Not my list, brother, took it from the TT forum but thank you.
Sir, thank you
I dearly miss the old PDF where we were sharp with our ideas but soft with our words. I'm doing my best to bring it back.
Is it me dreaming or has PDF taken a sharp turn for the better?
Thanks,
@jaibi. Have downloaded it, and will read it at leisure; just at the moment, I'm trying to get on top of the narrative of the 1965 conflict.
Sir, your views would be awesome to read.
have already downloaded it and have started to read it ...
My sincerest apologies.
A military strategy thread and you haven't tagged
@Aasimkhan or did I miss his name?
- PRTP GWD
Sir ji, how have you been? It's nice to see you again, of course, I understand that all activities need HQ permission
Thank you for the illuminating read. I do require time to read and digest it and work and a Mrs allergic to my spending time in " frivulous activities" do not help. However this is what I call "Den reading" and I will read and respond in due course.
A
The role of Lt Gen Tariq Khan is instrumental in these changes at the time. The Army has focused more on developing FC since then.
That was a wonderful piece
I got two important points out of it.
1)FC openly embraced American training and guidance,while PA was very reluctant to do so.
2)FC operated on a shoestring budget and still performed excellent.
I'm going to try to get sir to give an interview for us and would run a post for questions that people would like to ask.
Well it does state that the helicopters provided were insufficient and more were needed. It clearly does state that the funds provided were wholly insufficient for FC. But under the leadership of Gen Tariq they were used at their best .While PA got plenty of Equipment i guess the materials were insufficient to mount an offensive all over tribal areas and swat on the same time.
I would like to read up on what training the Americans and allies provided to FC . not much is out there regarding it.
Understandable
He was probably a Godsend for the war, I dont know who could've done a better job in countering the militancy. Which in the book is rightly used by Gen Tariq to describe the menece in the tribals.
These are excellent questions, let me give you my answers but these are mine, please bear that in mind.
Thanks for the interesting read. Some questions after reading it, if you don't mind:
To quite some degree, yes. However, Gen Raheel Sharif's direction towards engagement expanded the theater of engagement more so than Gen Kiyani's strategy but to a degree, you are correct in that assessment.
- Raheel Sharif's success had significant contributions from Kayani laying out the foundation for COIN training. Would that be right?
Compared to conventional engagements, these ones are tougher, for instance, just take a look at the US in Korea and then in Veitnam. Unconventional warfare or asymmetrical warfare is designed to exploit the weak areas of conventional armies and having a military well experienced in the latter makes it stronger, in my opinion. For instance, new recruits and freshly passed out officers were posted directly to these areas. There are entire courses which have yielded battle hardened officers and entries which have done so for soldiers. There is a huge component of the psychology of warfare which cannot be ignored and it cannot be taught. Since these young men have been forged in that fire they're better than the rest. This is something that has been acknowledged because no amount of training makes up for the real thing.
Secondly, the forces of Pakistan also used their strengths to counter the enemy. Therefore, many units of the artillery and infantry especially have gotten increased proficiency in terms of operational versatility and engagement. Moreover, as you've seen we've never neglected the Eastern sector either, continuously getting better equipment and trying to maintain the balance of power as well. Therefore, I would say that these two types of warfare aren't necessarily so different that experience in one of them does not translate well into the experience of the other. As far as resources are concerned then that's always been our challenge but I think we navigated through it quite well, given the dynamics in place.
- The article is 9 years old, so it doesn't cover the changes post-Modi. We have been fighting, training and getting equipped for COIN and internal security operations for over a decade. How does that affect our conventional warfighting capability against India? By no means I mean to say we're neglecting the east, but resources needed to be split to counter the two types of warfare.
It teaches us to be creative with our equipment, foresighted with our strategy, versatile with our tactics and therefore increases our versatility overall. My response above has more details.
- How do the lessons learnt from COIN operations aid our conventional training?
