Israel's spies jolted again

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Israel's spies jolted again​

By Victor Kotsev

There is a mythical aura surrounding Israeli intelligence. Much of it is well-deserved, as a string of spectacular covert operations has consistently shown in the decades since the formation of the Jewish state.

Feats such as the 1967 destruction of the Egyptian air force, Operation Entebbe (1976), the destruction of Osirak (1981) and, more recently, of the Syrian plutonium reactor (2007), have enshrined the central role of the intelligence arm in Israeli military strength and deterrence.

Not to mention a chillingly successful abductions and assassinations program, whose most famous targets range from Nazi criminal against humanity Adolf Eichmann to Palestinian Black September terrorists to Israeli nuclear whistle-blower Mordechai Vanunu to Hezbollah arch-terrorist Imad Mughniyeh (2008).

Nevertheless, no spy agency is infallible, and recent events have revealed gaping holes in the formidable Israeli intelligence apparatus. Firstly, the killing in January in Dubai of a senior Hamas commander, Mahmoud al-Mabhouh (all but unanimously attributed to the Mossad), however well executed in January, blew up, and this by definition detracts from a covert operation's success. There were some tangible negative consequences for the Jewish state, such as increased international criticism and the expulsion of an Israeli diplomat from London.

Secondly, if the indictments filed against Israeli journalist Anat Kamm on Wednesday prove true, it would appear that about 2,000 classified Israeli military documents, including 700 marked "secret" and "top secret", were copied and remained undetected in private possession for years. These are all documents whose content could "gravely damage state security and endanger the lives of both soldiers and Israeli civilians", in the words of counter-intelligence agency Shin Beth's chief, Yuval Diskin.

According to a report in leading Israeli daily Yediot Ahronoth, this affair is likely the "most severe in Israeli history as far as the damage it could have caused to the country's security". Needless to say, it constitutes a blow to Israeli deterrence at a time when tensions in the region are high and rising.

What is publicly known of the storyline - parts of the affair are still secret and "said to be enormously sensitive", according to New York Times' Judith Miller - is the following. In 2007, Anat Kamm, a conscript office clerk at the Israeli Central Command chief's (then Yair Naveh) office, made illegal copies of over 2,000 classified documents. These, according to Yediot Ahronoth, included "operational military information, security and situation assessments, meetings' minutes and protocols, highly sensitive intelligence information, orders of deployment and battle, drill briefings, and warfare doctrines for the West Bank".

In 2008, Kamm offered the documents to two Israeli journalists: first to Yossi Yehoshua, and later, when that initial contact fell through, to Ha'aretz's Uri Blau. Blau used the information to write a number of stories, including a highly critical of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) series on target terrorist assassinations that he published in late 2008. An excerpt from the most widely quoted piece, "A License to Kill", reads:

A Ha'aretz Magazine investigation reveals for the first time operational discussions in which the fate of wanted men and innocent people was decided, in apparent disregard of the High Court decision. Thus it was revealed that the IDF approved assassination plans in the West Bank even when it would probably have been possible to arrest the wanted men - in contradiction to the State's statement to the High Court - and that in cold military terminology the most senior IDF echelons approve, in advance and in writing, the harming of innocent Palestinians during the course of assassination operations. Moreover, it turns out that the assassination of a target the defense establishment called part of a "ticking infrastructure" was postponed, because it had been scheduled to take place during the visit of a senior US official.

The publications caught the attention of the chief of staff and the attorney general, who ordered the counter-intelligence services to investigate. Almost a year later, in September 2009, Uri Blau made a deal with the Shin Beth, whereby he surrendered about 50 documents in his possession alongside his personal computer in exchange for immunity from persecution and a pledge that the materials will not be used to locate his source. Nevertheless, Shin Beth was quick to locate Anat Kamm, placing her under house arrest in December and formally indicting her last Wednesday.

This is where the affair gets truly fuzzy. It was after Kamm's arrest, apparently, that the magnitude of the intelligence leak was discovered. Kamm allegedly admitted to copying the information and claimed that she had transferred "many of" the documents to Blau. "The Shin Beth," writes The Jerusalem Post, "realized that there was a major gap between the number of documents Blau had returned and the number Kamm said she had given. Additional intelligence obtained by the Shin Bet reinforced suspicion that Blau was still in possession of hundreds of documents classified as top secret."

Meanwhile, Blau had left the country. He claims it was by chance that he went abroad shortly before Kamm was arrested: "When I left Israel I had no reason to believe our planned trip would suddenly turn into a spy movie whose end is not clear," he wrote in a Ha'aretz article on Friday. He is currently in London, negotiating his return to Israel after a strenuous journey that apparently also included China and Thailand.

The relationship between Kamm, Blau and Yossi Yehoshua, to whom Kamm initially offered the documents, remains unclear. Yehoshua's name appears on the list of witnesses against Kamm, and it is reasonable to assume that he bears some responsibility for her arrest. Blau claims he is being persecuted "only because I published reports that were not convenient to the establishment".

Similarly, Kamm claims that she acted because of ideological persuasion, but not to hurt Israel's interests. "She's a Zionist," her lawyer, Eitan Lehman, told The Jerusalem Post. "[And she] denies that any damage was done to the security of the State of Israel or that it was ever her intention to do so." Moreover, Lehman expressed concerns that the process was "damaging to the democratic status of the State of Israel".

To add to the donnybrook, Ha'aretz complained in an editorial on Friday that "Shin Bet broke its deal". In all, it appears that the media attention is currently shifting toward a debate on free speech and the democratic values of Israel, which, however important for Israeli society, is missing the point from a strategic perspective. [1]

It is hard to avoid the sobering fact that, in Debka File's concise summary, "this soldier's ability to photocopy and filch 2,000 top-secret documents from an army facility over a two-year period ranging from 2005 to 2007 demonstrates the vulnerability of the highest command levels in the IDF to infiltration by hostile elements and the free availability of their most secret documents". Attesting to their shock and therefore to the sensitivity of the scandal, the Israeli intelligence services kept a gag order in place preventing Israeli media from publishing any information about the affair even weeks after foreign media had discussed it openly.

To top it off, less severe similar incidents have been reported consistently over the past few years. Last year, for example, a number of low-security level classified documents were found abandoned near a trash can, and, moreover, were again found lying around days after the initial signal was given. More recently, Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi's credit card data (and according to unconfirmed reports some classified military data) was stolen.

All this signals a gaping hole in Israel's information security, and, by extension, in its intelligence apparatus. The recent incidents - including the Dubai affair - confirm that while Israeli spy agencies are ever-more adept at penetrating their enemies' ranks and security defenses, they have neglected the home front, so to speak, and are increasingly vulnerable to leaks. This is bad news for Israel at a time when tensions with Iran are nearing their peak - in intelligence matters as much as in pure military terms. Iranian spy services have registered a few spectacular coups of their own as well.

A month and a half ago, they captured the most wanted man on Iran's terror list, Jundallah's leader Abdulmalik Rigi, in a complex covert operation that included the interception of a civilian airliner bound for Dubai. According to Asia Times Online's M K Bhadrakumar:
The Iranian performance stands out in sharp contrast with the fallout from the Israeli intelligence operation in Dubai ... Iranian Interior Minister Mostafa Mohammad Najjar made this clear when he said, "Such an operation by the Islamic Republic's security forces indicates that the country's intelligence and security have the upper hand in the region." [2]

Overall, almost overnight, Israel's formidable intelligence agencies have lost some glitter. This, from the point of view of Israeli security, spells trouble for Israeli deterrence, and raises the likelihood of an enemy attack. Ironically - or not - it might make Israel itself more aggressive in the short term.

Notes
1. Debate in Israel on Gag Order in Security Leak Case The New York Times, April 6, 2010.
2. Jundallah arrest proves timely for Iran Asia Times Online, February 25, 2010.

Victor Kotsev is a freelance journalist and political analyst with expertise in the Middle East.

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