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Mechanised Divisions Pakistan Army

So my friends there are thousands of such articels and information available to Indian Military not because of us or PDF but because from traitors in our own lines !

Traitors are:
The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in FATA and Waziristan

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in South Waziristan (which also included Chechan and Uighur militants)

Against the anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan in the sensitive Darra Adam Khel-Kohat area of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa or KPK (formerly NWFP) and the Shia-dominated Kurram Agency of FATA

The Tehrik-e-Nifaz-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), headed by Maulana Fazlullah

The Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) in the Swat Valley of KPK.

The BLA which is active in Balochistan

Political traitors such as Altaf Hussain and the PPPs Zardari

the list is very long !

Check that, its from Hindu national Military organisation ! @django @Signalian also nice reading for you guys to understand the Hindus military perspective !

http://trishul-trident.blogspot.de/2016/10/gloves-are-finally-off-against-those.html



On paper, to the north, those Pakistan Army (PA) battle formations that are LoC-specific and Chicken’s Neck-specific are the Mangla-based I Corps that comprises the Gujranwala-based 6 Armoured Division, Kharian-based 17 Infantry Division, the 37 Mechanised Infantry Division also in Kharian, and the 8 Independent Armoured Brigade; and the Rawalpindi-based X Corps that includes the Gilgit-based Force Command Gilgit-Baltistan, Murree-based 12 Infantry Division, Mangla-based 19 Infantry Division, the Jhelum-based 23 Infantry Division, and the Rawalpindi-based 111 Independent Infantry Brigade. Formations allocated for operations along the ‘Shakargarh Bulge’ are the Gujranwala-based XXX Corps comprising the Sialkot-based 8 Infantry Division and 15 Infantry Division; Lahore-based IV Corps with its 10 and 11 Infantry Divisions, two semi-mechanised Independent Infantry Brigades (including the 212 Bde) and one Independent Armoured Brigade; and the Multan-based II Corps made up of the Multan-based 1 Armoured Division, and the Okara-based 14 Infantry Division, 40 Infantry Division and an Independent Armoured Brigade. Thus far, no significant forward deployments of any of these formations have taken place. View attachment 438179

Down south, the battle formations arrayed against Rajasthan include the Bahawalpur-based XXXI Corps with its 26 Mechanised Division, 35 Infantry Division, two Independent Armoured Brigades and the 105 Independent Infantry Brigade; and the Karachi-based V Corps with its Pano Aqil-based 16 Infantry Division, Hyderabad-based 18 Infantry Division, Malir-based 25 Mechanised Division, plus three Independent Armoured Brigades at Malir, Pano Aqil and Hyderabad. So far, only some elements of the 25 and 26 Mechanised Divisions have been deployed opposite an area stretching from Jaisalmer to Fort Abbas and the PA has begun flying relentless sorties of its Shahpar (CH-3) tactical UAVs that were acquired from China’s CATIC in 2012.

This is probably a precautionary measure aimed at monitoring the IA’s upcoming Division-level armoured/mechanised infantry exercises that are held during wintertime. Along the Durand Line, formations that are deployed include the Peshawar-based XI Corps currently with its 7, 9, 14, 17 Divisions and part of 23 Division, along with two independent infantry brigades; and the Quetta-based XII Corps with the 33 and 41 Infantry Divisions).

The PA, however, is most unlikely to attempt any form of escalation along either the LoC or the WB since it presently has a deployment ratio of 54.6%, while the resting and re-equipping ratio is 12.7%, and the remaining 33% is undergoing the training cycle. This trend will continue for at least another four years, since the defunct Durand Line too became active from mid-2014.

It may be recalled that since March 2002, the PA has been forced by elements that later on went on to become the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) by 2006 to wage a three-front war against the TTP and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in South Waziristan (which also included Chechan and Uighur militants; against the anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan in the sensitive Darra Adam Khel-Kohat area of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa or KPK (formerly NWFP) and the Shia-dominated Kurram Agency of FATA; and, against the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), headed by Maulana Fazlullah, and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) in the Swat Valley of KPK.

The TTP’s cadre base is more than 20,000 tribesmen and the Abdullah Mehsud group from the Alizai clan of the Mehsud tribe from South Waziristan commands about 5,000 fighters. Other militant groups within the TTP include Maulvi Nazir from the Kaka Khel sub-tribe of the Ahmadzai Waziri tribe (South Waziristan), Hafiz Gul Bahadur from the Ibrahim Khel clan of the Utmanzai Wazir tribe (North Waziristan), the Haqqani network using manpower from the Mezi sub-tribe of the Zadran tribe (North Waziristan), Mangal Bagh (Khyber), TNSM (Swat, Dir, Malakand), and Faqir Mohammad (Bajaur).

Some 35% of PA troops (about 180,000 out of an end-strength of approximately 550,000 active-duty personnel and another 500,000 reservists) were engaged in LIC campaigns since 2007 till 2014 and are still literally bogged down throughout the entire 27,200 square kilometres of FATA.

Formations fully committed to LIC operations include the 37 Mechanised Infantry Division and 17 Infantry Division from Mangla-based I Corps in Swat, 19 Infantry Division from X Corps in northern Swat (based out of Jhelum), 7 Infantry Division from Rawalpindi-based X Corps in North Waziristan (based out of Mardan), 9 Infantry Division from Peshawar-based XI Corps in South Waziristan (based out of Kohat), 14 Division from Multan-based II Corps, Jhelum-based 23 Division (with 7 infantry brigades) of the X Corps, and 40 Infantry Division. The Gujranwala-based XXX Corps and the Bahawalpur-based XXXI Corps lent one Brigade each.


In all, there are approximately 17 infantry brigades or 45 infantry battalions, and 58 Frontier Corps (FC) wings now engaged in LIC operations. By mid-2011, 1,83,400 troops had a westward deployment orientation (it now stands at 206,000), while another 10,000 are now abroad on UN-related peacekeeping missions.

Clearly, therefore, the PA is most unlikely to stage large-scale land offensives involving manoeuvre warfare. Instead, the PA, whose MBT armoury presently comprises 550 Al Khalids, 320 Type 85IIAPs upgraded to Al Zarrar standard, 500 Type 59s upgraded to Al Zarrar standard, 380 Type 59s, 450 69IIAPs, and 320 T-80UDs, making for a total of 2,520 tanks, is likely to do what it did in both 1965 and 1971, i.e. use the combination of its armoured and mechanised infantry assets to swiftly transform Pakistan’s semi-urban and rural areas bordering India’s Jammu & Kashmir, Punjab and Rajasthan states into impregnable fortresses for the sake of blunting the Indian Army’s (IA) expected shallow-depth land offensives that could be launched from southern J & K and northern Punjab through the Chicken’s Neck and Shakargarh Bulge areas.

Given Pakistan’s elongated geography, it is possible for the PA to use its interior lines of communications for deploying its warfighting assets to their forward concentration areas within 72 hours. To this end, the PA has since 2007 built a sprawling new central ammunition storage depot to the South of its Mangla Cantonment, and has also expanded the existing depot at Kharian.

Therefore, the IA’s principal doctrinal challenge is to seek ways of enticing the PA to come out in the open so that its armoured/mechanised infantry formations are forced to engage in manoeuvre wars of attrition, during which the IA will be required to swiftly locate and destroy in detail the adversary’s warfighting assets and capabilities. Exactly how this can be achieved is explained below.



Key Areas Requiring Attention
It is obvious from the above-mentioned dispositions of the PA’s armoured/mechanised infantry formations that Pakistan’s heartland remains its province of Punjab, and nothing else. From this, one can deduce that the full conventional might of the PA will be utilised for denying the IA the much-needed space for deep AirLand battles. All talk, therefore, of the PA acquiring ‘full-spectrum’ nuclear deterrence through the deployment of TNWs to thwart large-scale IA land offensives is therefore utter baloney and boulderdash. This becomes starkly evident when analysing the IA’s objectives for its future AirLand campaigns that will most likely focus on ways and means of seizing back Azad Kashmir (Azad Kashmir) through multi-dimensional AirLand campaigns being launched from the southwest, east and to the north00all aimed at capturing the districts of Bagh, Bhimber, Kotli, Mirpur and Muzaffarabad. The PA will consequently be forced to commit the bulk of its offensive Strike Corps formations against those IA’s offensive formations poised for breakout throughout India’s Punjab State and the southern portion of Jammu & Kashmir State.


So my friends there are thousands of such articels and information available to Indian Military not because of us or PDF but because from traitors in our own lines !
Of course India has it's assets over here and we also have our own assets in India or at least I bloody hope so :azn:, for all the hawkish Indian bluster about inflicting a defeat of magnitude similar to that of 71 in reality they know they have very little options other than the ones they are currently pursuing ie BLA, TTP, contract killers from a certain political party I shall not mention etc and these assets of theirs are on the backfoot due to measures put in place by initially Gen Raheel Sharif and subsequently Gen Bajwa,,,,thoughtful Indian defence analyst Col (retd) Ajai Shukla summed it up best, from 15:55 .Kudos bro
@Signalian @Mentee @Joe Shearer
 
Of course India has it's assets over here and we also have our own assets in India or at least I bloody hope so :azn:, for all the hawkish Indian bluster about inflicting a defeat of magnitude similar to that of 71 in reality they know they have very little options other than the ones they are currently pursuing ie BLA, TTP, contract killers from a certain political party I shall not mention etc and these assets of theirs are on the backfoot due to measures put in place by initially Gen Raheel Sharif and subsequently Gen Bajwa,,,,thoughtful Indian defence analyst Col (retd) Ajai Shukla summed it up best, from 15:55 .Kudos bro
@Signalian @Mentee @Joe Shearer

He's right, in present circumstances, isn't he? Do we want to create a BLA or a TTP? Keeping aside, for a minute, the Pakistani credo that all who do not believe in Pakistan are Indian paid stooges?

The second thing to note is again something that Col. Shukla pointed out, we are facing an establishment that is totally uninhibited. I have said this before, and I will say it again, we cannot match Pakistan in its complete lack of self-control.

The last thing that I want to point out is something that is not available to us, given our present outlook and attitude towards things internal, not towards things outside. Do you check your private mail?
 
@Signalian

India has nearly 6,000 tanks in inventory; Pakistan has 4,000, to the best of my knowledge. Given that 1/3 of the inventory has to be committed to defend against attacks in the northern theatre, are you saying that because of the parity, Pakistan is ahead, as being committed to defence? I thought Pakistan Army doctrine was to make the first move and capture Indian territory, so as to be able to negotiate good terms at the bargaining to follow the short engagement of not more than two weeks.
Committed to defence in a way, yes, as these are not part of Strike Corps of PA. In saying that the area where they operate is desert and rapid movement by infantry is required for deployment and capturing purposes. The doctrine of capturing Indian territory remains, however that is not considered possible in every theatre of war. The capturing of Indian territory is mainly expected by Strike Corps assets, 1st and 6th Armoured Divisions.

Pakistan is ahead and its not ahead also. Pakistani Armoured Divisions are smaller than Indian Armoured Divisions and Pakistan has raised Independent Armoured Brigades with an aim to support PA Armour Divisions with another role to support infantry Divisions. The Independent Armoured Brigades serves three purposes:
1. Beef up numbers of Armour Division if required when attached to Armour Division.
2. Operate separately from Armour Divisions and act as strategic reserve to defend the area from a possible IA counter attack.
3. Lead the attack when used in conjunction with Infantry Divisions. e.g. IV Corps in Lahore, Independent Armoured brigade operates with 10th and 11th Infantry Divisions. Similarly, XXX Corps in Sialkot, Independent Armoured brigade operates with 8th and 15th Infantry Divisions.

This business of 3 Armoured Divisions against 4 Armoured Divisions confused me. Sometimes I feel that the separation of the Indian Army into strike and pivot corps has so confused most of us that we tend to ignore all these and concentrate on divisions. Is that what is happening here? Because RAPIDs are precisely intended for quick movement with almost purely mechanised divisions, pivot corps are supposed to be better equipped for defence, and will not have to move swiftly into action, just hold their own against pre-emptive attacks.

Please throw some light on these issues.

The 1st and 6th Armoured Divisions have no infantry of their own and derive infantry from their Infantry Divisions, 14th and 40th for 1st Armoured Div, 17th and 37th for 6th Armoured Div and all are part of Strike Corps.

The 25th and 26th Mechanised Divisions are self sufficient (armour and infantry units within Divisions) in this regard and are not considered Strike Corps. Although both Divs have support of Infantry Div's yet they are flexible and independent enough to maneuver on their own. This way they are mainly poised for defence of the area but can also switch roles and turn to offensive role to enter enemy territory. With an IA RAPID deployed in Bikaner opposite Bahawalpur, there was a need to place a decent amount of PA Armour in the sector.

The raising of these mechanised divisions has lifted the burden from PA strike Corps to turn south and defend the southern Punjab and Sindh regions, instead since these two regions are being defended by these mechanised Division with good armour and infantry ratio, the Strike Corps can now function suitably as an offensive force to enter Indian territory.

There is another possible chance that PA will raise Ad-Hoc HQ's (whether Div or Brigade level) during the course of war and these will be under-strength formations and could be formed with using para military forces even. In 1971 war, 2 Ad-Hoc Div HQ's were raised in East-Pak in similar fashion.

A division with only ~300 tanks cannot be called an armoured division.
You need Atleast 700 tanks in an armoured division.
Do you know how many tanks are there in IA 33rd Armoured Division ?

There is only 1 Armour regiment and 2 mechanised battalions in each of 3 brigades. With 59 tanks in one regiment, thats roughly 177 Tanks in IA 33rd Armoured Division.

do Indians already know abiut the info yiu posted ?
G bhai, Indian intelligence has a very good idea.

Nice piece of info.
BTW is only punjab covered like this or also anyother province as well?

Sindh, V-Corps.

25th Mechanised Div
16th Infantry Div
18th Infantry Div.
Few other brigades including armour and mechanised.

India maintains Mech. divisions (& RAPIDs) much larger than Pakistani Mech. divisions in armour strength (MBT+IFV/APC).

Things have improved for PA as 600+ APC's were procured from Italy. But, no IFV's are in sight.

IA formations are larger than PA counterparts.

PA Armour regiment, 44 MBT. IA Armour regiment, 59 MBT.

PA Armour Div, 5 Armour regiments. IA Armour Div, 7 Armour regiments (except 33rd Armoured Div).
 
He's right, in present circumstances, isn't he? Do we want to create a BLA or a TTP? Keeping aside, for a minute, the Pakistani credo that all who do not believe in Pakistan are Indian paid stooges?

The second thing to note is again something that Col. Shukla pointed out, we are facing an establishment that is totally uninhibited. I have said this before, and I will say it again, we cannot match Pakistan in its complete lack of self-control.

The last thing that I want to point out is something that is not available to us, given our present outlook and attitude towards things internal, not towards things outside. Do you check your private mail?
He was not referring to BLA or TTP but rather a RSS style "Sanatan Dharami" terrorist group which I imagine would try to develop a symbiotic relationship with the Pakistani Hindu population, so far it has not been attempted as far as I am aware, in regards to BLA and TTP do read up on Mr Doval and Gen Bikram Singh statements and even Scotland Yard corroborated the relations between certain political groups in Karachi and RAW.
BTW Joe you are facing an establishment that is quintessentially Machiavelllian, not unhinged that elements in hyper-nationalist Indian media like to project.Kudos Joe
 
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Its not a he or she but a whole brigade of workers which are building this trishul side, and they are always up to date when it comes to Pakistan Military, ignoring such organisations is very dangerous and naiv !
They better be!!!! And, I am pretty sure the Indian intelligence must be knowing how serious the Pak strategists are about the "end-game"!!!!
 
Committed to defence in a way, yes, as these are not part of Strike Corps of PA. In saying that the area where they operate is desert and rapid movement by infantry is required for deployment and capturing purposes. The doctrine of capturing Indian territory remains, however that is not considered possible in every theatre of war. The capturing of Indian territory is mainly expected by Strike Corps assets, 1st and 6th Armoured Divisions.

Pakistan is ahead and its not ahead also. Pakistani Armoured Divisions are smaller than Indian Armoured Divisions and Pakistan has raised Independent Armoured Brigades with an aim to support PA Armour Divisions with another role to support infantry Divisions. The Independent Armoured Brigades serves three purposes:
1. Beef up numbers of Armour Division if required when attached to Armour Division.
2. Operate separately from Armour Divisions and act as strategic reserve to defend the area from a possible IA counter attack.
3. Lead the attack when used in conjunction with Infantry Divisions. e.g. IV Corps in Lahore, Independent Armoured brigade operates with 10th and 11th Infantry Divisions. Similarly, XXX Corps in Sialkot, Independent Armoured brigade operates with 8th and 15th Infantry Divisions.



The 1st and 6th Armoured Divisions have no infantry of their own and derive infantry from their Infantry Divisions, 14th and 40th for 1st Armoured Div, 17th and 37th for 6th Armoured Div and all are part of Strike Corps.

The 25th and 26th Mechanised Divisions are self sufficient (armour and infantry units within Divisions) in this regard and are not considered Strike Corps. Although both Divs have support of Infantry Div's yet they are flexible and independent enough to maneuver on their own. This way they are mainly poised for defence of the area but can also switch roles and turn to offensive role to enter enemy territory. With an IA RAPID deployed in Bikaner opposite Bahawalpur, there was a need to place a decent amount of PA Armour in the sector.

The raising of these mechanised divisions has lifted the burden from PA strike Corps to turn south and defend the southern Punjab and Sindh regions, instead since these two regions are being defended by these mechanised Division with good armour and infantry ratio, the Strike Corps can now function suitably as an offensive force to enter Indian territory.

There is another possible chance that PA will raise Ad-Hoc HQ's (whether Div or Brigade level) during the course of war and these will be under-strength formations and could be formed with using para military forces even. In 1971 war, 2 Ad-Hoc Div HQ's were raised in East-Pak in similar fashion.


Do you know how many tanks are there in IA 33rd Armoured Division ?

There is only 1 Armour regiment and 2 mechanised battalions in each of 3 brigades. With 59 tanks in one regiment, thats roughly 177 Tanks in IA 33rd Armoured Division.


G bhai, Indian intelligence has a very good idea.



Sindh, V-Corps.

25th Mechanised Div
16th Infantry Div
18th Infantry Div.
Few other brigades including armour and mechanised.



IA formations are larger than PA counterparts.

PA Armour regiment, 44 MBT. IA Armour regiment, 59 MBT.

PA Armour Div, 5 Armour regiments. IA Armour Div, 7 Armour regiments (except 33rd Armoured Div).

Thank you very much. Pleasure reading such a clearly articulated note.

He was not referring to BLA or TTP but rather a RSS style "Sanatan Dharami" terrorist group which I imagine would try to develop a symbiotic relationship with the Pakistani Hindu population, so far it has not been attempted as far as I am aware, in regards to BLA and TTP do read up on Mr Doval and Gen Bikram Singh statements and even Scotland Yard corroborated the relations between certain political groups in Karachi and RAW.
BTW Joe you are facing an establishment that is quintessentially Machiavelllian, not unhinged that elements in hyper-nationalist Indian media like to project.Kudos Joe

@django

I've dealt with these so-called Machiavellian characters and their plots through an intense period of work-life, and I never saw/detected anything that resembled the kind of thought process that you think they can generate. The leading element in decision-making is definitely unbalanced, a bunch of hysterical bigots. The implementing side is career bureaucrats, who know that if they don't make mistakes, they will get their full pension in due course of time.

If someone is thinking of an RSS style Sanatan Dharmi terrorist group, he needs urgent medical attention. The Pakistani Hindu minority is a crushed and abject group that has given up hopes of survival in any kind of civic sense, and will not support conspiracies.

About the BLA/TTP supposed connections, it is frustrating to discuss this with any Pakistani friend, because the conversation always comes down to the MQM connection, which I believe was very real at one time. But nowhere, other than Doval's self-promotion, do we know about links with BLA or the TTP.

I hope intelligent Pakistanis who read this realise that under Desai, Gujral and Manmohan Singh, RAW operations were cut back severely, and their clandestine intelligence gathering operations were banned outright. I have asked you before, and I am asking you this again: do you think that it is possible to build up field resources, networks of informers and delivery capability in three years' time?
 
Committed to defence in a way, yes, as these are not part of Strike Corps of PA. In saying that the area where they operate is desert and rapid movement by infantry is required for deployment and capturing purposes. The doctrine of capturing Indian territory remains, however that is not considered possible in every theatre of war. The capturing of Indian territory is mainly expected by Strike Corps assets, 1st and 6th Armoured Divisions.

As the two Mechanized divisions are meant to operate in the deserts (Cholistan and Thar), PA should take the pains and induct tracked IFV's. The APC's and their dismounted infantry are not very useful in the desert. Even if PA equips soldiers in these APC's with portable anti-tank weapons like Alcotan 100.
 
As the two Mechanized divisions are meant to operate in the deserts (Cholistan and Thar), PA should take the pains and induct tracked IFV's. The APC's and their dismounted infantry are not very useful in the desert. Even if PA equips soldiers in these APC's with portable anti-tank weapons like Alcotan 100.

The same thing applies to our formations on this side.

You probably know that the very carefully designed mechanisation of the PBI, formation of the RAPIDs, has been stalled or derailed by the dismal bureaucrats of Defence Ministry.
 
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Yes, you are absolutely correct. I hope that will persuade you to go away.

And I hope it will persuade you also in telling the number of tanks in your army.

6000 tanks :D :D :D

Even PLA army never claimed to have 6000 operational tanks :D :D
 
As the two Mechanized divisions are meant to operate in the deserts (Cholistan and Thar), PA should take the pains and induct tracked IFV's. The APC's and their dismounted infantry are not very useful in the desert. Even if PA equips soldiers in these APC's with portable anti-tank weapons like Alcotan 100.
Agreed. I understand the cost of inducting many new armoured vehicles is expensive, fair, but the comparative cost of at least transitioning your primary production facility - HIT - to a new design isn't that much in the great scheme of things. Companies design these tracked IFVs for $50-100 m, that is roughly the cost of acquiring the blueprints and ensuring you have the right tooling. You can gradually induct these new IFVs over the long or very long-term (and in successive variants, each more advanced than the previous), exactly like what is being done with the al-Khalid. Just apply this to a new tracked IFV, 8x8 AFV and 4x4 MRAP/LAV.
 
The same thing applies to our formations on this side.

You probably know that the very carefully designed mechanisation of the PBI, formation of the RAPIDs, has been stalled or derailed by the dismal bureaucrats of Defence Ministry.

IA has a large inventory of BMP's. And formation of RAPIDs is an ongoing exercise - the most recent being conversion of Akhnoor based infantry division into RAPID.

Things are not great for PA. Continues to rely on M-113 APC and derivatives. Acquired 600+ VCC-1 Camillino and VCC-2 from Italy few years ago to mechanize more infantry battalions.
 

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