In the 18th and 19th centuries, relations between the Russian Empire and Japan were generally positive. However, Russian expansionism threatened Japan’s security, and conflicts of interest over the Korean Peninsula and Manchukuo caused the Russo-Japanese War. Japan’s victory in 1905 solidified its position as a major modern state in East Asia; however, the relationship between Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR, later Russia) was further strained by World War II. At the conclusion of the war, (1) the USSR broke the Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact, (2) Japan allied with the United States during the following Cold War and (3) the Northern Territories became disputed territory between Japan and the USSR. [2]
Upon collapse of the USSR in 1991, Russia was torn in multiple directions economically and politically, and its attitude toward foreign countries outside of the former USSR countries was often confused and disjointed. Then-President Boris Yeltsin agreed to discuss the territorial dispute over all four islands. The Tokyo Declaration, signed by Yeltsin and then-Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa in October 1993, recognized the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration of 1956, which noted “prior returning of 2 islands,” and agreed that both sides would negotiate the territorial dispute in accordance with the prior agreement. [3] This suggested that two of the four islands, Habomai and Shikotan, might be returned. The Tokyo Declaration laid a foundation for the Irkutsuk Statement signed between then-President Vladimir Putin and then-Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori in March 2001, in which the two leaders agreed to continue negotiations based on the 1993 Tokyo Declaration. [4]
For many years, Japan’s Russia policy has focused on negotiations regarding the Northern Territories, keeping distance from issues such as Russia’s internal affairs. This limited the Japanese government’s policy options for negotiating the territorial dispute: Japan could only demand the return of “all four islands,” because the Japanese government maintains that the Northern Territories are illegally occupied by Russia and remain the inherent territory of Japan. [5]
Putin was and continues to seem favorable toward a resolution of the territorial dispute. Though resolutions involving the reduction of territory would be controversial, Putin has enough political capital to ensure consensus for such an action. Putin has suggested that the territorial resolution should be done on a fifty-fifty basis – split the disputed territory such that both sides gain equally. Russia has resolved other territorial disputes with neighboring countries in this way, such as China and Norway. The Japanese government thus hoped that Putin’s leadership may offer an opportunity for recovering the Northern Territories.
On November 14, 2004, while Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov were visiting Japan, Lavrov stated that Russia, as state-successor of the Soviet Union, recognized the Declaration of 1956 and was ready to negotiate with Japan on this basis. This statement further fueled domestic Japanese expectations that the Northern Territories may be recovered.
The economy and trade is one area in which Japan-Russia relations have been growing (as shown in Figure 1). Specifically, Japan-Russia relations began to shift qualitatively in 2010. The Japanese government revised its basic diplomatic policy toward Russia and suspended efforts toward the resolution of the territorial dispute. Instead, Japanese policy focused on expanding and deepening relations with Russia in all aspects, including the political, security, economic, energy, technical and environmental domains. Trade relations between Russia and Japan hit $32 billion in 2013 – a 5.3 percent increase compared to 2012, and the volume of trade was largely expected to continue to increase in 2014. Figures from January and February 2014 show a 6 percent increase from the same period in 2013. Mineral resources accounted for 60 percent of Russia’s exports to Japan, and cars accounted for 80 percent of Japan’s exports to Russia. Although the trade structure is still simple (as shown in Figure 2), Tokyo and Moscow have been trying to diversify the bilateral trade. Economic relations continued to progress positively until 2014, when the Ukraine crisis became serious.
Since returning to office in December 2012, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has intensified his efforts to build a personal relationship with Putin. Between December 2012 through December 2014, Abe and Putin have met seven times. Abe even attended the opening ceremony of the Sochi Olympics, when many Western leaders refused to attend in protest of the Russian human rights issues. It appears that Abe had hoped to strengthen his relationship with Putin enough to leverage it to possibly resolve the Northern Territories issue during his time in office. At a minimum, Abe is interested in moving Japan’s policy toward Russia beyond its exclusive focus on the Northern Territories issue.
Both Japan and Russia have softened their attitudes toward the territorial dispute, agreeing upon a policy for accelerating negotiations of the Northern Territories at a summit meeting in April 2013. The Japanese government demonstrated its willingness to accept the “return of the two islands of Habomai and Shikotan before the other islands in the territories” if Russia recognized all four islands to be part of Japanese territory. Putin favored a fifty-fifty, or “hikiwake” (draw), resolution. [6]
He explained, “A Judo-ka (Judo player) must take a brave step forward not only to win, but also to avoid losing. We don’t have to achieve victory. In this situation, we have to reach an acceptable compromise.”
In November 2013, in their first-ever “two-plus-two (foreign and defense)” ministerial meeting, Russia and Japan agreed upon a framework for a comprehensive partnership on security affairs. This framework is significant, because Russia is only the third country with which Japan has created such a frame work, even though Russia has never had such relations with other US allies.
This framework is expected to expand the agenda for potential cooperation between Japan and Russia and effectively deepen the relationship. However, the China factor is one of the barriers preventing Japan from deepening its relations with Russia, because China maintains a tough stance on Japan, while China and Russia share an “anti-America” and “anti-unipolar world” point of view, as well as their perception of post-World War II history. They insist that as big powers in Asia, they made the peace in the Asia-Pacific region after the war. Their plans to hold a joint ceremony in 2015 on the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II imply that Russia and China maintain a stance against Japan.
In addition, poor US-Russia relations have created a dilemma for Japan. Japan is expected by the US to support its ally, while Russia appeals for Japan to act independently. This dilemma has been played out throughout the Ukraine crisis in three stages: the Euro-Maidan movement (November 2013 to February 2014); the Crimea Annexation by Russia (February to March 2014) and the crisis in Eastern Ukraine (March 2014 to present).[8]
Since the Ukraine crisis became serious in 2014, the US and the European Union (EU) have activated sanctions against Russia, gradually increasing pressure over time. The Japanese government has been reluctant to follow suit, in the hopes of maintaining positive relations with Russia; however, as a G7 member, the Japanese government could not entirely avoid activating some sanctions. In the first stage, immediately following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Japan only activated very light sanctions upon Russia, such that Putin even noted his admiration for Japan’s actions.
In the second stage, the Japanese government strengthened the level of sanctions following US President Barack Obama’s visit to Japan in April. Russia angrily responded that the Japanese action was proof that Japan’s foreign policy simply followed the US. Then-Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida’s scheduled visit to Russia was postponed, as was Putin’s scheduled visit to Japan for autumn 2014. Yet even at this dire level of relations between the two countries, the personal relationship between Abe and Putin has remained positive and hopeful.
The two leaders exchanged phone calls on each other’s birthdays in September and October 2014, discussing birthday celebrations, the Ukraine crisis and potential meetings. They sat together for about 10 minutes at the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in Milan in October 2014 and conducted a meeting on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in Beijing in November 2014. The two have agreed to improve ties despite the sanctions, as well as reschedule Putin’s visit to Japan for 2015.
At the end of 2014, Russia faced an economic crisis as a result of the rapid decline of the Russian ruble, a fall in the price of oil, the economic sanctions imposed following the Ukraine crisis, illegal monopoly of wealth by a small number of persons, speculative actions, capital flights and so on. During this time, Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) won the parliamentary elections, and Abe was reelected as prime minister. The Russian government welcomed this result in the hopes that a stable Japanese government could enable further improvement in the bilateral relations.
Moving forward, Japan will continue to formulate its Russia policy independent of the Northern Territories dispute as China, which maintains a strong anti-Japan stance, deepens its own relationship with Russia.
Upon collapse of the USSR in 1991, Russia was torn in multiple directions economically and politically, and its attitude toward foreign countries outside of the former USSR countries was often confused and disjointed. Then-President Boris Yeltsin agreed to discuss the territorial dispute over all four islands. The Tokyo Declaration, signed by Yeltsin and then-Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa in October 1993, recognized the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration of 1956, which noted “prior returning of 2 islands,” and agreed that both sides would negotiate the territorial dispute in accordance with the prior agreement. [3] This suggested that two of the four islands, Habomai and Shikotan, might be returned. The Tokyo Declaration laid a foundation for the Irkutsuk Statement signed between then-President Vladimir Putin and then-Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori in March 2001, in which the two leaders agreed to continue negotiations based on the 1993 Tokyo Declaration. [4]
For many years, Japan’s Russia policy has focused on negotiations regarding the Northern Territories, keeping distance from issues such as Russia’s internal affairs. This limited the Japanese government’s policy options for negotiating the territorial dispute: Japan could only demand the return of “all four islands,” because the Japanese government maintains that the Northern Territories are illegally occupied by Russia and remain the inherent territory of Japan. [5]
Putin was and continues to seem favorable toward a resolution of the territorial dispute. Though resolutions involving the reduction of territory would be controversial, Putin has enough political capital to ensure consensus for such an action. Putin has suggested that the territorial resolution should be done on a fifty-fifty basis – split the disputed territory such that both sides gain equally. Russia has resolved other territorial disputes with neighboring countries in this way, such as China and Norway. The Japanese government thus hoped that Putin’s leadership may offer an opportunity for recovering the Northern Territories.
On November 14, 2004, while Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov were visiting Japan, Lavrov stated that Russia, as state-successor of the Soviet Union, recognized the Declaration of 1956 and was ready to negotiate with Japan on this basis. This statement further fueled domestic Japanese expectations that the Northern Territories may be recovered.
The economy and trade is one area in which Japan-Russia relations have been growing (as shown in Figure 1). Specifically, Japan-Russia relations began to shift qualitatively in 2010. The Japanese government revised its basic diplomatic policy toward Russia and suspended efforts toward the resolution of the territorial dispute. Instead, Japanese policy focused on expanding and deepening relations with Russia in all aspects, including the political, security, economic, energy, technical and environmental domains. Trade relations between Russia and Japan hit $32 billion in 2013 – a 5.3 percent increase compared to 2012, and the volume of trade was largely expected to continue to increase in 2014. Figures from January and February 2014 show a 6 percent increase from the same period in 2013. Mineral resources accounted for 60 percent of Russia’s exports to Japan, and cars accounted for 80 percent of Japan’s exports to Russia. Although the trade structure is still simple (as shown in Figure 2), Tokyo and Moscow have been trying to diversify the bilateral trade. Economic relations continued to progress positively until 2014, when the Ukraine crisis became serious.
Since returning to office in December 2012, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has intensified his efforts to build a personal relationship with Putin. Between December 2012 through December 2014, Abe and Putin have met seven times. Abe even attended the opening ceremony of the Sochi Olympics, when many Western leaders refused to attend in protest of the Russian human rights issues. It appears that Abe had hoped to strengthen his relationship with Putin enough to leverage it to possibly resolve the Northern Territories issue during his time in office. At a minimum, Abe is interested in moving Japan’s policy toward Russia beyond its exclusive focus on the Northern Territories issue.
Both Japan and Russia have softened their attitudes toward the territorial dispute, agreeing upon a policy for accelerating negotiations of the Northern Territories at a summit meeting in April 2013. The Japanese government demonstrated its willingness to accept the “return of the two islands of Habomai and Shikotan before the other islands in the territories” if Russia recognized all four islands to be part of Japanese territory. Putin favored a fifty-fifty, or “hikiwake” (draw), resolution. [6]
He explained, “A Judo-ka (Judo player) must take a brave step forward not only to win, but also to avoid losing. We don’t have to achieve victory. In this situation, we have to reach an acceptable compromise.”
In November 2013, in their first-ever “two-plus-two (foreign and defense)” ministerial meeting, Russia and Japan agreed upon a framework for a comprehensive partnership on security affairs. This framework is significant, because Russia is only the third country with which Japan has created such a frame work, even though Russia has never had such relations with other US allies.
This framework is expected to expand the agenda for potential cooperation between Japan and Russia and effectively deepen the relationship. However, the China factor is one of the barriers preventing Japan from deepening its relations with Russia, because China maintains a tough stance on Japan, while China and Russia share an “anti-America” and “anti-unipolar world” point of view, as well as their perception of post-World War II history. They insist that as big powers in Asia, they made the peace in the Asia-Pacific region after the war. Their plans to hold a joint ceremony in 2015 on the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II imply that Russia and China maintain a stance against Japan.
In addition, poor US-Russia relations have created a dilemma for Japan. Japan is expected by the US to support its ally, while Russia appeals for Japan to act independently. This dilemma has been played out throughout the Ukraine crisis in three stages: the Euro-Maidan movement (November 2013 to February 2014); the Crimea Annexation by Russia (February to March 2014) and the crisis in Eastern Ukraine (March 2014 to present).[8]
Since the Ukraine crisis became serious in 2014, the US and the European Union (EU) have activated sanctions against Russia, gradually increasing pressure over time. The Japanese government has been reluctant to follow suit, in the hopes of maintaining positive relations with Russia; however, as a G7 member, the Japanese government could not entirely avoid activating some sanctions. In the first stage, immediately following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Japan only activated very light sanctions upon Russia, such that Putin even noted his admiration for Japan’s actions.
In the second stage, the Japanese government strengthened the level of sanctions following US President Barack Obama’s visit to Japan in April. Russia angrily responded that the Japanese action was proof that Japan’s foreign policy simply followed the US. Then-Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida’s scheduled visit to Russia was postponed, as was Putin’s scheduled visit to Japan for autumn 2014. Yet even at this dire level of relations between the two countries, the personal relationship between Abe and Putin has remained positive and hopeful.
The two leaders exchanged phone calls on each other’s birthdays in September and October 2014, discussing birthday celebrations, the Ukraine crisis and potential meetings. They sat together for about 10 minutes at the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in Milan in October 2014 and conducted a meeting on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in Beijing in November 2014. The two have agreed to improve ties despite the sanctions, as well as reschedule Putin’s visit to Japan for 2015.
At the end of 2014, Russia faced an economic crisis as a result of the rapid decline of the Russian ruble, a fall in the price of oil, the economic sanctions imposed following the Ukraine crisis, illegal monopoly of wealth by a small number of persons, speculative actions, capital flights and so on. During this time, Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) won the parliamentary elections, and Abe was reelected as prime minister. The Russian government welcomed this result in the hopes that a stable Japanese government could enable further improvement in the bilateral relations.
Moving forward, Japan will continue to formulate its Russia policy independent of the Northern Territories dispute as China, which maintains a strong anti-Japan stance, deepens its own relationship with Russia.
