, choosing not to take on Fazal Saeed’s fighters in Kurram may have jeopardized the deal’s longevity. Whether or not the deal holds is now entirely dependent on the good behavior of Fazal Saeed and the TTIP, of which there can be no guarantee—unless the military is ready to undertake a second, larger operation should the TTIP violate the deal’s terms again. Furthermore, the government and military have allowed the TTIP to essentially govern in those spaces where it holds sway, undermining the writ of the government, and have done nothing to prevent the TTIP from operating freely against American and coalition forces in Afghanistan.

The successful reinstatement of the peace deal, while a boon for Kurram’s population, particularly its Shias, will also significantly strengthen the position of the Haqqani Network. The Haqqanis will regain their ability to use Shia areas of Kurram to reach deep inside Afghanistan and will continue to enjoy the use of a new safe haven outside of their main strongholds in North Waziristan. As a result, targeting the Haqqanis using drone aircraft inside Pakistan will be more difficult, and the network will have increased operational capabilities and, ultimately, deadliness inside Afghanistan. The TTP’s loss, in this case, also turns out to be the Haqqani Network’s gain: while the defection of Fazal Saeed’s group will cause some weakening of the TTP, the increased cooperation between the Haqqanis and the TTIP increases the Haqqanis’ influence in Kurram agency and gives them an ally in Kurram akin to the one they have with Hafiz Gul Bahadur in North Waziristan. Any strengthening of the Haqqani Network—already Afghanistan’s deadliest insurgent group—is likely to impact long-term stability on both sides of the border. The group is closely affiliated with, cooperates with and supports al Qaeda and other Pakistani militant groups that consider the Pakistani state to be a legitimate target. While the Haqqani Network and the TTP may occasionally quarrel over specific issues, they are, by and large, mutually accommodating and frequently share the same havens, facilities and operatives. Distinctions between the myriad groups are superficial at best and delusional at worst; to strengthen one in the hope of weakening another is to leave the enemy at overall par strength.

On balance, the operation in Kurram, while a tactical success, aimed to gather the low-hanging fruit—only a small part of a larger enemy was targeted in a sliver of territory. Whether or not Operation Koh-e-Sufaid proved decisive in bringing long-term peace to Kurram agency will be borne out by time. What is clear, however, is that the operation does not seem to have been a significant contribution to the overall fight against militancy in the FATA. While residents of Kurram may enjoy the short-term benefits of the operation’s tactical successes, its shortcomings expose the larger war effort against militants and militancy in the FATA, Pakistan, and Afghanistan to some dangerous long-term consequences.


[1] Author’s interview with Pakistani military sources
Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Army ends operation in Central Kurram,” Dawn, August 19, 2011. Available at Army ends operation in Central Kurram | DAWN.COM
[2] Expected end date was pre-eid
Urdu TV report, “Operation Koh e Sufaid,” Dunya News, uploaded to Youtube on July 15, 2011. Available at Operation Koh e Sufaid - YouTube
“Special report: The battle for Kurram Agency,” Express News, uploaded to Youtube on July 24, 2011. Available at Special report: The battle for Kurram Agency - YouTube
[3] Reza Jan and Jeffrey Dressler, “The Haqqani Network in Kurram: The Regional Implications of a Growing Insurgency,” The Critical Threats Project and the Insititute for the Study of War, May 9, 2011. Available at http://www.criticalthreats.org/site...am_Agency_-_Reza_Jan_-_Jeffrey_Dressler_0.pdf
[4] Ibid
[5] This figure is according to a 1998 census, the last officially conducted census in Pakistan. Actual figures are likely much higher.
The Jamestown Foundation: U.S. Places Two Pakistani Charities on Terrorism Watch List[tt_news]=34730&cHash=b0060e4fc9
[6] Reza Jan and Jeffrey Dressler, “The Haqqani Network in Kurram: The Regional Implications of a Growing Insurgency,” The Critical Threats Project and the Insititute for the Study of War, May 9, 2011. Available at http://www.criticalthreats.org/site...am_Agency_-_Reza_Jan_-_Jeffrey_Dressler_0.pdf
[7] Ibid
[8] Ibid
[9] Ibid
[10] Ibid
[11] Ibid
[12] Ibid
[13] “13 killed in Kurram attack on minibus,” Daily Times, March 26, 2011. Available at Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan
[14] Jeffrey Dressler, “Pakistan’s Kurram Offensive: Implications for Afghanistan,” Institute for the Study of War, August 18, 2011. Available at Pakistan's Kurram Offensive-Implications for Afghanistan | Institute for the Study of War
[15] “Taliban welcome Kurram truce,” Dawn, February 8, 2011. Available at Taliban welcome Kurram truce | DAWN.COM
Jeffrey Dressler, “Pakistan’s Kurram Offensive: Implications for Afghanistan,” Institute for the Study of War, August 18, 2011. Available at Pakistan's Kurram Offensive-Implications for Afghanistan | Institute for the Study of War
[16] Zia Khan, “Kurram Agency: Haqqani warns Hakimullah not to sabotage peace deal,” Express Tribune, May 2, 2011. Available at >Kurram Agency: Haqqani warns Hakimullah not to
[17] “Army hints at operation in Kurram agency,” Dawn, May 20, 2011. Available at Army hints at operation in Kurram Agency | DAWN.COM
[18] “Taliban commander Fazal Saeed leaves TTP,” Dawn, June 27, 2011. Available at
Taliban commander Fazal Saeed leaves TTP | DAWN.COM
[19] “Taliban commander Fazal Saeed leaves TTP,” Dawn, June 27, 2011. Available at
Taliban commander Fazal Saeed leaves TTP | DAWN.COM
Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Rebel TTP commander claims his groups is getting offers of support,” The News, June 30, 2011. Available at Rebel TTP commander claims his group is getting offers of support - thenews.com.pk
[20] “Kurram: Operation Eyewash in Pakistan,” SATP, August 2, 2011. Available at
Kurram: Operation Eyewash In Pakistan - Analysis Eurasia Review
[21] “Taliban commander Fazal Saeed leaves TTP,” AFP, June 27, 2011. Available at Taliban commander Fazal Saeed leaves TTP | DAWN.COM
[22] Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Rebel TTP commander claims his groups is getting offers of support,” The News, June 30, 2011. Available at Rebel TTP commander claims his group is getting offers of support - thenews.com.pk
“The sham operation in Kurram,” Daily Times, July 7, 2011. Available at
Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan
[23] “The Significance of Fazal Saeed’s Defection from the Pakistani Taliban,” CTC, July 1, 2011. Available at
The Significance of Fazal Saeed
[24] Jane Perlez, “Pakistan Finds Local Allies Against Ferocious Foe,” New York Times, October 20, 2009. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/21/world/asia/21waziristan.html
[25] Author’s interview with Pakistani military sources
[26] Ibid
[27] Ibid
[28] Ibid
Urdu TV report, “Operation Koh e Sufaid,” Dunya News, uploaded to Youtube on July 15, 2011. Available at Operation Koh e Sufaid - YouTube
“Special report: The battle for Kurram Agency,” Express News, uploaded to Youtube on July 24, 2011. Available at Special report: The battle for Kurram Agency - YouTube
Urdu TV news, “Frontline Report on Kurram Operation Zahir Sherazi,” Dawn News, uploaded to Youtube July 13, 2011. Available at Frontline Report on Kurram Operation Zahir Sherazi - YouTube
[29] Author’s interview with Pakistani military sources
[30] Author’s interview with Pakistani military sources
Urdu TV report, “Operation Koh e Sufaid,” Dunya News, uploaded to Youtube on July 15, 2011. Available at Operation Koh e Sufaid - YouTube
“Special report: The battle for Kurram Agency,” Express News, uploaded to Youtube on July 24, 2011. Available at Special report: The battle for Kurram Agency - YouTube
Urdu TV news, “Frontline Report on Kurram Operation Zahir Sherazi,” Dawn News, uploaded to Youtube July 13, 2011. Available at Frontline Report on Kurram Operation Zahir Sherazi - YouTube
[31] Reza Jan and Jeffrey Dressler, “The Haqqani Network in Kurram: The Regional Implications of a Growing Insurgency,” The Critical Threats Project and the Insititute for the Study of War, May 9, 2011. Available at http://www.criticalthreats.org/site...am_Agency_-_Reza_Jan_-_Jeffrey_Dressler_0.pdf
[32] Ibid
[33] The operation targeted areas known to house TTP operatives in central Kurram. Areas known to be under the control of TTIP forces and where the Haqqani Network is suspected of sheltering were not targeted in the operation.
Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Army ends operation in Central Kurram,” Dawn, August 19, 2011. Available at Army ends operation in Central Kurram | DAWN.COM
[34] “Bibhu Prasad Routray: Skewed objectives and inherent operational failure in Pakistan’s Kurram Agency,” Al Arabiya, July 6, 2011. Available at Bibhu Prasad Routray: Skewed objectives and inherent operational failure in Pakistan
[35] Pakistan launches offensive in restive Kurram tribal region - Home » Other Sections » Breaking News
“Special report: The battle for Kurram Agency,” Express News, uploaded to Youtube on July 24, 2011. Available at Special report: The battle for Kurram Agency - YouTube
[36] Mullah Toofan and Tariq Afridi operate between Kurram and upper Orakzai, where much of their infrastructure is still based.
Zia Khan, “Averting a doomsday scenario,” Express Tribune, October 27, 2010. Available at Averting a doomsday scenario – The Express Tribune
Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Rebel TTP commander claims his groups is getting offers of support,” The News, June 30, 2011. Available at Rebel TTP commander claims his group is getting offers of support - thenews.com.pk
[37] Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Rebel TTP commander claims his groups is getting offers of support,” The News, June 30, 2011. Available at Rebel TTP commander claims his group is getting offers of support - thenews.com.pk
[38] Zia Khan, “Averting a doomsday scenario,” Express Tribune, October 27, 2010. Available at Averting a doomsday scenario – The Express Tribune
[39] Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Rebel TTP commander claims his groups is getting offers of support,” The News, June 30, 2011. Available at Rebel TTP commander claims his group is getting offers of support - thenews.com.pk
[40] Reza Jan, Nicholas Patella and Benjamin Shultz, “Daily Tracker: Pakistani Military Operations in Orakzai,” Critical Threats Project, May 13, 2011. Available at Daily Tracker: Pakistani Military Operations in Orakzai | Critical Threats
[41] Author’s interview with Pakistani military sources
“Special report: The battle for Kurram Agency,” Express News, uploaded to Youtube on July 24, 2011. Available at Special report: The battle for Kurram Agency - YouTube
Urdu TV report, “Operation Koh e Sufaid,” Dunya News, uploaded to Youtube on July 15, 2011. Available at Operation Koh e Sufaid - YouTube
[42] “Nine militants killed in Kurram raid,” Dawn, June 25, 2011. Available at Nine militants killed in Kurram raid | DAWN.COM
[43] “Special report: The battle for Kurram Agency,” Express News, uploaded to Youtube on July 24, 2011. Available at Special report: The battle for Kurram Agency - YouTube
[44] Urdu TV news, “Frontline Report on Kurram Operation Zahir Sherazi,” Dawn News, uploaded to Youtube July 13, 2011. Available at Frontline Report on Kurram Operation Zahir Sherazi - YouTube
Author’s interview with Pakistani military sources
[45] Author’s interview with Pakistani military sources
Urdu TV news, “Frontline Report on Kurram Operation Zahir Sherazi,” Dawn News, uploaded to Youtube July 13, 2011. Available at Frontline Report on Kurram Operation Zahir Sherazi - YouTube
[46] Ali Afzaal and Mushtaq Yusufzai, “Forces enter militant strongholds in Kurram,” The News, July 5, 2011. Available at Forces enter militant strongholds in Kurram - thenews.com.pk
[47] Ibid
[48] Ibid
[49] Iqbal Hussain, “35 militants killed in nKurram clash,” The News, July 7, 2011. Available at 35 militants killed in Kurram clash - thenews.com.pk
[50] Urdu TV news, “Frontline Report on Kurram Operation Zahir Sherazi,” Dawn News, uploaded to Youtube July 13, 2011. Available at Frontline Report on Kurram Operation Zahir Sherazi - YouTube
[51] “Special report: The battle for Kurram Agency,” Express News, uploaded to Youtube on July 24, 2011. Available at Special report: The battle for Kurram Agency - YouTube
[52] Author’s interview with Pakistani military sources
“Special report: The battle for Kurram Agency,” Express News, uploaded to Youtube on July 24, 2011. Available at Special report: The battle for Kurram Agency - YouTube
[53] Iqbal Hussain, “35 militants killed in nKurram clash,” The News, July 7, 2011. Available at 35 militants killed in Kurram clash - thenews.com.pk
[54] Author’s interview with Pakistani military sources
“Special report: The battle for Kurram Agency,” Express News, uploaded to Youtube on July 24, 2011. Available at Special report: The battle for Kurram Agency - YouTube
[55] Ibid
[56] Ibid
[57] Ibid
[58] “Tribesmen kill six militants in Kurram,” Dawn, July 21, 2011. Available at Tribesmen kill six militants in Kurram | DAWN.COM
“At least 20 militants killed in central Kurram,” Dawn, July 23, 2011. Available at At least 20 militants killed in central Kurram | DAWN.COM
[59] Imtiaz Gul, The Most Dangerous Place: Pakistan's Lawless Frontier (June 10, 2010).
[60] Based on news reports of military advances, the northwest pincer was appeared to be covering ground more rapidly than its southeastern counterpart.
[61] Tom Hussain, “Elite Pakistani troops move into Taliban mountain stronghold,” The National, July 6, 2011. Available at Full: Elite Pakistani troops move into Taliban mountain stronghold - The National
[62] “Special report: The battle for Kurram Agency,” Express News, uploaded to Youtube on July 24, 2011. Available at Special report: The battle for Kurram Agency - YouTube
[63] Ibid
[64] Tom Hussain, “Elite Pakistani troops move into Taliban mountain stronghold,” The National, July 6, 2011. Available at Full: Elite Pakistani troops move into Taliban mountain stronghold - The National
[65] Zulfiqar Ali, “Return of Kurram IDPs from Aug 25,” Dawn, August 18, 2011. Available at Return of Kurram IDPs from Aug 25 | DAWN.COM
“40 militants killed in Kurram clashes,” Geo News, July 7, 2011. Available at 40 militants killed in Kurram clashes - GEO.tv
Iqbal Hussain, “35 militants killed in nKurram clash,” The News, July 7, 2011. Available at 35 militants killed in Kurram clash - thenews.com.pk
[66] Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Army ends operation in Central Kurram,” Dawn, August 19, 2011. Available at Army ends operation in Central Kurram | DAWN.COM
Urdu TV report, “Operation Koh e Sufaid,” Dunya News, uploaded to Youtube on July 15, 2011. Available at Operation Koh e Sufaid - YouTube
[67] Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Army ends operation in Central Kurram,” Dawn, August 19, 2011. Available at Army ends operation in Central Kurram | DAWN.COM
[68] Ibid
[69] Ibid
[70] “More than 1,000 families flee Pakistan fighting,” AFP, July 4, 2011. Available at
AFP: More than 1,000 families flee Pakistan fighting
Return of Kurram IDPs from Aug 25 | DAWN.COM
[71] Ibid
[72] “Up to 100,000 flee Kurram offensive,” AFP, July 27, 2011. Available at
Up to 100,000 flee Kurram offensive | DAWN.COM
The population of Kurram was 448, 310 as of 1998 (latest count). See “Population Demography,” Available at Population Demography
[73] “Up to 100,000 flee Kurram offensive,” AFP, July 27, 2011. Available at
Up to 100,000 flee Kurram offensive | DAWN.COM
[74] Zulfiqar Ali, “Return of Kurram IDPs from Aug 25,” Dawn, August 18, 2011. Available at Return of Kurram IDPs from Aug 25 | DAWN.COM
[75] Zahir Shah, “Manato in Kurram Agency falls to Pakistan army,” Central Asia Online, July 14, 2011. Available at Manato in Kurram Agency falls to Pakistan Army - Central Asia Online
“40 militants killed in Kurram clashes,” The News, July 7, 2011. Available at 40 militants killed in Kurram clashes - thenews.com.pk
[76] “More than 1,000 families flee Pakistan fighting,” AFP, July 4, 2011. Available at
AFP: More than 1,000 families flee Pakistan fighting
Zulfiqar Ali, “Return of Kurram IDPs from Aug 25,” Dawn, August 18, 2011. Available at Return of Kurram IDPs from Aug 25 | DAWN.COM
[77] “More than 1,000 families flee Pakistan fighting,” AFP, July 4, 2011. Available at
AFP: More than 1,000 families flee Pakistan fighting
[78] “Kurram Update,” FDMA, July 31, 2011. Available at
http://fdma.gov.pk/images/stories/kurram2011/20110731 - Kurram Update.pdf
[79] “Kurram: Operation Eyewash in Pakistan,” SATP, August 2, 2011. Available at
Kurram: Operation Eyewash In Pakistan - Analysis Eurasia Review
[80] “The Significance of Fazal Saeed’s Defection from the Pakistani Taliban,” CTC, July 1, 2011. Available at
The Significance of Fazal Saeed
[81] “Bibhu Prasad Routray: Skewed objectives and inherent operational failure in Pakistan’s Kurram Agency,” Al Arabiya, July 6, 2011. Available at Bibhu Prasad Routray: Skewed objectives and inherent operational failure in Pakistan
“The Significance of Fazal Saeed’s Defection from the Pakistani Taliban,” CTC, July 1, 2011. Available at
The Significance of Fazal Saeed
[82] Zulfiqar Ali, “Return of Kurram IDPs from Aug 25,” Dawn, August 18, 2011. Available at Return of Kurram IDPs from Aug 25 | DAWN.COM
[83] If Saeed had not defected, however, enemy strengths may have been as high as 1,400
[84] “Special report: The battle for Kurram Agency,” Express News, uploaded to Youtube on July 24, 2011. Available at Special report: The battle for Kurram Agency - YouTube
[85] Reza Jan, “Paradise Regained: Swat One Year On,” CriticalThreats.org, May 25, 2010. Available at Paradise Regained: Swat One Year On | Critical Threats
Reza Jan, “Trickling Home to South Waziristan,” Foreign Policy, December 10, 2010. Available at Trickling Home to South Waziristan | Critical Threats
 
.
Limited Goals, Limited Gains: The Pakistan Army's Operation in Kurram

By Reza Jan, Sam Worby

September 6, 2011


Operation Koh-e-Sufaid in Kurram agency, Pakistan.

INTRODUCTION
On July 4, 2011, the Pakistani military launched its latest offensive against Taliban militants in northwest Pakistan in Kurram, an agency within the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Dubbed Operation Koh-e-Sufaid (White Mountain), the offensive targeted militants in central and lower Kurram with the principal objective of securing and reopening the Thall-Parachinar road, a major thoroughfare through Kurram that had come under repeated attack by Sunni militants, the blocking of which had left Kurram’s Shia population effectively under siege for the last several years.

Pakistani military commanders declared on August 18 that the operation had been successfully completed and the principal objectives attained. While that may be the case, it must be noted that the military operation was limited in its scope, duration and objectives. The area in which operations took place, the size and makeup of the forces involved, the militant organizations targeted, the tactics implemented, and the statements of senior officers and commanders on the ground all attest to the operation’s inherently limited nature. The effective area of operations was no larger than 80 square kilometers and excluded key parts of Kurram agency that have been plagued by militant violence in the past. Only 4,000 troops, supported by heavy artillery, armor units and airpower, participated in the operation.[1] The military expected the operation to last less than two months and, from the very beginning, stated that its primary objective was to secure and open the Thall-Parachinar road—not to take on the variety of militant groups that hold sway in the region.[2] Indeed, the military almost exclusively targeted one militant group, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), to the exclusion of others that are known to have a presence in the area.

Furthermore, although the completion of the operation may bring some respite to Kurram’s population, it may also have negative externalities for long-term stability for Pakistan and for operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan if its gains are not followed up on. This primer will discuss and analyze the forces used in the operation, the groups targeted, the form the operation took, the mass displacement of Kurram residents, and the operation’s implications for the war in Afghanistan and for the larger fight against militancy in Pakistan.

THE BUILDUP TO HOSTILITIES
Kurram agency has suffered a world of misfortune at the hands of militants since 2007. Located between the FATA’s North Waziristan and Khyber agencies, the agency has a “parrot’s beak” shape that protrudes deep into Afghanistan, giving it a strategic importance that has been taken advantage of by guerrilla fighters for decades.[3] The Thall-Parachinar road running through the length of the Kurram river valley provides the shortest transit route between any point in Pakistan and Afghanistan’s capital, Kabul. During the Soviet-Afghan war of the 1980s, Kurram served as a key safe haven for, and launching pad for attacks by, the anti-Soviet mujahideen fighters.[4]

Kurram is also home to a significant Shia population: of the agency’s 500,000 inhabitants, around 40 percent are Shia, mostly concentrated in upper Kurram.[5] While Shia tribes there have periodically clashed with Sunni tribes from Sunni-dominated central and lower Kurram, conflicts were usually limited in intensity and short-lived.[6] Since 2007, however, the amplification of the anti-state Taliban insurgency inside Pakistan, and an influx of Taliban militants and anti-Shia militant groups into the region, impregnated ongoing Sunni-Shia strife with a virulence that begat a state of civil war between Shia tribesmen and militant-backed Sunni tribesmen in much of the agency.[7] The militant problem was exacerbated when TTP militants, fleeing Pakistani military operations in their traditional safe havens in Swat and South Waziristan, joined their affiliates based in Kurram and neighboring Orakzai agencies.[8] Sunni militants blocked the Thall-Parachinar road, the only significant artery allowing Shias in upper Kurram to reach the rest of the country, essentially besieging the Shias. Shia tribesmen were frequently forced to undertake long, arduous and perilous journeys into and through Afghanistan in order to reach other parts of Pakistan.[9] Previous attempts at peace deals between the Sunnis and Shias failed to hold, and limited attempts by the Pakistani military to target militants in the agency remained ineffective in lifting the state of siege for any appreciable amount of time.[10]

In February 2011, however, a new peace deal was signed between Sunni and Shia tribesmen. This latest treaty held particular promise because it had been mediated by the al Qaeda-affiliated and Afghanistan-focused Haqqani Network and promised to bring on board spoiler groups like the TTP.[11] Ever since the intensification of the U.S. drone campaign in North Waziristan and Special Operations Forces activity in traditional areas of Haqqani dominance in neighboring Afghanistan, the Haqqani Network had been searching for a new safe haven inside Pakistan and unobstructed transit routes into Afghanistan and, in particular, to Kabul. Kurram made eminent strategic sense. While Shia tribesmen had refused access to the Haqqanis for several years, by 2011, conditions had changed: Worn down by constant fighting, the siege of the Thall-Parachinar road, and the perception that the Pakistani government was not particularly serious in solving the problem, the Shias acquiesced to a Haqqani-brokered deal that gave the network access to and transit through Shia areas into Afghanistan in exchange for peace with Sunni tribesmen and a guarantee that the Thall-Parachinar road would be opened to unimpeded traffic.[12]

The deal held for over a month until, on March 25, TTP militants ambushed a Shia convoy near Baggan, killing 13 people and taking hostage as many as 45 more.[13] Continued attacks, and a failure to mediate for the hostages’ release or the prevention of future attacks brought the deal into abeyance. Fazal Saeed, a local TTP commander in Kurram agency loyal to TTP leader Hakimullah Mehsud, likely carried out the attack.[14] While the attack contradicted Saeed’s previous promises to personally observe and enforce the peace treaty, he, like Hakimullah, is strongly anti-Shia and likely had the backing of the TTP leadership.[15] Prior to his ascension to the TTP leadership, Hakimullah cut his teeth in the organization by demonstrating his brutality against Kurram’s Shias during his time as the TTP’s main commander in Kurram. The TTP has frequently played the role of a spoiler group in the agency’s peace negotiations.

The sullying of the deal played to the disadvantage of both the Pakistani state and the Haqqani Network, to mention nothing of the beleaguered Shias. The government was once again assailed with accusations of indifference to the plight of the Shias and of failing to exercise control over its territory. The Haqqanis saw their hard-won agreement with the Shias slowly unraveling. Increasingly severe urgings by the operational head of the Haqqani Network, Sirajuddin Haqqani, to Hakimullah to desist from attacking the Shias failed to have an effect and exacerbated what appeared to be a growing rift between the TTP and Haqqani Network.[16] By May, the Pakistani government had resolved to launch a military operation into Kurram to open the road and to flush out militants not adhering to the peace deal.[17] Negotiations between Fazal Saeed’s group and the Haqqani Network, possibly involving the Pakistani government, were almost certainly underway; on June 27, days before the military was to swing into action, Saeed announced his defection from the TTP and the formation of his own group, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Islami Pakistan (TTIP).[18] He promised to adhere to the February 2011 peace deal and foreswore attacks on the Pakistani state.[19]

Saeed is closely linked to the Haqqani Network, and his disassociation from the TTP may have been an effort to emphasize the distinction between the two groups before the operation.[20] In his announcement, Saeed claimed that he disagreed with the TTP’s use of “suicide attacks against mosques, markets and other civilian targets” and preferred a focus on combating the U.S. and NATO presence in Afghanistan—an stance more in line with the Haqqanis than the TTP.[21] Saeed even recently began referring to himself as Fazal Saeed “Haqqani,” a practice common among graduates of the infamous Dar-ul-Uloom Haqqania madrassa in Akora Khattak.[22] Moreover, in praising the truce, Saeed, a native of Kurram, was aligning himself with the Haqqani Network and the Pakistani government, both of whom value stability in the agency.[23]

His defection also brought the TTIP into line with several other militant groups in the FATA, such as those of Maulvi Nazir in South Waziristan and Hafiz Gul Bahadur in North Waziristan, both of which cut deals with the Pakistani military prior to the launch of a major operation against the TTP in South Waziristan in 2009.[24] Such groups are allowed to exercise influence in their own areas and launch attacks on NATO forces in Afghanistan unmolested by the army so long as they do not participate in attacks against the state.

On July 4, Pakistani troops advanced against and engaged TTP militants in the start of Operation Koh-e-Sufaid.

COMBATANTS
BLUE FORCES: About 4,000 troops were involved in the prosecution of the operation in Kurram.[25] This number is slightly smaller than that of the force used in the offensive to clear neighboring Orakzai agency in 2010. The Orakzai agency operation, headed by the paramilitary Frontier Corps (FC), was itself an economy of force operation to begin with.

The forces involved include battalions cannibalized from two to three army brigades in the region.[26] While the battalions came from different parent brigades, they operated as part of XI Corps (Peshawar) under a unified command for the purposes of the operation.[27] So far, infantry battalions from the Frontier Force regiment, the Northern Light Infantry, the Punjab Regiment and the Sindh Regiment are all known to have been involved in various aspects of the operation.[28] The army units are supported by several wings of the FC, including the Thall Scouts and Kurram Militia, which have their headquarters in the region, as well as reinforcements brought in from Khyber Rifles, Chitral Scouts and Dir Scouts.[29] The infantry forces are supported by heavy artillery batteries, armor units, Cobra gunship helicopters, Mi-17 heavy-lift helicopters, and, reportedly, close air support from Pakistan Air Force (PAF) jets when required.[30]

Later in the operation, local tribal militias known as lashkars, primarily from the Masuzai tribe of central Kurram, also participated in the fight against the TTP. These lashkars battled militants chiefly in the Masuzai and Neka Ziarat areas, although they operated largely independent of the military.

RED FORCES: A number of militant groups operate in Kurram Agency. In addition to the aforementioned TTP, TTIP, and Haqqani Network, other groups, such as Sipah-e-Sahab Pakistan (SSP), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), are also present in the region.[31] The SSP, LeJ and JeM, all Sunni militant groups, have been involved in anti-Shia violence in Kurram throughout the past several years.[32]

The military operation, however, primarily targeted the TTP with the intention of securing the Parachinar-Thall road.[33] The TTP and Sunni militants affiliated with the TTP have been the biggest violators of the Haqqani Network-facilitated Sunni-Shia truce. Moreover, unlike the Haqqani Network, the TTP opposes and carries out attacks against the Pakistani state, making them a far less complicated target for the Pakistani government to engage.[34]

According to “official estimates” by government forces, there were only a limited number of enemy forces present in the area. Only 600 militants were believed to be present at the start of the operation, including 250 fighters local to Kurram and “dozens” of foreign fighters including Arabs, Uzbeks, Chechens and others, some of whom were reportedly disguising themselves in army and FC uniforms.[35] The main TTP factions in Kurram are those under the command of Maulvi Noor Jamal, also known as Mullah Toofan, and Tariq Afridi, both senior commanders in the TTP.[36] A new commander reportedly appointed by the TTP to replace Fazal Saeed, Maulana Zahir, is also likely to have commanded enemy forces in the agency.[37] Both Toofan and Afridi moved their operations to Kurram and some parts of upper Orakzai after being squeezed out of their traditional strongholds in Darra Adam Khel and other areas of neighboring Orakzai.[38]

Fazal Saeed’s break from the TTP at the eleventh hour weakened the enemy fighting force. It not only allowed the Pakistani military to narrow its operational goals but also robbed the TTP of close to 800 additional fighters that would have faced off against the army.[39] Previous operations in the FATA have usually faced much greater concentrations of enemy strength. Even in the limited operation in Orakzai in 2010, between 2,000 and 2,500 enemy fighters were reported killed by the end of hostilities, far more than the military believed it would face in Kurram at the start of Operation Koh-e-Sufiad.[40]

THE OFFENSIVE
Central and lower Kurram agency consist of two major valleys, both running northwest to southeast, linking up near the town of Sadda before running jointly on to Parachinar in upper Kurram. The western branch of the valley is more heavily populated and hosts the central and lower Kurram portions of the Thall-Parachinar road. The offensive appears to be limited mostly to the eastern branch of the valley between Sadda in the northwest and Tora Warai in the southeast. According to Pakistani military sources, this eastern branch has been the center of TTP activity and housed the main TTP supply depots and command and control centers.[41]

The operation officially began on July 4, although PAF strike aircraft had starting bombing TTP positions in the valley on June 24.[42] According to Brigadier Basharat Ahmed, the sector commander for forces in the southwest and the officer in overall command of the operation, the offensive was launched from five separate directions.[43] It appears, however, that most of the kinetic activity took place over two main axes of advance: the first heading southeast from Sadda through the Ali Sherzai tribal area of the valley, and the second moving northwest up the valley from Tora Warai in Hangu district with the intention of linking up with the opposing pincer.

The operation commenced with infantry battalions from the Sindh regiment (SR) and the Northern Light Infantry (NLI), a specialized mountain warfare unit, advancing from Sadda in central Kurram eastwards into the Ali Sherzai tribal area and the entrance to main valley system.[44] The Ali Sherzai area in particular served as a haven for a number of TTP militants. Geographically, it not only allowed them to easily cross back and forth between havens in Orakzai and Khyber, but also gave them easy access into central Kurram from where they were able to threaten the Thall-Parachinar road.

Troops advanced under the cover of gunship helicopters and artillery batteries based in Sadda.[45] Units reported little enemy resistance and were able to quickly take several TTP command centers, including Gawakai, Murghan and Manatu.[46] Soldiers moved into and cleared a number of government buildings, schools and healthcare facilities that militants had used for accommodation, ammunition storage, training facilities and private prisons.[47] According to locals, some of the towns taken in central Kurram had not seen the presence of Pakistani troops for over four years.[48] Manatu, the main Taliban command and control hub in the valley, was the only town where any notable Taliban resistance was encountered. On July 6, as many as 40 TTP militants died in fierce clashes that also left two soldiers injured.[49] After these early gains, the SR and NLI battalions moved eastwards in an attempt to link up with forces advancing from Tora Warai. By July 13, the pincer had reached Mandan.[50] By July 24, forces were “days” away from linking up with units that had advanced from the southeast and were now in Dumbakai and Sper Kot.[51]

The units operating in the south and southeast include the 42 FF (42nd Battalion, Frontier Force Regiment), the 42 PR (42nd Battalion, Punjab Regiment), and the FC’s Kurram Militia and Thall Scouts. These units were supported by tanks and heavy artillery including a 155mm battery part of the 72nd MED, an artillery unit based near Tora Warai.[52] Troops in this sector advanced from the direction of Tora Warai westwards up the valley, battling Taliban resistance along the way. Forces advanced up to and took TTP locations in Khalwat, Pungai, Kurt and Dumbakai, a major TTP command center, by July 6.[53] 42 PR, operating further south and west of the main assault force, captured a major TTP stronghold in Tanna.[54] 42 FF made a push to secure the Sper Kot ridge on the valley’s northern wall, near the border with upper Orakzai. According to the colonel in command of the force, securing the ridge would allow the military to sever or severely degrade the Taliban’s ability to traverse south from Orakzai through Kurram towards the Thall-Parachinar road and then south to North Waziristan.[55] By securing the sector, the colonel argued, the Taliban would be forced to rely on moving on foot and using small trails as opposed to being able to use vehicles to move rapidly and in large numbers.[56] One of the drawbacks to this approach is that the Pakistani military, in order to secure such heights, tends to establish semi-permanent outposts at the top of strategic features. These outposts are static and require frequent resupply. This task is made more difficult by the fact that transport helicopters have come under Taliban attack and the resupply of these outposts require effort-intensive means, such as ground forces moving up the mountain.[57]

In a positive development for the operation, about two weeks into the offensive, reports emerged of local lashkars participating in the fight against militants.[58] Tribesmen, primarily from the Masuzai tribe, formed a lashkar that began operating primarily in the Masuzai and Neka Ziarat areas and was on several occasions involved in large clashes with militants. The involvement of lashkars in the fight against the Taliban is one of the most important steps in inoculating an area to a Taliban re-infiltration. That the Masuzai, a Sunni tribe, chose to take up arms against the Taliban is significant, as the Taliban have previously co-opted or coerced Kurram’s Sunni tribes into attacking Shias.[59]

Pakistani military movement from the southeast was much slower and more calculated than the rapid advance seen from the northwest.[60] Few major clashes occurred over the course of the operation.[61] Most engagements appear to have taken place over long distances with troops, travelling in convoys, coming under frequent sniper and rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) attack. The army tended to return fire at enemy combatants over long ranges using artillery and armor.[62] TTP militants used harassing tactics, using fighters at distances of up to 500 meters from each other taking potshots at advancing forces before diving back into hideouts in caves. According to one soldier, troops were under orders not to pursue militants fleeing into mountain caves as they had previously faced difficulties and suffered casualties trying to clear them.[63]

For their part, the Taliban do not appear to have presented battle in any serious manner during the campaign. Many fighters simply harassed oncoming troops with long-range fire before melting away. According to locals, most of the militants had fled the area well before the operation had started, moving to safe havens in neighboring Orakzai or Khyber agencies.[64] Taliban resistance in Kurram appeared to be a rearguard action, at best. Enemy forces have likely learnt from the experiences of previous operations such as those in Swat and South Waziristan that concerted resistance to conventional assaults can only be upheld for a limited period and at very high cost. The ability to steal away to safe havens in neighboring agencies also makes resistance an unattractive option. Only around 200 militants were killed by the end of the campaign, with a fifth of those casualties occurring in a single battle in Manatu.[65]

By August 18, Pakistani officials declared the operation complete, much earlier than the end-of-the-month termination date initially floated by Corps Commander Peshawar Lt. Gen. Asif Yasin Malik.[66] The army declared victory and stated that it had succeeded in eliminating enemy positions in the agency and that it had secured the Thall-Parachinar road. Interestingly, while the ultimate objective of the operation was, ostensibly, to open the Thall-Parachinar road, no operations took place in or around the areas lining much of the road. While forces had been operating near Sadda in central Kurram, there have been no reports of troop movement or clashes with militants anywhere near the road in lower Kurram, including in Baggan, the area where militant groups originally launched attacks on Shia convoys in violation of the February peace deal.

One possibility for this is that Taliban militants either abandoned or never maintained permanent positions in the towns and villages along the road and relied on their strongholds in the eastern valley as bases from which to temporarily erect checkpoints along, and raid vehicles on, the Thall-Parachinar road. The more likely explanation is that the road in question, particularly in lower Kurram, runs through areas in the grip of Fazal Saeed’s TTIP militant faction which split off from the TTP days before the launch of the operation and pledged to adhere to the Kurram peace deal.[67] Given the narrow objectives of the operation—to open and secure movement along the main road—this factor would have made it easy for the military to exclude the TTIP from its list of targets.[68] Whether ignoring Saeed’s group jeopardizes the long-term success of the operation remains to be seen, but the prognosis is not encouraging: the operation’s success now hinges upon the continued good behavior of the TTIP. Guaranteeing such good behavior will be difficult given that Saeed was responsible for the initial violation of the February peace deal, despite earlier avowals that his group would adhere to, and help enforce, the terms of the agreement. For now, only FC-escorted traffic has been authorized for travel along the road.[69]



INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDPs)
Even before hostilities commenced in Kurram, locals began fleeing areas expected to come under attack.[70] At the onset of the operation, Arshad Khan, Director General of the FATA Disaster Management Authority (FDMA), estimated that 8,000 to 12,000 families could be displaced, but this number turned out to be closer to 21,000.[71] As of July 27, the operation in Kurram had displaced around 100,000 residents of the agency, nearly one-fourth of the agency’s population.[72] The number far exceeded Pakistani government expectations and led to shortages of relief materials for the IDPs.[73]

IDP flows to relief camps varied depending on where families were fleeing from. The majority of IDPs who ended up in camps went to the New Durrani IDP camp, located approximately 2.5 miles from Sadda, and likely fled areas in the upper sections of the eastern Kurram valley, such as Murghan, Manatu and the Ali Sherzai area.[74] Those in the lower valley, including large numbers fleeing fighting near Kurt, Khalwat, Dumbakai and Dand, escaped across the border to adjacent Hangu district, where they took up residence in smaller camps in Togh Sarai, Tora Warai, Doaba, Naryab and Darsamand.[75] The vast majority of IDPs, however, did not flee to a camp but stayed with relatives in Sadda or Hangu.[76]

The FDMA expected that near 4,000 families would take refuge in the New Durrani Camp.[77] As of July 31, 2,500 families and 12,736 total individuals, including 5,981 under 12-years-old, had arrived at the New Durrani camp where 2,900 tents had been provided with only 2,185 being used.[78]

Worryingly, UN and international aid workers reported being barred by the Pakistani government from entering some relief camps in upper Kurram due to safety concerns following reports that militants had infiltrated the camps and were hiding among IDPs.[79] Many IDPs complained that “the same militants who used to terrorize them are now living with them inside the camp.”[80] The operation’s skeptics argue that the humanitarian crisis brought on by the operation has enabled militants to hide among the IDPs and allowed them to escape being targeted by U.S. drones.[81]

With the conclusion of the operation, the FDMA announced that phased IDP repatriation would begin on August 25, with the first phase involving the return of some 700 families, and that the UN would assist with transport and relief supplies.[82] How long it will take to repatriate all of Kurram’s displaced remains to be seen, and the speed of the repatriation will have a critical effect on the long-term success of the operation.

LESSONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The latest operation in Kurram proves instructive on several counts. First, it provides observers with an idea of the kind of force and tactics the Pakistani military believed would be necessary to employ against an enemy of defined strength over a certain size of battlespace. The military employed a brigade-strength infantry force infused with armor units and supplemented by gunship helicopters, artillery and fixed-wing close air support against an estimated enemy strength of 600 fighters spread out over 80 square kilometers and hiding in a mix of semi-urban and mountainous environments.[83]

Second, the operation is enlightening in that it highlights the fact that TTP militants increasingly refuse to present battle against conventional forces. Large numbers of militants fled well before the operation commenced. Fazal Saeed’s forces made peace with the government once the launch of an operation seemed inevitable. Even those that stayed mainly seemed to engage oncoming forces from a distance, and in small numbers.[84] Militants positioned at great distances from each other made frequent use of caves in order to take intermittent shots at soldiers before returning to cover, possibly under the assumption that the military was unlikely to go to the trouble of assaulting such positions to kill individual fighters.

As a result, only a fraction of the militants who originally afflicted the affected area were killed. Most of them were able to flee to alternative safe havens. In order to make military gains permanent in such circumstances, the army will need to take further action. It will need to infuse the area with a larger force and maintain overwatch for a significant amount of time in order to prevent militant re-infiltration, and/or it will need to rapidly repatriate the IDP population and convince it to cooperate with government forces in either taking on militants themselves, or providing intelligence against them. In this respect, the military has had more success in some places than in others. While such an approach proved fairly successful in the Swat valley, the military is still having trouble fully repatriating IDPs from South Waziristan and getting them to agree to the idea of assisting them in the fight against militants in their areas.[85] A drawn-out repatriation process could further disaffect tribes impacted by the operation from the Pakistani government.

CONCLUSION
In a narrow sense, the military’s operation in Kurram was successful. The operation: fulfilled the popular demand for action against those elements that were violating the February 2011 peace deal; eliminated TTP strongholds that threatened the Thall-Parachinar road; disrupted a frequently traveled route that allowed militant fighters to easily and quickly traverse between Orakzai and Khyber agencies and North Waziristan agency; strong-armed Fazal Saeed and his new TTIP into discontinuing attacks upon Shia travelers on the road; and created the conditions for the reopening of traffic along the Thall-Parachinar route, the key demand from Kurram locals.

Yet the manner in which the above was achieved has opened the door to a number of negative externalities, both for Pakistan and for stability in Afghanistan. While the army may have reinstated the peace deal, choosing not to take on Fazal Saeed’s fighters in Kurram may have jeopardized the deal’s longevity. Whether or not the deal holds is now entirely dependent on the good behavior of Fazal Saeed and the TTIP, of which there can be no guarantee—unless the military is ready to undertake a second, larger operation should the TTIP violate the deal’s terms again. Furthermore, the government and military have allowed the TTIP to essentially govern in those spaces where it holds sway, undermining the writ of the government, and have done nothing to prevent the TTIP from operating freely against American and coalition forces in Afghanistan.

The successful reinstatement of the peace deal, while a boon for Kurram’s population, particularly its Shias, will also significantly strengthen the position of the Haqqani Network. The Haqqanis will regain their ability to use Shia areas of Kurram to reach deep inside Afghanistan and will continue to enjoy the use of a new safe haven outside of their main strongholds in North Waziristan. As a result, targeting the Haqqanis using drone aircraft inside Pakistan will be more difficult, and the network will have increased operational capabilities and, ultimately, deadliness inside Afghanistan. The TTP’s loss, in this case, also turns out to be the Haqqani Network’s gain: while the defection of Fazal Saeed’s group will cause some weakening of the TTP, the increased cooperation between the Haqqanis and the TTIP increases the Haqqanis’ influence in Kurram agency and gives them an ally in Kurram akin to the one they have with Hafiz Gul Bahadur in North Waziristan. Any strengthening of the Haqqani Network—already Afghanistan’s deadliest insurgent group—is likely to impact long-term stability on both sides of the border. The group is closely affiliated with, cooperates with and supports al Qaeda and other Pakistani militant groups that consider the Pakistani state to be a legitimate target. While the Haqqani Network and the TTP may occasionally quarrel over specific issues, they are, by and large, mutually accommodating and frequently share the same havens, facilities and operatives. Distinctions between the myriad groups are superficial at best and delusional at worst; to strengthen one in the hope of weakening another is to leave the enemy at overall par strength.

On balance, the operation in Kurram, while a tactical success, aimed to gather the low-hanging fruit—only a small part of a larger enemy was targeted in a sliver of territory. Whether or not Operation Koh-e-Sufaid proved decisive in bringing long-term peace to Kurram agency will be borne out by time. What is clear, however, is that the operation does not seem to have been a significant contribution to the overall fight against militancy in the FATA. While residents of Kurram may enjoy the short-term benefits of the operation’s tactical successes, its shortcomings expose the larger war effort against militants and militancy in the FATA, Pakistan, and Afghanistan to some dangerous long-term consequences.


[1] Author’s interview with Pakistani military sources
Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Army ends operation in Central Kurram,” Dawn, August 19, 2011. Available at Army ends operation in Central Kurram | DAWN.COM
[2] Expected end date was pre-eid
Urdu TV report, “Operation Koh e Sufaid,” Dunya News, uploaded to Youtube on July 15, 2011. Available at Operation Koh e Sufaid - YouTube
“Special report: The battle for Kurram Agency,” Express News, uploaded to Youtube on July 24, 2011. Available at Special report: The battle for Kurram Agency - YouTube
[3] Reza Jan and Jeffrey Dressler, “The Haqqani Network in Kurram: The Regional Implications of a Growing Insurgency,” The Critical Threats Project and the Insititute for the Study of War, May 9, 2011. Available at http://www.criticalthreats.org/site...am_Agency_-_Reza_Jan_-_Jeffrey_Dressler_0.pdf
[4] Ibid
[5] This figure is according to a 1998 census, the last officially conducted census in Pakistan. Actual figures are likely much higher.
The Jamestown Foundation: U.S. Places Two Pakistani Charities on Terrorism Watch List[tt_news]=34730&cHash=b0060e4fc9
[6] Reza Jan and Jeffrey Dressler, “The Haqqani Network in Kurram: The Regional Implications of a Growing Insurgency,” The Critical Threats Project and the Insititute for the Study of War, May 9, 2011. Available at http://www.criticalthreats.org/site...am_Agency_-_Reza_Jan_-_Jeffrey_Dressler_0.pdf
[7] Ibid
[8] Ibid
[9] Ibid
[10] Ibid
[11] Ibid
[12] Ibid
[13] “13 killed in Kurram attack on minibus,” Daily Times, March 26, 2011. Available at Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan
[14] Jeffrey Dressler, “Pakistan’s Kurram Offensive: Implications for Afghanistan,” Institute for the Study of War, August 18, 2011. Available at Pakistan's Kurram Offensive-Implications for Afghanistan | Institute for the Study of War
[15] “Taliban welcome Kurram truce,” Dawn, February 8, 2011. Available at Taliban welcome Kurram truce | DAWN.COM
Jeffrey Dressler, “Pakistan’s Kurram Offensive: Implications for Afghanistan,” Institute for the Study of War, August 18, 2011. Available at Pakistan's Kurram Offensive-Implications for Afghanistan | Institute for the Study of War
[16] Zia Khan, “Kurram Agency: Haqqani warns Hakimullah not to sabotage peace deal,” Express Tribune, May 2, 2011. Available at >Kurram Agency: Haqqani warns Hakimullah not to
[17] “Army hints at operation in Kurram agency,” Dawn, May 20, 2011. Available at Army hints at operation in Kurram Agency | DAWN.COM
[18] “Taliban commander Fazal Saeed leaves TTP,” Dawn, June 27, 2011. Available at
Taliban commander Fazal Saeed leaves TTP | DAWN.COM
[19] “Taliban commander Fazal Saeed leaves TTP,” Dawn, June 27, 2011. Available at
Taliban commander Fazal Saeed leaves TTP | DAWN.COM
Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Rebel TTP commander claims his groups is getting offers of support,” The News, June 30, 2011. Available at Rebel TTP commander claims his group is getting offers of support - thenews.com.pk
[20] “Kurram: Operation Eyewash in Pakistan,” SATP, August 2, 2011. Available at
Kurram: Operation Eyewash In Pakistan - Analysis Eurasia Review
[21] “Taliban commander Fazal Saeed leaves TTP,” AFP, June 27, 2011. Available at Taliban commander Fazal Saeed leaves TTP | DAWN.COM
[22] Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Rebel TTP commander claims his groups is getting offers of support,” The News, June 30, 2011. Available at Rebel TTP commander claims his group is getting offers of support - thenews.com.pk
“The sham operation in Kurram,” Daily Times, July 7, 2011. Available at
Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan
[23] “The Significance of Fazal Saeed’s Defection from the Pakistani Taliban,” CTC, July 1, 2011. Available at
The Significance of Fazal Saeed
[24] Jane Perlez, “Pakistan Finds Local Allies Against Ferocious Foe,” New York Times, October 20, 2009. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/21/world/asia/21waziristan.html
[25] Author’s interview with Pakistani military sources
[26] Ibid
[27] Ibid
[28] Ibid
Urdu TV report, “Operation Koh e Sufaid,” Dunya News, uploaded to Youtube on July 15, 2011. Available at Operation Koh e Sufaid - YouTube
“Special report: The battle for Kurram Agency,” Express News, uploaded to Youtube on July 24, 2011. Available at Special report: The battle for Kurram Agency - YouTube
Urdu TV news, “Frontline Report on Kurram Operation Zahir Sherazi,” Dawn News, uploaded to Youtube July 13, 2011. Available at Frontline Report on Kurram Operation Zahir Sherazi - YouTube
[29] Author’s interview with Pakistani military sources
[30] Author’s interview with Pakistani military sources
Urdu TV report, “Operation Koh e Sufaid,” Dunya News, uploaded to Youtube on July 15, 2011. Available at Operation Koh e Sufaid - YouTube
“Special report: The battle for Kurram Agency,” Express News, uploaded to Youtube on July 24, 2011. Available at Special report: The battle for Kurram Agency - YouTube
Urdu TV news, “Frontline Report on Kurram Operation Zahir Sherazi,” Dawn News, uploaded to Youtube July 13, 2011. Available at Frontline Report on Kurram Operation Zahir Sherazi - YouTube
[31] Reza Jan and Jeffrey Dressler, “The Haqqani Network in Kurram: The Regional Implications of a Growing Insurgency,” The Critical Threats Project and the Insititute for the Study of War, May 9, 2011. Available at http://www.criticalthreats.org/site...am_Agency_-_Reza_Jan_-_Jeffrey_Dressler_0.pdf
[32] Ibid
[33] The operation targeted areas known to house TTP operatives in central Kurram. Areas known to be under the control of TTIP forces and where the Haqqani Network is suspected of sheltering were not targeted in the operation.
Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Army ends operation in Central Kurram,” Dawn, August 19, 2011. Available at Army ends operation in Central Kurram | DAWN.COM
[34] “Bibhu Prasad Routray: Skewed objectives and inherent operational failure in Pakistan’s Kurram Agency,” Al Arabiya, July 6, 2011. Available at Bibhu Prasad Routray: Skewed objectives and inherent operational failure in Pakistan
[35] Pakistan launches offensive in restive Kurram tribal region - Home » Other Sections » Breaking News
“Special report: The battle for Kurram Agency,” Express News, uploaded to Youtube on July 24, 2011. Available at Special report: The battle for Kurram Agency - YouTube
[36] Mullah Toofan and Tariq Afridi operate between Kurram and upper Orakzai, where much of their infrastructure is still based.
Zia Khan, “Averting a doomsday scenario,” Express Tribune, October 27, 2010. Available at Averting a doomsday scenario – The Express Tribune
Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Rebel TTP commander claims his groups is getting offers of support,” The News, June 30, 2011. Available at Rebel TTP commander claims his group is getting offers of support - thenews.com.pk
[37] Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Rebel TTP commander claims his groups is getting offers of support,” The News, June 30, 2011. Available at Rebel TTP commander claims his group is getting offers of support - thenews.com.pk
[38] Zia Khan, “Averting a doomsday scenario,” Express Tribune, October 27, 2010. Available at Averting a doomsday scenario – The Express Tribune
[39] Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Rebel TTP commander claims his groups is getting offers of support,” The News, June 30, 2011. Available at Rebel TTP commander claims his group is getting offers of support - thenews.com.pk
[40] Reza Jan, Nicholas Patella and Benjamin Shultz, “Daily Tracker: Pakistani Military Operations in Orakzai,” Critical Threats Project, May 13, 2011. Available at Daily Tracker: Pakistani Military Operations in Orakzai | Critical Threats
[41] Author’s interview with Pakistani military sources
“Special report: The battle for Kurram Agency,” Express News, uploaded to Youtube on July 24, 2011. Available at Special report: The battle for Kurram Agency - YouTube
Urdu TV report, “Operation Koh e Sufaid,” Dunya News, uploaded to Youtube on July 15, 2011. Available at Operation Koh e Sufaid - YouTube
[42] “Nine militants killed in Kurram raid,” Dawn, June 25, 2011. Available at Nine militants killed in Kurram raid | DAWN.COM
[43] “Special report: The battle for Kurram Agency,” Express News, uploaded to Youtube on July 24, 2011. Available at Special report: The battle for Kurram Agency - YouTube
[44] Urdu TV news, “Frontline Report on Kurram Operation Zahir Sherazi,” Dawn News, uploaded to Youtube July 13, 2011. Available at Frontline Report on Kurram Operation Zahir Sherazi - YouTube
Author’s interview with Pakistani military sources
[45] Author’s interview with Pakistani military sources
Urdu TV news, “Frontline Report on Kurram Operation Zahir Sherazi,” Dawn News, uploaded to Youtube July 13, 2011. Available at Frontline Report on Kurram Operation Zahir Sherazi - YouTube
[46] Ali Afzaal and Mushtaq Yusufzai, “Forces enter militant strongholds in Kurram,” The News, July 5, 2011. Available at Forces enter militant strongholds in Kurram - thenews.com.pk
[47] Ibid
[48] Ibid
[49] Iqbal Hussain, “35 militants killed in nKurram clash,” The News, July 7, 2011. Available at 35 militants killed in Kurram clash - thenews.com.pk
[50] Urdu TV news, “Frontline Report on Kurram Operation Zahir Sherazi,” Dawn News, uploaded to Youtube July 13, 2011. Available at Frontline Report on Kurram Operation Zahir Sherazi - YouTube
[51] “Special report: The battle for Kurram Agency,” Express News, uploaded to Youtube on July 24, 2011. Available at Special report: The battle for Kurram Agency - YouTube
[52] Author’s interview with Pakistani military sources
“Special report: The battle for Kurram Agency,” Express News, uploaded to Youtube on July 24, 2011. Available at Special report: The battle for Kurram Agency - YouTube
[53] Iqbal Hussain, “35 militants killed in nKurram clash,” The News, July 7, 2011. Available at 35 militants killed in Kurram clash - thenews.com.pk
[54] Author’s interview with Pakistani military sources
“Special report: The battle for Kurram Agency,” Express News, uploaded to Youtube on July 24, 2011. Available at Special report: The battle for Kurram Agency - YouTube
[55] Ibid
[56] Ibid
[57] Ibid
[58] “Tribesmen kill six militants in Kurram,” Dawn, July 21, 2011. Available at Tribesmen kill six militants in Kurram | DAWN.COM
“At least 20 militants killed in central Kurram,” Dawn, July 23, 2011. Available at At least 20 militants killed in central Kurram | DAWN.COM
[59] Imtiaz Gul, The Most Dangerous Place: Pakistan's Lawless Frontier (June 10, 2010).
[60] Based on news reports of military advances, the northwest pincer was appeared to be covering ground more rapidly than its southeastern counterpart.
[61] Tom Hussain, “Elite Pakistani troops move into Taliban mountain stronghold,” The National, July 6, 2011. Available at Full: Elite Pakistani troops move into Taliban mountain stronghold - The National
[62] “Special report: The battle for Kurram Agency,” Express News, uploaded to Youtube on July 24, 2011. Available at Special report: The battle for Kurram Agency - YouTube
[63] Ibid
[64] Tom Hussain, “Elite Pakistani troops move into Taliban mountain stronghold,” The National, July 6, 2011. Available at Full: Elite Pakistani troops move into Taliban mountain stronghold - The National
[65] Zulfiqar Ali, “Return of Kurram IDPs from Aug 25,” Dawn, August 18, 2011. Available at Return of Kurram IDPs from Aug 25 | DAWN.COM
“40 militants killed in Kurram clashes,” Geo News, July 7, 2011. Available at 40 militants killed in Kurram clashes - GEO.tv
Iqbal Hussain, “35 militants killed in nKurram clash,” The News, July 7, 2011. Available at 35 militants killed in Kurram clash - thenews.com.pk
[66] Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Army ends operation in Central Kurram,” Dawn, August 19, 2011. Available at Army ends operation in Central Kurram | DAWN.COM
Urdu TV report, “Operation Koh e Sufaid,” Dunya News, uploaded to Youtube on July 15, 2011. Available at Operation Koh e Sufaid - YouTube
[67] Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Army ends operation in Central Kurram,” Dawn, August 19, 2011. Available at Army ends operation in Central Kurram | DAWN.COM
[68] Ibid
[69] Ibid
[70] “More than 1,000 families flee Pakistan fighting,” AFP, July 4, 2011. Available at
AFP: More than 1,000 families flee Pakistan fighting
Return of Kurram IDPs from Aug 25 | DAWN.COM
[71] Ibid
[72] “Up to 100,000 flee Kurram offensive,” AFP, July 27, 2011. Available at
Up to 100,000 flee Kurram offensive | DAWN.COM
The population of Kurram was 448, 310 as of 1998 (latest count). See “Population Demography,” Available at Population Demography
[73] “Up to 100,000 flee Kurram offensive,” AFP, July 27, 2011. Available at
Up to 100,000 flee Kurram offensive | DAWN.COM
[74] Zulfiqar Ali, “Return of Kurram IDPs from Aug 25,” Dawn, August 18, 2011. Available at Return of Kurram IDPs from Aug 25 | DAWN.COM
[75] Zahir Shah, “Manato in Kurram Agency falls to Pakistan army,” Central Asia Online, July 14, 2011. Available at Manato in Kurram Agency falls to Pakistan Army - Central Asia Online
“40 militants killed in Kurram clashes,” The News, July 7, 2011. Available at 40 militants killed in Kurram clashes - thenews.com.pk
[76] “More than 1,000 families flee Pakistan fighting,” AFP, July 4, 2011. Available at
AFP: More than 1,000 families flee Pakistan fighting
Zulfiqar Ali, “Return of Kurram IDPs from Aug 25,” Dawn, August 18, 2011. Available at Return of Kurram IDPs from Aug 25 | DAWN.COM
[77] “More than 1,000 families flee Pakistan fighting,” AFP, July 4, 2011. Available at
AFP: More than 1,000 families flee Pakistan fighting
[78] “Kurram Update,” FDMA, July 31, 2011. Available at
http://fdma.gov.pk/images/stories/kurram2011/20110731 - Kurram Update.pdf
[79] “Kurram: Operation Eyewash in Pakistan,” SATP, August 2, 2011. Available at
Kurram: Operation Eyewash In Pakistan - Analysis Eurasia Review
[80] “The Significance of Fazal Saeed’s Defection from the Pakistani Taliban,” CTC, July 1, 2011. Available at
The Significance of Fazal Saeed
[81] “Bibhu Prasad Routray: Skewed objectives and inherent operational failure in Pakistan’s Kurram Agency,” Al Arabiya, July 6, 2011. Available at Bibhu Prasad Routray: Skewed objectives and inherent operational failure in Pakistan
“The Significance of Fazal Saeed’s Defection from the Pakistani Taliban,” CTC, July 1, 2011. Available at
The Significance of Fazal Saeed
[82] Zulfiqar Ali, “Return of Kurram IDPs from Aug 25,” Dawn, August 18, 2011. Available at Return of Kurram IDPs from Aug 25 | DAWN.COM
[83] If Saeed had not defected, however, enemy strengths may have been as high as 1,400
[84] “Special report: The battle for Kurram Agency,” Express News, uploaded to Youtube on July 24, 2011. Available at Special report: The battle for Kurram Agency - YouTube
[85] Reza Jan, “Paradise Regained: Swat One Year On,” CriticalThreats.org, May 25, 2010. Available at Paradise Regained: Swat One Year On | Critical Threats
Reza Jan, “Trickling Home to South Waziristan,” Foreign Policy, December 10, 2010. Available at Trickling Home to South Waziristan | Critical Threats
 
.
Designating the Haqqani Network: New Constraints Moderating Pakistan’s Relationship with the U.S.

By Reza Jan

August 8, 2012


Jalaluddin Haqqani points to a map of Afghanistan during a visit to Islamabad, Pakistan in October 2001.


Introduction
The Haqqani Network is one of the most violent and dangerous insurgent organizations, and the most prolific user of terrorism, operating in South Asia today. The network maintains complex and diversified funding streams throughout Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Persian Gulf. The U.S. has done little to combat the network’s financial base or cut into its revenue streams, however. The U.S. State Department has yet to list the group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), a key first step towards actively targeting the group’s international financial activity and support network, despite the group appearing to fit the necessary criteria.

The State Department’s inactivity appears to result at least partly from fears within the U.S. government that designating the Haqqani Network as an FTO will imperil the precarious U.S.-Pakistan relationship and possibly elicit a strong reaction or retaliation from Pakistan. This fear is likely overblown: Pakistan faces a serious, impending financial crisis, the avoidance of which may depend on continuing to improve relations with the U.S. The recently reopened gates of the NATO supply lines are unlikely to be abruptly slammed shut. The list of possible Pakistani reactions to such a move is limited. The constraints on Pakistan’s actions are emblematic of a larger change in the factors governing the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, which now include Pakistan’s teetering economy, upcoming election, and the increased importance of domestic political consideration for Pakistani leaders.



The Haqqanis
The Pakistan-based Haqqani Network is the most virulent enemy group active in Afghanistan. It has historically had close ties to al Qaeda and other regional terrorist and insurgent groups, such as the Quetta Shura Taliban, Pakistani Taliban, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), and others.[1] The group is responsible for some of the worst violence inside Afghanistan, including multiple complex and spectacular attacks in Kabul, attacks on the U.S. embassy and the headquarters of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in September 2011 and April 2012, and the bombing of an American base in Wardak in 2012 that injured 77 U.S. troops.[2]

The group maintains its traditional power center in Paktia, Paktika and Khost provinces of Afghanistan but is based out of North Waziristan agency in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas. In North Waziristan, the Haqqani Network has built itself a safe haven where it is able to plan and prepare for attacks, rest and refit, and coordinate with allied and likeminded insurgent and terrorist groups.[3]

The group also manages a vast network of diversified businesses and financial ventures that gives it deep pockets with which to carry out operations in Afghanistan. The network relies on both licit and illicit forms of revenue: on the illicit side, extortion, smuggling networks, kidnapping and racketeering are widespread; on the licit side, the Haqqanis are engaged in running construction companies and car dealerships among other ventures, many of which are believed to be linked to the Pakistani military’s own expansive business establishment.[4] The group also raises large amounts of money in the form of donations from wealthy individuals in Gulf Arab countries.[5]



The Supposed Pitfalls of Designation
To date, the State Department has not designated the Haqqani Network as an FTO, despite repeated calls from lawmakers and military commanders, and numerous pieces of legislation being introduced urging it to do so.[6] On July 16, Congress passed a bill urging the State Department to declare the network an FTO or to explain why it was refusing to do so.[7] The State Department announced in November 2011 that it was conducting a “final formal review” on whether to label the Haqqani Network as an FTO.[8] It has thus far refused to take any action against the group as a whole, choosing instead to target individual members of the network.[9]

According to Jeffrey Dressler at the Institute for the Study of War, designating the entire network rather than just individual members has big advantages when it comes to tackling its resource streams and degrading its operations.[10] An FTO designation allows U.S. authorities to seize a designee’s property, freeze its bank accounts, and make it illegal to engage in business with it. Individuals can, however, take precautions that would prevent damage being levied upon their network as a whole, for example, by transferring assets in their name to a different member of the organization. Designating the whole network as an FTO would enable the U.S. to target not only every member of the organization and all its assets, but also anybody engaging in business with, affiliated with, or found to be supporting the network.[11] In theory, by targeting facilitators and their international assets and interests, the U.S. would be able to dramatically increase the cost of doing business with the Haqqani Network, both in Afghanistan, and across international borders.

Given that the Haqqani Network appears to fit all the criteria for designation—it is foreign, engages in terrorism, and threatens U.S. nationals or national security—and that doing so would give the U.S. strong tools with which to take on the group, why has the State Department dawdled on designation for so long?[12] According to Dressler, opponents of designation fear endangering U.S. peace negotiations with the Taliban and eliciting a negative reaction from Pakistan, which the U.S. accuses of being the Haqqani Network’s primary sponsor.[13] They further tout that labeling the Haqqani Network as an FTO will put the U.S. in the awkward position of being forced to designate Pakistan, with which it is heavily engaged, as a state sponsor of terrorism.[14]



A Rocky Past for U.S.-Pakistan Relations
The fear that Pakistan will react strongly to such a designation is colored by the turbulent recent history of U.S.-Pakistan relations. Those fears do not, however, take into account changed ground realities and domestic pressures inside Pakistan that will likely work to constrain such a reaction.

Relations between the U.S. and Pakistan have suffered dramatically over the past year and a half. The breakdown started with the killing of two Pakistanis in Lahore by a CIA contractor in February 2011. This incident was exacerbated by the May 2011 raid that killed Osama bin Laden deep inside Pakistan and embarrassed the Pakistani government. The relationship reached its nadir in November 2011 when, following a botched border raid in which U.S. forces killed 24 Pakistani soldiers, Pakistan closed NATO supply lines through the country to Afghanistan for over seven months. The supply route closure forced the U.S. to move the majority of its Afghanistan-bound traffic through vastly more expensive air routes and ground routes through Russia and Central Asia.[15] The Pakistani routes were recently reopened following protracted and painstaking negotiations between the U.S. and Pakistan.[16]

Those who worry about a Pakistani reaction fear that Pakistan may retaliate by once again closing the supply routes through the country, or engineering causes for backlogs, delays, and other roadblocks to NATO traffic. An additional worry is that Pakistan may encourage the Haqqani Network to launch increased and deadlier attacks upon U.S. troops inside Afghanistan.



The Dire State of Pakistan’s Economy
The idea that Pakistan could take its anger out on the U.S. by utilizing its most readily available form of leverage—control over NATO supply routes to Afghanistan—fails to recognize that the Pakistanis have their own reasons for not wanting to scuttle the recent supply routes deal and the accompanying improvement in bilateral relations. Pakistan’s economy is growing more fragile by the day and is soon to be subject to extraordinary external pressures. These pressures forced the Pakistanis to essentially capitulate in the supply routes contest in the hope that a deal would help restart stalled aid flows from the U.S., which are vital to ensuring the Pakistani economy does not go into freefall this year.[17]





That Pakistan is economically in poor health is not new. In fiscal year (FY) 2012 (which ended on June 30), the country had an annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of around $230 billion and held a public debt of nearly $140 billion, giving it a debt to GDP ratio of over 60 percent.[18] While that number by itself is not indicative of an economy in danger, Pakistan, unlike many other countries which have similar or higher debt to GDP ratios, has an extremely narrow revenue base.[19] Pakistan needs to have a tax net of approximately 15 percent of GDP to maintain a healthy economy with its levels of public debt.[20] Pakistan’s current tax net is no more than nine percent.[21] There is little room to expand revenue by increasing taxation on those within the tax net, and the political barriers to expanding the tax net in Pakistan are extremely high.[22] Pakistan ran a budget deficit of approximately eight percent of GDP in FY 2012, nearly double its target for that fiscal year.[23] While the level of debt to GDP in Pakistan is not dangerous by itself, it is more than Pakistan is able to afford.

While the above figures are indicative of Pakistan’s generally unhealthy economy, the reasons for its precarious political position today come from more immediate economic pressures. In 2008, amid the prospects of catastrophic economic failure, Pakistan went to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a bailout package that exceeded $11 billion, repayable from 2012 through 2015 (in 2011, Pakistan did not receive the last $3 billion tranche of the program because it failed to satisfy IMF fiscal targets governing the release of the final tranche).[24] While the bailout program staved off financial disaster and a default on foreign debt in 2008, Pakistan faces intense economic pressure now that it has to start repaying its loans to the IMF. It paid back over $1.2 billion to the Fund in FY 2012.[25]





Foreign and domestic debt servicing ate into over one third of Pakistan’s national budget for FY 2012-13, and Pakistan owes over $3 billion more to the IMF in 2013.[26] For the moment, Pakistan has been meeting its foreign obligations by utilizing the $15 billion in its foreign exchange reserves.[27] Over half that amount is money Pakistan received from the IMF bailout, however, and the remainder would not be able to afford even five months of imports for Pakistan.[28] Given the extremely heavy burden the country faces, it is looking for quick salves and may even face going back to the IMF for a second bailout if it is unable to service its current debt.[29]

It is in this context that Pakistan approached recent negotiations with the U.S. over reopening the NATO supply lines. Pakistan initially took a hard line, demanding an unambiguous apology from the U.S. for the death of its troops, and a hike in fees from $250 to $5,000 for every NATO tanker that transited Pakistan.[30] The U.S. called Pakistan’s bluff, however. The U.S. refused to accede to what it saw as Pakistani rent-seeking and began expanding its use of alternative supply routes to Pakistan, accepting the greatly increased cost of the indirect transport route. The U.S. also withheld over $1.2 billion in military aid to Pakistan under the Coalition Support Funds (CSF) program.[31]

Pakistan likely realized that its supply blockade was not having the intended effect on the U.S., and once financial deadlines started to loom in the U.S. and Pakistan, its conditions began to soften and evaporate. Pakistan settled for a “soft” apology from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and dropped its request for increased truck fees. The U.S., for its part, agreed to expedite the release of the stalled $1.2 billion under the CSF program.[32]

Two separate ticking clocks likely forced Pakistan’s hand in the supply route negotiations: the maturing IMF loans due in 2013 and the end of the U.S. fiscal year FY 2012 on October 1, 2012. At the end of FY 2012, unspent money appropriated for that year can no longer be disbursed. If Pakistan waited any longer, it would have risked losing the outstanding $1.2 billion as well as any further CSF reimbursements it could claim for costs incurred after May 2011 when it stopped submitting receipts to the U.S. as part of its protest against the bin Laden raid.[33] Pakistan has thus far submitted over $600 million for the period after May 2011, and the new bills could run into the billions (though the U.S. typically only approves about 60 percent of the amount Pakistan bills).[34]



While $1.2 billion is essentially budget dust to the U.S., it is equivalent to one-sixth of Pakistan’s defense budget and could mean the difference on whether it defaults on its foreign loans or is forced to go back to the IMF.[35] Indeed, Pakistan’s FY 2013 budget included over $1 billion in CSF payments that it expected to receive but that were blocked due to the supply chain impasse.[36] One indicator of the central importance of these concerns to the Pakistani negotiating position is the fact that the man appointed to lead Pakistani negotiations with the U.S. over reopening the supply routes following initial negotiating failures was none other than its finance minister, Abdul Hafeez Shaikh.[37]



Limited Options for Retaliation
Given its precarious economic footing, Pakistan is unlikely to jeopardize its financial lifeline by reclosing supply routes any time soon. Indeed, the aid sword continues to dangle hazardously overhead for Pakistan. On July 20, the U.S. Congress voted to cut $650 million in aid to Pakistan as part of its defense appropriations bill, the latest in a number of bills threatening to strip Pakistan of aid it had been authorized.[38] While that number is likely to change based on the way the House and Senate share appropriations responsibilities, the message is probably not lost on the Pakistanis that they have few friends left in Washington, D.C. and that aid from the U.S. is no longer the sure thing it used to be. Furthermore, Pakistan recognizes the importance of needing to improve relations with the U.S.; if it does need to go back to the IMF to seek readjustment of its current loans, or additional bailout funding, the IMF would be unlikely to cooperate in the face of strong U.S. opposition.

The Pakistani military, which has a history of intervening in the name of national interest during particularly dire domestic situations, appears to be at a loss for how to rectify Pakistan’s economic ship. The military has largely watched from the sidelines, allowing the civilian government to take ownership of the crisis lest it be tarred by the same brush when time comes to assign responsibility for the country’s economic failures. The civilian government is well aware that it is going to be seen as responsible for the country’s economic fortunes. Given that this is an election year in Pakistan, the government will likely not let the military easily bully it into closing off supply routes or undertaking steps that will imperil the government’s ability to secure the immediate aid it needs from the U.S. in order to repay its upcoming loans and (somewhat) balance its budget.

The only other significant recourse for Pakistan to display its displeasure at an FTO designation of the Haqqani Network would be for the network’s handlers to encourage it to step up attacks inside Afghanistan against NATO and host-country forces. Then again, the Haqqani Network has never really held back from the fullest application of violence, and an increase in attacks should be expected if the Haqqanis were given an FTO designation regardless of outside encouragement. This scenario assumes that the Pakistani military is even able to exert operational control over the Haqqani Network, which is very much in doubt.[39] While Pakistan’s support to, and benevolent ignorance of, the network has been variously established, the notion that the Haqqanis are bound to obey their Pakistani patrons is much more circumspect.[40]

The idea that the U.S. would be forced to designate Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism if the Haqqani Network was labeled as an FTO, furthermore, does not merit serious concern. If the U.S. was compelled to designate Pakistan as such because of its established links to an FTO, such a designation would have been applied long before given Pakistan’s ties to LeT. LeT, the group responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and with which Pakistan’s intelligence services have maintained a longstanding relationship, has been on the FTO list since 2001.[41] If labeling a group as an FTO compelled the U.S. to label all the group’s affiliates as supporters of terrorism, it would have been forced to designate the Haqqani Network as an FTO years ago due to its relations with al Qaeda, among other FTOs. The fact that the Haqqani Network designation is even being debated right now is indicative of the vast leeway the government enjoys in applying the label. Slapping the FTO brand on the Haqqanis is not for the purposes of making sure that bureaucratic lists are meticulously complete, but to give the U.S. government the necessary powers to actively target some of the group’s foundational interests. The U.S. is not compelled to target the Pakistani state as a whole, but it will gain the ability to take action against individuals within Pakistan who are assisting a terror network in its activities.



Conclusion
There could be several motivations for not designating the Haqqani Network as an FTO. The idea that Pakistan is likely to react in a meaningfully negative manner should not be counted among them. Pakistan is about to pass through a very turbulent economic period and needs all the help it can get from friends, aid donors, and willing international financial institutions, the list of which is shrinking. Pakistan is unlikely to further its international isolation, jeopardize the resumption of much-needed CSF payments, and imperil the diminishing but still salvageable viability of its economy in an effort to express its displeasure over actions the U.S. takes that would be, even to the Pakistanis, entirely logical and predictable.

In fact, given the unique circumstances that currently exist, the inherent restraints on Pakistani retaliation and the recent “upward spiral” in U.S.-Pakistan relations (including potential talks of a joint U.S.-Pakistani offensive against the Haqqani Network), the U.S. government is currently presented with what may be a singular opportunity to designate the Haqqanis as an FTO and escape meaningful repercussions from Pakistan.[42]

Pakistan no longer operates in the context of a pure military dictatorship as it did in days past, when the deals and motivations of powerbrokers were more unified and less complicated. The combination of economic woes, a domestic governance deficit that the military does not want to own and the pressures of electoral politics in an election year have all had a tangible impact on the way Pakistan formulates its foreign policy towards the U.S. and its neighborhood writ large. The simple conclusion that Pakistan will match the U.S. for every seeming slight does not necessarily hold true anymore.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[1] Jeffrey Dressler, “The Haqqani Network: A Strategic Threat,” Institute for the Study of War, March 2012. Available: http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Haqqani_StrategicThreatweb_29MAR_0.pdf
[2] “S. 1959: Haqqani Network Terrorist Designation Act of 2011,” 112th Congress, July 17, 2012. Available: Full Text of S. 1959: Haqqani Network Terrorist Designation Act of 2012 - GovTrack.us
[3] Jeffrey Dressler, “The Haqqani Network: A Strategic Threat,” Institute for the Study of War, March 2012. Available: http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Haqqani_StrategicThreatweb_29MAR_0.pdf
[4] Gretchen Peters, “Haqqani Network Financing: The Evolution of an Industry,” Combating Terrorism Center, July 31, 2012. Available: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/CTC_Haqqani_Network_Financing-Report__Final.pdf
Gretchen Peters, “Crime and Insurgency in the Tribal Areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Combating Terrorism Center, October 15, 2010. Available: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/Crime-and-Insurgency_Final.pdf
Jeffrey Dressler, “Terror Is Their Family Business,” The Weekly Standard, July 16, 2012. Available: Terror Is Their Family Business
[5] Gretchen Peters, “Haqqani Network Financing: The Evolution of an Industry,” Combating Terrorism Center, July 31, 2012. Available: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/CTC_Haqqani_Network_Financing-Report__Final.pdf
[6] Julian Pecquet, “House votes to request that State Department designate Pakistan-based Haqqani network as terrorists,” The Hill, July 17, 2012. Available: House votes to request that State Department designate Pakistan-based Haqqani network as terrorists - The Hill's Global Affairs
Jeffrey Dressler, “Terror Is Their Family Business,” The Weekly Standard, July 16, 2012. Available: Terror Is Their Family Business
[7] Julian Pecquet, “House votes to request that State Department designate Pakistan-based Haqqani network as terrorists,” The Hill, July 17, 2012. Available: House votes to request that State Department designate Pakistan-based Haqqani network as terrorists - The Hill's Global Affairs
[8] Ibid.
[9] Jeffrey Dressler, “Terror Is Their Family Business,” The Weekly Standard, July 16, 2012. Available: Terror Is Their Family Business
[10] Based on conversations and communications with Jeffrey Dressler, Senior Analyst at the Institute for the Study of War and an expert on the Haqqani Network, July 2012.
Jeffrey Dressler, “Terror Is Their Family Business,” The Weekly Standard, July 16, 2012. Available: Terror Is Their Family Business
[11] Ibid.
[12] “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” U.S. Department of State, January 27, 2012. Available: Foreign Terrorist Organizations
[13] Jeffrey Dressler, “Terror Is Their Family Business,” The Weekly Standard, July 16, 2012. Available: Terror Is Their Family Business
[14] Jamie Crawford, “Haqqani network not on terror list,” CNN, July 11, 2012. Available: Enemy to U.S. troops but not on the terror list – CNN Security Clearance - CNN.com Blogs
[15] Reza Jan, “Failure in Chicago: No U.S.-Pakistan Deal on NATO Supply Lines,” Critical Threats Project, May 22, 2012. Available: Failure in Chicago: No U.S.-Pakistan Deal on NATO Supply Lines | Critical Threats
David Trilling “Northern Distribution Nightmare,” Foreign Policy, December 6, 2011. Available: Northern Distribution Nightmare - By David Trilling | Foreign Policy
[16] Josh Rogin, “Inside the U.S. ‘apology’ to Pakistan,” Foreign Policy, July 3, 2012. Available: Inside the U.S.
“Eric Schmitt, “Clinton’s ‘Sorry’ to Pakistan Ends Barrier to NATO,” New York Times, July 3, 2012. Available: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/04/w...-to-nato-after-us-apology.html?pagewanted=all
[17] Pakistan’s Finance Ministry’s Debt Policy Statement for 2011-12 implores policymakers to seek out “debt and non-debt foreign currency flows” due to anticipated pressure from IMF repayments due beginning in the second half of FY 2012. “Pakistan Debt Policy Statement 2011-12,” Pakistan Ministry of Finance. Available: http://www.finance.gov.pk/publications/DPS_12.pdf
[18] Figures are based on conversion to U.S. dollars of numbers reported in “Pakistan’s Debt and Liabilities Summary,” State Bank of Pakistan. Available: http://www.sbp.org.pk/ecodata/Summary.pdf
[19] Khurram Hussain, “Towards the debt trap,” Dawn, May 30, 2012. Available: Towards the debt trap | DAWN.COM
[20] Ibid.
[21] Estimate based on stated figures of revenue for FY 2012 as outlined in “Federal Budget 2012-2013: Exploratory Memorandum on Federal Receipts,” Finance Ministry of Pakistan, June 1, 2012. Available: http://www.finance.gov.pk/budget/exp_memorandum_2012_13.pdf
[22] Khurram Hussain, “Towards the debt trap,” Dawn, May 30, 2012. Available: Towards the debt trap | DAWN.COM
[23] Shahbaz Rana, “Fiscal deficit reaches whopping Rs1.68 trillion,” Express Tribune, July 17, 2012. Available: Fiscal deficit reaches whopping Rs1.68 trillion – The Express Tribune
[24] Tom Wright, “Disappointed in Pakistan, IMF Ends Loan Program,” Wall Street Journal, November 2, 2011. Available: IMF Ends Emergency Program for Pakistan - WSJ.com
[25] “Sajid Chaudhry “Govt to pay $2.9bn to IMF in 12 instalments,” Daily Times, August 5, 2012. Available: Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan
[26] “Pakistan: Financial Position in the Fund as of June 30, 2012,” International Monetary Fund. Available: Financial Position in the Fund for Pakistan as of July 31, 2012
[27] Shahid Kardar, “Back in the IMF’s Parlour,” Dawn, May 15, 2012. Available: Back in the IMF
The actual amount of Pakistan’s Foreign Exchange Reserves fluctuates, as of August 2, 2012 it was estimated at over $14.5 billion.
“Pakistan’s forex reserves drop to $14.574 billion” Reuters, August 2, 2012. Available: Pakistan’s forex reserves drop to $14.574 billion | DAWN.COM
[28] Monthly imports averaged $3.3 billion for Pakistan during the period July-April 2011-12.
“Economic Survey of Pakistan 2011-12: Chapter 8: Trade and Payments,” Pakistan Ministry of Finance. Available: http://www.finance.gov.pk/survey/chapter_12/08-TradeAndPayments.pdf
[29] Shahid Kardar, “Back in the IMF’s Parlour,” Dawn, May 15, 2012. Available: Back in the IMF
[30] Reza Jan, “Failure in Chicago: No U.S.-Pakistan Deal on NATO Supply Lines,” Critical Threats Project, May 22, 2012. Available: Failure in Chicago: No U.S.-Pakistan Deal on NATO Supply Lines | Critical Threats
[31] “Eric Schmitt, “Clinton’s ‘Sorry’ to Pakistan Ends Barrier to NATO,” New York Times, July 3, 2012. Available: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/04/w...-to-nato-after-us-apology.html?pagewanted=all
Bradley Klapper and Rebecca Santana, “Pakistan Opens NATO Supply Lines Into Afghanistan,” Huffington Post, July 3, 2012. Available: Pakistan Opens NATO Supply Lines Into Afghanistan
[32] “Eric Schmitt, “Clinton’s ‘Sorry’ to Pakistan Ends Barrier to NATO,” New York Times, July 3, 2012. Available: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/04/w...-to-nato-after-us-apology.html?pagewanted=all
“Pakistan receives $ 1.18 bln from US under coalition support fund,” AFP, August 2, 2012. Available: Pakistan receives $ 1.18 bln from US under coalition support fund | DAWN.COM
[33] Shahbaz Rana, “Pakistan stops billing US for ‘war on terror’ costs,” Express Tribune, December 20, 2011. Available: Pakistan stops billing US for
[34] Shahbaz Rana, “First war on terror bills sent to Washington since OBL raid,” Express Tribune, July 19, 2012. Available: First war on terror bills sent to Washington since OBL raid – The Express Tribune
Mehtab Haider, “US rejects CSF claims of $1.3 bn,” The News, July 18, 2012. Available: http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-16164-US-rejects-CSF-claims-of-$13-bn
[35] Razi Syed, “Pakistan may seek more IMF loan to clear debt,” Daily Times, May 30, 2012. Available: Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan
Pakistan’s defence budget for FY 2012-13 is approximately $6.8 billion, based on figures from Pakistan’s Ministry of Finance.
[36] Shahbaz Rana, “Budget 2012-13: Pakistan includes $1.1 billion in evasive coalition support,” Express Tribune, May 12, 2012. Available: Budget 2012-13: Pakistan includes $1.1b in evasive coalition support – The Express Tribune
[37] “Eric Schmitt, “Clinton’s ‘Sorry’ to Pakistan Ends Barrier to NATO,” New York Times, July 3, 2012. Available: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/04/w...-to-nato-after-us-apology.html?pagewanted=all
[38] Jeremy Herb, “House votes to cut $650M in Pakistan aid,” The Hill, July 19, 2012. Available: House votes to cut $650M in Pakistan aid - The Hill's DEFCON Hill
[39] Gretchen Peters, “Haqqani Network Financing: The Evolution of an Industry,” Combating Terrorism Center, July 31, 2012. Available: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/CTC_Haqqani_Network_Financing-Report__Final.pdf
[40] Ibid.
[41] “Jamaat ud Dawa – JuD (Lashkar e Tayyiba – LT),” U.S. Department of the Treasury Resource Center. Available: Aliases
[42] Siobhan Gorman, “U.S., Pakistan Enter Talks on Counterterror Efforts,” Wall Street Journal, August 3, 2012. Available: U.S., Pakistan Enter Talks on Counterterror Efforts - WSJ.com
“Goodby Haqqani network?” Express Tribune, August 6, 2012. Available: Goodbye, Haqqani network? – The Express Tribune
“US sees ‘progress’ with Pakistan in talks,” AFP, August 2, 2012. Available: US sees ‘progress’ with Pakistan in talks – The Express Tribune
 
.
Designating the Haqqani Network: New Constraints Moderating Pakistan’s Relationship with the U.S.

By Reza Jan

August 8, 2012


Jalaluddin Haqqani points to a map of Afghanistan during a visit to Islamabad, Pakistan in October 2001.


Introduction
The Haqqani Network is one of the most violent and dangerous insurgent organizations, and the most prolific user of terrorism, operating in South Asia today. The network maintains complex and diversified funding streams throughout Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Persian Gulf. The U.S. has done little to combat the network’s financial base or cut into its revenue streams, however. The U.S. State Department has yet to list the group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), a key first step towards actively targeting the group’s international financial activity and support network, despite the group appearing to fit the necessary criteria.

The State Department’s inactivity appears to result at least partly from fears within the U.S. government that designating the Haqqani Network as an FTO will imperil the precarious U.S.-Pakistan relationship and possibly elicit a strong reaction or retaliation from Pakistan. This fear is likely overblown: Pakistan faces a serious, impending financial crisis, the avoidance of which may depend on continuing to improve relations with the U.S. The recently reopened gates of the NATO supply lines are unlikely to be abruptly slammed shut. The list of possible Pakistani reactions to such a move is limited. The constraints on Pakistan’s actions are emblematic of a larger change in the factors governing the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, which now include Pakistan’s teetering economy, upcoming election, and the increased importance of domestic political consideration for Pakistani leaders.



The Haqqanis
The Pakistan-based Haqqani Network is the most virulent enemy group active in Afghanistan. It has historically had close ties to al Qaeda and other regional terrorist and insurgent groups, such as the Quetta Shura Taliban, Pakistani Taliban, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), and others.[1] The group is responsible for some of the worst violence inside Afghanistan, including multiple complex and spectacular attacks in Kabul, attacks on the U.S. embassy and the headquarters of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in September 2011 and April 2012, and the bombing of an American base in Wardak in 2012 that injured 77 U.S. troops.[2]

The group maintains its traditional power center in Paktia, Paktika and Khost provinces of Afghanistan but is based out of North Waziristan agency in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas. In North Waziristan, the Haqqani Network has built itself a safe haven where it is able to plan and prepare for attacks, rest and refit, and coordinate with allied and likeminded insurgent and terrorist groups.[3]

The group also manages a vast network of diversified businesses and financial ventures that gives it deep pockets with which to carry out operations in Afghanistan. The network relies on both licit and illicit forms of revenue: on the illicit side, extortion, smuggling networks, kidnapping and racketeering are widespread; on the licit side, the Haqqanis are engaged in running construction companies and car dealerships among other ventures, many of which are believed to be linked to the Pakistani military’s own expansive business establishment.[4] The group also raises large amounts of money in the form of donations from wealthy individuals in Gulf Arab countries.[5]



The Supposed Pitfalls of Designation
To date, the State Department has not designated the Haqqani Network as an FTO, despite repeated calls from lawmakers and military commanders, and numerous pieces of legislation being introduced urging it to do so.[6] On July 16, Congress passed a bill urging the State Department to declare the network an FTO or to explain why it was refusing to do so.[7] The State Department announced in November 2011 that it was conducting a “final formal review” on whether to label the Haqqani Network as an FTO.[8] It has thus far refused to take any action against the group as a whole, choosing instead to target individual members of the network.[9]

According to Jeffrey Dressler at the Institute for the Study of War, designating the entire network rather than just individual members has big advantages when it comes to tackling its resource streams and degrading its operations.[10] An FTO designation allows U.S. authorities to seize a designee’s property, freeze its bank accounts, and make it illegal to engage in business with it. Individuals can, however, take precautions that would prevent damage being levied upon their network as a whole, for example, by transferring assets in their name to a different member of the organization. Designating the whole network as an FTO would enable the U.S. to target not only every member of the organization and all its assets, but also anybody engaging in business with, affiliated with, or found to be supporting the network.[11] In theory, by targeting facilitators and their international assets and interests, the U.S. would be able to dramatically increase the cost of doing business with the Haqqani Network, both in Afghanistan, and across international borders.

Given that the Haqqani Network appears to fit all the criteria for designation—it is foreign, engages in terrorism, and threatens U.S. nationals or national security—and that doing so would give the U.S. strong tools with which to take on the group, why has the State Department dawdled on designation for so long?[12] According to Dressler, opponents of designation fear endangering U.S. peace negotiations with the Taliban and eliciting a negative reaction from Pakistan, which the U.S. accuses of being the Haqqani Network’s primary sponsor.[13] They further tout that labeling the Haqqani Network as an FTO will put the U.S. in the awkward position of being forced to designate Pakistan, with which it is heavily engaged, as a state sponsor of terrorism.[14]



A Rocky Past for U.S.-Pakistan Relations
The fear that Pakistan will react strongly to such a designation is colored by the turbulent recent history of U.S.-Pakistan relations. Those fears do not, however, take into account changed ground realities and domestic pressures inside Pakistan that will likely work to constrain such a reaction.

Relations between the U.S. and Pakistan have suffered dramatically over the past year and a half. The breakdown started with the killing of two Pakistanis in Lahore by a CIA contractor in February 2011. This incident was exacerbated by the May 2011 raid that killed Osama bin Laden deep inside Pakistan and embarrassed the Pakistani government. The relationship reached its nadir in November 2011 when, following a botched border raid in which U.S. forces killed 24 Pakistani soldiers, Pakistan closed NATO supply lines through the country to Afghanistan for over seven months. The supply route closure forced the U.S. to move the majority of its Afghanistan-bound traffic through vastly more expensive air routes and ground routes through Russia and Central Asia.[15] The Pakistani routes were recently reopened following protracted and painstaking negotiations between the U.S. and Pakistan.[16]

Those who worry about a Pakistani reaction fear that Pakistan may retaliate by once again closing the supply routes through the country, or engineering causes for backlogs, delays, and other roadblocks to NATO traffic. An additional worry is that Pakistan may encourage the Haqqani Network to launch increased and deadlier attacks upon U.S. troops inside Afghanistan.



The Dire State of Pakistan’s Economy
The idea that Pakistan could take its anger out on the U.S. by utilizing its most readily available form of leverage—control over NATO supply routes to Afghanistan—fails to recognize that the Pakistanis have their own reasons for not wanting to scuttle the recent supply routes deal and the accompanying improvement in bilateral relations. Pakistan’s economy is growing more fragile by the day and is soon to be subject to extraordinary external pressures. These pressures forced the Pakistanis to essentially capitulate in the supply routes contest in the hope that a deal would help restart stalled aid flows from the U.S., which are vital to ensuring the Pakistani economy does not go into freefall this year.[17]





That Pakistan is economically in poor health is not new. In fiscal year (FY) 2012 (which ended on June 30), the country had an annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of around $230 billion and held a public debt of nearly $140 billion, giving it a debt to GDP ratio of over 60 percent.[18] While that number by itself is not indicative of an economy in danger, Pakistan, unlike many other countries which have similar or higher debt to GDP ratios, has an extremely narrow revenue base.[19] Pakistan needs to have a tax net of approximately 15 percent of GDP to maintain a healthy economy with its levels of public debt.[20] Pakistan’s current tax net is no more than nine percent.[21] There is little room to expand revenue by increasing taxation on those within the tax net, and the political barriers to expanding the tax net in Pakistan are extremely high.[22] Pakistan ran a budget deficit of approximately eight percent of GDP in FY 2012, nearly double its target for that fiscal year.[23] While the level of debt to GDP in Pakistan is not dangerous by itself, it is more than Pakistan is able to afford.

While the above figures are indicative of Pakistan’s generally unhealthy economy, the reasons for its precarious political position today come from more immediate economic pressures. In 2008, amid the prospects of catastrophic economic failure, Pakistan went to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a bailout package that exceeded $11 billion, repayable from 2012 through 2015 (in 2011, Pakistan did not receive the last $3 billion tranche of the program because it failed to satisfy IMF fiscal targets governing the release of the final tranche).[24] While the bailout program staved off financial disaster and a default on foreign debt in 2008, Pakistan faces intense economic pressure now that it has to start repaying its loans to the IMF. It paid back over $1.2 billion to the Fund in FY 2012.[25]





Foreign and domestic debt servicing ate into over one third of Pakistan’s national budget for FY 2012-13, and Pakistan owes over $3 billion more to the IMF in 2013.[26] For the moment, Pakistan has been meeting its foreign obligations by utilizing the $15 billion in its foreign exchange reserves.[27] Over half that amount is money Pakistan received from the IMF bailout, however, and the remainder would not be able to afford even five months of imports for Pakistan.[28] Given the extremely heavy burden the country faces, it is looking for quick salves and may even face going back to the IMF for a second bailout if it is unable to service its current debt.[29]

It is in this context that Pakistan approached recent negotiations with the U.S. over reopening the NATO supply lines. Pakistan initially took a hard line, demanding an unambiguous apology from the U.S. for the death of its troops, and a hike in fees from $250 to $5,000 for every NATO tanker that transited Pakistan.[30] The U.S. called Pakistan’s bluff, however. The U.S. refused to accede to what it saw as Pakistani rent-seeking and began expanding its use of alternative supply routes to Pakistan, accepting the greatly increased cost of the indirect transport route. The U.S. also withheld over $1.2 billion in military aid to Pakistan under the Coalition Support Funds (CSF) program.[31]

Pakistan likely realized that its supply blockade was not having the intended effect on the U.S., and once financial deadlines started to loom in the U.S. and Pakistan, its conditions began to soften and evaporate. Pakistan settled for a “soft” apology from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and dropped its request for increased truck fees. The U.S., for its part, agreed to expedite the release of the stalled $1.2 billion under the CSF program.[32]

Two separate ticking clocks likely forced Pakistan’s hand in the supply route negotiations: the maturing IMF loans due in 2013 and the end of the U.S. fiscal year FY 2012 on October 1, 2012. At the end of FY 2012, unspent money appropriated for that year can no longer be disbursed. If Pakistan waited any longer, it would have risked losing the outstanding $1.2 billion as well as any further CSF reimbursements it could claim for costs incurred after May 2011 when it stopped submitting receipts to the U.S. as part of its protest against the bin Laden raid.[33] Pakistan has thus far submitted over $600 million for the period after May 2011, and the new bills could run into the billions (though the U.S. typically only approves about 60 percent of the amount Pakistan bills).[34]



While $1.2 billion is essentially budget dust to the U.S., it is equivalent to one-sixth of Pakistan’s defense budget and could mean the difference on whether it defaults on its foreign loans or is forced to go back to the IMF.[35] Indeed, Pakistan’s FY 2013 budget included over $1 billion in CSF payments that it expected to receive but that were blocked due to the supply chain impasse.[36] One indicator of the central importance of these concerns to the Pakistani negotiating position is the fact that the man appointed to lead Pakistani negotiations with the U.S. over reopening the supply routes following initial negotiating failures was none other than its finance minister, Abdul Hafeez Shaikh.[37]



Limited Options for Retaliation
Given its precarious economic footing, Pakistan is unlikely to jeopardize its financial lifeline by reclosing supply routes any time soon. Indeed, the aid sword continues to dangle hazardously overhead for Pakistan. On July 20, the U.S. Congress voted to cut $650 million in aid to Pakistan as part of its defense appropriations bill, the latest in a number of bills threatening to strip Pakistan of aid it had been authorized.[38] While that number is likely to change based on the way the House and Senate share appropriations responsibilities, the message is probably not lost on the Pakistanis that they have few friends left in Washington, D.C. and that aid from the U.S. is no longer the sure thing it used to be. Furthermore, Pakistan recognizes the importance of needing to improve relations with the U.S.; if it does need to go back to the IMF to seek readjustment of its current loans, or additional bailout funding, the IMF would be unlikely to cooperate in the face of strong U.S. opposition.

The Pakistani military, which has a history of intervening in the name of national interest during particularly dire domestic situations, appears to be at a loss for how to rectify Pakistan’s economic ship. The military has largely watched from the sidelines, allowing the civilian government to take ownership of the crisis lest it be tarred by the same brush when time comes to assign responsibility for the country’s economic failures. The civilian government is well aware that it is going to be seen as responsible for the country’s economic fortunes. Given that this is an election year in Pakistan, the government will likely not let the military easily bully it into closing off supply routes or undertaking steps that will imperil the government’s ability to secure the immediate aid it needs from the U.S. in order to repay its upcoming loans and (somewhat) balance its budget.

The only other significant recourse for Pakistan to display its displeasure at an FTO designation of the Haqqani Network would be for the network’s handlers to encourage it to step up attacks inside Afghanistan against NATO and host-country forces. Then again, the Haqqani Network has never really held back from the fullest application of violence, and an increase in attacks should be expected if the Haqqanis were given an FTO designation regardless of outside encouragement. This scenario assumes that the Pakistani military is even able to exert operational control over the Haqqani Network, which is very much in doubt.[39] While Pakistan’s support to, and benevolent ignorance of, the network has been variously established, the notion that the Haqqanis are bound to obey their Pakistani patrons is much more circumspect.[40]

The idea that the U.S. would be forced to designate Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism if the Haqqani Network was labeled as an FTO, furthermore, does not merit serious concern. If the U.S. was compelled to designate Pakistan as such because of its established links to an FTO, such a designation would have been applied long before given Pakistan’s ties to LeT. LeT, the group responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and with which Pakistan’s intelligence services have maintained a longstanding relationship, has been on the FTO list since 2001.[41] If labeling a group as an FTO compelled the U.S. to label all the group’s affiliates as supporters of terrorism, it would have been forced to designate the Haqqani Network as an FTO years ago due to its relations with al Qaeda, among other FTOs. The fact that the Haqqani Network designation is even being debated right now is indicative of the vast leeway the government enjoys in applying the label. Slapping the FTO brand on the Haqqanis is not for the purposes of making sure that bureaucratic lists are meticulously complete, but to give the U.S. government the necessary powers to actively target some of the group’s foundational interests. The U.S. is not compelled to target the Pakistani state as a whole, but it will gain the ability to take action against individuals within Pakistan who are assisting a terror network in its activities.



Conclusion
There could be several motivations for not designating the Haqqani Network as an FTO. The idea that Pakistan is likely to react in a meaningfully negative manner should not be counted among them. Pakistan is about to pass through a very turbulent economic period and needs all the help it can get from friends, aid donors, and willing international financial institutions, the list of which is shrinking. Pakistan is unlikely to further its international isolation, jeopardize the resumption of much-needed CSF payments, and imperil the diminishing but still salvageable viability of its economy in an effort to express its displeasure over actions the U.S. takes that would be, even to the Pakistanis, entirely logical and predictable.

In fact, given the unique circumstances that currently exist, the inherent restraints on Pakistani retaliation and the recent “upward spiral” in U.S.-Pakistan relations (including potential talks of a joint U.S.-Pakistani offensive against the Haqqani Network), the U.S. government is currently presented with what may be a singular opportunity to designate the Haqqanis as an FTO and escape meaningful repercussions from Pakistan.[42]

Pakistan no longer operates in the context of a pure military dictatorship as it did in days past, when the deals and motivations of powerbrokers were more unified and less complicated. The combination of economic woes, a domestic governance deficit that the military does not want to own and the pressures of electoral politics in an election year have all had a tangible impact on the way Pakistan formulates its foreign policy towards the U.S. and its neighborhood writ large. The simple conclusion that Pakistan will match the U.S. for every seeming slight does not necessarily hold true anymore.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[1] Jeffrey Dressler, “The Haqqani Network: A Strategic Threat,” Institute for the Study of War, March 2012. Available: http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Haqqani_StrategicThreatweb_29MAR_0.pdf
[2] “S. 1959: Haqqani Network Terrorist Designation Act of 2011,” 112th Congress, July 17, 2012. Available: Full Text of S. 1959: Haqqani Network Terrorist Designation Act of 2012 - GovTrack.us
[3] Jeffrey Dressler, “The Haqqani Network: A Strategic Threat,” Institute for the Study of War, March 2012. Available: http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Haqqani_StrategicThreatweb_29MAR_0.pdf
[4] Gretchen Peters, “Haqqani Network Financing: The Evolution of an Industry,” Combating Terrorism Center, July 31, 2012. Available: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/CTC_Haqqani_Network_Financing-Report__Final.pdf
Gretchen Peters, “Crime and Insurgency in the Tribal Areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Combating Terrorism Center, October 15, 2010. Available: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/Crime-and-Insurgency_Final.pdf
Jeffrey Dressler, “Terror Is Their Family Business,” The Weekly Standard, July 16, 2012. Available: Terror Is Their Family Business
[5] Gretchen Peters, “Haqqani Network Financing: The Evolution of an Industry,” Combating Terrorism Center, July 31, 2012. Available: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/CTC_Haqqani_Network_Financing-Report__Final.pdf
[6] Julian Pecquet, “House votes to request that State Department designate Pakistan-based Haqqani network as terrorists,” The Hill, July 17, 2012. Available: House votes to request that State Department designate Pakistan-based Haqqani network as terrorists - The Hill's Global Affairs
Jeffrey Dressler, “Terror Is Their Family Business,” The Weekly Standard, July 16, 2012. Available: Terror Is Their Family Business
[7] Julian Pecquet, “House votes to request that State Department designate Pakistan-based Haqqani network as terrorists,” The Hill, July 17, 2012. Available: House votes to request that State Department designate Pakistan-based Haqqani network as terrorists - The Hill's Global Affairs
[8] Ibid.
[9] Jeffrey Dressler, “Terror Is Their Family Business,” The Weekly Standard, July 16, 2012. Available: Terror Is Their Family Business
[10] Based on conversations and communications with Jeffrey Dressler, Senior Analyst at the Institute for the Study of War and an expert on the Haqqani Network, July 2012.
Jeffrey Dressler, “Terror Is Their Family Business,” The Weekly Standard, July 16, 2012. Available: Terror Is Their Family Business
[11] Ibid.
[12] “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” U.S. Department of State, January 27, 2012. Available: Foreign Terrorist Organizations
[13] Jeffrey Dressler, “Terror Is Their Family Business,” The Weekly Standard, July 16, 2012. Available: Terror Is Their Family Business
[14] Jamie Crawford, “Haqqani network not on terror list,” CNN, July 11, 2012. Available: Enemy to U.S. troops but not on the terror list – CNN Security Clearance - CNN.com Blogs
[15] Reza Jan, “Failure in Chicago: No U.S.-Pakistan Deal on NATO Supply Lines,” Critical Threats Project, May 22, 2012. Available: Failure in Chicago: No U.S.-Pakistan Deal on NATO Supply Lines | Critical Threats
David Trilling “Northern Distribution Nightmare,” Foreign Policy, December 6, 2011. Available: Northern Distribution Nightmare - By David Trilling | Foreign Policy
[16] Josh Rogin, “Inside the U.S. ‘apology’ to Pakistan,” Foreign Policy, July 3, 2012. Available: Inside the U.S.
“Eric Schmitt, “Clinton’s ‘Sorry’ to Pakistan Ends Barrier to NATO,” New York Times, July 3, 2012. Available: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/04/w...-to-nato-after-us-apology.html?pagewanted=all
[17] Pakistan’s Finance Ministry’s Debt Policy Statement for 2011-12 implores policymakers to seek out “debt and non-debt foreign currency flows” due to anticipated pressure from IMF repayments due beginning in the second half of FY 2012. “Pakistan Debt Policy Statement 2011-12,” Pakistan Ministry of Finance. Available: http://www.finance.gov.pk/publications/DPS_12.pdf
[18] Figures are based on conversion to U.S. dollars of numbers reported in “Pakistan’s Debt and Liabilities Summary,” State Bank of Pakistan. Available: http://www.sbp.org.pk/ecodata/Summary.pdf
[19] Khurram Hussain, “Towards the debt trap,” Dawn, May 30, 2012. Available: Towards the debt trap | DAWN.COM
[20] Ibid.
[21] Estimate based on stated figures of revenue for FY 2012 as outlined in “Federal Budget 2012-2013: Exploratory Memorandum on Federal Receipts,” Finance Ministry of Pakistan, June 1, 2012. Available: http://www.finance.gov.pk/budget/exp_memorandum_2012_13.pdf
[22] Khurram Hussain, “Towards the debt trap,” Dawn, May 30, 2012. Available: Towards the debt trap | DAWN.COM
[23] Shahbaz Rana, “Fiscal deficit reaches whopping Rs1.68 trillion,” Express Tribune, July 17, 2012. Available: Fiscal deficit reaches whopping Rs1.68 trillion – The Express Tribune
[24] Tom Wright, “Disappointed in Pakistan, IMF Ends Loan Program,” Wall Street Journal, November 2, 2011. Available: IMF Ends Emergency Program for Pakistan - WSJ.com
[25] “Sajid Chaudhry “Govt to pay $2.9bn to IMF in 12 instalments,” Daily Times, August 5, 2012. Available: Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan
[26] “Pakistan: Financial Position in the Fund as of June 30, 2012,” International Monetary Fund. Available: Financial Position in the Fund for Pakistan as of July 31, 2012
[27] Shahid Kardar, “Back in the IMF’s Parlour,” Dawn, May 15, 2012. Available: Back in the IMF
The actual amount of Pakistan’s Foreign Exchange Reserves fluctuates, as of August 2, 2012 it was estimated at over $14.5 billion.
“Pakistan’s forex reserves drop to $14.574 billion” Reuters, August 2, 2012. Available: Pakistan’s forex reserves drop to $14.574 billion | DAWN.COM
[28] Monthly imports averaged $3.3 billion for Pakistan during the period July-April 2011-12.
“Economic Survey of Pakistan 2011-12: Chapter 8: Trade and Payments,” Pakistan Ministry of Finance. Available: http://www.finance.gov.pk/survey/chapter_12/08-TradeAndPayments.pdf
[29] Shahid Kardar, “Back in the IMF’s Parlour,” Dawn, May 15, 2012. Available: Back in the IMF
[30] Reza Jan, “Failure in Chicago: No U.S.-Pakistan Deal on NATO Supply Lines,” Critical Threats Project, May 22, 2012. Available: Failure in Chicago: No U.S.-Pakistan Deal on NATO Supply Lines | Critical Threats
[31] “Eric Schmitt, “Clinton’s ‘Sorry’ to Pakistan Ends Barrier to NATO,” New York Times, July 3, 2012. Available: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/04/w...-to-nato-after-us-apology.html?pagewanted=all
Bradley Klapper and Rebecca Santana, “Pakistan Opens NATO Supply Lines Into Afghanistan,” Huffington Post, July 3, 2012. Available: Pakistan Opens NATO Supply Lines Into Afghanistan
[32] “Eric Schmitt, “Clinton’s ‘Sorry’ to Pakistan Ends Barrier to NATO,” New York Times, July 3, 2012. Available: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/04/w...-to-nato-after-us-apology.html?pagewanted=all
“Pakistan receives $ 1.18 bln from US under coalition support fund,” AFP, August 2, 2012. Available: Pakistan receives $ 1.18 bln from US under coalition support fund | DAWN.COM
[33] Shahbaz Rana, “Pakistan stops billing US for ‘war on terror’ costs,” Express Tribune, December 20, 2011. Available: Pakistan stops billing US for
[34] Shahbaz Rana, “First war on terror bills sent to Washington since OBL raid,” Express Tribune, July 19, 2012. Available: First war on terror bills sent to Washington since OBL raid – The Express Tribune
Mehtab Haider, “US rejects CSF claims of $1.3 bn,” The News, July 18, 2012. Available: http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-16164-US-rejects-CSF-claims-of-$13-bn
[35] Razi Syed, “Pakistan may seek more IMF loan to clear debt,” Daily Times, May 30, 2012. Available: Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan
Pakistan’s defence budget for FY 2012-13 is approximately $6.8 billion, based on figures from Pakistan’s Ministry of Finance.
[36] Shahbaz Rana, “Budget 2012-13: Pakistan includes $1.1 billion in evasive coalition support,” Express Tribune, May 12, 2012. Available: Budget 2012-13: Pakistan includes $1.1b in evasive coalition support – The Express Tribune
[37] “Eric Schmitt, “Clinton’s ‘Sorry’ to Pakistan Ends Barrier to NATO,” New York Times, July 3, 2012. Available: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/04/w...-to-nato-after-us-apology.html?pagewanted=all
[38] Jeremy Herb, “House votes to cut $650M in Pakistan aid,” The Hill, July 19, 2012. Available: House votes to cut $650M in Pakistan aid - The Hill's DEFCON Hill
[39] Gretchen Peters, “Haqqani Network Financing: The Evolution of an Industry,” Combating Terrorism Center, July 31, 2012. Available: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/CTC_Haqqani_Network_Financing-Report__Final.pdf
[40] Ibid.
[41] “Jamaat ud Dawa – JuD (Lashkar e Tayyiba – LT),” U.S. Department of the Treasury Resource Center. Available: Aliases
[42] Siobhan Gorman, “U.S., Pakistan Enter Talks on Counterterror Efforts,” Wall Street Journal, August 3, 2012. Available: U.S., Pakistan Enter Talks on Counterterror Efforts - WSJ.com
“Goodby Haqqani network?” Express Tribune, August 6, 2012. Available: Goodbye, Haqqani network? – The Express Tribune
“US sees ‘progress’ with Pakistan in talks,” AFP, August 2, 2012. Available: US sees ‘progress’ with Pakistan in talks – The Express Tribune
 
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Pakistan Army moving ahead with Swat drawdown despite Taliban shooting


Author:Farhan Bokhari, Islamabad

Last posted:2012-Oct-25



The Pakistan Army is confident that a recent high-profile attack against a teenage girl by the Pakistan Taliban in the Swat region is an isolated incident and is preparing to reduce the number of troops deployed to the region.

The army forced the Taliban out of Swat in northern Pakistan in 2009 during a three-month campaign that prevented the militants from enacting a plan to turn the region into an Islamist enclave. Military strategists saw the campaign as an important demonstration of the army's ability to fight a non-conventional enemy, a mission far different from its traditional role as a conventional deterrent force positioned against India.

The 9 October shooting of Malala Yousafzai, a 14-year-old schoolgirl who had publicly condemned the Taliban for opposing the education of girls, prompted widespread concern that the Taliban was re-emerging in Swat. Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed responsibility for the attack in Mingora, Swat's largest city.

However, Major General Asim Bajwa, director general of the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) agency, commented that the shooting was an isolated incident. "The army is on its way to move out of the Swat valley. By early 2013, there will be more reduction of troops," he said.

While the Pakistan Army does not provide exact troop numbers for security reasons, a senior security official stated that there are currently three brigades under its 19th Division based at Khwazakhela in Swat.

A senior Western defence official said Ms Yousafzai's shooting has "clearly outraged many of us. But this case does not indicate the Taliban are anywhere near seizing territory, which was a very real threat in 2009." He added that the troops removed from Swat would probably be deployed close to Pakistan's border with Afghanistan.

COMMENT
The shooting of Malala Yousafzai has prompted fresh concerns inside Pakistan over the targeting of those who publicly take positions against the Taliban. Security officials, however, concur with the Western defence official in not seeing it as part of a wider strategic trend.

"This shooting is, of course, extremely unfortunate. said one senior Pakistan intelligence officer. "If the concern over a Taliban comeback was serious, the army would not have been preparing to reduce its troops in Swat," he added.

DW
 
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BARA: Nine bullet-riddled bodies of Taliban fighters found in North Waziristan. PHOTO: AFP/FILE At least 14 people were killed in air raids on militant hideouts in the remote Tirah Valley of Khyber Agency on Monday. Security forces, however, claimed that
eight suspected militants were killed in air strikes. Pakistan Air Force (PAF) warplanes bombed two houses in the Malikdin Khel area of
Tirah, killing 14 people, a political administration official told The Express Tribune on
condition of anonymity. He added that the houses belonged to two local tribesmen Hunar Baz and Ashraf Khan,
but refused to provide details. The warplanes fired two missiles at the houses,
according to local sources. The conflicting accounts could not be verified independently
as journalists have no access to the areas infested with militants. Meanwhile, medics at Peshawar’s Hyatabad Medical Complex said on Monday that they
have received 10 injured people.It wasn’t clear if the men were injured in the Tirah blitz.
The Express Tribune tried to contact government officials – but either they did not
respond to calls or simply refused to comment. Earlier on December 22, two militants
were killed and as many injured in airstrike on their hideouts in Tirah Valley, which
remains under the virtual control of a strange mix of militant groups. Due to its strategic location, militant groups, including Lashkar-e-Islam, Tehreek-e-Taliban
Pakistan and Ansarul Islam, have carved out hideouts in the valley. Local tribesmen have
little contact with the outside world due to its inaccessibility. Dumped bodies In North Waziristan Agency, nine bullet-riddled bodies of suspected Taliban fighters
were found dumped by a roadside. A security official said unidentified men killed the insurgents and dumped their bodies
on a roadside in Peer Kaley village, 10 kilometres east of Miramshah, the main town in
North Waziristan. “No one knows who killed them,” the security official added. The TTP claimed that the slain men were its fighters from Mehsud tribe and that they
were killed by security forces. “Soon we will avenge these deaths,” TTP spokesperson
Ehsanullah Ehsan told journalists in a phone call from an undisclosed location. (With additional reporting by our correspondents in Peshawar and Miramshah) Published in The Express Tribune, January 1st, 2013. Tweet 5 Share this article

http://tribune.com.pk/story/487271/14-killed-in-tirah-valley-air-blitz/
 
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