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Is the UAE moving to replace Qatar as Turkey's top Gulf partner?
.In a first since Feb. 2012, Abu Dhabi’s crown prince and de facto ruler of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has paid a visit to Turkey. Meeting President Recep Tayyip Erdogan at the presidential palace in Ankara on Nov. 24, an official reception that included the rolling out of a unique turquoise...
In a first since Feb. 2012, Abu Dhabi’s crown prince and de facto ruler of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has paid a visit to Turkey. Meeting President Recep Tayyip Erdogan at the presidential palace in Ankara on Nov. 24, an official reception that included the rolling out of a unique turquoise carpet and a cavalry procession was held for Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MbZ).
The buildup to the visit
The Emirati state visit has received significant attention from observers worldwide given the previous hostility between the two countries, particularly since the 2013 military coup in Egypt, which ousted late president Mohamed Morsi.
Several developments prior to the visit paved the way for it to be held. In January, the Emirati minister of state for foreign affairs at the time, Anwar Gargash, openly expressed Abu Dhabi's desire to normalize relations with Ankara. In April, UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan (AbZ) held a phone call with his Turkish counterpart. And four months later, there was another high-level phone call, this between MbZ and Erdogan.
A further important development took place towards the end of August: Emirati National Security Advisor Sheikh Tahnoon bin Zayed Al Nahyan (TbZ) visited Ankara, where he met with President Erdogan. The two discussed Emirati plans to strengthen economic relations and invest in Turkey. More recently, prior to MbZ's arrival in Ankara on Nov. 24, UAE Deputy Prime Minister and Interior Minister Saif bin Zayed Al Nahyan met with Turkey's Interior Minister Suleyman Soylu in Italy on Nov. 18.
In the media sphere, Abu Dhabi on Nov. 4 notably shut down the Istanbul office of the UAE-based Sky News Arabia. This followed the TV channel’s airing of dismissed allegations that Turkey had deployed Russian-built air defenses at the Incirlik base, which is used by NATO. A few weeks later, on Nov. 25, Emirati officials met Turkey's Ambassador to Abu Dhabi, Tugay Tuncer. Emirati TV has also hosted Tuncer to speak about bilateral relations. Of note, the envoy was appointed earlier this year, on May 1.
The broader context
Unpacking the context of MbZ’s trip to Ankara requires a multi-dimensional analysis. Following the reconciliation at the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit in Saudi Arabia’s Al-Ula region in January—which the UAE was seemingly not initially happy about—regional countries had to de-escalate tensions, adapt to new realities, and synchronize their approaches with that of the new Joe Biden administration. Therefore, the hard split between the regional blocs took the back seat, and regional capitals started to demonstrate more flexible foreign policy in pursuit of their interests.
Indeed, Riyadh, a primary ally of Abu Dhabi during the 2017-21 blockade of Qatar by the ‘Arab Quartet’ (Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE), promptly normalized its relations with Doha. Saudi Arabia also opened on Turkey—before Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud (MbS) seemingly decided to stall the thaw. Egypt, another ally of the UAE which has been under heavy Emirati influence since the 2013 coup, has also charted its own path after the Ula agreement, swiftly developing relations with Qatar. Additionally, rapprochement between Cairo and Ankara has been progressing slowly but steadily.
Considering these dynamics, Abu Dhabi has seemingly felt insecure, and especially given the growing rift with Saudi Arabia following the GCC reconciliation in January. In this sense, the current Emirati regional charm offensive is partly a response to the Biden administration’s new priorities. Abu Dhabi is seeking to signal that it can play a constructive role and benefit both the US and the region by banking on the current de-escalation moment. The Emirati message is also that it is ready to establish ties with everyone—including former foes of both the UAE and the US. Indeed, in parallel with the Emirati-Turkish rapprochement, ties between Tehran and Abu Dhabi have also noticeably improved in recent months.
There are other elements to Abu Dhabi's sense of insecurity and associated fear of possible isolation. An America that is less committed to the security of the GCC countries would endanger the UAE, particularly if Emirati ties with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Iran are not repaired. For instance, the UAE’s normalization with Israel last year will not mean much if Saudi Arabia decides to increase pressure on Abu Dhabi amid the growing rift between them in the post-Ula agreement era. Against this backdrop, better relations with Turkey and Iran would likely be far more effective in terms of safeguarding the UAE. And the Emiratis are probably aware of this. How? The 2017-21 Gulf crisis.
A history of broken promises
From Turkey’s perspective, the normalization of relations with the UAE is a very timely and welcomed initiative, particularly given the sharp recent depreciation of the lira and the desperate need for foreign investment.
In this vein, Turkish officials have pointed out that while undermining Turkey was previously a top priority for the UAE, Ankara never targeted Abu Dhabi. In April, Turkish Presidential Spokesman Ibrahim Kalin stated that Ankara wants good relations with all Gulf countries—hinting that opening a new page with the UAE would be a positive development.
At the conclusion of MBZ's visit to Turkey, ten memorandums of understanding (MoUs) and agreements were signed in the fields of investment, finance, trade, energy, and the environment—including an MoU between Abu Dhabi Development Holding (ADQ), chaired by TbZ, the Turkish Wealth Fund (TVF), and the Turkish Presidency Investment Office. Moreover, The Turkish and Emirati central banks signed a cooperation agreement, paving the way for a possible swap deal. Furthermore, Ankara has announced that Turkey’s foreign minister will visit the UAE on Dec. 15.
Meanwhile, catchy headlines about the UAE setting up a 10B USD fund to support strategic investment in Turkey have dominated local and international news coverage. Although these kinds of measures send a strong positive message, the MoUs, agreements and significant financial promises will not mean much unless materialized. The GCC countries have a history of throwing out big numbers for PR reasons and political messaging. Additionally, even if there is a genuine intention to put down 10B USD, there is always a possibility that the Emiratis may cancel or withdraw those investments whenever a political disagreement may emerge. Indeed, there are precedents for this scenario.
In Jan. 2013, the UAE signed an agreement to invest around 12B USD in a Turkish mega power plant project, Afşin-Elbistan. Abu Dhabi, however, canceled its commitments once there was political disagreement with Ankara over the military coup in Cairo that year, citing financial reasons. Similarly, Saudi Arabia canceled major deals with Turkish defense companies against the backdrop of Ankara's support for Doha during the 2017-21 Gulf crisis.
Assuming that the UAE is serious about investing in Turkey this time, the key questions would be: why—and particularly, why now?
What’s next?
There are three primary motivating factors for the Emirati maneuvering. First, there are clear investment opportunities in Turkey right now. The depreciation of the lira will allow the UAE to buy massive assets and successful companies at low prices. Given the size, capacity and the potentials of the Turkish economy, the economic dividends for Abu Dhabi will be huge once Turkey has exited its current downturn.
Second, utilizing trade and investment to approach Turkey is far more effective than pursuing mere political diplomacy. Given the trust deficit between the two sides, the Turks wanted solid proof from the Emiratis of their intentions: and the UAE has responded by saying that it will put its money where its mouth is. Such promises not only serve Erdogan's interests, but are also compatible with the broader de-escalation moment in the region.
Third and most importantly, although it might seem that Abu Dhabi is offering a service to the Turkish president, the UAE might in fact be preparing for a post-Erdogan scenario by increasing its financial clout in Ankara and creating leverage. At the end of the day, Turkey is not a monarchy, and political change is always possible. If change occurs in Turkey’s June 2023 general elections or sooner, the UAE will be very well positioned to utilize such a shift both economically and politically vis-à-vis its GCC adversaries. However, if Erdogan remains in power, it will keep Abu Dhabi’s relations with Ankara smooth until further regional and international developments occur.
There is also the question of the future of Turkey’s relations with Qatar. Even though Qatar is a wealthy nation, its economic might does not outshine that of the UAE. At the end of the day, the Qatari market is limited, megaprojects associated with the long-awaited FIFA World Cup in late 2022 are finishing, and its bilateral trade with Turkey is minimal despite the noticeable increase following the 2017-21 Gulf crisis. Unless Doha is willing to strongly counter the Emirati maneuvering with measures geared to exponentially increase bilateral trade and foreign direct investment in Turkey, there is little chance that what Qatar can financially offer can match what the UAE can provide.
However, Qatar has one significant advantage over the UAE vis-à-vis Turkey: its military ties. The presence of a Turkish military base in Qatar offers Turkey a foothold in the Gulf, and this is no less critical to Ankara than trade and investment relations with the UAE. In this context, one way for Doha to outmaneuver Abu Dhabi could be to bring Riyadh on board with its alliance with Turkey. By joining forces in this bigger influence game, Qatar and Saudi Arabia will not only be able to balance the rising Emirati influence in Turkey, but also ensure that the leverage that the UAE is building will not be used against them.
However, this scenario faces one major challenge—namely the position of MbS. Following the reconciliation at the GCC summit in Ula, Doha expressed its readiness to mediate between Ankara and Riyadh if they decide to approach it with such a request. Yet, neither of Turkey nor Saudi Arabia have done so—up until now.
According to one senior Arab official who spoke on condition of anonymity, Saudi Arabia's crown prince may visit Doha in the coming days as Qatar is hosting the Nov. 30-Dec. 18 FIFA Arab Cup. If the visit takes place, there is a great chance that the Qataris will discuss rapprochement with Turkey with MbS. The outcome of such a conversation could be highly significant given that President Erdogan is set to embark on a so-far unannounced visit to Doha on Dec. 7. But whether Qatar can bring Saudi Arabia on board will ultimately depend on the Saudi crown prince’s vision for his country’s role in the region.
Author-
Ali Bakir
Dr. Ali Bakir is an Assisant Professor at Qatar University's Ibn Khaldon Center. He specializes in ... Full Bio
