pakistani342
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Another well written article by his excellency Omar Samad.
It seems to be a good elucidation of the Afghan elite, or at least the Afghan-American elite.
Scattered are interesting factoids that the Afghan government has had 40 high profile meetings with the Pakistani government.
The the US special envoy has confirmed what was already feared - that Afghanistan is already in a state of civil war.
His excellency agrees that things could deteriorate post 2014
original article here.
...
By Omar Samad
The Afghan government on Sunday reacted angrily at the U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan James Dobbins comment that there already is of course a civil war in Afghanistan. Dobbins also warned that it is probably exceedingly optimistic to think reconciliation talks could actually yield peace before the end of 2014.
It is not his pessimistic prophecy that has rattled Afghans once more including President Hamid Karzai but the way the point man for the region is reading the nature of the conflict. Most Afghans, regardless of ethnic or political bent, believe that the conflict would subside or die altogether were it not for the sanctuaries and support and logistics available to the militants almost entirely in Pakistan.
Over the last 12 years, the Afghan leader, pushed by public opinion, met Pakistani leaders more than 40 times at different venues to offer an olive branch and point to the threat of extremism and terrorism affecting both nations equally, but to no avail. He went as far as sidelining key Afghan government officials since 2005 wrongly perceived as being anti-Pakistani to appease his neighbor.
The proxy militia fighters are neither representing a specific indigenous community nor an ethnic group as a whole. They were schooled in a non-traditional setting with imported values, trained by real or rogue elements of foreign paramilitary and intelligence operatives, and depend on foreign funds (and drug proceeds) for everything from motorcycle fuel to medical treatment, notwithstanding arms and munitions.
Most importantly, to keep power in the hands of radicals and loyalists, traditionalists and nationalists within Afghan Taliban ranks have either been systematically eliminated since the 1990s, or kept as hostage with their families under the watchful eyes of non-Afghan militants increasingly playing a pivotal role in the Afghan campaign.
There was a time two decades ago when other neighboring countries were also involved in this tragic travesty. With the exception of the Taliban (and a Hezb-e Islami faction), all other groups who used to fight each other, are now in support of the constitutional order. That accounts for the overwhelming majority of the people. Today, the conflict in Afghanistan is neither ethnic nor sectarian.
If this is civil war, then is it not also what threatens parts of Pakistan?
If this has been an ongoing civil war, then have the US and NATO been engaged in a civil strife for the past decade?
It would require a mindboggling reinterpretation of the Afghan mission to say that the West and others sacrificed so much in such a conflict.
But if this is a tactic to re-engage the pretentious Taliban to enter talks, then it runs the risk of upsetting the rest of the Afghans as was the case recently with the flag and Emirate sign put up on the walls of their political office in Doha.
This scenario and the pieces that make up the Afghan imbroglio can hardly be summed up as an ongoing full-fledged civil war. Afghans are facing brutal murderers, once called terrorists. The will to fight them has dissipated around the world, other hotspots have emerged, but the enemys cause and methods have not changed.
However, Dobbins is right to say that post 2014, the countrys conditions could worsen and then an externally-instigated civil war might ensue. That is if we fail to adequately manage and lead the political and security transitions.
Isnt that what many stakeholders with the exception of militants and their patrons are trying to avoid?
It is now incumbent on Ambassador Dobbins to provide an explanation so we all get it right and end up on the same page.
Omar Samad is Senior Central Asia Fellow at New America Foundation, President of Silkroad Consulting, and former Afghan ambassador to France and Canada.
It seems to be a good elucidation of the Afghan elite, or at least the Afghan-American elite.
Scattered are interesting factoids that the Afghan government has had 40 high profile meetings with the Pakistani government.
The the US special envoy has confirmed what was already feared - that Afghanistan is already in a state of civil war.
His excellency agrees that things could deteriorate post 2014
original article here.
...
By Omar Samad
The Afghan government on Sunday reacted angrily at the U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan James Dobbins comment that there already is of course a civil war in Afghanistan. Dobbins also warned that it is probably exceedingly optimistic to think reconciliation talks could actually yield peace before the end of 2014.
It is not his pessimistic prophecy that has rattled Afghans once more including President Hamid Karzai but the way the point man for the region is reading the nature of the conflict. Most Afghans, regardless of ethnic or political bent, believe that the conflict would subside or die altogether were it not for the sanctuaries and support and logistics available to the militants almost entirely in Pakistan.
Over the last 12 years, the Afghan leader, pushed by public opinion, met Pakistani leaders more than 40 times at different venues to offer an olive branch and point to the threat of extremism and terrorism affecting both nations equally, but to no avail. He went as far as sidelining key Afghan government officials since 2005 wrongly perceived as being anti-Pakistani to appease his neighbor.
The proxy militia fighters are neither representing a specific indigenous community nor an ethnic group as a whole. They were schooled in a non-traditional setting with imported values, trained by real or rogue elements of foreign paramilitary and intelligence operatives, and depend on foreign funds (and drug proceeds) for everything from motorcycle fuel to medical treatment, notwithstanding arms and munitions.
Most importantly, to keep power in the hands of radicals and loyalists, traditionalists and nationalists within Afghan Taliban ranks have either been systematically eliminated since the 1990s, or kept as hostage with their families under the watchful eyes of non-Afghan militants increasingly playing a pivotal role in the Afghan campaign.
There was a time two decades ago when other neighboring countries were also involved in this tragic travesty. With the exception of the Taliban (and a Hezb-e Islami faction), all other groups who used to fight each other, are now in support of the constitutional order. That accounts for the overwhelming majority of the people. Today, the conflict in Afghanistan is neither ethnic nor sectarian.
If this is civil war, then is it not also what threatens parts of Pakistan?
If this has been an ongoing civil war, then have the US and NATO been engaged in a civil strife for the past decade?
It would require a mindboggling reinterpretation of the Afghan mission to say that the West and others sacrificed so much in such a conflict.
But if this is a tactic to re-engage the pretentious Taliban to enter talks, then it runs the risk of upsetting the rest of the Afghans as was the case recently with the flag and Emirate sign put up on the walls of their political office in Doha.
This scenario and the pieces that make up the Afghan imbroglio can hardly be summed up as an ongoing full-fledged civil war. Afghans are facing brutal murderers, once called terrorists. The will to fight them has dissipated around the world, other hotspots have emerged, but the enemys cause and methods have not changed.
However, Dobbins is right to say that post 2014, the countrys conditions could worsen and then an externally-instigated civil war might ensue. That is if we fail to adequately manage and lead the political and security transitions.
Isnt that what many stakeholders with the exception of militants and their patrons are trying to avoid?
It is now incumbent on Ambassador Dobbins to provide an explanation so we all get it right and end up on the same page.
Omar Samad is Senior Central Asia Fellow at New America Foundation, President of Silkroad Consulting, and former Afghan ambassador to France and Canada.
