By Ajit Mohan
On China” is Henry Kissinger’s effort to draw a long arc that traces the political history of China, from an ancient civilization with “no beginning” to a modern-day state that is fast becoming the 21st century’s most consequential power.
Can India learn anything more about its neighbor from a diplomat who has closely watched the country over the last 40 years?
The 1962 war
The book’s prologue dramatically starts with a conversation between Mao Zedong and his top commanders on the eve of China’s war with India in October 1962. The border war is one of the only parts of the book where Mr. Kissinger deals with India directly, giving a blow-by-blow account of events. India gets little attention elsewhere, which may be an accurate depiction of the lack of deep engagement between the two neighbors historically, or perhaps a reflection of Mr. Kissinger’s acceptance of the current Beijing narrative that India is inconsequential to China’s rise on the world stage.
But Mr. Kissinger’s story on how the border conflict came to be is interesting in its own right, given that it sharply contradicts the popular Indian version of itself as the aggrieved party.
The former U.S. Secretary of State goes back to the 1912-1914 Simla conference convened by the British with Chinese and Tibetan authorities to settle the borders between the three countries. The Chinese delegate, citing his country’s weakened condition at that stage, initialed the resulting agreement on the McMahon line but did not sign the document, thus keeping the border dispute open. Decades later, in the late 1950s, upon completion of Tibet’s annexation, Mr. Kissinger says Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai made an offer to accept the Indian position in the west (Arunachal Pradesh) in return for recognition of Chinese claims on Aksai Chin in the east. India Prime Minister Nehru rejected the offer.
November 24, 1973: Then U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, right, with Mao Zedong, left, in Beijing.Soon after, India started pursuing a “Forward Policy” at the border, with troops being asked to patrol far in advance of their positions, closer to the international border drawn by India, and toward Chinese military positions. Mao Zedong, however, ordered his forces to exercise restraint – Chinese policy at this stage was still to avoid a military conflict. Emboldened by the response to the excursions, India’s own goals escalated to push back the Chinese from their military posts. Mao saw this as an act that left him with no option but to force India back to the negotiating table through a sudden blow that also had the benefit of potentially gaining a useful psychological advantage over a large neighbor. Mr. Kissinger quotes Mao as saying, “Since Nehru sticks his head out and insists on us fighting him, for us not to fight with him would not be friendly enough; courtesy emphasizes reciprocity.” China launched an offensive in October 1962 that lasted only a few days but inflicted a decisive defeat on India. With its objectives met, the Chinese army returned to its starting point without conquering any new territories.
With references to an exhaustive list of Indian and Chinese historical records, Mr. Kissinger’s history is a rebuttal of the Indian version of the war as pre-meditated aggression from China (articulated amongst others by retired Colonel Anil Athale, the former director of war history at the Defence Ministry). His narrative also runs counter to the view that was put forth by the then U.S. Ambassador to India, John Kenneth Galbraith (a friend of President Kennedy and a key player on the scene in 1962 in New Delhi), that the war was accidental.
On the contrary, the 1962 war seems to have been the result of deliberate choices from both countries: Nehru’s attempts to probe his strategic space on the border without fully considering the possibility and consequences of a Chinese reaction, and China’s clear intent to use the border skirmish to send a signal to India about its own “red lines.” The contrasting philosophies of Mao and Nehru showed up in their own interpretations of history as well. In Nehru’s history, China and India had never fought a war through 2,000 years of history, and therefore, a war between the two neighbors was impossible. Mao, on the other hand, is cited by Mr. Kissinger as telling his commanders that China and India had, in fact, fought “one-and-a-half” wars before 1962: the first one 1,300 years earlier when the Tang dynasty had sent troops to aid one Indian kingdom against its rival and a “half war” when Mongol ruler Timurlane sacked Delhi. Mao reasoned that since Mongolia and China were then part of the same political entity, this was a “’half’ Sino-Indian war”.
China and the world
But even a book that has India as just a bit player still has enormous significance for the country. It is an opportunity to understand – from an intimate observer – the path that led to China’s emergence as a global power and its likely posture towards its neighbors, as well as the rest of the world.
At the heart of the book is Mr. Kissinger’s portrayal of a China that, for much of its history, has believed in its own version of exceptionalism. For the U.S., the idea that America is different to every other nation has been central to the country’s view of its role in the world, ever since it was first articulated by Alexis de Tocqueville in the early 19th century. Mr. Kissinger argues that Chinese exceptionalism has its roots in ancient history, where China perceived itself as being at “the center of the world – the ‘Middle Kingdom,’ and other societies were assessed as gradations from it. As the Chinese saw it, a host of lesser states that imbibed Chinese culture and paid tribute to China’s greatness constituted the natural order of the universe.” The Emperor ruled All Under Heaven (even if his subjects weren’t entirely aware of it.)
But China’s version of exceptionalism remained distinct from America’s, especially in how it shaped its engagement with the rest of the world. In Confucianism, the country claimed a set of values that was both universal and secular, but it saw no need to spread these values beyond its boundaries. As Mr. Kissinger explains, “China did not export its ideas but let others come to seek them. The Chinese Emperors felt it was impractical to contemplate influencing countries that nature had the misfortune of locating at such a great distance from China.”
As for the remote “barbarians” such as Europeans, about whom they knew little, the Chinese maintained a friendly, if condescending, aloofness.” China accepted its own inherent superiority, but had “no New World to populate, no redemption awaiting mankind on distant shores. The promised land was China, and the Chinese were already there.” But Mr. Kissinger doesn’t answer the question on the minds of India and the world’s other powers: Which China will likely show up in the next few decades? The China that stays away from conquering new worlds or a China that, in its perennial quest for security and resources, will flex its growing muscles in both its neighborhood and in the world’s remote corners? A China that will play by the rules of the international system or the one whose companies, in violation of sanctions, allegedly sold arms to Libya’s Col. Moammar Gadhafi?
The other recurring theme in the book is Mr. Kissinger’s deep admiration for China’s approach to international relations. For a man considered a master thinker himself, Mr. Kissinger is clearly in awe of China’s strategic acumen. He portrays a country that consistently takes a long view of history, is deliberate in its actions and persistent in seeking relative advantages vis-à-vis its adversaries – often when these advantages are imperceptible and well before adversaries have woken up to the truth of their competition with China. And, when it comes to strategy, Mr. Kissinger outlines how fundamentally different China’s approach is in comparison to that of the western world.
US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and Chairman Mao in Beijing in 1973.“A turbulent history has taught Chinese leaders that not every problem has a solution,” Mr. Kissinger writes. Therefore, “rarely did Chinese statesmen risk the outcome of a conflict on a single all-or-nothing clash; elaborate multiyear maneuvers were closer to their style. Where the Western tradition prized the decisive clash of forces emphasizing feats of heroism, the Chinese ideal stressed subtlety, indirection and the patient accumulation of relative advantage.”
“In contrast to the Western approach of treating history as a process of modernity achieving a series of absolute victories over evil and backwardness, the traditional Chinese view of history emphasized a cyclical process of decay and rectification.”
Mr. Kissinger brings in the analogy of wei qi and chess to illustrate the differences between the Chinese and western approaches. “If chess is about the decisive battle, wei qi is about the protracted campaign.” It is hard not to wonder if the equivalent stand-in for India’s foreign policy approach in this analogy of games is its own invention, kabaddi: dashing forays, bold moves at times, all usually followed by breathless retreats.
In story after story, Mr. Kissinger shows superior Chinese statecraft at play, pitting one “barbarian” against another, often projecting a strength it did not have, hiding vulnerabilities it did have, and always biding its time for a future that it was certain of. In the days leading up to the 1962 war with India, China asked its ambassador in Warsaw to meet American diplomats to check on non-existent “preparations in Taiwan for a landing on the mainland.”
Without understanding that China was effectively probing any intent to use the border war with India to force an advantage in the Taiwan Strait, confused American diplomats effectively gave comfort to China that its border conflict with India would not trigger other strategic moves. In 1958, China invited Soviet premier Nikita Krushchev to Beijing weeks before it triggered a crisis in the Taiwan Straits. The U.S. assumed wrongly that “Mao was acting not only with Moscow’s support but at its behest.” More often than not, Kissinger’s China plays as many games in the minds of its adversaries as it does on the battlefields.
What should India learn?
Chinese President Hu Jintao, left, with Henry Kissinger in Washington DC in January this year. This is an important lesson for India: recognizing that its northern neighbor always plays the long game, and that the ability to effectively toy with the minds of its allies and adversaries alike is a crucial tool in its approach towards foreign relations. So, when China issues stapled visas to residents of Kashmir (presumably questioning the status of the state), it is very likely a well-crafted move, meant to needle India’s insecurities. The uproar it creates in India is exactly the response that it is seeking. China’s opposition to an Asian Development Bank funded project in Arunachal Pradesh (presumably questioning the status of Arunachal) in 2009 should be seen in the same light. These are low effort strategies on China’s part, meant to stoke India’s fears and insecurities.
The narrative, most recently articulated in a New York Times article, that Indians are obsessed with China and China is barely aware of India’s existence, may well be a truthful articulation of a brief, contemporary moment. Here and now, China is of more consequence to India and the world than India is to China and the world. But more than any other country, China knows from its own history that great transitions can happen in a matter of years, if not decades, and that the trajectory of politics and economics has pitted the two countries as hefty peers on the international scene.
Whether it’s building up a navy or developing ports in the Indian Ocean, or supporting Pakistan’s ambivalent approach to extremism, China is developing options and capabilities vis-à-vis India that can be leveraged in case the future demands it. If Mr. Kissinger is to be believed, encirclement is the game that China has always played best.
Mr. Kissinger’s China is not a country that actively seeks out enemies and battles, but it is a country that will always be prepared for a future that may bring with it adversaries and confrontation.
India would be wise to craft an approach to China that understands the games it plays, and evolve from constantly reacting to Chinese moves to actively shaping the contours of the relationship. A few mind games from India’s side could help of course, although the idea floated in government circles in 2010 of stapling visas granted to Chinese government officials who have worked in Tibet did not seem imaginative enough! More than anything, India needs to steal a page of ancient Chinese wisdom quoted by Mr. Kissinger – that “confrontation can be safely pursued only if the weaker is in a position to make its defeat costly beyond the tolerance of the stronger” – and raise the cost to China, incrementally, of any of its policies that are detrimental to India’s economic and social interests. India too should start developing equivalent points of leverage in case the relationship becomes adversarial in the future.
There are other valuable lessons for India in Mr. Kissinger’s book, and a whole lot to be envious about. A compellingly naïve argument often cited for China’s relative economic success is the advantage of an autocratic form of government in sharp contrast to India’s noisy democracy that apparently slows reforms. The real story that emerges in the book is of a China that has been blessed through the centuries with custodians close to the center of power who are unremittingly looking out for the country’s interests above all else.
From an “imperial bureaucracy recruited by competitive examination” who compensate for “the general obtuseness of the imperial court” in the pre-modern era, to skilled diplomats who risk their own lives to protect the state from the machinations of the European powers in the 19th century, China always seem to find champions at the right moment with a long sense of history who are deeply committed to the idea of Chinese culture and the greater good. Even in the midst of Mao’s brutal reign, China found a Zhou Enlai who softened the blow and saved the country from complete implosion.
What stands out too is China’s incessant focus on economic growth in the last three decades. It is a story that has been told often; of how China’s leaders since Mao have all traded ideology for pragmatic and persistent reforms that have converted “Mao’s drab China of agricultural communes, a stagnant economy and a population wearing standard jackets” to today’s China of “bustling cities, the un-Communist dilemma of a growth rate occasionally threatened by inflation, and, at other times, looked to by the Western democracies as a bulwark against global recession.”
What is less known is the subplot of how, at every point of transition, China’s direction could have swayed sharply away from the reforms that eventually yielded it enormous success. Mr. Kissinger gives a powerful example of how 87-year-old Deng came out of retirement in early 1992 to resist the powerful array of forces within the Communist party who were coalescing to resist Jiang Zemin’s reform leadership. Though with no official role at that point, he used an “inspection tour” of southern China to launch an aggressive advocacy of continued economic liberalization that kept Chinese reforms going. Again, what seems to make the difference at crucial moments are outstanding stewards, who had conviction in their choices and a willingness to take on entrenched interests for the greater good of the country. It is a history that does stand in sharp contrast to India’s own. Even when surprised by the superior military prowess of the Europeans, China, steered by savvy custodians, managed to emerge out of the turmoil unscathed by full-blown colonization. Rarely does India’s political history have such parallels; and more often than not, its contemporary history is one of even good men failing to stand up for their convictions and ideals, of an absence of thoughtful but combative champions for reforms, political and economic.
His last act of diplomacy
The book is also noteworthy for what Kissinger chooses to avoid, and the questions he leaves unanswered. His view of Mao, his partner in the re-establishment of diplomatic relations, is gentle, sometimes adulatory. He goes beyond glossing over the extreme excesses of Mao’s Cultural Revolution to attempting a morbid philosophy of national development to explain Mao’s actions. The student protests at Tiananmen Square show up less as a horrific atrocity and more as an interlude in Chinese-American relations that he personally helps to repair. The systematic suppression of dissent in China is immaterial to his grand narrative of international relations. Even as he draws a long arc across history, he does not find a way to explain China’s more recent actions, from economic mercantilism to its aggressive posture in the South China Sea.
The book also doesn’t reveal Mr. Kissinger’s own views on whether China’s rise will indeed be peaceful. Very deliberately, he has created a tome and a narrative that portrays China in a way that China would want to see itself. And, in many ways, his book seems to be beseeching China to remain the country in his mind’s eye, the same country that was eager to embrace him and America when the moment needed it.
“On China”, therefore, may well be Mr. Kissinger’s final act of diplomacy couched in a grand narrative about the world’s most consequential nation of the moment.
Based in New Delhi, Ajit Mohan has worked with private and public institutions around the world. He is a graduate of the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. He writes the Weekend Panorama column for India Real Time every two weeks.
On China” is Henry Kissinger’s effort to draw a long arc that traces the political history of China, from an ancient civilization with “no beginning” to a modern-day state that is fast becoming the 21st century’s most consequential power.
Can India learn anything more about its neighbor from a diplomat who has closely watched the country over the last 40 years?
The 1962 war
The book’s prologue dramatically starts with a conversation between Mao Zedong and his top commanders on the eve of China’s war with India in October 1962. The border war is one of the only parts of the book where Mr. Kissinger deals with India directly, giving a blow-by-blow account of events. India gets little attention elsewhere, which may be an accurate depiction of the lack of deep engagement between the two neighbors historically, or perhaps a reflection of Mr. Kissinger’s acceptance of the current Beijing narrative that India is inconsequential to China’s rise on the world stage.
But Mr. Kissinger’s story on how the border conflict came to be is interesting in its own right, given that it sharply contradicts the popular Indian version of itself as the aggrieved party.
The former U.S. Secretary of State goes back to the 1912-1914 Simla conference convened by the British with Chinese and Tibetan authorities to settle the borders between the three countries. The Chinese delegate, citing his country’s weakened condition at that stage, initialed the resulting agreement on the McMahon line but did not sign the document, thus keeping the border dispute open. Decades later, in the late 1950s, upon completion of Tibet’s annexation, Mr. Kissinger says Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai made an offer to accept the Indian position in the west (Arunachal Pradesh) in return for recognition of Chinese claims on Aksai Chin in the east. India Prime Minister Nehru rejected the offer.
November 24, 1973: Then U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, right, with Mao Zedong, left, in Beijing.Soon after, India started pursuing a “Forward Policy” at the border, with troops being asked to patrol far in advance of their positions, closer to the international border drawn by India, and toward Chinese military positions. Mao Zedong, however, ordered his forces to exercise restraint – Chinese policy at this stage was still to avoid a military conflict. Emboldened by the response to the excursions, India’s own goals escalated to push back the Chinese from their military posts. Mao saw this as an act that left him with no option but to force India back to the negotiating table through a sudden blow that also had the benefit of potentially gaining a useful psychological advantage over a large neighbor. Mr. Kissinger quotes Mao as saying, “Since Nehru sticks his head out and insists on us fighting him, for us not to fight with him would not be friendly enough; courtesy emphasizes reciprocity.” China launched an offensive in October 1962 that lasted only a few days but inflicted a decisive defeat on India. With its objectives met, the Chinese army returned to its starting point without conquering any new territories.
With references to an exhaustive list of Indian and Chinese historical records, Mr. Kissinger’s history is a rebuttal of the Indian version of the war as pre-meditated aggression from China (articulated amongst others by retired Colonel Anil Athale, the former director of war history at the Defence Ministry). His narrative also runs counter to the view that was put forth by the then U.S. Ambassador to India, John Kenneth Galbraith (a friend of President Kennedy and a key player on the scene in 1962 in New Delhi), that the war was accidental.
On the contrary, the 1962 war seems to have been the result of deliberate choices from both countries: Nehru’s attempts to probe his strategic space on the border without fully considering the possibility and consequences of a Chinese reaction, and China’s clear intent to use the border skirmish to send a signal to India about its own “red lines.” The contrasting philosophies of Mao and Nehru showed up in their own interpretations of history as well. In Nehru’s history, China and India had never fought a war through 2,000 years of history, and therefore, a war between the two neighbors was impossible. Mao, on the other hand, is cited by Mr. Kissinger as telling his commanders that China and India had, in fact, fought “one-and-a-half” wars before 1962: the first one 1,300 years earlier when the Tang dynasty had sent troops to aid one Indian kingdom against its rival and a “half war” when Mongol ruler Timurlane sacked Delhi. Mao reasoned that since Mongolia and China were then part of the same political entity, this was a “’half’ Sino-Indian war”.
China and the world
But even a book that has India as just a bit player still has enormous significance for the country. It is an opportunity to understand – from an intimate observer – the path that led to China’s emergence as a global power and its likely posture towards its neighbors, as well as the rest of the world.
At the heart of the book is Mr. Kissinger’s portrayal of a China that, for much of its history, has believed in its own version of exceptionalism. For the U.S., the idea that America is different to every other nation has been central to the country’s view of its role in the world, ever since it was first articulated by Alexis de Tocqueville in the early 19th century. Mr. Kissinger argues that Chinese exceptionalism has its roots in ancient history, where China perceived itself as being at “the center of the world – the ‘Middle Kingdom,’ and other societies were assessed as gradations from it. As the Chinese saw it, a host of lesser states that imbibed Chinese culture and paid tribute to China’s greatness constituted the natural order of the universe.” The Emperor ruled All Under Heaven (even if his subjects weren’t entirely aware of it.)
But China’s version of exceptionalism remained distinct from America’s, especially in how it shaped its engagement with the rest of the world. In Confucianism, the country claimed a set of values that was both universal and secular, but it saw no need to spread these values beyond its boundaries. As Mr. Kissinger explains, “China did not export its ideas but let others come to seek them. The Chinese Emperors felt it was impractical to contemplate influencing countries that nature had the misfortune of locating at such a great distance from China.”
As for the remote “barbarians” such as Europeans, about whom they knew little, the Chinese maintained a friendly, if condescending, aloofness.” China accepted its own inherent superiority, but had “no New World to populate, no redemption awaiting mankind on distant shores. The promised land was China, and the Chinese were already there.” But Mr. Kissinger doesn’t answer the question on the minds of India and the world’s other powers: Which China will likely show up in the next few decades? The China that stays away from conquering new worlds or a China that, in its perennial quest for security and resources, will flex its growing muscles in both its neighborhood and in the world’s remote corners? A China that will play by the rules of the international system or the one whose companies, in violation of sanctions, allegedly sold arms to Libya’s Col. Moammar Gadhafi?
The other recurring theme in the book is Mr. Kissinger’s deep admiration for China’s approach to international relations. For a man considered a master thinker himself, Mr. Kissinger is clearly in awe of China’s strategic acumen. He portrays a country that consistently takes a long view of history, is deliberate in its actions and persistent in seeking relative advantages vis-à-vis its adversaries – often when these advantages are imperceptible and well before adversaries have woken up to the truth of their competition with China. And, when it comes to strategy, Mr. Kissinger outlines how fundamentally different China’s approach is in comparison to that of the western world.
US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and Chairman Mao in Beijing in 1973.“A turbulent history has taught Chinese leaders that not every problem has a solution,” Mr. Kissinger writes. Therefore, “rarely did Chinese statesmen risk the outcome of a conflict on a single all-or-nothing clash; elaborate multiyear maneuvers were closer to their style. Where the Western tradition prized the decisive clash of forces emphasizing feats of heroism, the Chinese ideal stressed subtlety, indirection and the patient accumulation of relative advantage.”
“In contrast to the Western approach of treating history as a process of modernity achieving a series of absolute victories over evil and backwardness, the traditional Chinese view of history emphasized a cyclical process of decay and rectification.”
Mr. Kissinger brings in the analogy of wei qi and chess to illustrate the differences between the Chinese and western approaches. “If chess is about the decisive battle, wei qi is about the protracted campaign.” It is hard not to wonder if the equivalent stand-in for India’s foreign policy approach in this analogy of games is its own invention, kabaddi: dashing forays, bold moves at times, all usually followed by breathless retreats.
In story after story, Mr. Kissinger shows superior Chinese statecraft at play, pitting one “barbarian” against another, often projecting a strength it did not have, hiding vulnerabilities it did have, and always biding its time for a future that it was certain of. In the days leading up to the 1962 war with India, China asked its ambassador in Warsaw to meet American diplomats to check on non-existent “preparations in Taiwan for a landing on the mainland.”
Without understanding that China was effectively probing any intent to use the border war with India to force an advantage in the Taiwan Strait, confused American diplomats effectively gave comfort to China that its border conflict with India would not trigger other strategic moves. In 1958, China invited Soviet premier Nikita Krushchev to Beijing weeks before it triggered a crisis in the Taiwan Straits. The U.S. assumed wrongly that “Mao was acting not only with Moscow’s support but at its behest.” More often than not, Kissinger’s China plays as many games in the minds of its adversaries as it does on the battlefields.
What should India learn?
Chinese President Hu Jintao, left, with Henry Kissinger in Washington DC in January this year. This is an important lesson for India: recognizing that its northern neighbor always plays the long game, and that the ability to effectively toy with the minds of its allies and adversaries alike is a crucial tool in its approach towards foreign relations. So, when China issues stapled visas to residents of Kashmir (presumably questioning the status of the state), it is very likely a well-crafted move, meant to needle India’s insecurities. The uproar it creates in India is exactly the response that it is seeking. China’s opposition to an Asian Development Bank funded project in Arunachal Pradesh (presumably questioning the status of Arunachal) in 2009 should be seen in the same light. These are low effort strategies on China’s part, meant to stoke India’s fears and insecurities.
The narrative, most recently articulated in a New York Times article, that Indians are obsessed with China and China is barely aware of India’s existence, may well be a truthful articulation of a brief, contemporary moment. Here and now, China is of more consequence to India and the world than India is to China and the world. But more than any other country, China knows from its own history that great transitions can happen in a matter of years, if not decades, and that the trajectory of politics and economics has pitted the two countries as hefty peers on the international scene.
Whether it’s building up a navy or developing ports in the Indian Ocean, or supporting Pakistan’s ambivalent approach to extremism, China is developing options and capabilities vis-à-vis India that can be leveraged in case the future demands it. If Mr. Kissinger is to be believed, encirclement is the game that China has always played best.
Mr. Kissinger’s China is not a country that actively seeks out enemies and battles, but it is a country that will always be prepared for a future that may bring with it adversaries and confrontation.
India would be wise to craft an approach to China that understands the games it plays, and evolve from constantly reacting to Chinese moves to actively shaping the contours of the relationship. A few mind games from India’s side could help of course, although the idea floated in government circles in 2010 of stapling visas granted to Chinese government officials who have worked in Tibet did not seem imaginative enough! More than anything, India needs to steal a page of ancient Chinese wisdom quoted by Mr. Kissinger – that “confrontation can be safely pursued only if the weaker is in a position to make its defeat costly beyond the tolerance of the stronger” – and raise the cost to China, incrementally, of any of its policies that are detrimental to India’s economic and social interests. India too should start developing equivalent points of leverage in case the relationship becomes adversarial in the future.
There are other valuable lessons for India in Mr. Kissinger’s book, and a whole lot to be envious about. A compellingly naïve argument often cited for China’s relative economic success is the advantage of an autocratic form of government in sharp contrast to India’s noisy democracy that apparently slows reforms. The real story that emerges in the book is of a China that has been blessed through the centuries with custodians close to the center of power who are unremittingly looking out for the country’s interests above all else.
From an “imperial bureaucracy recruited by competitive examination” who compensate for “the general obtuseness of the imperial court” in the pre-modern era, to skilled diplomats who risk their own lives to protect the state from the machinations of the European powers in the 19th century, China always seem to find champions at the right moment with a long sense of history who are deeply committed to the idea of Chinese culture and the greater good. Even in the midst of Mao’s brutal reign, China found a Zhou Enlai who softened the blow and saved the country from complete implosion.
What stands out too is China’s incessant focus on economic growth in the last three decades. It is a story that has been told often; of how China’s leaders since Mao have all traded ideology for pragmatic and persistent reforms that have converted “Mao’s drab China of agricultural communes, a stagnant economy and a population wearing standard jackets” to today’s China of “bustling cities, the un-Communist dilemma of a growth rate occasionally threatened by inflation, and, at other times, looked to by the Western democracies as a bulwark against global recession.”
What is less known is the subplot of how, at every point of transition, China’s direction could have swayed sharply away from the reforms that eventually yielded it enormous success. Mr. Kissinger gives a powerful example of how 87-year-old Deng came out of retirement in early 1992 to resist the powerful array of forces within the Communist party who were coalescing to resist Jiang Zemin’s reform leadership. Though with no official role at that point, he used an “inspection tour” of southern China to launch an aggressive advocacy of continued economic liberalization that kept Chinese reforms going. Again, what seems to make the difference at crucial moments are outstanding stewards, who had conviction in their choices and a willingness to take on entrenched interests for the greater good of the country. It is a history that does stand in sharp contrast to India’s own. Even when surprised by the superior military prowess of the Europeans, China, steered by savvy custodians, managed to emerge out of the turmoil unscathed by full-blown colonization. Rarely does India’s political history have such parallels; and more often than not, its contemporary history is one of even good men failing to stand up for their convictions and ideals, of an absence of thoughtful but combative champions for reforms, political and economic.
His last act of diplomacy
The book is also noteworthy for what Kissinger chooses to avoid, and the questions he leaves unanswered. His view of Mao, his partner in the re-establishment of diplomatic relations, is gentle, sometimes adulatory. He goes beyond glossing over the extreme excesses of Mao’s Cultural Revolution to attempting a morbid philosophy of national development to explain Mao’s actions. The student protests at Tiananmen Square show up less as a horrific atrocity and more as an interlude in Chinese-American relations that he personally helps to repair. The systematic suppression of dissent in China is immaterial to his grand narrative of international relations. Even as he draws a long arc across history, he does not find a way to explain China’s more recent actions, from economic mercantilism to its aggressive posture in the South China Sea.
The book also doesn’t reveal Mr. Kissinger’s own views on whether China’s rise will indeed be peaceful. Very deliberately, he has created a tome and a narrative that portrays China in a way that China would want to see itself. And, in many ways, his book seems to be beseeching China to remain the country in his mind’s eye, the same country that was eager to embrace him and America when the moment needed it.
“On China”, therefore, may well be Mr. Kissinger’s final act of diplomacy couched in a grand narrative about the world’s most consequential nation of the moment.
Based in New Delhi, Ajit Mohan has worked with private and public institutions around the world. He is a graduate of the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. He writes the Weekend Panorama column for India Real Time every two weeks.
