Iranian Nuclear Technology and Industry (technical only... non-political)

[aryobarzan]

Iranian Quantum Research (summary)
2018: Iran conducts first lab based secure quantum communication (2 meter)
2019: Iran announces the opening of first large laboratory dedicated to quantum physics and 300 meter secure transmission
2021: Iran announces that researchers at the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) have successfully tested an indigenous version of the quantum key distribution (QKD) technology on a relatively long distance of 1,650 meters.
2023: Not yet announced ..Plans were for fourth phase of QKD test on a 7-kilometer distance between the Milad Tower and Azadi Tower in Tehran in the near future.

Note: Even more future plans: Iran could use the QKD for secure communication between the organization’s AEOI headquarters in Tehran and a major nuclear site in Fordow in central Iran.

 

[HGV]

Latest IAEA report on Iran's nuclear activities released/leaked (Feb 2023).

Highlights of February 2023 report (vs November 2022 report):

• 87.5kg of uranium enriched to 60% (62.3kg) [42kg uranium enriched to 60% is sufficient for one nuclear bomb (if further enriched)]
• 434.7kg of uranium enriched to 20% (386.4kg)
• IAEA cannot re-establish continuity of knowledge of centrifuge inventory even if new deal is reached
• 3,760kg of total enriched uranium [JCPOA limit was 202.8kg]
• Traces of uranium enriched to 83.7% found in modified cascades

Iran has sufficient 60% HEU for at least two nuclear warheads (if further enriched to 90% for weaponisation). And sufficient 20% HEU for another warhead. The US estimates this process would take Iran 12 days.

If Iran is confident in its ability to quickly weaponise 90% HEU then the best (but riskiest) move is to rapidly accumulate large stockpiles of 60% HEU. Current rates of accumulation are very slow (+ 8.4kg 60% HEU per month = sufficient 60% HEU for 1 additional nuclear warhead every 5 months). 210kg+ or 420kg+ 60% HEU would be a critical amount (sufficient for 5 or 10 nuclear warheads) and probably the 'do or die' moment for Israel.

For context, 28kg of 90% HEU is typically required for a nuclear warhead (equivalent to 400kg of 20% HEU).

Iran must balance the risk of enriching to 90% HEU now with the time delay to further enrich 60% HEU to 90% HEU in the event the decision is made to do so. Ideally, 90% HEU would be stockpiled. If it indeed takes 12 days to further enrich 42kg of 60% HEU to 28kg of 90% HEU for one warhead then that is a relatively substantial delay).

Approximate amount of uranium enriched to different levels required to produce the same amount of 90% enriched uranium:

• 5% LEU: 16:1 (i.e. 16kg of 5% LEU = 1kg of 90% HEU)
• 20% HEU: 10:1 (10kg of 20% HEU = 1kg of 90% HEU)
• 60% HEU: 1.5:1 (1.5kg of 60% HEU = 1kg of 90% HEU)

15-25kg of 90% HEU is typically required for one simple nuclear warhead based on nuclear fission and with a relatively modest yield of 10 kt.

Therefore, based on the February 2023 IAEA report, Iran has the following enriched uranium:

• 3,760kg is total enriched uranium - uranium enriched to 60% and 20% and halve to exclude uranium enriched below 5% = c. 1600kg @ 5%. / 16 = 100kg @ 90% HEU
• 435kg @ 20% / 10 = 43.5kg @ 90% HEU
• 88kg @ 60% / 1.5 = 59kg @ 90% HEU

Total 90% HEU potential = c. 200kg.

Conclusion: Iran has sufficient enriched uranium stockpiles to produce 8-13 nuclear warheads (if further enriched to 90%). Enriching the existing stockpile of 60% HEU to 90% HEU would likely take 1-2 weeks for the first few warheads, but enriching the 5% and 20% stockpile to 90% would take months. Iran's priority must be to further enrich existing stockpiles of 5% and 20% enriched uranium to 60% to minimise the 'break out' time for those 8-13 potential nuclear warheads.

 

[aryobarzan]

Your estimate of 8 - 13 nuclear warheads is vlose to my estimate of 15...Depending on what generation of nuclear device Iran currently has mastered those numbers will be even higher.. Higher generation of nuclear devices use much less fuel to generate higher yeilds.

 

[HGV]

Your estimate of 8 - 13 nuclear warheads is vlose to my estimate of 15...Depending on what generation of nuclear device Iran currently has mastered those numbers will be even higher.. Higher generation of nuclear devices use much less fuel to generate higher yeilds.

Yes, it largely depends on two factors: (1) the efficiency of Iran's enrichment (from 5-60% to 90%) and (2) the amount of 90% HEU Iran requires to produce a nuclear warhead. I tried to be conservative, but it is possible that Iran is more advanced than known.

Another important priority should be to explore an alternative path to nuclear weapons beyond uranium enrichment, e.g. a heavy water reactor and plutonium reprocessing facility or laser enrichment. Laser enrichment in particular would be an appropriately covert method for Iran to accumulate HEU without needing thousands of large centrifuges. But none of these appear feasible in the near future, so I reiterate that the near-term priority must be to further enrich existing stockpiles of 5% and 20% enriched uranium to 60%.

 

[aryobarzan]

Yes, it largely depends on two factors: (1) the efficiency of Iran's enrichment (from 5-60% to 90%) and (2) the amount of 90% HEU Iran requires to produce a nuclear warhead. I tried to be conservative, but it is possible that Iran is more advanced than known.

Another important priority should be to explore an alternative path to nuclear weapons beyond uranium enrichment, e.g. a heavy water reactor and plutonium reprocessing facility or laser enrichment. Laser enrichment in particular would be an appropriately covert method for Iran to accumulate HEU without needing thousands of large centrifuges. But none of these appear feasible in the near future, so I reiterate that the near-term priority must be to further enrich existing stockpiles of 5% and 20% enriched uranium to 60%.

Laser enrichment was being done in Iran during Ahmadinejad but stopped because of jcpoa...Jcpoa has a specific wordings with regards to any laser enrichment..
Personally I think Iran's Irgc covert enrichment is using this method..just a hunch!

 

[HGV]

Laser enrichment was being done in Iran during Ahmadinejad but stopped because of jcpoa...Jcpoa has a specific wordings with regards to any laser enrichment..
Personally I think Iran's Irgc covert enrichment is using this method..just a hunch!

The JCPOA requires that Iran may only enrich uranium using "gaseous centrifuge technology" for 10 years. A footnote confirms that non-gaseous forms of enrichment include laser enrichment. So under the terms of the JCPOA, Iran could legally enrich uranium using laser enrichment from January 2026.

However, most reports suggest that Iran never achieved full-scale laser enrichment of uranium (around 2013) since it failed to acquire certain equipment from abroad.

 

[aryobarzan]

The JCPOA requires that Iran may only enrich uranium using "gaseous centrifuge technology" for 10 years. A footnote confirms that non-gaseous forms of enrichment include laser enrichment. So under the terms of the JCPOA, Iran could legally enrich uranium using laser enrichment from January 2026.

However, most reports suggest that Iran never achieved full-scale laser enrichment of uranium (around 2013) since it failed to acquire certain equipment from abroad.

Iran is not allowed to do any R&D in in Laser enrichment for 10 years after the start of JCPOA which is as you said is 2026.

In 2010 Iran formally announced the capability to enrich Uranium by laser in Lashkar-abad facility...This capability was developed by 2003 when Iran stopped the AMAD project..
The 2010 announcement was done by president Ahmadinejad when he visited a laser research facility..JCPOA specifically forbid Iran from laser enrichment for 10 years. (page 44 of JCPOA and Page 50)

 

[HGV]

Iran is not allowed to do any R&D in in Laser enrichment for 10 years after the start of JCPOA which is as you said is 2026.

In 2010 Iran formally announced the capability to enrich Uranium by laser in Lashkar-abad facility...This capability was developed by 2003 when Iran stopped the AMAD project..
The 2010 announcement was done by president Ahmadinejad when he visited a laser research facility..JCPOA specifically forbid Iran from laser enrichment for 10 years. (page 44 of JCPOA and Page 50)

As I said, under the JCPOA Iran can enrich uranium using laser enrichment from January 2026, less than three years from now. Although it is no longer bound by the terms of the JCPOA, so it can start today if it so chooses.

NTI says:

"Tehran later admitted that it had conducted laser enrichment experiments at the site, and several IAEA inspections determined that the AVLIS facility was able to produce small quantities of highly-enriched uranium. 4 However, the facility never became fully operational due to Iran’s inability to purchase critical equipment, such as electron beam guns, from abroad. 5 Iran dismantled the AVLIS equipment in 2003 and shipped it to the Karaj Agricultural and Medical Center, where it remains in storage."

Lashkar Ab'ad

Iran’s Lashkar Ab’ad, Nuclear Facility

www.nti.org

That refers to the efforts until 2003. Even when Ahmadinejad made the announcement later on, he spoke about a capability to do so and said that was put on hold for now. Regardless, this is a feasible avenue for Iran to explore to covertly enrich uranium and increase its leverage against the West.

 

[aryobarzan]

Bye bye JCPOA! here comes more yellow cake!..

Iran increases "Yellow cake" production by 50% and starts the operation of Dynamitron​

• Iran open Yellow cake productions line by "Heap Leaching" method​
• Will boost Uranium mining from current 2 mines to 10​
• Adds 2000 Technical staff ​
• Starts operation of Iranian built "Dynamitron"​

A typical "Dynamitron"..which accelerates particles through an evacuated beam tube between the electrode and a target at ground potential.

Many more info here:

اسÙاÙÛ: تÙÙÛد Ú©ÛÚ© زرد ÛµÛ° درصد اÙزاÛØ´ ÙÛâÛابد

رئÛس سازÙا٠اÙرÚÛ Ø§ØªÙÛ Ú¯Ùت: ÙÙکارا٠Ùا اÙرÙز Ú©ÛÚ© زرد را با استÙاد٠از رÙØ´ ÙÛÙ¾âÙÛÚÛÙÚ¯ تÙÙÛد کردÙد. ظرÙÛت Ú©ÛÚ© زرد در اÛ٠کارخاÙ٠ب٠صÙرت ÙاÙØ¹Û ØدÙد ÛµÛ° درصد اÙزاÛØ´ ÙÛâÛابد.

www.mashreghnews.ir

 

[aryobarzan]

An interesting view of a self contained centrifuge cascade mockup..shown today to SL..

 

[HGV]

Latest IAEA report on Iran's nuclear activities released/leaked (Feb 2023).

Highlights of February 2023 report (vs November 2022 report):

• 87.5kg of uranium enriched to 60% (62.3kg) [42kg uranium enriched to 60% is sufficient for one nuclear bomb (if further enriched)]
• 434.7kg of uranium enriched to 20% (386.4kg)
• IAEA cannot re-establish continuity of knowledge of centrifuge inventory even if new deal is reached
• 3,760kg of total enriched uranium [JCPOA limit was 202.8kg]
• Traces of uranium enriched to 83.7% found in modified cascades

Iran has sufficient 60% HEU for at least two nuclear warheads (if further enriched to 90% for weaponisation). And sufficient 20% HEU for another warhead. The US estimates this process would take Iran 12 days.

If Iran is confident in its ability to quickly weaponise 90% HEU then the best (but riskiest) move is to rapidly accumulate large stockpiles of 60% HEU. Current rates of accumulation are very slow (+ 8.4kg 60% HEU per month = sufficient 60% HEU for 1 additional nuclear warhead every 5 months). 210kg+ or 420kg+ 60% HEU would be a critical amount (sufficient for 5 or 10 nuclear warheads) and probably the 'do or die' moment for Israel.

For context, 28kg of 90% HEU is typically required for a nuclear warhead (equivalent to 400kg of 20% HEU).

Iran must balance the risk of enriching to 90% HEU now with the time delay to further enrich 60% HEU to 90% HEU in the event the decision is made to do so. Ideally, 90% HEU would be stockpiled. If it indeed takes 12 days to further enrich 42kg of 60% HEU to 28kg of 90% HEU for one warhead then that is a relatively substantial delay).

Highlights of May 2023 IAEA report (vs February 2023 report):

• 114.1kg of uranium enriched to 60% (87.5kg) +26.6kg
• 470.9kg of uranium enriched to 20% (434.7kg) +36.2kg
• 1340kg of uranium enriched to 5% (1324.5kg) +15.7kg
• 4384.8kg total enriched uranium (3760kg) +904kg

Pace of enrichment to 20%/60% is very slow.

 

[glablo]

At first glance, the pace of concentration appears to be very slow.
However, when this workload is calculated, it is clear that the centrifuges are actually operating at full capacity.

Since it is not known how much uranium was enriched from what concentration, a rough assumption is that 26.6 kg of 60% enriched uranium was obtained from natural uranium.
This amount of work is 4,000 swu[kg] assuming a 10% concentration of waste uranium, or 12,000swu[kg] per year.
We can see that this is a high operating rate compared to Iran's current estimated capacity of 19,100swu[kg] of uranium enrichment.

The problem still lies in the slow pace of centrifuge installation due to concerns about foreign pressure.

 

[aryobarzan]

Bye bye JCPOA! here comes more yellow cake!..

Iran increases "Yellow cake" production by 50% and starts the operation of Dynamitron​

• Iran open Yellow cake productions line by "Heap Leaching" method​
• Will boost Uranium mining from current 2 mines to 10​
• Adds 2000 Technical staff ​
• Starts operation of Iranian built "Dynamitron"​

View attachment 927909View attachment 927907View attachment 927908
A typical "Dynamitron"..which accelerates particles through an evacuated beam tube between the electrode and a target at ground potential.

Many more info here:

اسÙاÙÛ: تÙÙÛد Ú©ÛÚ© زرد ÛµÛ° درصد اÙزاÛØ´ ÙÛâÛابد

رئÛس سازÙا٠اÙرÚÛ Ø§ØªÙÛ Ú¯Ùت: ÙÙکارا٠Ùا اÙرÙز Ú©ÛÚ© زرد را با استÙاد٠از رÙØ´ ÙÛÙ¾âÙÛÚÛÙÚ¯ تÙÙÛد کردÙد. ظرÙÛت Ú©ÛÚ© زرد در اÛ٠کارخاÙ٠ب٠صÙرت ÙاÙØ¹Û ØدÙد ÛµÛ° درصد اÙزاÛØ´ ÙÛâÛابد.

www.mashreghnews.ir

UPDATE:

Iran launches massive Uranium extraction complex

• Location : Khoy, West Azarbaijan...following the discovery of radioactive materials and rare-earth elements there.
• The capacity of this mining complex is so [great] that undoubtedly it will be a hub for supplying the raw material for nuclear fuel production, and it will play a significant role in supporting the plan to produce 20,000 megawatts of nuclear electricity
• Uranium, molybdenum, and a number of other rare-earth elements have been discovered in the area.
• Project would be completed within two and a half years, and that the first phase of the project needs around $20 million to be completed.

Iran launches mining complex touted as 'hub' of nuclear fuel raw material

Iran has begun constructing a mining complex in the northwestern region of the country.

www.presstv.ir

 

[Ich]

huuu 20 GW ^^

Edit:

The best what german nuclear powerplants produced was ~168 TWh/year in the year 2000, what corresponds to ~19100 MW or 19,1 GW. So 20 GW in Iran is a lot.

 

[aryobarzan]

A good plan to make some $$$ from nuclear facilities.
Iran planning to commercialize sale of heavy water.

• Heavy water is the second strategic nuclear material after uranium in the world .
• Iran is one of the five countries producing this compound with high purity and production efficiency
• “Our clients have noticed the high quality and purity of Iran's heavy water,” Heavy water derivatives are very expensive and we are completing investment in this high added value chain.

Iran's Heavy water production reactor in Khondab.

Iran’s production of world’s second strategic nuclear substance

Heavy water is the second strategic nuclear material after uranium in the world and Iran is one of the five countries producing this compound with high purity and production efficiency which many countries are looking to buy despite sanctions.

www.presstv.ir