Spectre
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Historical Perspective - Power of Ideas
In the year 1923 – a ridiculous little demagogue with a funny mustache, Adolf Hitler, staged an attempted putsch in Munich. It was put down by a handful of policemen and soon forgotten.The world had far more serious dangers to contend with. There was the galloping inflation in Germany. There was the young Soviet Union. There was the dangerous competition between the two mighty colonial powers, Great Britain and France. There was, in 1929, the terrible economic crisis that devastated the world economy.
But the little Munich demagogue had a weapon that did not catch the eye of experienced statesmen and wily politicians: a powerful state of mind. He turned the humiliation of a great nation into a weapon more effective than aircraft and battleships. In a short time – just a few years – he conquered Germany, then Europe and looked set to take on the entire world. Many millions of human beings perished in the process. Untold misery visited many countries. Not to mention the Holocaust, a crime almost without parallel in the annals of modern history.
How did he do it? Primarily not by political and military power, but by the power of an idea, a state of mind, a mental explosion. Against an intoxicating new idea, material weapons are powerless, armies and navies crumble and mighty empires, like Byzantium and Persia, disintegrate. But ideas are invisible, realists cannot see them, experienced statesmen and mighty generals are blind to them.
“How many divisions has the Pope?” Stalin responded contemptuously, when told about the power of the Church. Yet the Soviet Empire fell and disappeared, and the Catholic Church is still here.
Contemporary Relevance
Every day in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Israel, India and elsewhere soldiers are working to win the global war on terrorism. But are they winning? Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has wondered out loud about this, asking if the strategy to fight the war on terrorism has been fully coherent. He said:
It's quite clear to me that we do not have a coherent approach to this [war on terrorism] … terrorism is simply a technique being used by extremists. It is not the problem in and of itself; it's a weapon that's being used.
From a military perspective, such incoherence exists because planners have not based their strategy on a detailed threat analysis of the enemy, its objectives, and its strategies. A coherent approach is not only necessary to achieve military goals but also to rally the public support needed for a sustainable long-term struggle in the defense of freedom and sovereignty.
The Players
There are two explicit players – the insurgents and the government force that fight each other – and one implicit player – the general population that sustains collateral casualties by the government’s actions and provides new recruits to the insurgency. The combat situation is asymmetric; while the insurgents have perfect institutional awareness regarding the government forces, the insurgents are mixed in the general population, and thus their signature as targets is inversely related to the size of the population in which they are embedded. It follows that the effectiveness of the government not only depends on its force size and its effectiveness, but also on the insurgents’ signature. Moreover, for a given level of combat intensity exerted by the government forces, smaller signature of the insurgency results in higher collateral damage – killing innocent bystanders – with an adverse effect to the government and favorable effect to the insurgency.
Possible Endgame - Game Theory Application
1. Loss for Government- The government always loses if there is no reinforcement to its force, as the intelligence capabilities of the government degrade with the attrition of its force, causing many innocent casualties and indirectly strengthening the insurgency, which eventually takes over.
2. Safe Stalemate - For the government, because it is robust the reinforcement rate is Sufficient, the insurgency, realizing it cannot grow, settles with the government and the insurgency situation ends.
3. Unsafe Stalemate - When the population is very sensitive to innocent casualties, and as a result the recruitment to the insurgency accelerates, the government and insurgents may approach a stalemate in an oscillating manner.
The above model represents a best-case situation from the government perspective. If the government can gather significant accurate intelligence when the insurgency is very small, it can reduce the insurgency to a small manageable size. Finally, “soft” actions such as reconstruction, civil-support, and effective propaganda may positively affect the population support for the government and thus improve intelligence obtained from human sources. Such actions can only improve the prospects of defeating the insurgency.
How to Fight Invisible Enemies
As ISIS, TTP and likes are the most relevant threat today - I would be using them to make my points. Kindly note that this is in no way intended to take pot-shots at Islam.
1. Define The Threat - We have to zero down on the threat - There should be no political correctness or efforts at obfuscation - If the Threat is Islamic Fundamentalism or Tamil Separatism then we should be clear about it all levels of government and civil society. Only once the threat is acknowledged there can be remedies, tactics, and solutions. Military planning often begins with identification and analysis of an opponent's ends, ways, and means.
2. Identifying the Strength, Weakness, MO and End-Game (Ways, Means and Ends)- We can use this type of analysis to identify an enemy's strategy and identify its weaknesses. Applying this to ISIS, multiple stages of planning and execution become evident. In the first phase, they utilize charismatic teachers and propagandists to incite the masses to overthrow "corrupt puppet" governments. They seek to turn indoctrinated Muslims against secular rulers and initiate either rebellion or one-man, one-vote, one-time elections. Decisions to stage dramatic attacks like those of September 11, 2001, Mumbai Seize Situation, Peshawar APS Attack or bombings in Baghdad become mere tactical decisions on the part of these terrorists. As these insurgencies progress and defeat national governments they move from revolution to consolidation.
Within the context of the global insurgency, the first two phases—sparking and consolidating revolution—need not be synchronized.The ISIS has not yet reached its final stage in which an government or governments work to re-establish a pan-Islamic caliphate. While such an objective might seem far fetched, groups ranging from small and local to global acknowledge this idea to be their ultimate goal.
Center of Gravity - After military theoreticians evaluate an opponent using ends, ways, and means analysis, they seek to determine the "center of gravity," which military theory teaches is crucial to the development of a successful counterinsurgency strategy. The center of gravity is the means or source of power that enemies use to accomplish their goals. If an adversary's center of gravity is neutralized, then it cannot achieve its objective.
In the ISIS and TTP's pre-revolutionary and revolutionary phases, there are two centers of gravity: Islamist cells and religious schools (madrassas). Among the critical requirements for these centers of gravity are an ideology to inspire recruits; a fertile environment in which to recruit; command and control leadership; legitimacy-providing sponsorship from either a state, political party, or media outlet; funding; sanctuary; and access to supplies, including everything from paper for pamphlets to C-4 plastic explosives. Damaging any of these weakens the center of gravity. If the attacks are of sufficient quality, the center of gravity deteriorates to the point that it ceases to function. In traditional military parlance, these critical requirements are the "fronts" or "lines of operation" in the war on terrorism.
Of these requirements, ideology is the most important. Fortunately, it is also the most vulnerable. Discrediting their ideology should be the main component of the counterinsurgency plan.
Ideological War
In the military struggle against TTP and ISIS, winning the war of ideas is crucial. This is nothing new. Communism vs Capitalism was the keystone for Cold-War. Center-of-gravity analysis suggests that a successful strategy should focus upon the critical requirements of ideology and the environment. In case of TTP ISPR has this role. But, swatting individual mosquitoes can only bring victory if the Pakistan simultaneously works to drain the swamp. Victory requires an approach that leverages diplomacy, information operations, economic leverage, and military pressure in a focused and coordinated effort. For example, discrediting militant Islam's ideology, while promoting tolerant interpretations of Islam is an informational and diplomatic effort not suited for military action.
Conclusion - Specific To Pakistan
Things are not as bleak as they seem sometimes - Pakistan has made progress in it;s war on terrorism. With most of these terrorists killed, detained, or in hiding, they have been starved of space to operate from and resorted to desperate attacks against civilians. While Pakistani forces work to contain insurgency, Civilian Government should also work on war footing to provide funds to reconstruct schools and roads rather than make marquee defense acquisitions and pursue vanity civilian projects. Successful action requires Pakistani officials to acknowledge militant Islam as the core of the problem. Failure to do so not only hampers efforts to address the TTP's insurgency's center of gravity but, ironically - in the name of strategic depth - it also betrays Muslims who are among the first victims of militant Islam.
@Irfan Baloch @Icarus @Oscar @AUSTERLITZ
In the year 1923 – a ridiculous little demagogue with a funny mustache, Adolf Hitler, staged an attempted putsch in Munich. It was put down by a handful of policemen and soon forgotten.The world had far more serious dangers to contend with. There was the galloping inflation in Germany. There was the young Soviet Union. There was the dangerous competition between the two mighty colonial powers, Great Britain and France. There was, in 1929, the terrible economic crisis that devastated the world economy.
But the little Munich demagogue had a weapon that did not catch the eye of experienced statesmen and wily politicians: a powerful state of mind. He turned the humiliation of a great nation into a weapon more effective than aircraft and battleships. In a short time – just a few years – he conquered Germany, then Europe and looked set to take on the entire world. Many millions of human beings perished in the process. Untold misery visited many countries. Not to mention the Holocaust, a crime almost without parallel in the annals of modern history.
How did he do it? Primarily not by political and military power, but by the power of an idea, a state of mind, a mental explosion. Against an intoxicating new idea, material weapons are powerless, armies and navies crumble and mighty empires, like Byzantium and Persia, disintegrate. But ideas are invisible, realists cannot see them, experienced statesmen and mighty generals are blind to them.
“How many divisions has the Pope?” Stalin responded contemptuously, when told about the power of the Church. Yet the Soviet Empire fell and disappeared, and the Catholic Church is still here.
Contemporary Relevance
Every day in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Israel, India and elsewhere soldiers are working to win the global war on terrorism. But are they winning? Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has wondered out loud about this, asking if the strategy to fight the war on terrorism has been fully coherent. He said:
It's quite clear to me that we do not have a coherent approach to this [war on terrorism] … terrorism is simply a technique being used by extremists. It is not the problem in and of itself; it's a weapon that's being used.
From a military perspective, such incoherence exists because planners have not based their strategy on a detailed threat analysis of the enemy, its objectives, and its strategies. A coherent approach is not only necessary to achieve military goals but also to rally the public support needed for a sustainable long-term struggle in the defense of freedom and sovereignty.
The Players
There are two explicit players – the insurgents and the government force that fight each other – and one implicit player – the general population that sustains collateral casualties by the government’s actions and provides new recruits to the insurgency. The combat situation is asymmetric; while the insurgents have perfect institutional awareness regarding the government forces, the insurgents are mixed in the general population, and thus their signature as targets is inversely related to the size of the population in which they are embedded. It follows that the effectiveness of the government not only depends on its force size and its effectiveness, but also on the insurgents’ signature. Moreover, for a given level of combat intensity exerted by the government forces, smaller signature of the insurgency results in higher collateral damage – killing innocent bystanders – with an adverse effect to the government and favorable effect to the insurgency.
Possible Endgame - Game Theory Application
1. Loss for Government- The government always loses if there is no reinforcement to its force, as the intelligence capabilities of the government degrade with the attrition of its force, causing many innocent casualties and indirectly strengthening the insurgency, which eventually takes over.
2. Safe Stalemate - For the government, because it is robust the reinforcement rate is Sufficient, the insurgency, realizing it cannot grow, settles with the government and the insurgency situation ends.
3. Unsafe Stalemate - When the population is very sensitive to innocent casualties, and as a result the recruitment to the insurgency accelerates, the government and insurgents may approach a stalemate in an oscillating manner.
The above model represents a best-case situation from the government perspective. If the government can gather significant accurate intelligence when the insurgency is very small, it can reduce the insurgency to a small manageable size. Finally, “soft” actions such as reconstruction, civil-support, and effective propaganda may positively affect the population support for the government and thus improve intelligence obtained from human sources. Such actions can only improve the prospects of defeating the insurgency.
How to Fight Invisible Enemies
As ISIS, TTP and likes are the most relevant threat today - I would be using them to make my points. Kindly note that this is in no way intended to take pot-shots at Islam.
1. Define The Threat - We have to zero down on the threat - There should be no political correctness or efforts at obfuscation - If the Threat is Islamic Fundamentalism or Tamil Separatism then we should be clear about it all levels of government and civil society. Only once the threat is acknowledged there can be remedies, tactics, and solutions. Military planning often begins with identification and analysis of an opponent's ends, ways, and means.
2. Identifying the Strength, Weakness, MO and End-Game (Ways, Means and Ends)- We can use this type of analysis to identify an enemy's strategy and identify its weaknesses. Applying this to ISIS, multiple stages of planning and execution become evident. In the first phase, they utilize charismatic teachers and propagandists to incite the masses to overthrow "corrupt puppet" governments. They seek to turn indoctrinated Muslims against secular rulers and initiate either rebellion or one-man, one-vote, one-time elections. Decisions to stage dramatic attacks like those of September 11, 2001, Mumbai Seize Situation, Peshawar APS Attack or bombings in Baghdad become mere tactical decisions on the part of these terrorists. As these insurgencies progress and defeat national governments they move from revolution to consolidation.
Within the context of the global insurgency, the first two phases—sparking and consolidating revolution—need not be synchronized.The ISIS has not yet reached its final stage in which an government or governments work to re-establish a pan-Islamic caliphate. While such an objective might seem far fetched, groups ranging from small and local to global acknowledge this idea to be their ultimate goal.
Center of Gravity - After military theoreticians evaluate an opponent using ends, ways, and means analysis, they seek to determine the "center of gravity," which military theory teaches is crucial to the development of a successful counterinsurgency strategy. The center of gravity is the means or source of power that enemies use to accomplish their goals. If an adversary's center of gravity is neutralized, then it cannot achieve its objective.
In the ISIS and TTP's pre-revolutionary and revolutionary phases, there are two centers of gravity: Islamist cells and religious schools (madrassas). Among the critical requirements for these centers of gravity are an ideology to inspire recruits; a fertile environment in which to recruit; command and control leadership; legitimacy-providing sponsorship from either a state, political party, or media outlet; funding; sanctuary; and access to supplies, including everything from paper for pamphlets to C-4 plastic explosives. Damaging any of these weakens the center of gravity. If the attacks are of sufficient quality, the center of gravity deteriorates to the point that it ceases to function. In traditional military parlance, these critical requirements are the "fronts" or "lines of operation" in the war on terrorism.
Of these requirements, ideology is the most important. Fortunately, it is also the most vulnerable. Discrediting their ideology should be the main component of the counterinsurgency plan.
Ideological War
In the military struggle against TTP and ISIS, winning the war of ideas is crucial. This is nothing new. Communism vs Capitalism was the keystone for Cold-War. Center-of-gravity analysis suggests that a successful strategy should focus upon the critical requirements of ideology and the environment. In case of TTP ISPR has this role. But, swatting individual mosquitoes can only bring victory if the Pakistan simultaneously works to drain the swamp. Victory requires an approach that leverages diplomacy, information operations, economic leverage, and military pressure in a focused and coordinated effort. For example, discrediting militant Islam's ideology, while promoting tolerant interpretations of Islam is an informational and diplomatic effort not suited for military action.
Conclusion - Specific To Pakistan
Things are not as bleak as they seem sometimes - Pakistan has made progress in it;s war on terrorism. With most of these terrorists killed, detained, or in hiding, they have been starved of space to operate from and resorted to desperate attacks against civilians. While Pakistani forces work to contain insurgency, Civilian Government should also work on war footing to provide funds to reconstruct schools and roads rather than make marquee defense acquisitions and pursue vanity civilian projects. Successful action requires Pakistani officials to acknowledge militant Islam as the core of the problem. Failure to do so not only hampers efforts to address the TTP's insurgency's center of gravity but, ironically - in the name of strategic depth - it also betrays Muslims who are among the first victims of militant Islam.
@Irfan Baloch @Icarus @Oscar @AUSTERLITZ
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