Le coup d'état against Baghdadi: The Hazimite Faction

[21st Century Vampire]

Alleged Coup Attempt Exposes Hazimite Faction Within Islamic State
Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 17 Issue: 5
By: Rafid Jaboori
March 12, 2019 09:24 AM Age: 1 year

Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (source: washingtonexaminer.com)
As Islamic State (IS) was losing its last strongholds in Syria to the advancing, U.S.-backed, Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), there were reports of a coup attempt against its leader Abu Baker al-Baghdadi. The attempted ouster of the IS leader started with reports about fighting near the town of Hajin in Eastern Syria near the border with Iraq, which is one of the last IS-controlled areas to fall to the hands of the U.S.-backed forces. The plan included an attack on his convoy with an improvised explosive device (IED)—a direct attempt on the life of al-Baghdadi (Asharq al-Awsat, February 8).

The attempt had apparently failed, but it revealed the scale of the internal division between IS and a more radical group within it known as the Hazimite, named after the radical Saudi jihadist cleric Sheikh Ahmed Bin Omar al-Hazimi. Al-Hazimi was arrested in his home country and has been in prison since 2015. Media reports indicated that IS issued a warrant and put a bounty on an individual named Abu Muath al-Jazairi, who was accused of leading the ultra-radical Hazimite faction (Alsumaria, October 7, 2016). [1]

The recent events also indicate a possible new path for the group after losing all the territory it controlled in Iraq and Syria. One of the features of this next period could be shaped by the rivalry between two or more IS factions over who is more genuine in its extremist ideology and practices.

Roots of Division

Abu Muath al-Jazairi is believed to be a prominent leader of the Hazimite faction. He is from Algeria and is better known as Abu Muath al-Asimi. [2] Hazimites and their supporters appear to hold high respect of al-Asimi and his writings. Since the arrest of al-Hazimi and the killing of other Hazimites, al-Asimi emerged as a Hazimite ideologue. [3] A considerable number of IS members from North African countries are believed to have become Hazimites. That could be tracked to the years al-Hazimi himself had spent in Tunisia after the Arab Spring upheaval that struck the region in 2011 and after (Noon Post, July 31, 2017).

The central point of the disagreement between Hazimites and the rest of IS concerns the notion of takfeer (excommunication). IS is well-known for its broad, extremist definition of who should be declared apostate or non-Muslim and consequently excommunicated, but Hazimites believe IS has not gone far enough. According to the doctrine introduced by al-Hazimi and promoted by those influenced by him, anyone who does not embrace a radical Salafist interpretation of Islam is not a Muslim. In their world, ignorance of their ideology or having no access to it is not an excuse for an individual or a group not to embrace al-Tawheed (literal meaning is monotheism, but for them, it is specifically Salafism and more specifically their interpretation of it). Accordingly, those who do not believe in al-Tawheed should be considered kafir (non-believers) and anyone who does not consider them kafir should be excommunicated as he is equally a nonbeliever (Almarjie-Paris, May 9, 2018).

This last notion has been alarming for many IS members and its leadership because it could lead to what is called “chain takfeer,” an endless chain of denunciation for the group’s members and even leaders who showed the slightest degree of tolerance. Before his killing in a coalition airstrike in 2015, Bahraini IS ideologue Turki al-Bin Ali wrote arguments against the Hazimites condemning their hard lines (Al-Quds, July 26, 2017).

In 2016, IS launched a purge against the Hazimites. Prominent Hazimite figures were executed but al-Asimi survived and is believed to be living in Turkey now. He has written a number of essays against IS leadership. As the military campaigns against IS intensified and reached the largest two cities it controlled—Mosul in Iraq and its self-declared capital Raqqa in Syria—IS communication lines became difficult to maintain. In an attempt to tackle that challenge, al-Baghdadi delegated some of his power to a body called the Delegated Committee and decreased his visibility significantly in order to avoid being detected. The Delegated Committee, which was created to go around logistical and field challenges, found itself in the middle of the theological debate of who should be kafir and what were the limits, if any. In May 2017, the Delegated Committee issued a statement that was perceived to be an acknowledgment of the Hazimi doctrine. At one point, even an article in the IS weekly publication al-Naba attacked and condemned prominent jihadists like al-Qaeda’s Attiyah al-Libi as kafir (Jihadology, June 15, 2017). That implied that al-Baghdadi himself might be considered kafir as he previously praised al-Libi. That led al-Baghdadi to appear again to take back control of his group which was seemingly about to disintegrate. He reshuffled the Delegated Committee, removing members and putting more trusted men in charge (Al-Quds, October 21, 2017). However, by the time al-Baghdadi introduced his new measures the Hazimites seemed to have morphed into a distinct, new entity that is not part of IS. That led to a significant question—will the Hazimites split completely from IS or try to take it over?

Conclusion

Since the inception of the Hazimite group, the question was if it was part of IS or a new group. The writings of al-Asimi indicate the latter, but the recent attempt on al-Baghdadi’s life suggest otherwise. The appeal of the Caliphate figure has been quite attractive to jihadists around the world, and convinced many to declare allegiance to IS and consider themselves parts of the movement. IS might be very weak and lost in Iraq and Syria, but there are other regions that could be well suited to become its new headquarters, helping maintain the claim it persists and holds territory, or according to its infamous slogan, is “remaining and expanding.”

The Hazimites have already gained a base of support in West Africa. The leader of the Nigerian radical group Boko Haram Abubakar Shekau is already leading a faction that was condemned by IS as too extremist (Mauri News, November 21, 2017; See Militant Leadership Monitor, January 4).

The Hazimite ideology is more suitable for an age of total violence without any consideration of governing a territory. Yet the symbolism of the Caliphate has been central in the IS’ appeal to jihadists. By eliminating al-Baghdadi, Hazimites could well be poised to take over leadership of the IS heartland in Iraq and Syria in order to subsequently inherent influence over its franchises in North and West Africa.

Unlike in 2016-2017, IS and its leadership obviously do not have the capacity to quell a better-prepared coup attempt. One of the main reasons behind IS’ domination in Syria was that it was less prone to splits compared to other militant groups. By moving to areas controlled by the Syrian government, IS will need to face new challenges that are not similar to the environment of 2011-2014. Groups of IS fighters have reportedly already moved to the areas controlled by the Syrian regime, fleeing the SDF’s final campaigns against their last remaining pockets. The IS element in the Syrian civil war was vital to the survival of the Syrian regime which always wanted the war to be portrayed as a confrontation between a secular government and savage jihadists who threaten not only the regime, but the world. Therefore, the regime would not accept being excluded from the U.S. and SDF endgame. Both IS and the Hazimites will likely try to initiate new bases or revive old ones in Syria.

Iraq, however, remains IS and its leaders’ favorite retreat. More than a year and a half since the Iraqi government declared victory against IS, the group is not completely defeated. It lost all the territory it held in Iraq, but a new phase of IS insurgency has emerged. Despite deployments of thousands of Iraqi armed forces and Shia militias in the areas IS controlled, the group is still able to launch attacks and destabilize the area. The Iraqization of the IS leadership, which was introduced by al-Baghdadi, was vital to the group’s ascendancy. It will likely be key to any strategy of survival and revival. But that will always require keeping the position of the Caliphate intact and occupied by al-Baghdadi or one of his inner circle when he dies. The Hazimites have proven to represent an imminent threat to that.

Notes

[1] The bounty is new but the warrant was issued in 2016. See November 7, 2016 https://www.alsumaria.tv/news/181897/بالوثيقة-داعش-يصدر-مذكرات-قبض-واعدام-بال/ar

[2] Al-Jazairi means the Algerian in Arabic. Al-Asimi means the one who comes from al-Asima which means the capital in Arabic and that is a common word Algerians use to refer to their capital.

[3] See writings about al-Asimi July 7, 2016 https://justpaste.it/vy9e

https://jamestown.org/program/alleged-coup-attempt-exposes-hazimite-faction-within-islamic-state/

 

[21st Century Vampire]

July 23, 2017

Al Hazimi Ideology: Radicalization of Extremism

• INSIDE THE MIDDLE EAST
  
• INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
  
• MILITANT ISLAM
  
• RADICAL ISLAM
  
• SAUDI ARABIA
  
• THE WEST AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Click Here to Download a PDF of this Bulletin

Intelligence Bulletin
Al Hazimi Ideology: Radicalization of Extremism


July 23, 2017

Information:

Major Arab information platforms, including Elaph and Al Arabiya, have just recently introduced a person named Ahmad Bin Omar Al Hazimi, a Saudi Salafi-Jihadi preacher advocating what is described as “a more extreme and brutal version of the ISIS ideology.”

Accumulative, yet unconfirmed, information claims that ISIS in Iraq has executed and arrested militants identifying with Al Hazimi’s ideology.

According to one source, the reason for ISIS’ actions is an evolving inner power-struggle within ISIS following the alleged death of ISIS’ leader, Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi.

In that context, according one source, a senior ISIS leader, named Abu Hafs Al Jazrawi, who is reportedly an adherent of Al Hazimi’s ideology, may replace ISIS’ leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. (For more on that please read my Immediate Intelligence Bulletin – Arab News Platforms Echo Reports ISIS Leader Dead, published on July 11, 2017).

Al Hazimi was reportedly arrested in Saudi Arabia is 2015 – the details of his arrest are not clear.

I do not possess information regarding Al Hazimi’s whereabouts.

His website appears to be inactive and the contents are not up to date.

However, his YouTube Channel, featuring many of his lectures as well as videos of his religious ordinances, is seemingly active, recently resuming after three years of being inactive.

It is not clear if the narrator in those videos is Al Hazimi himself.

It should also be noted that the number of views per video on his channel varies between a few hundred views to around 20,000.

Analysis:

Al Hazimi’s ideology seems to differ from ISIS theology in two significant ways:

1. The Concept of Takfir

The essence of Islam is the complete and willing submission of an individual to Allah’s rule, meaning – full adherence to Islamic law, the Shari’ah.

Islamic theologians argue there are two kinds of people: Muslims and non-Muslims. Non-Muslims are Infidels, or in Arabic Quffar (also spelled in English Kufar), who should be convinced – either through education, or by force if necessary, to adopt Islam.

The concept of Takfir says there are actually not two kinds of people, there are three kinds of people: Muslims, Infidels, and Muslims who “pretend” to be Muslims but are not “real Muslims,” they are “fake Muslims.”

Those fake Muslims are thus even worse than Quffar (infidels).

Why?

Because in the eyes of Takfir ideology, Islam is “contaminated” from within by those fake Muslims. And in order to bring about the realization of the global Caliphate which will be subdued to Shari’ah law Islam must first be “purified” from within.

ISIS theologians argue there are two types of fake Muslims and they differentiate between the two types of fake Muslims:

One type of fake Muslims in the ISIS ideology are Muslims who either, because of laziness and or a lack of religious devotion, knowingly and intentionally do not follow the Shari’ah, and worse – they pretend as if they do. In ISIS’ view these people are destined to, and must be executed because they are contaminating Islam from within.

This ideology results in two major outcomes:

1. The majority of the victims of Salafi-Jihadi ideology are Muslims.

1. The top goal and priority of Salafi-Jihadism is to first of all, topple all political structures in Muslim societies, because these governments and regimes are – in the eyes of Salafi-Jihadi ideology – fake Muslims and must be destroyed.

The second type of fake Muslims, in the eyes of ISIS theologians, are Muslims who out of ignorance do not follow the Shari’ah. The term describing that ignorance is “Jahiliyyah “- a term used by Islam to describe the pre-Islamic period, a time that is described in Muslim thought as a period of “Barbarism and Darkness.” Thus, the second kind of Quffar Muslims are “Juhhal” ignorant people, living in darkness. They, therefore should be redirected to see the light – meaning Islam – through education – and if needed, through the use of non-fatal punishments and sanctions – to become “true” Muslims.

On the above two points, Al Hazimi disagrees with ISIS theologians.

Al Hazimi does not differentiate between the types of fake Muslims.

He argues that the Islamist religious ordinance – the Shari’ah, defines very clearly the strict rules according to which a person is considered to be a “Muslim.”

Thus, in his view, if those rules are not fully and strictly met, the person cannot be considered a “Muslim” and therefore can only be “Qafer” (also spelled in English Kafir) – an Infidel, and as such must be treated according to the Islamic religious law as an Infidel. Al Hazimi also makes it clear that the treatment of a Qafer must only be according to the Shari’ah and not any other law (state law, traditional law, civil law, common law, etc).

And, according to Al Hazimi’s beliefs, the Shari’ah law orders the execution of such a person.

2. Obedience to Salafi–Jihadi Theologians

Present day Salafi-Jihadi movements – ISIS, Al-Qaeda, Islamic Jihad, Boko Haram, and others throughout the Middle East and in other regions of the world, base their beliefs according to the philosophy and teachings of iconic theologians of Salafi-Jihadi ideology such as Ibn Taymiyyah (d.1328) or Mohammad Bin ‘Abd Al Wahab (d.1791). Following and obeying their path and implementing their teachings is a cornerstone of the political and operational praxis of ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and other Salafi-Jihadi groups.

Al Hazimi argues that the philosophy of such Salafi-Jihadi thinkers, teachers, and theologians like Ibn Taymiyyah and `Abd Al Wahab – let alone the current ones, is not to be blindly obeyed.

This outlook completely shakes the very foundation of current Salafi-Jihadi hierarchy and structure.

Al Hazimi’s ideology and teachings echoes the philosophy of the Egyptian Islamist thinker Sayyid Qutb (executed in Egypt in 1966), whose thoughts significantly inspired contemporary Militant Islam.

Sayyid Qutb was a senior member of the Muslim Brotherhood, and was profoundly influenced by the philosophy of iconic Salafi-Jihadi thinkers – and especially, Ibn Taymiyyah.

As an adherent of Ibn Tamiyyah’s teachings, Qutb argued that the Muslim world was going through a phase of “Jahiliyyah,” – i.e. a period of ” the absence of Allah’s rule” – and that reality must be changed.

Qutb attributed the gloomy reality of Muslims to Western influence, secularism, corrupted governments, and rulers who were – in Qutb’s mind “fake Muslims” who must be overthrown by the Muslim masses.

Furthermore, he also accused Muslim clergy of cooperating with the corrupted leaders, and thus he argued that these clergy, and the religious ordinances they provide, were illegitimate and should, therefore, be disobeyed.

Yet, ironically, Al Hazimi, who echoes Qutb’s ideas – challenges the consensual authority of Ibn Taymiyyah, and also defines the Muslim Brotherhood as Quffar.

Why does Al Hazimi label the Muslim Brotherhood, the largest Sunni Islamic Muslim movement in the world, Quffar?

In a lecture he gave Al Hazimi argues that the Muslim Brotherhood theologians “accept the narrative that Judaism and Christianity are legitimate monotheistic religions, thus deserve to be protected by Islam.” Al Hazimi completely rejects this narrative. Thus, he labels the theologians of the Muslim Brotherhood as Quffar.

Labeling Muslim Brotherhood theologians as Quffar is ironic. A core value of the Muslim Brotherhood is its non-compromising animosity to the west, an entity completely viewed by the Muslim Brotherhood as Qafer – infidels.

Looking retrospectively at the evolution of Islamic Fundamentalism and Militant Islamic ideology since the appearance of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928, there is a rapid process of inner extremism within those circles.

Al Hazimi is yet another milestone in that process – proving that extremism, quite often, gives birth to more extremism.

In that context, Egyptian poet and writer Farouk Juweida wrote an article published in Elaph in July 2017 entitled “Where will ISIS Militants Go Now?” in which he said this: “ISIS militants are suffocated with extremism. It is unrealistic to expect they will change their skin and will integrate positively in their societies.“

Indeed, Al Hazimi’s path indicates that extremism, often gives birth to more extremism.

Evaluation and Prediction:

Al Hazimi likely has followers within ISIS. However, I’m unable to determine whether he has a significant impact in general, and inside ISIS in particular.

Information regarding an alleged power struggle between ISIS and Al-Hazimi’s followers is yet to be confirmed.

The Hazimis may offer a kind of ISIS 2.0 version, yet in my evaluation, “crowning” Al Hazimis as the ISIS’ heir is actually irrelevant. The merchandise they sell will be just more of the same: extreme ideology, terror, death, and atrocities.

Salafi-Jihadi groups are on the run and coming under growing military pressure in areas like Iraq, Syria, Libya, Sinai Peninsula, and the northern Sahara.

ISIS is losing its major strongholds in Iraq and Syria, and its militants are defeated and losing momentum.

Muslim societies largely oppose and reject Militant Islam, and the international community has joined forces to combat the challenge of Militant Islam.

Under such conditions, it is hard to envision how the Hazimis will be able to rehabilitate the declining momentum of Salafi-Jihadi groups.

It is also difficult to envision how the Hazimis could mark achievements that match – let alone surpass – ISIS’ achievements at its peak.

The current dire situation of ISIS indicates that in the end of the day its path leads nowhere.

That being said, it should be clear that Militant Islam is here to stay. Totally defeating Militant Islam ideology and path is a long-term effort.

In my book Inside the Middle East: Making Sense of the most Dangerous and Complicated Region on Earth (March 2016) I wrote : “…Corruption, Illiteracy, lack of civil rights. poverty, violence and other challenges in Muslim societies must be overcome. As long as they exist, Militant Islam will be present.” (pp. 82)

https://www.avimelamed.com/2017/07/23/al-hazimi-ideology-radicalization-of-extremism/