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JIRGA episode on TTP origins with Retired officers

^^ I agree with the above UCLA article and it is quite balanced in many respects. Although one distinction that should be made is that not all Saudis are salafis.

However, coming back to the main topic, nowhere does it say that salafis would actually promote terrorism on civilians or suicide bombings.

Distinction should also be made of the use of salafi movement by the house of Saud to get political power. This is the real poison and applies to all fascist ideologies and across all religious / ethnicity based extremist groups. If the Saud tribe had not used this ideology to gain political power in the name of Islam, there would have been no violent killings by their followers and these government sanctioned clerics would have no business setting up their own interpretation of rules to keep their power.
 
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Madrassas and jihad - Khaled Ahmad

Until the 1970s, Pakistani madrassas largely followed the Dars-i-Nizamia curriculum and its variants established in the 1700s in India. Even the Deobandi alteration of this curriculum focused on purification of faith for the purposes of knowledge, rather than militancy and jihad. All this changed in the late 1970s and early 1980s. General Zia ul-Haq, who took power after a military coup in 1977, was an ardent Islamist. He started off with some ill-fated attempts at rushing through "Islamic law" within Pakistan. Zia's existing plans to turn Pakistan into an "Islamic" state gained urgency and a more fundamentalist tone after two major events - the Iranian revolution in 1979 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 10 years later.

The twin shocks also encouraged a new movement within the Deobandi madrassas , which sought to change the way Islam was taught to students. While it is true that many madrassas dropped secular subjects like mathematics and sciences in part or whole, what was more significant than the narrowing of the syllabus was the change in focus and interpretation in the teaching of the Koran and the Hadith (sayings of the Prophet Mohammed), drawing on the incendiary combination of Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi thinking developed under Saudi funding from places like the Islamic University of Medina, and propagated by other Saudi-controlled foundations, such as the World Muslim League.

The emphasis in madrassa curriculum was shifted almost entirely from the standard pillars of faith such as prayer, charity and pilgrimage to the obligation and rewards of violent jihad. The madrassas taught the young students that the world was divided into believers and unbelievers in a black and white setting. Jews, Hindus and Christians were portrayed as evil usurpers. The curriculum started emphasizing the need for Islamic warriors or jihadis to "liberate" regions dominated by unbelievers as well as "purify" Islamic nations in order to establish a single Islamic caliphate where pure Islam would be followed. The students were taught that the only means to achieving this Utopian state was by waging a near-perpetual war, pursued by any and all means against unbelievers as well as "impure" sects within Muslims. The era of the jihadi madrassas was born.

Jihad as a policy tool

During the 1980s, radical Pakistani madrassas pumped out thousands of Afghan foot soldiers for the US and Saudi-funded jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan. They also helped bind the independent-minded Pashtun tribesmen closely to the Pakistani government for the first time in its history; easing the acute insecurity Pakistan had felt towards Afghanistan and the disputed border.

Gulf petrodollars funded a sustained spurt in Deobandi madrassas not only in the Pashtun areas of Pakistan near the Afghan border, but also in the port city of Karachi as well as rural Punjab. The Saudi and Gulf-Arab money also encouraged a Salafi jihad-centered curriculum. Prominent madrassas included the Darul Uloom Haqqania at Akora Khattak in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Binori madrassa in Karachi. The Haqqania boasts almost the entire Taliban leadership among its graduates, including Mullah Omar, the leader of the Taliban, while the Binori madrassa, whose leader Mufti Shamzai was recently assassinated, was once talked about as a possible hiding place of Osama bin Laden, and is also reportedly the place where bin Laden met Mullah Omar to form the al-Qaeda-Taliban partnership.

After the Soviets were ousted from Afghanistan in 1989, instead of a slow-down, the rapid spread of jihadi madrassas in Pakistan continued unabated. The reasons for this are manifold. The first and most important reason is that Saudi money continued to flow to the madrassa system. The prestige and influence of the big madrassas encouraged wealthy Pakistanis to contribute more than ever before, sometimes as an expression of conviction, and sometimes as a means of ingratiating themselves with what had become major power players.

Pakistani governments had grown comfortable spending massive amounts of money on defense and almost nothing on education during the days of Afghan jihad when US and Saudi aid flowed freely. In the 1990s, after US-imposed sanctions due to Pakistan's nuclear program, the economy almost collapsed and the education infrastructure deteriorated rapidly.

For the poor, the madrassas offered a place where their children could get free boarding, food and education, and it turned out to be an irresistible option when compared to crumbling or non-existent government-funded secular schools. Pakistani governments also encouraged this to avoid spending much on education. The sheer magnitude of this increase can be fathomed by this simple statistic: only 7,000 Pakistani children attended madrassas as early as 20 years ago. That number has grown today to closer to 2 million, by conservative estimates.

The Pakistani army on its part saw the large number of madrassa-trained jihadis as an asset for its covert support of the Taliban in Afghanistan, as well as its proxy war with India in Kashmir. While the NWFP madrassas supplied both Afghan refugees and Pakistanis as cannon fodder for the Taliban, the Binori madrassa and associated ones formed the base for Deobandi groups like Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and Jaish-e-Mohammed, which sought to do the Pakistan army's bidding in Kashmir. The many Salafi(Wahhabi) seminaries supplied Salafi groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba. Salafi sheikhs funded madrassas in the Rahimyar Khan area of rural Punjab, which formed the backbone of hardcore anti-Shi'ite jihadi groups like the Sipah-e-Sahaba, and its even more militant offshoot the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.
 
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Again, Khaled Ahmed's article reinforces my point of view.

The reason we see extremism today is because Islam was used for political purposes and for waging proxy wars for geo-political benefits. This applies to any other religion or sect as well. However, I dislike labelling extremist groups as deobandi barelwi shia and salafi because it is just like calling AQ Islamic terrorists. These extremist groups don't follow any tenants of Islam or their original school of thought
 
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^^ I agree with the above UCLA article and it is quite balanced in many respects. Although one distinction that should be made is that not all Saudis are salafis.

However, coming back to the main topic, nowhere does it say that salafis would actually promote terrorism on civilians or suicide bombings.

Distinction should also be made of the use of salafi movement by the house of Saud to get political power. This is the real poison and applies to all fascist ideologies and across all religious / ethnicity based extremist groups. If the Saud tribe had not used this ideology to gain political power in the name of Islam, there would have been no violent killings by their followers and these government sanctioned clerics would have no business setting up their own interpretation of rules to keep their power.

I agree to some extent that the Salafis would have limited clout if they had not allied themselves with the Sauds since the 19th century.

However, to imply that the Salafis were unwittingly used is a bit naive.The early-day Wahhabis, just like the latter-day Salafis, clearly had political ambitions, which is why they aligned with the Sauds in the first place. The fascist tactics and regressive tenets employed by the Salafis were happily adopted by the Sauds in an effort to expand their domain.
 
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Again, Khaled Ahmed's article reinforces my point of view.

The reason we see extremism today is because Islam was used for political purposes and for waging proxy wars for geo-political benefits.

I would rephrase - the Salafi ideology has been used for accumulating political power under the label of 'Islam' since the 18th century - the armed rebellion against the Ottomans being a case in point.

The problem is with the doctrine itself given the fact it is the ideological fuel that drives the Salafi Jihad Movement we see today.

As Khaled Ahmad points out, the trouble for us started when the Saudis started exporting the ideology thanks to the petrodollar boom in the 70s, which in turn set the stage for the jihadi indoctrination that followed.
 
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Excellent Program.Brig Asad gave very good info and well what TS said is correct.The main funding is from Gulf's people.
 
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Excellent Program.Brig Asad gave very good info and well what TS said is correct.The main funding is from Gulf's people.

The talk show host seemed well informed as well and asked good questions.

One of the few talk shows that have substance, as opposed to the ones heavy on theatre and innuendo.
 
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Amir Mir

Sufi Mohammad first rose to prominence in 1994 when he had staged a sit-in in Malakand by blocking the Mingora-Peshawar road for seven days, cutting off the Swat valley from the rest of Pakistan, demanding the enforcement of the Islamic laws. Subsequently, armed clashes between the law enforcing agencies and the TNSM activists took place at different places. A sitting member of the NWFP Assembly, Badiuzaman Khan, was taken hostage by the TNSM supporters and eventually killed. The law enforcement agencies thus moved in to crush the insurgents who clashed with the administration and effectively brought the whole administrative structure of Swat to a standstill by seizing control of the government buildings and the Saidu Sharif airport.

The uprising followed the February 12, 1994, Supreme Court verdict declaring the PATA Regulation that governed the Provincially-Administered Tribal Areas of Malakand as unconstitutional. The void created by the SC judgment led to the demand for the Shariah enforcement. Over three dozen people, including 12 security force personnel, were killed in a week of fighting before the government was able to re-establish its writ, but only after signing a peace agreement with Sufi to enforce the Shariah in Malakand. However, the deal could not be implemented, thus prompting fresh violence. Peace was only restored after another deal that served as a clear victory for the TNSM as Sufi Mohammad handed himself over to the military and the federal government agreed to enforce the Shariah in Malakand. Sufi remained in the government custody for a short period of time.

By November 1994, senior government functionaries reportedly sent Sufi official letters addressed to “Honorable Maulana Sufi Mohammad bin Hasan Mahmud” updating him about the government directives to enforce the Shariah law and requesting his cooperation. Immediate official instructions were then issued to establish religious courts. Sufi’s followers meanwhile started driving on the wrong side of the road claiming to defy the traffic rules introduced by Britain a century ago. Men were also told to grow beards. In short, Talibanisation began to take place while the political leadership failed to contain it and to put an end to the problem at its outset. Already a conservative area, Malakand suffered in the process with the TNSM extremists openly pursuing their agenda.

By that time, the Taliban movement led by Mullah Omar had already surfaced in Afghanistan after capturing Kandahar. As the Taliban and the TNSM had the same religious vision and ideals, Sufi Mohammad used to enjoy cordial relations with the Taliban rulers who funded him in a big way to make him extend the TNSM organisational set-up in other parts of the NWFP and in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. On September 6, 1998, the TNSM threatened to attack American property and to abduct American citizens in Pakistan unless Washington apologised for the August 1998 missile strikes in Afghanistan, targeting Osama’s training camps. The TNSM organised a protest procession in Mingora on September 20, 2001 where the speakers called for raising a voluntary army in order to extend support to the Taliban militia against the impending US strikes.

The Taliban rule in Afghanistan at that time actually provided the TNSM with an instant reference to argue and justify their rigid social policies. When the US-led Allied forces invaded Afghanistan in October 2001 in the aftermath of the 9/11 terror attacks, Sufi exhorted his followers to join the Taliban in Afghanistan in their armed struggle against the US-led allied forces. He had self-admittedly led over 10,000 Pakistani youngsters to fight the US-led Allied forces in Afghanistan in November 2001. Reportedly armed with Kalashnikovs, rocket launchers, missiles, anti-aircraft guns, hand grenades and swords, thousands of the TNSM cadres led by Sufi crossed the Pak-Afghan border. Thousands of the youngsters he had taken to Afghanistan in the aftermath of the US invasion were killed by the Northern Alliance troops and hundreds others were trapped by various Afghan warlords, who literally sold them back to their relatives in Pakistan for huge sums of money.

When a majority of his soldiers had been either killed or captured, he returned home only to be arrested by government forces. He was ultimately convicted on April 24, 2002, along with his 30 companions, to ten years of imprisonment for inciting people to go to Afghanistan and for violating state restrictions. He was then sent to a Dera Ismail Khan jail. Interestingly, he had refused to contest his case in the court of law, saying he does not believe in the existing courts and laws which were un-Islamic to him. In the aftermath of his Jihadi misadventure and the subsequent loss of lives, Sufi Mohammad lost much of his support in the Malakand division. A majority of his supporters went underground after the TNSM was banned on January 12, 2002 by the Musharraf regime along with four other Jihadi and sectarian organisations.

The TNSM had become almost dormant till the October 8, 2005 devastating earthquake struck the region, thus making the followers of Sufi capitalise on the great human tragedy and use it to revive their organisation.

Since the TNSM volunteers were in the forefront of the humanitarian relief work, especially in the devastated areas of the NWFP, the popularity of the Jihadi group once again shot up. In 2006, in the process of helping out the quake affected people, the TNSM, now led by Maulana Fazalullah, re-established its stronghold in the Malakand and Swat areas of the NWFP and in the Bajaur area of Fata like other banned Jihadi groups and started mobilising its activists.
 
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