WAJsal
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I was reading this book, came across some information, which, unfortunately not many are aware of. I thought i'd share it, hope you guys enjoy and hope it is informative.
An extract from the book "The first Round", by Air Marshal M Asghar Khan:
‘Having established effective maritime control over the Arabian sea, our Navy was keen to intercept on the high seas the the merchant ships taking supplies to India was stopped from doing so by our Foreign Office for fear of international opinion.
On 10 September 1965 Air Marshal Asghar Khan arrived in Peking and later handed over to Mr Chou En Lai a letter from the President Field Marshal Ayub Khan. After discussion he flew down to Indonesia and was received by the commander-in-chief Indonesian Air force at a military airfield, 100 miles from Djkarta. He was taken by a military plane to Djkarta and on arrival driven to President’s palace. President Sukarno receive him immediately and was given President Ayub Khan’s letter asking Indonesia’s help in our ‘dire’ need. President President Sukarno said, “your dire need? it is our dire need.” Sukarno went on to say that he had a meeting of the War council the previous day and they had decided that Indonesia would give all possible help to Pakistan. He said India’s attack on Pakistan was like an attack on Indonesia and they were duty bound to give us all possible assistance. He asked me to consider Indonesia as my own country and take away from there whatever i found could be useful to Pakistan in this emergency. “But remember,” he added, “ that we also have a problem - our conflict with Malaysia”. He suggested that whilst deciding what i should take away, i should, bearing in mind Indonesia’s needs, decide what should be left behind. These were, he said, his instructions to Subandrio i should discuss details with him and Omar Dhani.
I therefore asked Omar Dhani whether he could give us the four aircraft in reserve. ‘You have heard the president,’ he said, ‘you can have anything you want,’ i then enquired MIG-19 aircraft and Omar Dhani agreed to give all of them to us. He also agreed to give us a few MIG-15s. It was agreed that these should be dismantled and crafted by the Indonesian Air Force and carried in Indonesian Ships. Martadinata, the Indonesian Naval commander-in-Chief, was there and i asked whether he felt happy about taking this equipment to Karachi and whether he feared interference by the Indian Navy. He said that the ships would be escorted and he would ensure that the cargo was delivered safely at Karachi. When we had finished discussing the details of the assistance we could expect from Indonesia, i prepared to leave for Pekings on my way to Pakistan. As i got up to go, Martadinata asked whether this was all i wanted Indonesia to do for Pakistan. ‘What more can you do?’’ i asked. ‘don’t you want us to take over the Andaman Islands? a look at the map will show, he continued, ‘that the Andaman and Nicobar island are extensions of Sumatra and are in any case between East Pakistan and Indonesia. What right have the Indians to be there? I suggested that he should discuss the matter with his President. In the present situation there would certainly be no regrets on the part of Pakistan if Indonesia occupied these Islands. Unfortunately we were not in position to assist them in performing this task. ‘In any case’, he said, ‘the Indonesian Navy will immediately commence patrols of the approaches to these islands and carry out aerial reconnaissance missions to see what the Indians have there’. I thanked him for his support and, along with Omar Dhani, left for the military airfield where our Boeing was waiting.
Martadinata backed his words with substantial material aid for the Pakistan Navy. He ordered immediate transfer of two submarines and four Osa missile boats to Pakistan. In the previous year ships of Pakistan Navy had paid a goodwill visit to Indonesia and cordial understanding had been established between the two navies. Realizing the acute needs of Pakistan and appreciating the imbalance between our Navy and the Indian Navy, Martadinata acted swiftly and sincerely. At that time Indonesia was heading for a confrontation with the great Britain over the straits of Malacca where a sizeable Task Force of British Carriers and other big ships had been stationed. The missile boats were the only deterrent force available to the Indonesians. Moreover the, the submarines and the missile boats had been given to Indonesia by the USSR under a bilateral treaty which forbade their transfer to another country. It was therefore an act of great courage and friendship on the part of Soekarno and his naval Commander-in-chief to transfer these vessels to Pakistan at the time.
On my return to Pakistan, I briefed the Commander-in-Chief of our Navy, Admiral AR Khan, who established a direct link with Martidinata. The submarines and the missile boats arrived in Pakistan waters after the cease-fire due to the distance involved but they stayed with us till such time as the chances of recurrence of hostilities had receded. I was later told that the submarines were in fact ordered to proceed to Pakistan direct from their sea patrols and were not allowed to put into home ports even for a change of clothing's for their personnel.
Some 18 months after my meeting with Soekarno it was announced that he had been dismissed. Whatever his weaknesses, he, more than any other man I know, made a great gesture towards Pakistan that our future generations will always remember, and even if Soekarno is forgotten by his countrymen. Pakistan will remember that when were in ‘dire’ need Indonesia gave Pakistan the key to their arsenal. That the arsenal was not overfull did not make the gesture any the less important. In fact, it enhanced the value of the offer made by a great nation, itself faced with serious problems of only slightly military significance. I have often wondered if Pakistan will ever be able to repay this debt.’
An extract from the book "The first Round", by Air Marshal M Asghar Khan:
‘Having established effective maritime control over the Arabian sea, our Navy was keen to intercept on the high seas the the merchant ships taking supplies to India was stopped from doing so by our Foreign Office for fear of international opinion.
On 10 September 1965 Air Marshal Asghar Khan arrived in Peking and later handed over to Mr Chou En Lai a letter from the President Field Marshal Ayub Khan. After discussion he flew down to Indonesia and was received by the commander-in-chief Indonesian Air force at a military airfield, 100 miles from Djkarta. He was taken by a military plane to Djkarta and on arrival driven to President’s palace. President Sukarno receive him immediately and was given President Ayub Khan’s letter asking Indonesia’s help in our ‘dire’ need. President President Sukarno said, “your dire need? it is our dire need.” Sukarno went on to say that he had a meeting of the War council the previous day and they had decided that Indonesia would give all possible help to Pakistan. He said India’s attack on Pakistan was like an attack on Indonesia and they were duty bound to give us all possible assistance. He asked me to consider Indonesia as my own country and take away from there whatever i found could be useful to Pakistan in this emergency. “But remember,” he added, “ that we also have a problem - our conflict with Malaysia”. He suggested that whilst deciding what i should take away, i should, bearing in mind Indonesia’s needs, decide what should be left behind. These were, he said, his instructions to Subandrio i should discuss details with him and Omar Dhani.
I therefore asked Omar Dhani whether he could give us the four aircraft in reserve. ‘You have heard the president,’ he said, ‘you can have anything you want,’ i then enquired MIG-19 aircraft and Omar Dhani agreed to give all of them to us. He also agreed to give us a few MIG-15s. It was agreed that these should be dismantled and crafted by the Indonesian Air Force and carried in Indonesian Ships. Martadinata, the Indonesian Naval commander-in-Chief, was there and i asked whether he felt happy about taking this equipment to Karachi and whether he feared interference by the Indian Navy. He said that the ships would be escorted and he would ensure that the cargo was delivered safely at Karachi. When we had finished discussing the details of the assistance we could expect from Indonesia, i prepared to leave for Pekings on my way to Pakistan. As i got up to go, Martadinata asked whether this was all i wanted Indonesia to do for Pakistan. ‘What more can you do?’’ i asked. ‘don’t you want us to take over the Andaman Islands? a look at the map will show, he continued, ‘that the Andaman and Nicobar island are extensions of Sumatra and are in any case between East Pakistan and Indonesia. What right have the Indians to be there? I suggested that he should discuss the matter with his President. In the present situation there would certainly be no regrets on the part of Pakistan if Indonesia occupied these Islands. Unfortunately we were not in position to assist them in performing this task. ‘In any case’, he said, ‘the Indonesian Navy will immediately commence patrols of the approaches to these islands and carry out aerial reconnaissance missions to see what the Indians have there’. I thanked him for his support and, along with Omar Dhani, left for the military airfield where our Boeing was waiting.
Martadinata backed his words with substantial material aid for the Pakistan Navy. He ordered immediate transfer of two submarines and four Osa missile boats to Pakistan. In the previous year ships of Pakistan Navy had paid a goodwill visit to Indonesia and cordial understanding had been established between the two navies. Realizing the acute needs of Pakistan and appreciating the imbalance between our Navy and the Indian Navy, Martadinata acted swiftly and sincerely. At that time Indonesia was heading for a confrontation with the great Britain over the straits of Malacca where a sizeable Task Force of British Carriers and other big ships had been stationed. The missile boats were the only deterrent force available to the Indonesians. Moreover the, the submarines and the missile boats had been given to Indonesia by the USSR under a bilateral treaty which forbade their transfer to another country. It was therefore an act of great courage and friendship on the part of Soekarno and his naval Commander-in-chief to transfer these vessels to Pakistan at the time.
On my return to Pakistan, I briefed the Commander-in-Chief of our Navy, Admiral AR Khan, who established a direct link with Martidinata. The submarines and the missile boats arrived in Pakistan waters after the cease-fire due to the distance involved but they stayed with us till such time as the chances of recurrence of hostilities had receded. I was later told that the submarines were in fact ordered to proceed to Pakistan direct from their sea patrols and were not allowed to put into home ports even for a change of clothing's for their personnel.
Some 18 months after my meeting with Soekarno it was announced that he had been dismissed. Whatever his weaknesses, he, more than any other man I know, made a great gesture towards Pakistan that our future generations will always remember, and even if Soekarno is forgotten by his countrymen. Pakistan will remember that when were in ‘dire’ need Indonesia gave Pakistan the key to their arsenal. That the arsenal was not overfull did not make the gesture any the less important. In fact, it enhanced the value of the offer made by a great nation, itself faced with serious problems of only slightly military significance. I have often wondered if Pakistan will ever be able to repay this debt.’
