The Deterrent
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Brief history:
On February 14th 2019, a suicide car-bombing attack on a Indian CRPF convoy left over 40 security personnel dead, for which the Pakistan-based JeM claimed responsibility. In the aftermath, on February 26th, the Government of India (GoI) claimed that the Indian Air Force (IAF) had carried out preemptive air-strikes against multiple terrorist camps inside Pakistan (Balakot), around 0330hrs. While GoI declared the intended 'non-military' targets being destroyed and terrorists eliminated, the Pakistani Armed Forces denied any damages and claimed to have thwarted the strike. The following day around 1000hrs, the Pakistani Air Force (PAF) claimed to have carried out retaliatory strikes against multiple 'non-military' targets, hitting inside compounds of Indian Army's forward military installations without causing any damages. The incursion quickly evolved into a brawl involving multiple fighter aircrafts over the disputed territory of Kashmir, resulting in one MiG-21 Bison of the IAF being shot down over Pakistani territory, crashing roughly 5 km across the Line of Control (LoC). The pilot, Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman, was captured alive and subsequently released on March 1st, 2019. An IAF Mi-17 was also shot down in a case of fratricide, by an IAF SAM system based around Srinagar sector.
In the days that followed, both Pakistan and Indian Army engaged in heavy artillery exchange along the LoC. Pakistan Navy claimed to have thwarted an Indian Navy submarine close to Pakistani waters, whereas IA claimed to have shot down several PAF UAVs ingressing into the Indian territory. The tensions are still simmering and frequent exchange of heavy gunfire and artillery is still going on along the LoC.
This post attempts to compile and objectively analyze the failures of the armed forces of both countries, based on available evidence-backed and/or mutually agreed events. The intent here is not to declare any winners, as understandably it was not a war rather a standoff involving limited air-strikes and an aerial skirmish.
1. February 14th: Intelligence Failure (INDIA)
The suicide car-bomb attack in Pulwama on a convoy of Central Reserve Police Forces (CRPF) killed more than 40 Indian paramilitary personnel. The convoy had 78 buses transporting 2,500 soldiers moving through an attack-prone area. When the bomber vehicle joined the highway from a slip road and drove alongside the convoy for a while before ramming into the target bus, according to one report, there was no alert from a single soldier. The vehicle that rammed into the convoy reportedly carried around 300kg of explosives, which might have been smuggled into Pulwama over a period of time. All of it had to have reached a single destination, and the fact that this lethal courier service went undetected doesn’t speaks highly of the information network of the Indian Army. The attacker procured hundreds of kgs of explosives, procured a car, planned this elaborate attack on a high security convoy. There was intelligence information from the 8th February about such an attack, but it was overlooked. Furthermore the attacker was known to the army and was already on its radar, however, the people responsible failed to act.
There is no doubt that the JeM and the suicide bomber are the ones responsible for this heinous attack, however, the Indian intelligence services share this responsibility.
2. February 26th: Deterrence Failure (PAKISTAN)
In response to the Pulwama attack, IAF's Mirage-2000s crossed the LoC and GoI claimed to have pre-emptively struck terror camps inside northern Pakistan (Khyber-Pakhtunkhuwa) at three locations. Pakistan Army's spokesperson claimed that it had thwarted the IAF and it didn't hit anything except a hillside. However, what exactly the IAF hit is irrelevant here.
The fact that India was not deterred by Pakistan's military, is what has to be noted. In the past, in at least 2 instances (2001 Parliament Attack, 2008 Mumbai Attacks), India did not undertake any offensive military action against Pakistan due to Pakistan's conventional and nuclear deterrence. Subsequently, India modified its military tactics and introduced new ones to be able to mount small-scale skirmishes, well below Pakistani conventional and nuclear thresholds.
It should be noted that this strike did not challenge Pakistan's nuclear deterrence. Although Pakistan's nuclear weapons usage policy is ambiguous, it is not as irrational as to strike back with nuclear weapons in response to a single air strike, even if it was successful. If the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons by Pakistan is to be considered, the least sensitive of Pakistan's nuclear 'red lines' involve loss of slices of Pakistani territory, which was not the case here.
In this instance, the IAF on the orders of GoI, breached Pakistani Airspace for 4-5 nautical miles (8-9 kms) according to Pakistan Army's spokesperson and released their weapons. It has to be realized that this is not an insignificant action, and it effectively challenged Pakistan's conventional deterrence. PAF's retaliatory strikes will have re-established this conventional deterrence, only if India refrains from such strikes in the future.
3. February 26th: Air-Defence Failure (PAKISTAN)
According to Pakistan Army's spokesperson, IAF did technical violations at Bahawalpur-Okara and Lahore-Sialkot sectors before moving in over the Muzaffarabad sector to breach Pakistani Airspace. This resulted in PAF's airborne combat air-patrol (CAP) units being diverted to the first two mentioned sectors, and new CAP units being flown to intercept IAF over Muzaffarabad sector. Pakistan Army's spokesperson also claimed that PAF 'thwarted' IAF's aircrafts, which dropped their payloads in a 'hurry' and retreated to Indian territory.
It must be realized that IAF released armed 2000lbs stand-off weapons (SOWs), which flew up to 35 kms before hitting 100-200m away from the Madrassa at Jaba Top (Balakot). In order to launch these unpowered SOWs, the Mirage-2000s must gain significant altitude. Therefore, it can be concluded that the IAF launched the SOWs in an unchallenged manner and environment after successfully luring the PAF CAP units away from the Muzaffarabad sector.
The primary entity responsible for defending Pakistani airspace, PAF, failed in this instance. Additionally, the IAF was not challenged by Pakistan Army Air Defence equipped with AAAs, MANPADs and SAMs. It is unclear if they were deployed in the region.
4. February 26th: Air-Strike Failure (INDIA)
Multiple independent third-party analyses, based on multiple sources of satellite and ground imagery, have now concluded that the IAF strike missed its intended target. All the structures at Jaba Top (Balakot) appear intact, without any kind of 'holes' in their roofs. Instead, 3x craters of sizes correlating with 2000lbs bomb damage have been identified via satellite and ground imagery. Images from the ground have also revealed remnants of SPICE-2000 stand-off precision kit winglets in at least one of those craters.
It must be realized here that IAF Mirage-2000s returned to Indian territory after releasing their SOWs, without performing a bomb damage assessment (BDA). Furthermore, Jaba Top (Balakot) is more than 50 km from the Indian side of the technical violation buffer, so performing a BDA using a SAR-equipped aircraft from such a distance considering the mountainous terrain in-between, could be difficult. The SAR-satellites in service with ISRO also have resolutions much higher than the optical satellites. Whether India had sources on the ground capable of witnessing and verifying the damage at the time of the strike is unclear at the moment. This all points to the fact that GoI had little means to verify any damage done by the SOWs, and hence had to go-ahead with IAF's belief that they had successfully destroyed the said camp and eliminated a large number of terrorists.
The reason for IAF's SOWs missing their intended targets in not completely clear at the moment, however it has been theorized that the IAF made a systematic targeting error, resulting in a botched air-strike operation.
5. February 27th: Deterrence Failure (INDIA)
Following IAF's strike at Jaba Top (Balakot), on 27th February PAF undertook a retaliation strike against 6x claimed 'non-military' targets. Pakistan Army's spokesperson was quoted to have claimed that these strikes were done at open areas besides Indian Army infrastructure at Bhimber Gali, Narian and KG Top inside Indian Kashmir. Furthermore, the intention was to demonstrate retaliatory capability while avoiding collateral damage. Later that evening, Indian Military spokespersons confirmed that the bombs fell inside the premises of Indian Army formation compounds at a Brigade HQ, a Battalion HQ and an Ammo Dump. However they claimed that the reason the bombs didn't hit their intended targets was because IAF had 'thwarted' the attack.
Regardless of the magnitude of success of the PAF's retaliatory strike, it must be noted that India failed to deter Pakistan from undertaking an aerial strike, despite enjoying a position of conventional superiority. Pakistan demonstrated its capability to proportionally escalate the conflict, thereby putting the ball back in India's court.
6. February 27th: Air-Defence Failure (INDIA)
According to the IAF spokesperson, PAF breached Indian airspace west of Rajouri. It is unclear at what altitude the incursion took place, however, no observable or claimed action was taken by any Air Defence units equipped with AAAs, MANPADs or SAMs inside Indian territory. PAF was challenged by a claimed combination of MiG-21 Bisons, Mirage-2000s and Su-30MKIs, however PAF outnumbered IAF by at least a ratio of 2:1 in the region according to Indian reports. None of the PAF aircrafts were brought down within Indian territory. Furthermore, in an apparent hot pursuit, 1x MiG-21 Bison crossed into Pakistani territory and was subsequently shot down. Additional claims of 1x kill each were made by both Air Forces, which remain unverified to this date.
Despite the advantage of being in a state of alert for expected retaliation, having numerical superiority over PAF and a robust SAM infrastructure, IAF failed to effectively defend the Indian airspace. It is unclear what tactics PAF utilized to overcome IAF for achieving its objectives.
7. February 28th-onwards: Escalation Failure (INDIA)
The PAF retaliatory strike seems to have been a carefully calibrated proportional response to the IAF strike. Although apparently strikes by both air forces didn't cause any damages, the fact that PAF struck inside the premises of IA military installations in response to the IAF strike, indicates that it was also an escalatory response. By the morning of February 28th, reports had started coming in that India had prepared for an escalatory strike consisting of BrahMos cruise missiles on the night of February 27th, later confirmed by the Pakistani Prime Minister and media of both countries. Shortly afterwards, Pakistani Prime Minister announced that Pakistan will release the arrested IAF pilot for the sake of deescalation and peace. Around the same time, US officials including President Trump indicated that they had made significant progress in deescalating the tensions between the two countries. It is unclear why the Indian military did not proceed with the missile strike, although reports of international intervention and Pakistan's threats of further retaliatory strikes exist.
The standoff has thankfully deescalated for the moment, however it didn't deescalate on India's terms. The Indian military failed to respond to the PAF strike against its military installations in a calibrated and proportional manner, which made it not only lose the control of the escalation ladder, but also compromised its conventional deterrence capabilities.
Some helpful third-party analysis and reports:
https://in.reuters.com/article/uk-india-kashmir-pakistan-airstrike-insi-idINKCN1QN02Z
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/were-indias-airstrikes-in-pakistan-a-strategy-for-public-approval/
https://www.euspaceimaging.com/paki...ms-india-missed-target-in-pakistan-airstrike/
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/indias-strike-on-balakot-a-very-precise-miss/
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/rest-of-world/2019/03/02/falcon-vs-bison-verifying-a-mig-21-wreck/
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/04/did-india-shoot-down-a-pakistani-jet-u-s-count-says-no/
On February 14th 2019, a suicide car-bombing attack on a Indian CRPF convoy left over 40 security personnel dead, for which the Pakistan-based JeM claimed responsibility. In the aftermath, on February 26th, the Government of India (GoI) claimed that the Indian Air Force (IAF) had carried out preemptive air-strikes against multiple terrorist camps inside Pakistan (Balakot), around 0330hrs. While GoI declared the intended 'non-military' targets being destroyed and terrorists eliminated, the Pakistani Armed Forces denied any damages and claimed to have thwarted the strike. The following day around 1000hrs, the Pakistani Air Force (PAF) claimed to have carried out retaliatory strikes against multiple 'non-military' targets, hitting inside compounds of Indian Army's forward military installations without causing any damages. The incursion quickly evolved into a brawl involving multiple fighter aircrafts over the disputed territory of Kashmir, resulting in one MiG-21 Bison of the IAF being shot down over Pakistani territory, crashing roughly 5 km across the Line of Control (LoC). The pilot, Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman, was captured alive and subsequently released on March 1st, 2019. An IAF Mi-17 was also shot down in a case of fratricide, by an IAF SAM system based around Srinagar sector.
In the days that followed, both Pakistan and Indian Army engaged in heavy artillery exchange along the LoC. Pakistan Navy claimed to have thwarted an Indian Navy submarine close to Pakistani waters, whereas IA claimed to have shot down several PAF UAVs ingressing into the Indian territory. The tensions are still simmering and frequent exchange of heavy gunfire and artillery is still going on along the LoC.
This post attempts to compile and objectively analyze the failures of the armed forces of both countries, based on available evidence-backed and/or mutually agreed events. The intent here is not to declare any winners, as understandably it was not a war rather a standoff involving limited air-strikes and an aerial skirmish.
1. February 14th: Intelligence Failure (INDIA)
The suicide car-bomb attack in Pulwama on a convoy of Central Reserve Police Forces (CRPF) killed more than 40 Indian paramilitary personnel. The convoy had 78 buses transporting 2,500 soldiers moving through an attack-prone area. When the bomber vehicle joined the highway from a slip road and drove alongside the convoy for a while before ramming into the target bus, according to one report, there was no alert from a single soldier. The vehicle that rammed into the convoy reportedly carried around 300kg of explosives, which might have been smuggled into Pulwama over a period of time. All of it had to have reached a single destination, and the fact that this lethal courier service went undetected doesn’t speaks highly of the information network of the Indian Army. The attacker procured hundreds of kgs of explosives, procured a car, planned this elaborate attack on a high security convoy. There was intelligence information from the 8th February about such an attack, but it was overlooked. Furthermore the attacker was known to the army and was already on its radar, however, the people responsible failed to act.
There is no doubt that the JeM and the suicide bomber are the ones responsible for this heinous attack, however, the Indian intelligence services share this responsibility.
2. February 26th: Deterrence Failure (PAKISTAN)
In response to the Pulwama attack, IAF's Mirage-2000s crossed the LoC and GoI claimed to have pre-emptively struck terror camps inside northern Pakistan (Khyber-Pakhtunkhuwa) at three locations. Pakistan Army's spokesperson claimed that it had thwarted the IAF and it didn't hit anything except a hillside. However, what exactly the IAF hit is irrelevant here.
The fact that India was not deterred by Pakistan's military, is what has to be noted. In the past, in at least 2 instances (2001 Parliament Attack, 2008 Mumbai Attacks), India did not undertake any offensive military action against Pakistan due to Pakistan's conventional and nuclear deterrence. Subsequently, India modified its military tactics and introduced new ones to be able to mount small-scale skirmishes, well below Pakistani conventional and nuclear thresholds.
It should be noted that this strike did not challenge Pakistan's nuclear deterrence. Although Pakistan's nuclear weapons usage policy is ambiguous, it is not as irrational as to strike back with nuclear weapons in response to a single air strike, even if it was successful. If the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons by Pakistan is to be considered, the least sensitive of Pakistan's nuclear 'red lines' involve loss of slices of Pakistani territory, which was not the case here.
In this instance, the IAF on the orders of GoI, breached Pakistani Airspace for 4-5 nautical miles (8-9 kms) according to Pakistan Army's spokesperson and released their weapons. It has to be realized that this is not an insignificant action, and it effectively challenged Pakistan's conventional deterrence. PAF's retaliatory strikes will have re-established this conventional deterrence, only if India refrains from such strikes in the future.
3. February 26th: Air-Defence Failure (PAKISTAN)
According to Pakistan Army's spokesperson, IAF did technical violations at Bahawalpur-Okara and Lahore-Sialkot sectors before moving in over the Muzaffarabad sector to breach Pakistani Airspace. This resulted in PAF's airborne combat air-patrol (CAP) units being diverted to the first two mentioned sectors, and new CAP units being flown to intercept IAF over Muzaffarabad sector. Pakistan Army's spokesperson also claimed that PAF 'thwarted' IAF's aircrafts, which dropped their payloads in a 'hurry' and retreated to Indian territory.
It must be realized that IAF released armed 2000lbs stand-off weapons (SOWs), which flew up to 35 kms before hitting 100-200m away from the Madrassa at Jaba Top (Balakot). In order to launch these unpowered SOWs, the Mirage-2000s must gain significant altitude. Therefore, it can be concluded that the IAF launched the SOWs in an unchallenged manner and environment after successfully luring the PAF CAP units away from the Muzaffarabad sector.
The primary entity responsible for defending Pakistani airspace, PAF, failed in this instance. Additionally, the IAF was not challenged by Pakistan Army Air Defence equipped with AAAs, MANPADs and SAMs. It is unclear if they were deployed in the region.
4. February 26th: Air-Strike Failure (INDIA)
Multiple independent third-party analyses, based on multiple sources of satellite and ground imagery, have now concluded that the IAF strike missed its intended target. All the structures at Jaba Top (Balakot) appear intact, without any kind of 'holes' in their roofs. Instead, 3x craters of sizes correlating with 2000lbs bomb damage have been identified via satellite and ground imagery. Images from the ground have also revealed remnants of SPICE-2000 stand-off precision kit winglets in at least one of those craters.
It must be realized here that IAF Mirage-2000s returned to Indian territory after releasing their SOWs, without performing a bomb damage assessment (BDA). Furthermore, Jaba Top (Balakot) is more than 50 km from the Indian side of the technical violation buffer, so performing a BDA using a SAR-equipped aircraft from such a distance considering the mountainous terrain in-between, could be difficult. The SAR-satellites in service with ISRO also have resolutions much higher than the optical satellites. Whether India had sources on the ground capable of witnessing and verifying the damage at the time of the strike is unclear at the moment. This all points to the fact that GoI had little means to verify any damage done by the SOWs, and hence had to go-ahead with IAF's belief that they had successfully destroyed the said camp and eliminated a large number of terrorists.
The reason for IAF's SOWs missing their intended targets in not completely clear at the moment, however it has been theorized that the IAF made a systematic targeting error, resulting in a botched air-strike operation.
5. February 27th: Deterrence Failure (INDIA)
Following IAF's strike at Jaba Top (Balakot), on 27th February PAF undertook a retaliation strike against 6x claimed 'non-military' targets. Pakistan Army's spokesperson was quoted to have claimed that these strikes were done at open areas besides Indian Army infrastructure at Bhimber Gali, Narian and KG Top inside Indian Kashmir. Furthermore, the intention was to demonstrate retaliatory capability while avoiding collateral damage. Later that evening, Indian Military spokespersons confirmed that the bombs fell inside the premises of Indian Army formation compounds at a Brigade HQ, a Battalion HQ and an Ammo Dump. However they claimed that the reason the bombs didn't hit their intended targets was because IAF had 'thwarted' the attack.
Regardless of the magnitude of success of the PAF's retaliatory strike, it must be noted that India failed to deter Pakistan from undertaking an aerial strike, despite enjoying a position of conventional superiority. Pakistan demonstrated its capability to proportionally escalate the conflict, thereby putting the ball back in India's court.
6. February 27th: Air-Defence Failure (INDIA)
According to the IAF spokesperson, PAF breached Indian airspace west of Rajouri. It is unclear at what altitude the incursion took place, however, no observable or claimed action was taken by any Air Defence units equipped with AAAs, MANPADs or SAMs inside Indian territory. PAF was challenged by a claimed combination of MiG-21 Bisons, Mirage-2000s and Su-30MKIs, however PAF outnumbered IAF by at least a ratio of 2:1 in the region according to Indian reports. None of the PAF aircrafts were brought down within Indian territory. Furthermore, in an apparent hot pursuit, 1x MiG-21 Bison crossed into Pakistani territory and was subsequently shot down. Additional claims of 1x kill each were made by both Air Forces, which remain unverified to this date.
Despite the advantage of being in a state of alert for expected retaliation, having numerical superiority over PAF and a robust SAM infrastructure, IAF failed to effectively defend the Indian airspace. It is unclear what tactics PAF utilized to overcome IAF for achieving its objectives.
7. February 28th-onwards: Escalation Failure (INDIA)
The PAF retaliatory strike seems to have been a carefully calibrated proportional response to the IAF strike. Although apparently strikes by both air forces didn't cause any damages, the fact that PAF struck inside the premises of IA military installations in response to the IAF strike, indicates that it was also an escalatory response. By the morning of February 28th, reports had started coming in that India had prepared for an escalatory strike consisting of BrahMos cruise missiles on the night of February 27th, later confirmed by the Pakistani Prime Minister and media of both countries. Shortly afterwards, Pakistani Prime Minister announced that Pakistan will release the arrested IAF pilot for the sake of deescalation and peace. Around the same time, US officials including President Trump indicated that they had made significant progress in deescalating the tensions between the two countries. It is unclear why the Indian military did not proceed with the missile strike, although reports of international intervention and Pakistan's threats of further retaliatory strikes exist.
The standoff has thankfully deescalated for the moment, however it didn't deescalate on India's terms. The Indian military failed to respond to the PAF strike against its military installations in a calibrated and proportional manner, which made it not only lose the control of the escalation ladder, but also compromised its conventional deterrence capabilities.
Some helpful third-party analysis and reports:
https://in.reuters.com/article/uk-india-kashmir-pakistan-airstrike-insi-idINKCN1QN02Z
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/were-indias-airstrikes-in-pakistan-a-strategy-for-public-approval/
https://www.euspaceimaging.com/paki...ms-india-missed-target-in-pakistan-airstrike/
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/indias-strike-on-balakot-a-very-precise-miss/
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/rest-of-world/2019/03/02/falcon-vs-bison-verifying-a-mig-21-wreck/
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/04/did-india-shoot-down-a-pakistani-jet-u-s-count-says-no/
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