Myth_buster_1
BANNED
- Joined
- Mar 17, 2008
- Messages
- 9,016
- Reaction score
- -1
- Country
- Location
LCA a product of western companies, engineers, and consultants.
At a later date, while the Indian Government equivocated over the option to produce the Mirage under licence, the French offered to tie the deal to the development of the indigenous Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) through 'unrestricted access' to the technology embodied in the Mirage 2000.
The most important aspect of this was the proposal for development of a light combat aircraft (LCA), originally planned for production by 1994 with a prototype to be ready by 1990. In mid-1983 reports first appeared regarding the Indian Government's commitment to the development of an LCA to be powered by an indigenous engine.BAe emerged as the clear contender for the relatively limited collaboration envisaged by the decision makers given the complexity and ambitious nature of the project; by late 1984 reports continued to suggest that BAe would be a partner to the project. Much of this optimism stemmed from BAe's continued presence in the Indian defence industry, through the Jaguar DSPA licensed production agreement, while experience with the French and the Mirage 2000 had been a disappointment. However, by early 1984 the Indian Government had invited foreign companies to prepare feasibility studies which would involve collaborative development even though all production and marketing was to take place in India. The technology required from abroad was considerable-composite material technology, cockpit displays and active controls with electronic sensing and signalling. The significance of the cornrnitment to indigenous capacity was reflected in the budgetary arrangements. By 1990 the project was expected to have cost Rs.12-15 billion, but only 10 per cent of the development budget was allocated for foreign consultants. The response both inside and outside India to such an ambitious project was mixed, and before long the LCA became extremely controversial-experts questioned cost estimates, the aeronautic establishment's ability to deliver and the level of indigenous content. In mid-1985 the project was adversely affected by the unexpected resignation of two of the key personnel within the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA), the apex body set up to oversee the design and development of the LCA. The creation of the ADA itself had been a significant step and probably essential given the co-ordination and managerial problems which would inevitably emerge over the course of the programme. In other areas of big science, such as space research and nuclear energy, departments had been set up many years before in an attempt to co-ordinate diverse activities in a systematic manner and provide a recognized decision-making locus. In the field of aeronautics this did not occur, so that links between the R&D establishments and industry were severely hampered and the more general need for long-term planning and related decision making neglected: The bureaucratic viewpoint was that in the absence of an aircraft development programme there was no need for technology development-a tragic error of judgmentwhich prevails even today. Any discussion on planning for LCA mission orientated R&D and technology development programmes and fall back positions invited sarcastic comments of planning for a fall back aircraft; any suggestions to plan for integration of R&D and the industry and referring to early committee recommendations were thought to be greed on the part of the people making such suggestion^.^^ The creation of the ADA should have been a step in the right direction and a means of channelling the country's R&D capabilities into a single project which involved 50 companies and over 600 work packages. Unfortunately, this proved not to be the case. Although the Agency was given the responsibility for setting up the LCA programme, the authority to ensure that its decisions were implemented was lacking. The very existence of the ADA was a considerable blow for HAL because it raised the profile of the National Aeronautics Laboratory (NAL) and indicated for the first time that the interests of government might differ from those of HAL. The result was the resignation of two key figures, S. R. Valluri, the Director of the NAL in Bangalore and the Director General of the ADA, and India's chief aircraft designer and leader of the Agency design team, Raj Mahindra. Valluri had in fact been asked by the Chief Scientific Advisor to the MOD, V. S. Arunachalam, to remove Mahindra from the ADA following allegations in parliament relating to the latter's citizenship and patriotism, and Valluri also considered Arunachalam's apparent keenness to involve a number of younger designers in the project as an immense mistake. Aircraft design, he maintained, is in essence a product of accumulated experience which requires a person of experience at the top and a hierarchical organization, and Mahindra was the only person in India who could perform a similar role to that of the aircraft designer Mikoyan in the USSR, for instance.Valluri's views on organization received considerable support. For example, Valluri's views about organizational linkages between ADA and HAL were echoed by a HAL veteran who felt that the present organizational structure in the two was not conducive to design development. HAL is geared mainly to production, virtually a backyard workshop for the Air Force. Moreover, HAL's different wings reported to different departments: design and research to the DRDO and production to Defence production. 'I would put HAL's design and development wing under ADA', [Valluri] argued. Since then the development of the LCA has remained controversial. The loss of Valluri and Mahindra was certainly significant and must have affected the quality of technical decision making, particularly in relation to R&D and technology transfer. Throughout the mid- and late 1980s the LCA ran further and further into trouble as both government and industry prevaricated over the future direction of the project. First and foremost it became unclear from which source the LCA engine would come, and until the capabilities of the engine were decided upon only limited progress could be made in other areas of design, unless of course the Marut failure was to be replicated. It was hoped during the early part of the project to utilize the GTX engine under development at the GTRE in Bangalore. However, the GTX is many, many years behind schedule and currently the main problems appear to be the production of an engine which can function very effectively in ambient temperatures of up to 45OC, which is essential for any advanced aircraft deployed in Indian conditions. By 1984 only two out of the 10 demonstrators had been produced and the requirement to demonstrate a thrust capability of 4500 kg and 6600 kg with afterburning had not materialized. However, the scale of the task facing GTRE should not be underestimated; suggestions around 1987 that the GTX-35 would be ready by 1992 were extremely optimistic.109 Indeed, Indian officials continue to maintain that the GTX-35, now named the Kivari, will power the LCA when it goes into prod~ction.~~O Although the HAL Chairman, Air Marshal M. S. D. Wollen, stated in mid- 1985 that India possessed the means to develop the LCA with one or more collaborative partners, despite the submission of design studies from BAe, MBB, Dornier and Aerospatiale (some at no charge), it became clear that this would not be the case; something beyond this type of collaboration was required. In late 1985 the ADA met in Bangalore to review the design and development of the LCA and finalize the Air Staff Requirement, following which HAL could proceed to the definition stage. It was probably during this meeting that the ADA decided that an interim measure had to be taken given the continuing delay of the GTX project and that collaboration was unavoidable. In addition to the said European producers who were anxious to gain a toehold in the LCA project given the prevailing slump in the international combataircraft market elsewhere, the USA also appeared as a contender for collaboration, due entirely to Rajiv Gandhi's unsolicited willingness to do business with the USA and initiate a significant thaw in Indo-US relations. During a visit to the USA in January 1986, an agreement was reached over the export of the General Electric F404 engine, and the Prime Minister's visit was swiftly followed by a flood of US technicians to India. Thus, Grurnrnan, Lockheed and Northrop added themselves to the list of contenders for collaboration. Meanwhile new costings for the LCA project took estimated expenditure from Rs.600 crores to Rs. 1500 crores. By mid-1986 the LCA project had started to take shape following the issue of an Air Staff Requirement. The ADA had apparently decided upon a singleengined, single-seat aircraft with a maximum take-off weight of about 9000 kg. Primarily designed as a battlefield air superiority weapon system, with a secondary close support capability, it was to have a top speed of Mach 2. A decision on the interim engine was between the GE F404RM12 and the RollsRoyce Turbo Union RB.199 Stage B, pending the successful development of the GTX. A prototype would fly by 1990 and the LCA would enter front-line service in the mid- 1990s. The political will of the Government to pursue the programme prompted many inside and outside India to consider the likely success of the project. In particular, consultants in the USA started to evaluate the project and HAL's capability given the likelihood of US involvement and the results were far from positive. Dr Steven Bryen, Head of the Strategic Trade Directorate in the Pentagon, considered the very basis of the project to be poorly conceived: If India wants to go, suffer, spend a lot of money, in billions of dollars, that is your problem . . . But, there is a question about the economics of developing some of these products . . . [there] are no guarantees [it will work] . . . You are talking about inventing a new cadre of people to do that work . . . there is not enough rationale [for the LCA] . . . as it is [ultimately] an economic issue . . . because it starts to drag down where your talented people are going to spend their time, and I question those kinds of investments very closely. More to the point, for a US analyst, he also questioned the wisdom of US involvement in a project such as the LCA: 'The worse kind of project for us to get involved in is the one that fails, or, that gives opposition politicians a chance to stand up and say-you have been led up the garden path by the Americans.' Another respected US defence analyst, Jacques Gansler, considered the timing of the LCA project to be misconceived. In a similar interview he argued that India had embarked upon an extremely ambitious project but one which would only embody technology soon to be superseded by the coming generation. Thus, for example, the LCA is expected to incorporate a 'cranked arrow' configuration which calls for the leading edge of the wing to be angled with a resultant increase in lift for a given amount of power. However, the coming generation of fighter aircraft, notably the US Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF), will incorporate vectored thrust technology which is much more advanced. The composite materials used to build the ATF and its avionics will also be far in advance of those of the LCA. Gansler's recommendation was for India to delay the project to make possible a limited acquisition of the emerging technologies. However, Gansler did not discuss whether or not India could access such an advanced level of technology, afford the costs, or cope with and exploit such advances. In all three instances the answer would probably be negative. Negotiations over defence technology transfer with the USA proceeded apace and were extended to cover not only LCA technology but also radar technology, anti-tank weaponry, night vision equipment, MBT fire control and transmission systems, ammunition and advanced materials.Il7 A high point was reached in January 1987 when the US Secretary for Defense, Caspar Weinberger, visited India to promise publicly all the technical support the country required for the successful development of the LCA. At the same time, however, reports started to appear regarding future French involvement in the project. In October 1987 it was reported that Dassault-Breguet had signed an agreement worth $100 million with the Indian Government to supply 30 engineers to work in Bangalore under the auspices of the ADA. It therefore seemed that France had effectively won the design contract. Furthermore, it became evident that France wished for an even greater input into the project by seeking to turn the Government's head in the direction of the SNECMA M88 Mk I1 engine scheduled for use in the Rafale light combat aircraft. In addition, at the same period an ADA team visited the Rolls-Royce Military Engine Group facilities in Bristol to view the Turbo-Union RB 199 engine. Throughout 1987 interest in the LCA programme was overshadowed by the Bofors scandal and received much less media attention. However, by mid-1987 it seemed as though Saab had made a late bid to provide development assistance, probably on the grounds that the LCA would emerge as a close relation of the JAS-39 light combat aircraft. Although Saab did not contribute a feasibility study, it had held previous talks with the Indian Government on co-operation as early as 1980-81. During the same period it was announced that General Electric (GE) had in fact won the order for 10 F404 turbofans for the prototype phase of the project, although this did not guarantee eventual incorporation at the production stage. Predictably enough, the project definition stage fell behind schedule by more than a year, and serious consideration was given to the future of the programme. One reason for the delay was a failure to agree upon the optimum weight for the system which could in turn have been related to the delays encountered with the development of composite materials. Significantly, it was the IAF which was reported to be dissatisfied with progress and, furthermore, was actively considering abandoning the whole project in favour of joint development of the French Rafale. There would be several advantages for India in such a move. The GE F404 powers the Rafale prototype, which would not rule out an Indian version powered by the GTX-35, given that the engines are interchangeable. The multi-mode radar under development for the LCA could also be used in the Rafale. Finally, given the likelihood that the cost of the LCA would certainly spiral out of control with uncertain end results and timing, investment in the French system would be much safer and almost certainly cheaper. Soon after it was reported that Dassault had succeeded in a bid to strike a 'company-company' agreement with HAL over the marketing of the LCA. In effect, Dassault had managed to introduce the LCA into its product spectrum alongside other systems in production and proposed-the Mirage 2000 and 4000, the Rafale and the Franco-German Alpha jet. How much this represents the thin end of the wedge designed to assimilate finally the whole project remains to be seen. During the same period a Letter of Offer and Acceptance was signed between the US Air Force and the Indian DRDO which allowed Indian technicians access to the four Air Force Wright Aeronautical Laboratories. This opened the way for collaboration and the participation of US industry in the project. The transfer of technology envisaged was unprecedented and covered avionics and flight controls, fly-by-wire systems, flight actuators and carbon composite materials. Also, during the same period, the USSR started to display an interest in the ill-fated programme by offering New Delhi participation in a new single-engined combat aircraft, similar in capability to the US F-16, should the price tag for the LCA present further problems. At the end of 1988 another peculiar twist was added to the LCA saga. In a bid to drive a wedge between New Delhi and both Washington and Paris, the USSR offered to improve radically the MiG-21, the aircraft the LCA is destined to replace. On offer for the MiG-21 was the MiG-29 engine, new wings and a modem avionics system. Since MiG-21 production facilities already existed in India the retrofitting could be done at a comparatively low cost. India could slow down the pace of LCA development and therefore distribute the escalating costs over a wider period of time or it could cancel what was rapidly becoming the biggest white elephant in the history of Indian defence production. Furthermore, during a period when the country's foreign exchange reserves were becoming rapidly depleted, such an offer, if accepted, could also slow the import of other sophisticated aircraft and even provide India with a novel source of exports when many countries were finding it extremely difficult to afford state-of-the-art military technology. However, nothing more was heard of the offer. By mid-1991 it appeared that the LCA was to be much more a hybrid of foreign technologies than ever imagined, with the inclusion of a US engine, Swedish avionics, a US or French fly-by-wire avionics system, and an airframe of which the main input has come from foreign consultants. From the original estimate of Rs.560 crores, the cost is now estimated to be Rs. 1670 crores and production dates remain uncertain. In addition, the configuration of the system changed markedly, specifically with regard to weight. From the lithe 5.5 tonne system originally planned, the LCA is now a more portly 8 tonnes and much closer to the F-16 it is intended to outperform. The fault has been the traditional tendency to add on technology, which has also ramified into price rises-cost estimates are now about $10 billion for a reduced number of 200 units. However, a more optimistic note was sounded at the 1991 Paris Air Show when an HAL spokesman implied that the LCA production run could produce 500 aircraft.
This may tie in with the recent reports concerning a naval variant. It is now unlikely that the LCA will be operational before the end of the century, and the number of prototypes has been cut from seven to two. The Indian LCA is beginning to appear in a similar light to other major aeronautics projects attempted by India-chaotic and subject to flux, cost overruns, technological slippage and time delays. There have even been reports that the programme has been shelved but this does not appear to be the case. Above all it is possible that the IAF will eventually do what it appears to have done on numerous other occasions and effectively obstruct attempts at indigenization in an effort to ensure that foreign rather than indigenous systems prevail. Finally, in August 1992 the Indian Government at last took the inevitable step and opened the doors to full foreign collaboration, citing lack of funds as the primary reason. In the current climate the long- and short-term prospects for the Indian aeronautics industry look bleak. Hampered by bureaucratic infighting and rendered less capable than it really is by the unrealistic demands of the Air Force, deprived of an input into the decision making process and lacking the necessary political patronage, HAL is unlikely to develop its technological capabilities far enough to fulfil its undoubted potential. In this milieu there is no opportunity to close the gap between present levels of capability and the increasing rate of technological change in the defence industries of the West. Nor is the outlook helped by the severe downturn in the international aerospace market, which will hamper the company's attempts to attain rhythm and continuity. Given the way in which the technological needs for defence are defined, this is a prerequisite. The LCA project did to a certain extent reflect an understanding on the part of the Government that the opportunities for India to create a viable and credible aeronautic production capability based upon modem technolog' ies were fast diminishing. If the Government had not proceeded with the LCA programme, the long-term prospects of HAL would have looked bleak indeed, not least in view of the development of HAL's technology base. However, sound decision making, effective management and co-ordinated support were equally important, and in this direction there are many questions. Why were two of the most effective members of the ADA allowed to resign without attempts at reconciliation, particularly given the peculiarities of the industry and the need for experienced leadership? Why were so many foreign technicians and consultants allowed on to the programme in such an ad hoc manner? No fewer than six countries made offers to India during the mid-1980s, which led to confusion and prevarication and must surely have hindered progress, resolve and morale. Why was the IAF allowed to court Dassault for the Rafale given the apparent resolve on the part of government to develop as much of an indigenous capacity as possible? Equally relevant is the question why HAL was allowed to fall into such a parlous state in the late 1970s. During a period of rapid technological change why did government allow the industry to exist without projects and without significant R&D, thereby losing all the benefits of follow-on projects? This was the heart of the problems experienced over the course of the LCA programme. Under any circumstances it is both difficult and expensive for a country such as India to match the rate of technological change which obtains in the West or did obtain in the USSR. Any attempt, therefore, to leap one generation at least by moving from the HF-24 to the LCA when the industry has languished and many of the best and the brightest have left is bound to be time-consuming, costly and technically complex. Without effective management or government discipline over the role and input of all the relevant institutions, the failures and setbacks witnessed in recent years were probably inevitable. However, in contrast to the situation in the 1970s, HAL now enjoys an unprecedented degree of political support. Although the LCA programme has been roundly criticized by pundits and watchdog committees alike, the LCA programme is now seen as a project of immense national importance and prestige. The facts that it is a white elephant, capable of inflicting severe opportunity costs on other areas of the defence budget, and that it will be virtually obsolete by the time it is produced and probably unexportable, have made little difference. What seems of greater importance is that India will be seen to produce its own, indigenous advanced combat aircraft at some point in the future. By avoiding too much reference to foreign inputs, the myth of indigenization will be preserved. Quite where the LCA will figure in India's defence posture will depend very much upon the IAF.
Georges Bridel among many foreigner consultant. "As kurt tank is to maurt georges bridel is to LCA?"
Some of his light fighter jet designs.
LCA design evolved from multiple European companies MBB and Dassault.
@MastanKhan @gambit @Horus
At a later date, while the Indian Government equivocated over the option to produce the Mirage under licence, the French offered to tie the deal to the development of the indigenous Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) through 'unrestricted access' to the technology embodied in the Mirage 2000.
The most important aspect of this was the proposal for development of a light combat aircraft (LCA), originally planned for production by 1994 with a prototype to be ready by 1990. In mid-1983 reports first appeared regarding the Indian Government's commitment to the development of an LCA to be powered by an indigenous engine.BAe emerged as the clear contender for the relatively limited collaboration envisaged by the decision makers given the complexity and ambitious nature of the project; by late 1984 reports continued to suggest that BAe would be a partner to the project. Much of this optimism stemmed from BAe's continued presence in the Indian defence industry, through the Jaguar DSPA licensed production agreement, while experience with the French and the Mirage 2000 had been a disappointment. However, by early 1984 the Indian Government had invited foreign companies to prepare feasibility studies which would involve collaborative development even though all production and marketing was to take place in India. The technology required from abroad was considerable-composite material technology, cockpit displays and active controls with electronic sensing and signalling. The significance of the cornrnitment to indigenous capacity was reflected in the budgetary arrangements. By 1990 the project was expected to have cost Rs.12-15 billion, but only 10 per cent of the development budget was allocated for foreign consultants. The response both inside and outside India to such an ambitious project was mixed, and before long the LCA became extremely controversial-experts questioned cost estimates, the aeronautic establishment's ability to deliver and the level of indigenous content. In mid-1985 the project was adversely affected by the unexpected resignation of two of the key personnel within the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA), the apex body set up to oversee the design and development of the LCA. The creation of the ADA itself had been a significant step and probably essential given the co-ordination and managerial problems which would inevitably emerge over the course of the programme. In other areas of big science, such as space research and nuclear energy, departments had been set up many years before in an attempt to co-ordinate diverse activities in a systematic manner and provide a recognized decision-making locus. In the field of aeronautics this did not occur, so that links between the R&D establishments and industry were severely hampered and the more general need for long-term planning and related decision making neglected: The bureaucratic viewpoint was that in the absence of an aircraft development programme there was no need for technology development-a tragic error of judgmentwhich prevails even today. Any discussion on planning for LCA mission orientated R&D and technology development programmes and fall back positions invited sarcastic comments of planning for a fall back aircraft; any suggestions to plan for integration of R&D and the industry and referring to early committee recommendations were thought to be greed on the part of the people making such suggestion^.^^ The creation of the ADA should have been a step in the right direction and a means of channelling the country's R&D capabilities into a single project which involved 50 companies and over 600 work packages. Unfortunately, this proved not to be the case. Although the Agency was given the responsibility for setting up the LCA programme, the authority to ensure that its decisions were implemented was lacking. The very existence of the ADA was a considerable blow for HAL because it raised the profile of the National Aeronautics Laboratory (NAL) and indicated for the first time that the interests of government might differ from those of HAL. The result was the resignation of two key figures, S. R. Valluri, the Director of the NAL in Bangalore and the Director General of the ADA, and India's chief aircraft designer and leader of the Agency design team, Raj Mahindra. Valluri had in fact been asked by the Chief Scientific Advisor to the MOD, V. S. Arunachalam, to remove Mahindra from the ADA following allegations in parliament relating to the latter's citizenship and patriotism, and Valluri also considered Arunachalam's apparent keenness to involve a number of younger designers in the project as an immense mistake. Aircraft design, he maintained, is in essence a product of accumulated experience which requires a person of experience at the top and a hierarchical organization, and Mahindra was the only person in India who could perform a similar role to that of the aircraft designer Mikoyan in the USSR, for instance.Valluri's views on organization received considerable support. For example, Valluri's views about organizational linkages between ADA and HAL were echoed by a HAL veteran who felt that the present organizational structure in the two was not conducive to design development. HAL is geared mainly to production, virtually a backyard workshop for the Air Force. Moreover, HAL's different wings reported to different departments: design and research to the DRDO and production to Defence production. 'I would put HAL's design and development wing under ADA', [Valluri] argued. Since then the development of the LCA has remained controversial. The loss of Valluri and Mahindra was certainly significant and must have affected the quality of technical decision making, particularly in relation to R&D and technology transfer. Throughout the mid- and late 1980s the LCA ran further and further into trouble as both government and industry prevaricated over the future direction of the project. First and foremost it became unclear from which source the LCA engine would come, and until the capabilities of the engine were decided upon only limited progress could be made in other areas of design, unless of course the Marut failure was to be replicated. It was hoped during the early part of the project to utilize the GTX engine under development at the GTRE in Bangalore. However, the GTX is many, many years behind schedule and currently the main problems appear to be the production of an engine which can function very effectively in ambient temperatures of up to 45OC, which is essential for any advanced aircraft deployed in Indian conditions. By 1984 only two out of the 10 demonstrators had been produced and the requirement to demonstrate a thrust capability of 4500 kg and 6600 kg with afterburning had not materialized. However, the scale of the task facing GTRE should not be underestimated; suggestions around 1987 that the GTX-35 would be ready by 1992 were extremely optimistic.109 Indeed, Indian officials continue to maintain that the GTX-35, now named the Kivari, will power the LCA when it goes into prod~ction.~~O Although the HAL Chairman, Air Marshal M. S. D. Wollen, stated in mid- 1985 that India possessed the means to develop the LCA with one or more collaborative partners, despite the submission of design studies from BAe, MBB, Dornier and Aerospatiale (some at no charge), it became clear that this would not be the case; something beyond this type of collaboration was required. In late 1985 the ADA met in Bangalore to review the design and development of the LCA and finalize the Air Staff Requirement, following which HAL could proceed to the definition stage. It was probably during this meeting that the ADA decided that an interim measure had to be taken given the continuing delay of the GTX project and that collaboration was unavoidable. In addition to the said European producers who were anxious to gain a toehold in the LCA project given the prevailing slump in the international combataircraft market elsewhere, the USA also appeared as a contender for collaboration, due entirely to Rajiv Gandhi's unsolicited willingness to do business with the USA and initiate a significant thaw in Indo-US relations. During a visit to the USA in January 1986, an agreement was reached over the export of the General Electric F404 engine, and the Prime Minister's visit was swiftly followed by a flood of US technicians to India. Thus, Grurnrnan, Lockheed and Northrop added themselves to the list of contenders for collaboration. Meanwhile new costings for the LCA project took estimated expenditure from Rs.600 crores to Rs. 1500 crores. By mid-1986 the LCA project had started to take shape following the issue of an Air Staff Requirement. The ADA had apparently decided upon a singleengined, single-seat aircraft with a maximum take-off weight of about 9000 kg. Primarily designed as a battlefield air superiority weapon system, with a secondary close support capability, it was to have a top speed of Mach 2. A decision on the interim engine was between the GE F404RM12 and the RollsRoyce Turbo Union RB.199 Stage B, pending the successful development of the GTX. A prototype would fly by 1990 and the LCA would enter front-line service in the mid- 1990s. The political will of the Government to pursue the programme prompted many inside and outside India to consider the likely success of the project. In particular, consultants in the USA started to evaluate the project and HAL's capability given the likelihood of US involvement and the results were far from positive. Dr Steven Bryen, Head of the Strategic Trade Directorate in the Pentagon, considered the very basis of the project to be poorly conceived: If India wants to go, suffer, spend a lot of money, in billions of dollars, that is your problem . . . But, there is a question about the economics of developing some of these products . . . [there] are no guarantees [it will work] . . . You are talking about inventing a new cadre of people to do that work . . . there is not enough rationale [for the LCA] . . . as it is [ultimately] an economic issue . . . because it starts to drag down where your talented people are going to spend their time, and I question those kinds of investments very closely. More to the point, for a US analyst, he also questioned the wisdom of US involvement in a project such as the LCA: 'The worse kind of project for us to get involved in is the one that fails, or, that gives opposition politicians a chance to stand up and say-you have been led up the garden path by the Americans.' Another respected US defence analyst, Jacques Gansler, considered the timing of the LCA project to be misconceived. In a similar interview he argued that India had embarked upon an extremely ambitious project but one which would only embody technology soon to be superseded by the coming generation. Thus, for example, the LCA is expected to incorporate a 'cranked arrow' configuration which calls for the leading edge of the wing to be angled with a resultant increase in lift for a given amount of power. However, the coming generation of fighter aircraft, notably the US Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF), will incorporate vectored thrust technology which is much more advanced. The composite materials used to build the ATF and its avionics will also be far in advance of those of the LCA. Gansler's recommendation was for India to delay the project to make possible a limited acquisition of the emerging technologies. However, Gansler did not discuss whether or not India could access such an advanced level of technology, afford the costs, or cope with and exploit such advances. In all three instances the answer would probably be negative. Negotiations over defence technology transfer with the USA proceeded apace and were extended to cover not only LCA technology but also radar technology, anti-tank weaponry, night vision equipment, MBT fire control and transmission systems, ammunition and advanced materials.Il7 A high point was reached in January 1987 when the US Secretary for Defense, Caspar Weinberger, visited India to promise publicly all the technical support the country required for the successful development of the LCA. At the same time, however, reports started to appear regarding future French involvement in the project. In October 1987 it was reported that Dassault-Breguet had signed an agreement worth $100 million with the Indian Government to supply 30 engineers to work in Bangalore under the auspices of the ADA. It therefore seemed that France had effectively won the design contract. Furthermore, it became evident that France wished for an even greater input into the project by seeking to turn the Government's head in the direction of the SNECMA M88 Mk I1 engine scheduled for use in the Rafale light combat aircraft. In addition, at the same period an ADA team visited the Rolls-Royce Military Engine Group facilities in Bristol to view the Turbo-Union RB 199 engine. Throughout 1987 interest in the LCA programme was overshadowed by the Bofors scandal and received much less media attention. However, by mid-1987 it seemed as though Saab had made a late bid to provide development assistance, probably on the grounds that the LCA would emerge as a close relation of the JAS-39 light combat aircraft. Although Saab did not contribute a feasibility study, it had held previous talks with the Indian Government on co-operation as early as 1980-81. During the same period it was announced that General Electric (GE) had in fact won the order for 10 F404 turbofans for the prototype phase of the project, although this did not guarantee eventual incorporation at the production stage. Predictably enough, the project definition stage fell behind schedule by more than a year, and serious consideration was given to the future of the programme. One reason for the delay was a failure to agree upon the optimum weight for the system which could in turn have been related to the delays encountered with the development of composite materials. Significantly, it was the IAF which was reported to be dissatisfied with progress and, furthermore, was actively considering abandoning the whole project in favour of joint development of the French Rafale. There would be several advantages for India in such a move. The GE F404 powers the Rafale prototype, which would not rule out an Indian version powered by the GTX-35, given that the engines are interchangeable. The multi-mode radar under development for the LCA could also be used in the Rafale. Finally, given the likelihood that the cost of the LCA would certainly spiral out of control with uncertain end results and timing, investment in the French system would be much safer and almost certainly cheaper. Soon after it was reported that Dassault had succeeded in a bid to strike a 'company-company' agreement with HAL over the marketing of the LCA. In effect, Dassault had managed to introduce the LCA into its product spectrum alongside other systems in production and proposed-the Mirage 2000 and 4000, the Rafale and the Franco-German Alpha jet. How much this represents the thin end of the wedge designed to assimilate finally the whole project remains to be seen. During the same period a Letter of Offer and Acceptance was signed between the US Air Force and the Indian DRDO which allowed Indian technicians access to the four Air Force Wright Aeronautical Laboratories. This opened the way for collaboration and the participation of US industry in the project. The transfer of technology envisaged was unprecedented and covered avionics and flight controls, fly-by-wire systems, flight actuators and carbon composite materials. Also, during the same period, the USSR started to display an interest in the ill-fated programme by offering New Delhi participation in a new single-engined combat aircraft, similar in capability to the US F-16, should the price tag for the LCA present further problems. At the end of 1988 another peculiar twist was added to the LCA saga. In a bid to drive a wedge between New Delhi and both Washington and Paris, the USSR offered to improve radically the MiG-21, the aircraft the LCA is destined to replace. On offer for the MiG-21 was the MiG-29 engine, new wings and a modem avionics system. Since MiG-21 production facilities already existed in India the retrofitting could be done at a comparatively low cost. India could slow down the pace of LCA development and therefore distribute the escalating costs over a wider period of time or it could cancel what was rapidly becoming the biggest white elephant in the history of Indian defence production. Furthermore, during a period when the country's foreign exchange reserves were becoming rapidly depleted, such an offer, if accepted, could also slow the import of other sophisticated aircraft and even provide India with a novel source of exports when many countries were finding it extremely difficult to afford state-of-the-art military technology. However, nothing more was heard of the offer. By mid-1991 it appeared that the LCA was to be much more a hybrid of foreign technologies than ever imagined, with the inclusion of a US engine, Swedish avionics, a US or French fly-by-wire avionics system, and an airframe of which the main input has come from foreign consultants. From the original estimate of Rs.560 crores, the cost is now estimated to be Rs. 1670 crores and production dates remain uncertain. In addition, the configuration of the system changed markedly, specifically with regard to weight. From the lithe 5.5 tonne system originally planned, the LCA is now a more portly 8 tonnes and much closer to the F-16 it is intended to outperform. The fault has been the traditional tendency to add on technology, which has also ramified into price rises-cost estimates are now about $10 billion for a reduced number of 200 units. However, a more optimistic note was sounded at the 1991 Paris Air Show when an HAL spokesman implied that the LCA production run could produce 500 aircraft.
This may tie in with the recent reports concerning a naval variant. It is now unlikely that the LCA will be operational before the end of the century, and the number of prototypes has been cut from seven to two. The Indian LCA is beginning to appear in a similar light to other major aeronautics projects attempted by India-chaotic and subject to flux, cost overruns, technological slippage and time delays. There have even been reports that the programme has been shelved but this does not appear to be the case. Above all it is possible that the IAF will eventually do what it appears to have done on numerous other occasions and effectively obstruct attempts at indigenization in an effort to ensure that foreign rather than indigenous systems prevail. Finally, in August 1992 the Indian Government at last took the inevitable step and opened the doors to full foreign collaboration, citing lack of funds as the primary reason. In the current climate the long- and short-term prospects for the Indian aeronautics industry look bleak. Hampered by bureaucratic infighting and rendered less capable than it really is by the unrealistic demands of the Air Force, deprived of an input into the decision making process and lacking the necessary political patronage, HAL is unlikely to develop its technological capabilities far enough to fulfil its undoubted potential. In this milieu there is no opportunity to close the gap between present levels of capability and the increasing rate of technological change in the defence industries of the West. Nor is the outlook helped by the severe downturn in the international aerospace market, which will hamper the company's attempts to attain rhythm and continuity. Given the way in which the technological needs for defence are defined, this is a prerequisite. The LCA project did to a certain extent reflect an understanding on the part of the Government that the opportunities for India to create a viable and credible aeronautic production capability based upon modem technolog' ies were fast diminishing. If the Government had not proceeded with the LCA programme, the long-term prospects of HAL would have looked bleak indeed, not least in view of the development of HAL's technology base. However, sound decision making, effective management and co-ordinated support were equally important, and in this direction there are many questions. Why were two of the most effective members of the ADA allowed to resign without attempts at reconciliation, particularly given the peculiarities of the industry and the need for experienced leadership? Why were so many foreign technicians and consultants allowed on to the programme in such an ad hoc manner? No fewer than six countries made offers to India during the mid-1980s, which led to confusion and prevarication and must surely have hindered progress, resolve and morale. Why was the IAF allowed to court Dassault for the Rafale given the apparent resolve on the part of government to develop as much of an indigenous capacity as possible? Equally relevant is the question why HAL was allowed to fall into such a parlous state in the late 1970s. During a period of rapid technological change why did government allow the industry to exist without projects and without significant R&D, thereby losing all the benefits of follow-on projects? This was the heart of the problems experienced over the course of the LCA programme. Under any circumstances it is both difficult and expensive for a country such as India to match the rate of technological change which obtains in the West or did obtain in the USSR. Any attempt, therefore, to leap one generation at least by moving from the HF-24 to the LCA when the industry has languished and many of the best and the brightest have left is bound to be time-consuming, costly and technically complex. Without effective management or government discipline over the role and input of all the relevant institutions, the failures and setbacks witnessed in recent years were probably inevitable. However, in contrast to the situation in the 1970s, HAL now enjoys an unprecedented degree of political support. Although the LCA programme has been roundly criticized by pundits and watchdog committees alike, the LCA programme is now seen as a project of immense national importance and prestige. The facts that it is a white elephant, capable of inflicting severe opportunity costs on other areas of the defence budget, and that it will be virtually obsolete by the time it is produced and probably unexportable, have made little difference. What seems of greater importance is that India will be seen to produce its own, indigenous advanced combat aircraft at some point in the future. By avoiding too much reference to foreign inputs, the myth of indigenization will be preserved. Quite where the LCA will figure in India's defence posture will depend very much upon the IAF.Georges Bridel among many foreigner consultant. "As kurt tank is to maurt georges bridel is to LCA?"
Some of his light fighter jet designs.
LCA design evolved from multiple European companies MBB and Dassault.
@MastanKhan @gambit @Horus
Failed or Successfull doesnt matter.
