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We support resolution of the dispute through self-determination - under the UNSC resolutions there is no third option for 'freedom'.

Nonetheless, Azad kashmir does have a significant degree of autonomy, and passing a resolution in the UN and making Azad kashmir an independent nation does not resolve the issue of the territory occupied by India does it? So why do it?

If India and Israel can willfully violate their commitments to the UNSC resolutions on Kashmir and Palestine, then why would an additional resolution in the UNSC change things?

Why doesn't the international community pressure India to agree to fulfill its commitment to the existing resolutions and negotiate with Pakistan to implement a referendum?

The UNSC resolutions already had the broad agreement of India, Pakistan and the international community on the principle of a plebiscite under the UN to determine which nation the Kashmiris can be part of - what is needed is the will on the Indian side to move towards implementing that solution of a plebiscite.

Sir, Whatever Pakistan is doing right now, does THAT resolve the issue?? No. So why do it. Why do Pakistan supports and promote violence in India in the name of Kashmir freedom? Instead, Declaring Pakistan Administered Kashmir as a FULL AND REAL INDEPENDENT COUNTRY, and trying to get it recognized by International community will put a huge amount of pressure upon India to follow the suit. IMO, it will be a diplomatic masterstroke from Pakistan's POV. But, this will not happen. Because, Pakistan's real motive is not Independent Kashmir but an Pakistani state.

Be the change you want to see in the world. Pakistan need to lead from the front. Otherwise such rhetoric by posting some youtube videos will do nothing other than getting the poster some thanks on PDF.
 
Following the World War-II, there has been an unremitting resistance by the people of Subcontinent against the ruling British colonial power. Under the swelling pressure of the people of subcontinent, the British Government finally had to announce the partition of the Subcontinent on June 3, 1947. However, the British Parliament formally passed “The Indian Independence Act-1947” on July 17, 1947. As per provision of Article-I of the Independence Act, India was to be partitioned into two Dominions namely “India” and “Pakistan” from 15th day of August 1947. However, Article 7 of the Indian Independence Act very clearly states that from 15th August 1947, “the suzerainty of His Majesty over the Indian states lapse and with it lapses all treaties and agreements in force at the date of the passing of this Act between His Majesty and the rulers of Indian states”. Consequent upon this, all powers and functions, which were exercisable by the British Government in relation to the Princely States, also ceased.

All agreements of British governments with either rulers or states also lapsed on 15th of August 1947. Since the state of Jammu and Kashmir was a Princely State with a special autonomous status, therefore, it can be very conveniently said, that on 15th day of August 1947, the Maharaja Sir Hari Singh was not the permissible ruler of the state of Jammu and Kashmir as all his treaties with British India lapsed on that day. Once he was not a ruler of the state, he had no right to sign the instrument of accession (if at all he signed that) with the new Indian dominion. This title to the state was granted to him by the British Government (East India Company) under the Treaty of Amritsar (Kashmir Sale deed) signed on 16 March 1846 and lapsed on the appointed day of 15th August 1947.

Besides, on July 25, 1947 in his address to special full meetings of the Chamber of Princes held in New Delhi, Lord Mountbatten categorically told all princes of Princely States that they were practically free to join any one of dominions; India or Pakistan. He however clarified that, while acceding to any dominion they could take into account geographical contiguity and wishes of the people. In case of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, either of the above factors was favouring state’s accession to Pakistan, but Maharaja Hari Singh did not accept this basic precondition of accession.

Indian claim that its forces landed Srinagar Airport on October 27, 1947, only after signatures on Instrument of Accession by Maharaja and the Indian government is also fallacious. Indeed, a heavy contingent of Patiala State was involved in fighting against the Kashmiri rebellions in Uri Sector on 18 October 1947, which means that they were very much inside the State's territory much earlier than October 27, 1947.

On 24 October 1947, Kashmiris formally declared their independence from Dogra Raj and established their own government with the name of Azad (Free) Kashmir Government. Following this Maharaja Hari Singh sent his deputy Prime Minister Mr. R.L. Batra to New Delhi for Indian military assistance to his Government against those revolted and tribal from NWFP who joined their brethrens against a tyrant rule. He (Batra) met the Indian Prime Minster and other prominent Indian leaders and requested for assistance without making any mention or promise of state’s accession to the Indian Union. The Indian government instead sent Mr. V.P Menon (Indian Secretary of State) to Kashmir to assess the situation on the spot by himself on 25 October 1947.

After assessing, the situation in Kashmir Mr. V.P Menon flew back to New Delhi on 26 October 1947, together with Kashmiri Prime Minster Mr. Mahajan, who met top Indian leadership, seeking military assistance. He was refused to get that until state’s formal accession with India. On this Kashmiri Premier threatened the Indian leadership that if immediate military assistance was not granted, he would go to Lahore for negotiations with Pakistani leadership over the future status of the state. In a parallel development, Sheikh Abdullah met Indian Premier, Jawaharlal Nehru, on the same day, October 26, 1947, who agreed to despatch military assistance to the Kashmir government.

As stated by Mahajan, the Kashmiri Prime Minister, that V.P. Menon accompanied him to convince Hari Singh for accession of the State with India on 27 October 1947. Under the compulsion, Hari Singh signed the instrument of accession on the same day i.e. 27 October 1947, which was later taken to Lord Mountbatten (Indian Governor General), who also signed that on the same day (27 October), which was practically difficult. V.P. Menon, however, states that all these formalities of signatures were completed on 26 October 1947, which is impracticable. This version, however, seems concocted as even contradicted by pro Indian Kashmiri Premier. Both however are unanimous on one point that Indian state forces landed at Srinagar airfield in the morning of 27 October 1947 and a battalion of Patiala State received them there, which was already there.

In his travel account, Kashmiri Prime Minister Mahajan has described that he had refused to return to Kashmir and hand over powers to Sheikh Abdullah until Srinagar airfield had been physically taken over by the Indian forces. This creates doubt as to whether Mahajan and V.P Menon even went to the State (Jammu) for getting the signatures of Maharaja Hari Singh on the Instrument of Accession before 27 October 1947. This is further confirmed by variation in the statements of V.P. Menon and Mr. Mahajan (Kashmiri Prime Minister) regarding their travel to Kashmir either on 26 or on 27 October 1947 for getting the signatures of Maharaja Hari Singh.

However, whatever be the case the factual position is that; Maharaja Hari Singh was not in favour of State’s accession to Indian Union therefore, he only requested the Indian government for military assistance without any pre-condition of accession. Indeed, the accession documents and letters to Lord Mountbatten were initiated through the Joint efforts of V.P Menon and pro India Kashmiri Premier Mahajan, as wished by Indian Government and Hari Singh was forced to sign it on the evening of 27 October 1947 or thereafter. Whereas, Indian forces landed on Srinagar airport on the early hours of 27 October 1947. The time calculation of Mr. V.P Menon’s (Indian Secretary of State) visit to Srinagar, Delhi, Jammu and vice versa does not fit in with the concocted story of the signing of the Instrument of Accession.

Even if there is an instrument of accession between Maharaja Hari Singh and Indian government, it provides a number of safeguards to the state’s sovereignty, e.g. Clause 7 of the instrument says, “Nothing in this instrument shall be deemed to commit me in any way to acceptance of any future constitution of India …”. Whereas, Clause 8 of the Instruments says, “Nothing in this Instrument affects the continuance of my sovereignty in and over this state…….”.

Supposedly, the all instrument of accession was signed by the Maharaja and Indian government, it was clearly mentioned in his reply to Maharaja’s letter by Lord Mountbatten that after the restoration of law and order in the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the expulsion of the raiders, its future will be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State. The same stance was taken by UNO in its over 23 resolutions, passed from time to time. Besides, over the years, Indian leadership had been reiterating their commitments to Kashmiris, Government of Pakistan and to the world community that after the restoration of peace in the state, its future would be decided as per the wishes of the people of Jammu and Kashmir through UN mandated plebiscite. However, with the passage of time India refused to fulfil her commitments/obligations, which means she had ill designs right from the very beginning. Nevertheless, implementation of these resolutions and the fulfilment of Indian commitments is still awaited.

Another significant fact is that, had there been any accession treaty between the state of Jammu and Kashmir and the Indian government, why it could not be published in the Indian White Paper of 1948? This has left a great disbelief regarding the conclusion of any such agreement. Yet another very serious reservation arises, had Kashmir been part of the Indian Union, why it was given a special status under the provision of internal autonomy through Article 370 of the Indian constitution? It is momentous to mention that the Indian government did not accord a similar status to any other state under this provision. Indeed, out of 560 Princely states, over five hundred joined India, but none was accorded this special status.

Through this status and a number of commitments, India kept luring in Kashmiri masses to become its part. Upon failure of winning their commiserations, India forced its way, through a fake assembly resolution in mid 1950s and thereafter started calling the state as its integral part. United Nations, however, through its resolution, No.2017 of 30 March 1951 and S.3779 of January 24, 1957, made it absolutely clear that; any action which Kashmir Constituent Assembly may have taken or might attempt to take to determine the future shape of state or any of its part would not constitute the disposition of the state and that election of State’s Constituent Assembly cannot be a substitute for plebiscite. Thus, this act of India was a blatant violation of the UNSC resolutions that India had accepted too.
Inaccuracy of Indian claim of accession can be judged from the top-secret letter addressed to British Government by Mr Alexander Symon, UK High Commissioner to India. In this letter, he briefly described the events until 4.00 P.M on October 1947, as; ten Indian aircrafts loaded with arms and troops were despatched to Kashmir from New Delhi on the morning of 27 October 1947. Until 4 P.M of 27 October 1947, Mr V.P. Menon has not reported from Jammu, which mean accession documents were either not signed or signed by Hari Singh on 27 October 1947, and there were only rumours of Kashmir accession to Indian Union without any confirmation.

Indian antagonistic approach can be imagined from the fact that Kashmiri Administration had requested for a Standstill Agreement with both India and Pakistan. Pakistan, however, accepted this offer but India owing to its pre-planned evil designs did not accept it. Instead of accepting it, India started interference in state’s affair through leaders like Sheikh Abdullah. Finally, they paved the way for illegal interference in the state’s affair through military invasion by her forces in October 1947.

From July to October 1947, with the connivance of Indian leaders like Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Patel, and V.P Menon, three Kashmiri Prime Ministers were changed one after the other. Pandit Kak, the State’s Prime Minister, was indeed favouring state’s accession to Pakistan or to keep it independent. He was a strong opponent of states accession to India, in spite of being a Hindu Pandit. Mahajan, who replaced Pandit Kak as new Prime Minister was a non-Kashmiri. He was a Judge of East Punjab High Court and has been the member of Radcliff Award, and hence a party to giving away the Muslim majority areas of Gurdaspur to India. He was very close to the top Indian leadership. To get him appointed as a Prime Minister of the state was through a planned strategy to force Maharaja from all around for surrendering to Indian Union.

In the light of the above-mentioned facts it can be very conveniently said that the Indian claim over the state of Jammu and Kashmir is completely illegitimate and unsubstantiated. India is negating its own commitment with Kashmiris, Pakistan and world community. Indian leadership should realize this and adopt a realistic approach for the solution of this outstanding issue as a goodwill gesture. Let UNO settle it under its auspices through plebiscite as per its resolutions.

Legality of Indian Claim on Kashmir
 
Kashmir was under rule of Maharaja Ranjit singh and his fallow generals.
So just want to ask If Pakistan dont accept Hari singh as ruler of kashmir as it was "Forced" by Britishers............then any following generation of Maharaja Ranjit singh should had worked.

As per my Knowlegde , One of the granddaughter of Maharaja was able to reach Punjab.Her name was Princess Bamba Sutherland .She died in 1957 in Lahore.

c875708db2080b2921353cd515cf2ee9.jpg
 
But sadly none of Maharaja's Family is alive today.

Can his generals or their family members veto work????

If it is not of India how can it be of Pakistan????
 
Drama in a theater of despair
By Ajai Sahni

Gilgit-Baltistan ranks among the most beautiful places in the world. It is, however, a region of the enduring oppression and despair. This dark corner of Jammu and Kashmir, administered by Pakistan since the partition of British India in 1947, [1] has largely remained outside the spectrum of international attention and concern.

Harsh controls over the entry and movement of the press, both domestic and international, choke off information flows within and from the region, even as the population is silenced by an overwhelming military and intelligence presence, illegal detentions and "disappearances". Periodically, however, Islamabad orchestrates a charade, largely for the benefit of the fitfully apprehensive international community, and in efforts to divide and dilute increasing sub-nationalist sentiments and demands, variously, for human rights, autonomy or independence.

A fifth "package drama" since 1971 has recently been announced by Pakistan Prime Minister Yusuf Gilani. This comes after the October 2007 "comprehensive package" - introduced by then-president Pervez


Musharraf, purportedly to "help bring the region at par with the rest of the country" - failed to secure the slightest improvement in this unhappy land.

It is significant that the Musharraf package came as a damage-control exercise after the passage in the European Union parliament of a devastating report by the EU rapporteur, Baroness Emma Nicholson, which, while deploring "documented human-rights violations by Pakistan" declared unambiguously that "the people of Gilgit and Baltistan are under the direct rule of the military and enjoy no democracy". Nicholson’s report was scathing, both on sheer oppression of the people, on the complete absence of legal and human rights and of a constitutional status, as well as on the enveloping backwardness that had evidently been engineered as a matter of state policy in the region

Over the past two years, echoes of the Nicholson report continue to reverberate in the international discourse, even as there are growing concerns regarding the re-location of Islamist extremist and terrorist groups in Gilgit-Baltistan, and a growing restiveness in the region's predominantly Shi'ite population. It is against this backdrop that Gilani signed the "Empowerment and Self-governance Ordinance, 2009, for Gilgit-Baltistan", on August 29.

Through the ordinance, President Asif Ali Zardari explained to a delegation of leaders from Gilgit-Baltistan, the government had given "internal freedom and all financial, democratic, administrative, judicial, political and developmental powers to the Legislative Assembly of Gilgit-Baltistan".

How, then, does Manzoor Hussain Parwana, chairman of the Gilgit-Baltistan United Movement (GBUM), which demands "full autonomy" for the region, describe the Gilani "package" as an "Ordinance for Advancement of Slavery"? And why has the ordinance been rejected as an outright fraud by virtually all political formations struggling for constitutional, political and human rights in Gilgit-Baltistan? Why do leading parties even in Pakistan condemn the ordinance as a "unilateral decision of [the ruling] Pakistan People's Party", while others reject it as an attempt to "annex these regions through a presidential ordinance and by imposing governor’s rule?"

The reality quickly reveals itself in the most cursory examination of the provisions of the ordinance. It ostensibly gives Gilgit-Baltistan its own "elected" Legislative Assembly and chief minister, but takes away with one hand what it endows with the other. It is in the governor that all real power is vested, and this would be an "outsider", appointed by the president of Pakistan.

Significantly, the people of Gilgit-Baltistan, since they have been granted no constitutional status in Pakistan, do not vote to elect the president, the prime minister, or the members of the National Assembly. The chief minister may not select his own council of ministers, but must act in this regard on the "advice" of the governor. Critically, the Gilgit-Baltistan assembly cannot discuss or legislate on any issues relating to defense, foreign affairs, and crucially, finance, security and the interior. The ordinance awards no constitutional rights, guarantees or freedoms to the people. In effect, nothing has changed in what the region’s only weekly, K2, describes as "Sarzamin-be-Ain", the "Land without a constitution".

On examination, it is clear that the new "package" only brings "a change in nomenclature rather than genuine political reforms". It offers little that is concretely different from the Musharraf "package", and has quite rightly been dismissed as old wine in new bottles by a wide consensus of political leaders across Gilgit-Baltistan. Indeed, premonitions of the puppet assembly were already visible in the Emma Nicholson report:

The Northern Areas (Gilgit-Baltistan) Council, set up some time ago, with the boast that it is functioning like a "Provincial Assembly", screens, in reality, a total absence of constitutional identity or civil rights ...

Creating a Legislative Assembly under an Islamabad-dominated Gilgit-Baltistan Council, and allowing the "election" of a chief minister, cannot, consequently, conceal or alter the circumstances that have been closely documented in the Nicholson report:

The people are kept in poverty, illiteracy and backwardness. The deprivation and lack of even very basic needs provision can be easily seen - 25 small hospitals serviced by 140 doctors (translating into one doctor per 6,000 people) as compared to 830 hospitals and 75,000 doctors in the rest of Pakistan, an overall literacy rate of 33%, with especially poor educational indicators for girls and women; only 12 high schools and two regional colleges in Gilgit and Baltistan, with no post-graduate facilities; apart from government jobs, the only other employment being in the tourism sector, which is obviously problematic A few locals are able to secure government jobs but even then they are paid up to 35% less than non-native employees; there is no local broadcast media.

Indeed, the new ordinance simply reinforces the constitutional limbo within which Gilgit-Baltistan exists, continuing with the substantive provisions of the Musharraf package, in continuity with the succession of "Legal Framework Orders" under which the region was ruled over the preceding four decades. The new order is just another attempt to perpetuate and conceal the "political atrocities on the people in the occupied region", and to "buy time and hide violations of human and political rights".

It is useful, within this context, to review the contours of the occupation of Gilgit-Baltistan. When the British granted Independence to India, the 565 "Princely States" - including Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) - technically became "sovereign states". Consequently, following the collapse of British paramountcy in 1947, the entire Gilgit agency was restored to the then-Dogra King, Hari Singh, who eventually acceded to India.

Pakistan, however, fomented and supported a rebellion in the region, and seized control, consolidating its administration through a succession of ruses, such as the Karachi Agreement of 1949, under which entirely unrepresentative officials signed "letters of accession" and "ratified" Pakistani administrative control over the region. Crucially, a Supreme Court judgement in 1999 took note of the legal and constitutional anomalies, as well as the denial of basic rights and development, in Gilgit-Baltistan and explicitly directed the Pakistan government, among other things,

... to initiate appropriate administrative/legislative measures within a period of six months from today to make necessary amendments in the constitution/relevant statute/statutes/order/orders/rules/notification/notifications, to ensure that the people of Northern Areas enjoy their ... fundamental rights, namely, to be governed through their chosen representatives and to have access to justice through an independent judiciary inter alia for enforcement of their fundamental rights guaranteed under the constitution. (Emphases added).

A decade later, Pakistan has failed to meet even the minimum requirements of the clear and specific direction of its own Supreme Court.

The region continues, consequently, to be "directly administrated by fiat from Islamabad ... The bureaucracy, primarily drawn from the North-West Frontier Province and Punjab, has intensified the sense of alienation and negated any semblance of self-rule in the Northern Areas." Balawaristan National Front (BNF) leader, Nawaz Khan Naji, notes, "In every department, the chief is from Pakistan, the other, secondary positions are locals."

These legal and constitutional anomalies have been compounded by what the non-governmental Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) describes as "a distinct pattern of brutality and violence towards citizens". The Pakistani administration has long been involved in a campaign that seeks to alter the demographic profile of the region, and to reduce the local Shi'ite and Ismaili populations to a minority.

In the Gilgit and Skardu areas, large tracts of land have been allotted to non-locals, violating the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) resolutions and the Jammu and Kashmir State Subject Rule, and outsiders have also purchased vast landholdings. One unofficial estimate suggested that over 30,000 Gilgit residents had fled the city and its suburbs just between 2000 and 2004, in the wake of orchestrated incidents of sectarian strife, followed by discriminatory and repressive action by state forces.

Three different sects of Islam, Shi'ite, Sunni and Ismaili, are prevalent in Gilgit-Baltistan, with the Shi'ites dominating, unlike other parts of Pakistan, where Sunnis constitute the overwhelming majority. With the very small exception of Chilas, Darel and Tangir villages of the Diamer District, Shi'ites constitute the clear majority across the rest of the region.

However, Islamabad’s direct rule has allowed Pakistan to engage in a vast campaign of demographic re-engineering, opening up the region for colonization by Sunnis who are brought in with a number of incentives, including ownership of land and forests. Following the construction of the Karakoram Highway connecting Pakistan to China in 1978, the region saw a swelling Sunni influx from the Pakistani "mainland" - essentially Pashtuns. Sources in Gilgit-Baltistan indicate that large tracts of land continue to be allotted to Afghan refugees and Pashtuns from the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). BNF’s Nawaz Khan Naji observes:

... the Pathans [Pashtuns] are buying property and our cities are becoming Pathan-majority cities, where our locals are becoming minorities. We have no right to cast votes in Pakistan, nor in Azad Kashmir. Like a no-man’s land. We are the last colony in the world.

A sectarian polarization has been continuously encouraged in


Gilgit-Baltistan since the Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto regime in the mid-1970s. When Sunnis in Gilgit objected to Shi'ite processions and the construction of a stage on the city’s main road, these activities were immediately banned. Shi'ites subsequently protested the ban and the police fired on them.

The seeds of a sectarian polarization had been sown, but the situation worsened dramatically under General Zia ul-Haq, when the military dictator encouraged cadres of the radical Sunni Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) to extend its activities to the Gilgit-Baltistan region. A local (Shi'ite) insurrection broke out in Gilgit in May 1988, with people demanding wider rights.

To suppress the rebellion, the Special Services Group of the Pakistani army based in Khapalu was dispatched. Former president Musharraf, then a young brigadier, was in charge of the operations, in which he used Sunni tribal irregulars to execute a brutal pogrom against the locals, earning himself the sobriquet "butcher of Baltistan". Truckloads of Sunni tribals were sent in from the Afghan border to the region, and they indulged in anti-Shi'ite brutalities unprecedented in Pakistan’s history. After eight days of sustained violence, the army "stepped in" to "restore peace".

The anti-Shi'ite pogrom resurfaced in 1993, when sectarian riots started again in Gilgit, leading to the death of 20 Shi'ites. Later, the Shi'ite population was further alarmed when large numbers of Sunnis were brought in from Punjab and the NWFP to settle in Gilgit. This government-supported migration towards Gilgit-Baltistan has been hugely successful and, according to unofficial estimates, the 1:4 ratio of non-local to local people in the region, which prevailed in January 2001, had dipped to an alarming 3:4 by June 2004.

The Shi'ites retain a slim but continuously diminishing regional majority, but there are areas where concentrations of Sunnis already outnumber them. A cycle of sectarian killings has, moreover, become a continuous feature of the Gilgit-Baltistan political landscape, escalating repeatedly during religious festivals and periods of political tension.

Cyclical tensions and strife compound an extended campaign of intimidation, terror and inspired sectarian violence. There is cumulative evidence of an accelerated radicalization of Sunni organizations in Gilgit-Baltistan, especially since 2001, with the shifting of base of a number of terrorist groups - some affiliated with al-Qaeda - to "Azad Jammu and Kashmir" and to Gilgit-Baltistan. Abdul Hamid Khan of the BNF records:

There has ... been a steady inflow of Taliban and al-Qaeda operatives into the Ghezar Valley ... Terrorist training to Afghan mercenaries and various groups active in Indian-held Kashmir is being provided in the remote hilly areas of Hazara, Darel Yashote, Tangir, Astore, Skardu city and Gilgit city.

There is, moreover, "evidence to indicate that the sectarian violence in the NAs, in particular at Gilgit, is being planned and orchestrated from other Pakistani provinces, especially the North West Frontier Province".

Very significant quantities of weapons have also been seized in Gilgit-Baltistan, and are shipped in from the neighboring provinces, even as "the tactics used by sectarian terrorists in places like Quetta, Karachi, Islamabad, Lahore and elsewhere are now being employed in the Northern Areas".

As the Nicholson report clearly noted, moreover, the entire Gilgit-Baltistan region remains mired in extreme poverty and backwardness, with a pervasive absence of most basic amenities. Even the Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas (KANA) Ministry, which is charged with the development of the region, conceded, in the late 1990s, that the "Northern Areas" "have been neglected for the last 50 years ... [and] still rank in the most backward areas of the country."

In late August 2005, a 10-member group from the HRCP visited the Northern Areas to assess the level of social services and infrastructure in the region. The mission was fiercely critical of the inadequate structures of governance, the appalling justice system, and the paucity of social services available to the people of the region.

An index of regional backwardness can be found in the education sector. While current data for the region remain unavailable, in 1998/99 the overall literacy rate in the Northern Areas was estimated to be 33% - substantially below the national rate of 54%. There were significant disparities between the male and female population: the estimated literacy rate for males was 40%, whereas the estimate for females was only 25%.

More significantly, there are wide disparities even between the number of educational institutions in Gilgit-Baltistan and "Azad Jammu and Kashmir", reflecting Islamabad’s peculiar orientation towards, and biases against the former: Thus we find a total of 787 educational institutions at all levels, servicing a total population of 870,347 in Gilgit-Baltistan, as against 6,094 institutions in "Azad Jammu and Kashmir", servicing a population of 2.97 million (population figures: 1998 Census).

A comparison of the number of public health facilities in the Gilgit-Baltistan and "Azad Jammu and Kashmir" again reveals Islamabad’s partiality. Gilgit-Baltistan has a total of 305 public health facilities in all categories, hospitals, dispensaries and first aid posts. "Azad Jammu and Kashmir", in sharp contrast, has a total of 4,585 public health facilities across a much wider range of categories. Most of Gilgit-Baltistan’s settlements lack proper sewerage and drainage systems, with the result that virtually all the water supply is contaminated with human and animal waste, leading to a wide range of diseases. In January 2000, for example, the Army Field Hospital at Gilgit reported that some 47,152 patients had been treated for cholera over a period of just four months.

The region also suffers from under-utilization of its natural resources. Although the Northern Areas have tremendous potential for hydropower generation, and are, indeed, seen as a primary source of both water and power for the rest of Pakistan, the region fails to meet its own energy demands.

Gilgit-Baltistan currently has the lowest per capita rate of energy consumption in Pakistan and firewood is still the main source of domestic energy. Field surveys conducted by the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) with German technical assistance revealed that 99.6% of all respondents used firewood as fuel for domestic purposes. Kerosene is currently the second most widely used energy source in Gilgit-Baltistan. Even in its "electrified" regions, kerosene is commonly used because of limited coverage of the population and frequent disruptions of the power supply. There is a large and rapidly growing gulf between existing supplies of electricity and regional demand.

Despite a long history of protests against Islamabad’s discriminatory policies, against growing sectarianism and violence, and against brutal state repression, Gilgit-Baltistan remains a neglected center of inequity and widespread suffering. Pakistan has utterly and continuously suppressed the people of Gilgit-Baltistan; denied them the most basic constitutional and human rights; blocked access to development and an equitable use even of local natural resources; and repeatedly and brutally suppressed the local Shi'ite majority, even as it seeks to violently promote Sunni sectarianism in the region.

Gilgit-Baltistan remains an "area of darkness", of deep neglect and exploitation, and of the denial of political rights and identity - indeed, a violation of every conceivable element of the very "self-determination" that Pakistan advocates abroad. Circumstances in Gilgit-Baltistan constitute an international humanitarian crisis. Yet, for decades, Pakistan has set a distorted international agenda of discourse, treating areas under its administration - "Azad Jammu and Kashmir" and Gilgit-Baltistan - as settled issues, even as it violently promotes and stridently proclaims a "dispute" over the Indian-administered state of Jammu and Kashmir.

Note
1. Gilgit-Baltistan is an autonomous region in northern Pakistan. It was formerly known as the Northern Areas. It is the northernmost political entity within the Pakistani-administered part of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. It borders Afghanistan to the north, China to the northeast, the Pakistani-administered state of Azad Jammu and Kashmir to the south, and the Indian-administered state of Jammu and Kashmir to the southeast. The area became a single administrative unit in 1970 under the name "Northern Areas", formed from the amalgamation of the Gilgit Agency, the Baltistan District of the Ladakh Wazarat and the states of Hunza and Nagar. With its administrative center at the town of Gilgit, Gilgit Baltistan covers an area of 72,971 square kilometers and has an estimated population approaching 1,000,000. This area is part of the larger disputed territory of Kashmir between India, Pakistan and China. - Wikipedia

Ajai Sahni is the editor of the the South Asia Intelligence Review; executive director, Institute for Conflict Management.

(Published with permission from the South Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal)
 
Women in Gilgit Protest Atrocities of Pakistani Army

[video=metacafe;4175487/kashmir_news_women_in_gilgit_protest_atrocities_of]http://www.metacafe.com/watch/4175487/kashmir_news_women_in_gilgit_protest_atrocities_of _pakistani_army/[/video]
 
Talibanization of Gilgit-Baltistan and Sectarian Killings
Senge H. Sering

October 19, 2009

The authorities in Gilgit-Baltistan were not quite done celebrating the proclamation of the Empowerment and Self-governance Ordinance of 20091, when a bomb rocked Gilgit town on September 27 sparking off the latest bout of Shia-Sunni riots.2 Gun battles in the aftermath of the blast have led to the death of more than twelve people, including Raja Ali Ahmed Jan, a prominent leader of the Pakistan Muslim League.3 The incidents, culminating in a short-lived peace in this Pakistani occupied Shia region of Jammu & Kashmir, have led to the detention of several civilians as well two policemen. Some of the arrested are allegedly linked to those who assassinated Deputy Speaker Asad Zaidi and his companions in Gilgit in April 2009.4 Zaidi was the third-most high profile Shia politician, after the revered clerics Agha Ziauddin5 and Allama Hassan Turabi, to become the target of sectarian violence – a menace that has troubled Gilgit-Baltistan socially and economically, since the 1970s. Agha Ziauddin’s death in January 2005 caused widespread clashes leading to a six-month long curfew and emergency, and loss of more than two hundred lives. Allama Turabi, shot dead in Karachi on July 14, 2006, hailed from Baltistan and was the President of Tehrik Jafaria of Pakistan (TJP). His death has been termed as detrimental to Shia rights’ movement in Pakistan.6

In the sequence of events, as one looks back, eighteen people including the Director of the Agriculture Department of Gilgit7 died in 2008 as a result of Shia-Sunni clashes. However, by far, 2009 has seen more sectarian killings than the previous two years put together. It started in the middle of February when two Shias were killed in an attack on a van in Gilgit.8 Then, on June 17, ISI personnel arrested a Shia political activist, Sadiq Ali, and tortured him to death.9 Two months later, when the leader of the banned anti-Shia political party Sipah-e-Sahaba of Pakistan (SSP), Allama Ali Sher Hyderi was killed in Sindh, riots broke out in Gilgit leading to the closure of markets and heavy gun battle between Shias and Sunnis.10 In September, two Sunni Pashtuns and three native Shias were killed in Gilgit while a bus with Shia passengers coming from Baltistan was torched, causing several casualties.11

For centuries, people of Gilgit-Baltistan, professing various religions, co-existed in amicable conditions. It was only after Pakistan’s annexation of these regions in the seventies that anarchy began. First, authorities abrogated the State Subject Rule, the law that until then protected the local demographic composition, and encouraged Pakistani Sunnis to settle in Gilgit town. This illegal government-sponsored settlement scheme damaged the social fabric and provoked religious feuds that continue to simmer. Pakistan created a political vacuum and a law and order crisis, once princely states and time-tested administrative structures of Gilgit-Baltistan were abolished. While Islamabad refused to delegate powers to local Shias by establishing viable a modern political structure, the despotic military rulers maintained ad-hoc policies to govern the region with an iron fist. It was during the same time that Pakistan embarked on its well-rehearsed divide and rule policy to paralyze local society. It exploited ethnic and religious fault-lines to weaken the natives in their demands for genuine political and socio-economic rights. Government-led Shia-Sunni and Shia-Nurbaxshi riots caused acute socio-political polarization in Skardo during the early 1980s. Events like these forced members of the local intelligentsia like Wazir Mehdi, the only Law graduate of Gilgit-Baltistan from Aligarh University, to admit that unification with Ladakh and Kashmir brought culture and civilization to the region while opting for Pakistan has resulted in the arrival of drugs, Kalashnikovs and sectarianism. On occasion, agencies employ religious leaders to fan hatred. In one such incident, intelligence agencies released a Punjabi cleric, Ghulam Reza Naqvi, from prison “to be sent to Gilgit to keep the pot of sectarian violence boiling.” His release was granted after negotiations with SSP, which also got their leader Maulana Mohammad Ludhianivi freed from jail.12 A watershed in the history of Gilgit-Baltistan causing permanent trust deficit was reached in May 1988 when tribal Lashkars, after receiving a nod of approval from General Zia, massacred thousands of Shias in Gilgit and abducted local women. The intention was to undertake demographic change by force in this strategically located region sandwiched between China, the former Soviet Union and India.

The recent killings of Shias in Gilgit-Baltistan may also hinder the election process for the Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly (GBLA) that will take place in November of 2009. With the newly proclaimed self-governance ordinance, GBLA is expected to legislate on 66 articles pertaining to socio-economic and administrative issues. While local political institutions are evolving towards achieving genuine autonomy, the Sunni minority fears that the Shias would gain a majority in the assembly, which the former sees as a direct attack on its long term political and socio-economic interests in the region. The authorities intend to exploit similar insecurities to consolidate control over Gilgit city, which is not only the largest settlement in the region but also the capital of Gilgit-Baltistan. As the regional ballot is nearing, authorities may resort to electoral engineering to create a hung assembly, thereby stripping GBLA of the mandate to pass laws. The past experience of reorganization of constituencies along Shia-Sunni lines has also enabled Sunni candidates to gain a majority in various constituencies.

Gilgit city is divided into two constituencies – Gilgit-1 and Gilgit-2. Until a decade ago, voters from both constituencies sent Shia members to the local Council. The demographic change has turned the tide in favor of the Sunnis; in 2004, voters of Gilgit city returned Sunni candidates as winners. Shias in Gilgit-1 were further marginalized when the major Shia settlement of Nomal was transferred to Gilgit-4, thereby tilting the population balance. Since then, contests between Shia and Sunni candidates have remained neck to neck.13 The tipping point is the vote bank in the Amphari neighborhood with a mixed Shia-Sunni population where sectarian polarization will help the Sunni candidate gain a lead. Likewise, in Gilgit-2, the settlement of Pathans and Punjabis has changed the demography and this one-time Peoples Party (PPP) stronghold supported Hafiz Rehman of PML in the 2004 elections, which he won by a small margin of 500 votes.14 The voters’ list released recently shows more than a 80 per cent increase in voters’ numbers in Gilgit-1 (from 28,146 to 47,835) and Gilgit-2 (from 34,517 to 62,048) in just five years.15 Of these, a majority are Pakistani settlers who will impact election results in favor of Sunni candidates. The government is planning to increase the number of GBLA seats after the November elections and the above-mentioned additional voters in Gilgit city will lead to an out of proportion representation for Sunnis in GBLA. Such interference from Pakistan will only lead to further sectarian clashes and deaths.

Although sniper shooting has remained the primary method of sectarian killings, owing to Taliban influences bomb blasts are also becoming common. In May 2009, a bomb blast occurred in Baltistan, which led to the arrest of two Sunnis and recovery of explosive-making material and hand grenades.16 Later in July, a bomb was hurled at Bagrot Hostel, Gilgit, killing two and injuring several other Shia students.17 In April 2009, an Al Qaeda member, Abdullah Rehman, threatened to bomb a four-star hotel in Baltistan.18 Many Taliban who escaped from Swat and adjoining areas found shelter among Sunni extremists in Gilgit.19 Analysts fear that locals may benefit from the Taliban expertise in the field of bomb and suicide jacket making. Local youth is also susceptible to converting to the extremist Islamic ideology and joining the suicide bomber club as a result of Taliban influences. The fact that more than 300 suspected terrorists were expelled from Gilgit in October 2008 highlights fears that the Taliban presence in Gilgit-Baltistan is widespread.20 Successful Talibanization of Gilgit-Baltistan means more Shia deaths and continued arrival of Taliban in large hordes, which will hasten demographic change and hurt local cultural identity and ethnic solidarity. The ongoing military operation in Waziristan against Taliban and Al Qaeda may also create greater problems for Gilgit-Baltistan as Shia soldiers of the Northern Light Infantry Regiment will be in direct confrontation with those who perpetuated the Shia genocide in Gilgit in 1988.

1. 1. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KI16Df01.html
2. 2. http://www.thenews.com.pk/updates.asp?id=87717
3. 3. http://pamirtimes.net/2009/09/28/pml-leader-raja-ali-ahmad-jan-shot-dead-in-konodas-gilgit/
4. 4. http://pamirtimes.net/2009/04/21/asad-zaidi-deputy-speaker-nala-shot-dead-in-gilgit/
5. 5. http://pakistantimes.net/2005/01/14/top1.htm
6. 6. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allama_Hassan_Turabi#Early_life
7. 7. http://hunzatimes.wordpress.com/200...ly-killed-in-gilgit-attack-updated-news-news/
8. 8. http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=40756234671
9. 9. http://www.ahrchk.net/ua/mainfile.php/2009/3193/
10. 10. http://pamirtimes.net/2009/08/17/violent-protests-in-gilgit-over-murder-of-ali-sher-hyderi/
11. 11. http://www.blogcatalog.com/blog/pamir-times/854fb8cae3214331a32604745d595c27
12. 12. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006%5C05\21\story_21-5-2006_pg3_1
13. 13. http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/icg449/icg449.pdf (pp:16)
14. 14. http://pakistantimes.net/2004/10/14/top2.htm
15. 15. http://www.app.com.pk/en_/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=87988&Itemid=2
16. 16. http://dardistannews.wordpress.com/2009/05/
17. 17. http://pamirtimes.net/2009/05/23/bomb-blast-at-hostel-in-gilgit-city/
18. 18. http://weeklybaang.blogspot.com/2009/04/weekly-baang-karachi-voloum-02-issue-08_3275.html
19. 19. http://dardistannews.wordpress.com/...-asian-human-rights-commission-press-release/
20. 20. http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect...suspected-people-expelled-from-n-areas-gilgit
 
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Azad Kashmir today
By Ahmad Faruqui
Monday, 15 Feb, 2010


Azad Kashmir’s future is as murky today as it was in 1947. — File Photo by AFP

Azad Kashmir was created within two months of Pakistan’s independence with high expectations. Nestled in the mountainous western region that abuts the vale of Kashmir, it forms an archer’s bow that is about 100 miles long and about 20-40 miles wide.

The Pakistani security elite hoped that an arrow fired from the bow would bring about the instant liberation of the vale of Kashmir from Indian occupation. The first arrow was fired almost within days of creation.

It plunged the entire region of Kashmir into armed conflict. Fourteen months later, a ceasefire sponsored by the United Nations took effect on Jan 1, 1949. The ceasefire line remained stationary despite several attempts to move it. But after the 1971 war which saw the secession of East Pakistan, it was renamed the Line-of-Control (LoC). That militaristic designation persists to this day since the line which separates the two Kashmirs has not been formalised as an international border.

‘Azad’ means free and Azad Kashmir was supposed to serve as a model state whose liberty and freedom would inspire rebellion in Indian-administered Kashmir. That did not happen for several reasons. Constitutionally, Azad Kashmir is not a part of Pakistan. But neither is it an independent state. For its entire 62-year history, it has depended on Pakistan for its economic and political survival. It does not even issue its own postage stamps.

Because Islamabad has always exercised its claim on the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir, Azad Kashmir is not counted as a fifth province of Pakistan. But for all practical purposes, Muzaffarabad lives under Islamabad’s shadow. Its first government was established on Oct 24, 1947 with Sardar Mohammed Ibrahim as president. On Nov 3, 1947, Azad Kashmir sought unsuccessfully to join the United Nations as a member state.

In March 1949, after the dust had settled along the ceasefire line, Azad Kashmir signed a power-sharing arrangement with the Government of Pakistan ceding all authority related to defence, foreign affairs, refugees and the plebiscite to Pakistan.

Pakistan created a Ministry for Kashmir Affairs to look after its newest asset. However, as events would show, the ministry was soon preoccupied with influencing political direction in Azad Kashmir. Not surprisingly, the ministry’s directives were not always well received by Azad Kashmiris. At times, they were met with stiff resistance.

In 1955, Pakistan declared martial law in some parts of Azad Kashmir to suppress street violence triggered by the Kashmir Act. In 1957, Pakistan resorted to police action to quell a public meeting that was seeking direct action to create a united and liberated Kashmir. In 1961, President Ayub Khan carried out indirect elections in Azad Kashmir through a Basic Democracies Ordinance which legally only applied to Pakistan, further straining ties with the Azad Kashmiris.

Subsequently, faced with Islamabad’s dominance in their day-to-day affairs, several Azad Kashmiri leaders started a movement for liberating Indian-held Kashmir not for Pakistan but for creating a separate Kashmiri state. This further aggravated ties with Pakistan. While all this was happening, Jammu and Kashmir was inducted into the Indian union.

In 1965, the Pakistani army launched a covert war inside Indian Kashmir seeking to instigate a popular rebellion. This arrow too missed its target. Instead, it enraged India which launched a strong counter-offensive along the international border with West Pakistan.

Under the weight of the Indian elephant, the Pakistani military hastily called of its operations in Kashmir. The war ended in an UN-brokered ceasefire along the international border with minimal changes in the Kashmiri line. After the war, Pakistan lost its urge to light a fire across the Line of Control (LoC). Matters changed in 1979 when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and the Pakistani military, with US and Saudi assistance, began training legions of Mujahideen to evict the godless communists.

After a bruised and battered Red Army pulled out of Kabul in 1989, Indian Jammu and Kashmir found itself in the grip of a large-scale revolt. Whether this was a purely indigenous movement or a corollary to events in Kabul continues to enrich scholarly volumes.

Regardless of the cause, the uprising in the vale provided the Kashmir hawks in Pakistan’s security elite yet another opportunity to press on with their objective. They reactivated their bases in Azad Kashmir and once again decided to fire arrows into Indian Jammu and Kashmir. Soon, ‘freedom fighters,’ armed and trained allegedly by the Pakistan Army, were rolling across in droves across the LoC.

Azad Kashmir was again in the cross-hairs of armed conflict. Against this backdrop, Pakistan under Gen Ziaul Haq decided to legally separate the geographically much larger Northern Areas of Gilgit and Baltistan from Azad Kashmir. This caused almost as much consternation in the latter as it did in India. The separation of the Northern Areas by Pakistan eliminated all doubts about the sovereignty of Azad Kashmir. With the reactivation of conflict across the Line-of-Control, the quality of life of the Azad Kashmiris was trammelled. Those who did not want to take part in the proxy war became pariahs.

Most of the cross-border infiltration was halted in the wake of 9/11 and the US invasion of Afghanistan. The attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001 was designed to reinvigorate the Kashmir issue but all it did was bring India and Pakistan to the brink of full-scale war in 2002. For a while the Musharraf regime sought to differentiate the struggle for freedom in Kashmir from political acts of terror but its spin failed to gain traction with the world community. Cross-border terrorism was quiet for several years.

The attacks on Mumbai by a group linked to militant activities in Kashmir in November 2008 were an attempt to reignite the conflict but succeeded only in drawing widespread opprobrium. During the past 62 years, the people of Azad Kashmir have been unable to arise out of poverty in large measure because they are caught in the crossfire between India and Pakistan. The land which their elders knew as a mountain paradise has been turned into a living hell.

Of the four million people who inhabit the region, nine of 10 live in extremely impoverished conditions in rural areas. Population growth is excessive, at 2.4 per cent per year, and the average house holds no fewer than seven people. Sadly, Azad Kashmir’s future is as murky today as it was in 1947. And the objective for its creation, the liberation of the vale of Kashmir, seems increasingly remote.

ahmadfaruqui@gmail.com
 
Hidden Tremors
Ajai Sahni

In the shadow of the great and natural disaster that has struck Pakistan occupied Kashmir (***) and parts of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), another tragedy, in this case, fashioned by men, is being played out in the hidden Gilgit-Baltistan region (Northern Areas). Largely unnoticed, Gilgit has been under curfew since October 13, 2005, after a spate of killings that the administration is seeking to project as sectarian strife. Significantly, however, a majority of those killed have been demonstrators who have fallen to the bullets of the state's paramilitary force, the Pakistan Rangers, and sources in Gilgit claim that, contrary to the official position, there is no tension between local Shias and Sunnis, but rather a deliberate effort from the outside, part of a long-drawn campaign, to create mischief in the region.

On October 11, 2005, hired Sunni gunmen opened fire on a group of Shias in Basen, 58 kilometres from Gilgit Town on the Ghezer road, killing two and wounding others. Two of the gunmen escaped, but a third was injured and thereafter arrested by the local police, and taken to the District Hospital, Gilgit. Some documents recovered from his possession indicated that he came from Kohistan in the NWFP.

Shortly thereafter, however, the Pakistani Rangers, on orders from the 'highest quarters', forcibly removed the perpetrator from the hospital, apparently to avoid his identification and interrogation by the local police, which, sources in Gilgit indicate, would have exposed a larger conspiracy. At this stage, a crowd gathered and protests started, with people insisting that the culprit should not be taken away by the Rangers before the local police had interrogated them.

The Pakistan Rangers resorted to strong arm tactics to disperse the protestors, and also kidnapped one of the student protestors, 15-year old Maqsood Hussain. The next day, October 12, his body was recovered, sparking widespread outrage in the town. On October 13, Maqsood Hussain's fellow students and the townspeople organised a demonstration to protest his death in the Rangers' custody. The demonstration was peaceful, but, after the protestors began to disperse, the Rangers opened fire, killing seven persons, including three women.

The dead also included a former Chairman of the Municipal Committee, Gilgit, who was allegedly killed in his house. The death toll subsequently rose to twelve, after another five bodies were found in different parts of the city – including those of two Rangers. In a Press Release of October 14, 2005, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) noted that the Rangers had opened fire "after the protesters had dispersed and were returning home", and observed that the shooting appeared to follow "a distinct pattern of brutality and violence towards citizens".

In a purported bid to control the situation, the authorities arrested religious leaders of both the Shia and Sunni sect, though no clashes between the communities had been reported. The arrested leaders included, among Shias, Agha Rahat Al-Husaini, Shaikh Mirza Ali, Shaikh Nayyar Abbas, former Northern Areas Legislative Council (NALC) Member, Deedar Ali; and among the Sunnis, Maulana Qazi Nisar Ahmed, Chief of the Tanzeem Ahle Sunnat; Maulana Hussain Ahmad, Maulana Khalil Ahmad and NALC member Himayatullah Khan.
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The 'pattern of brutality and violence' has been clearly in evidence over the past year, and according to various estimates, close to a hundred persons have been killed in Gilgit-Baltistan over the past year (data compiled by the Institute for Conflict Management for year 2005, 81 persons had been killed till October 28) overwhelmingly in clashes with state Forces, but also in terrorist attacks engineered by 'outsiders', as well as retaliatory attacks by local forces.

Earlier, on September 10, 2005, Bilal Hussain of Sonikot Village, Gilgit, a teacher at the Gilgit High School No. 2, had been abducted in Gilgit, near Hotel Jamal, allegedly by officials of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). No charges have been brought against Bilal Hussain, nor has the Government declared his detention. He has not, however, been heard of since his abduction.

Unconfirmed reports suggest that there are indications of further trouble brewing in the region, with Shia youth congregating in Danyore on the outskirts of Gilgit, awaiting instructions from their spiritual leaders to march in protest on Gilgit. There are also reports of Sunnis having gathered in Jaglote and Chilas, demanding the release of their detained leaders.

Shia women also blocked the Karakoram Highway at several places to protest the presence of the Rangers in Gilgit. The women wanted regular soldiers to replace the paramilitary Rangers, accusing the latter of bias and abuse of their sweeping powers. Similarly, Shia agitators from the Hunza and Nagar Valleys of Gilgit District issued an 'ultimatum', on October 20, demanding that the Northern Areas administration to curb the powers of the Rangers. Some 25,000 Shia demonstrators said they would continue their protests until the powers of the Rangers were curtailed and they were replaced by another neutral and impartial force. The protestors also demanded that, if the Northern Areas Deputy Chief Executive, the NALC Speaker, and other members of the NALC were powerless, they should resign.

In Islamabad, the Shia Student Action Committed staged a demonstration at Aabpara Chowk on October 19, 2005, to protest against the Government's actions in Gilgit-Baltistan, and to demand the release of arrested persons. The demonstrators displayed pictures of the slain Shia leader from the region, Agha Ziauddin Rizvi, and of his successor, Agha Syed Rahat Hussain al Hussaini, who is under detention. Earlier, on October 17, leading Shia clerics of various seminaries and organisations had threatened the Government with a nationwide campaign of agitation if Rangers were not removed from Gilgit and action is not taken against those who killed civilians. Addressing a press conference at the Lahore Press Club, representatives of the Mujma-e-Ahle Bait, Jamiatul Muntazir, Imamia Students Organisation, Imamia Organisation, Imamia Alliance, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, and other organisations, blamed government agencies for incidents of sectarian violence in the Gilgit.

Significantly, 41 of the persons who have been detained (at the barracks built for the Northern Areas Scouts in Sakwar) after the October 11 clashes, went on a hunger strike against maltreatment and inadequate facilities in the barracks. The detainees, drawn from both the sects, jointly displayed handwritten placards outside their cells with the slogan, "Sunni-Shia Ittehad (Unity) for hunger strike".

Protests have now become a continuous process, on a near-daily basis, in the region, and threaten to snowball into a wider movement. However, given the past record, these may well attract extreme repression from state agencies.
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Crucially, a jirga, formed on September 21, 2005, and headed by the NALC Speaker, Malik Muhammad Miskeen, had drafted an agreement to be signed by top local Sunni and Shia leaders, and top Shia cleric, Agha Rahat al Hussaini (now detained) had approved the draft agreement. The Sunni leader, Maulana Qazi Nisar, who was travelling, was to sign the agreement on his return to Gilgit, but was thwarted by the current spate of violence.

The Pakistan Rangers from Punjab were deployed in Gilgit after disturbances in the wake of the assassination of Shia leader Agha Ziauddin, on January 8, 2005, to add to the Frontier Constabulary that was already deployed in the area. A bulk of Northern Light Infantry (NLI) units, composed largely of locals (though officered by 'outsiders', mainly Punjabis), had been moved out of the region and deployed in Punjab and Waziristan. Only four NLI battalions out of 15 remain in Gilgit-Baltistan.

The Pakistani administration has long been involved in a campaign that seeks to alter the demographic profile of the region, and to reduce the local Shia and Ismaili populations to a minority in Gilgit-Baltistan. In the Gilgit and Skardu areas, large tracts of land have been allotted to non-locals, violating the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) resolutions and the Jammu and Kashmir State Subject Rule, and outsiders have also purchased large tracts of land. One unofficial estimate suggest that over 30,000 Gilgit residents have fled the city and its suburbs since 2000, in the wake of orchestrated incidents of sectarian strife, followed by discriminatory and repressive action by the state Forces. Gilgit-Baltistan remains the poorest and most backward area in Pakistan, and is acutely lacking in education and infrastructure, with no more than a negligible presence of daily newspapers, radio or TV stations.

The Pakistani establishment has long supported an anti-Shia programme in this region. A local insurrection broke out in Gilgit in May 1988 and in order to suppress the rebellion, the Special Services Group of the Pakistani Army based in Khapalu was dispatched. Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf, then a young Brigadier, was in charge of the operations, in which he used Sunni tribal irregulars to execute a brutal pogrom against the locals. Truckloads of Sunni tribals were sent in from the Afghan border to the region, and they indulged in anti-Shia brutalities unprecedented in Pakistan's history. After eight days of sustained violence, the Army 'stepped in' to restore peace. Later on, the Shia population was further alarmed when large numbers of Sunnis were brought in from Punjab and the NWFP to settle in Gilgit.

The anti-Shia pogrom resurfaced in 1993, when sectarian riots started again in Gilgit, leading to the death of 20 Shias. Year 2003 again saw trouble brewing in the Northern Areas over the Islamic textbooks that the Pakistan Ministry of Education has issued as part of the curriculum for the schools in the region. According to Shia community leaders, the textbooks promote Sunni thought and values and are an attempt to promote sectarian hatred between the two sects. Almost everyday, hundreds of primary and secondary school students boycott classes and stage protest rallies in Gilgit. Protests and violence have been simmering in the region since.

But the troubles of Gilgit-Baltistan, and the repeated cycles of state repression, have remained concealed behind an iron veil that has been pulled across the region by Islamabad, reinforced by international indifference to, and ignorance of, the plight of the people. In a significant break from the past, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs did express concern over the "severe repressive measures being taken against legitimate protests and demonstrations", in the aftermath of the October 11-13 violence.

Nevertheless, despite a long history of protests, Gilgit-Baltistan remains a neglected centre of inequity. As Abdul Hamid Khan, Chairman, Balawaristan National Front (BNF), expresses it, "International attention is focussed only on those political concerns that appear in the international media. Unfortunately, the international Press, particularly Western Press, is not bothered with a peaceful struggle. Only when a struggle turns into an armed struggle does it attract media attention. The people of Balawaristan (Pakistan Occupied Gilgit Baltistan) believe in peaceful political struggle, and that unfortunately does not attract the attention of the world community."

Ajai Sahni is Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management. Courtesy, the South Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal
 
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Bro by Posting this thread you have negated your own signature and laid the foundations of a long war.

You can Post what ever Propaganda you want but unlike you we haven't killed 100,000 Innocents in Kashmir.
 
Bro by Posting this thread you have negated your own signature and laid the foundations of a long war.

You can Post what ever Propaganda you want but unlike you we haven't killed 100,000 Innocents in Kashmir.

hello some of these articles has been taken from ur pakistan newspapers..

so stop ur usual dialogues "India's propaganda"..coz when u post youtube vids which are anti-india in nature, they r "truths"...where as articles from ur newspapers are India's Propaganda..:hitwall:
 
Ya Ya you can post one video of a few dissatisfied Citizens we can post thousands of videos of Thousands of people marching and Chanting Anti India.
 
So why dont we put it to the test and have vote on the issue of kashmir and see who the people of kashmir choose.......pakistan or india.
You can post all the links you want but the only one that counts is the one when your willing to have election under the UN.
Lets see what the people want ,after all your pretty sure that the pak govt doesnt treat the people of AJK well and we say the people in IOK are not treated well......put your money whee your mouth is and back a UN vote on the issue......or ru scared that all BS fall apart?
 
So why dont we put it to the test and have vote on the issue of kashmir and see who the people of kashmir choose.......pakistan or india.
You can post all the links you want but the only one that counts is the one when your willing to have election under the UN.
Lets see what the people want ,after all your pretty sure that the pak govt doesnt treat the people of AJK well and we say the people in IOK are not treated well......put your money whee your mouth is and back a UN vote on the issue......or ru scared that all BS fall apart?

Seems only Indians have a problem with this.We have been screaming for UN for last 6 decades.
 
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