India's Light stealth aircraft.

[MULUBJA]

About LSA.


LSA will be known as a marvel of Indian frugal engineering skills like Mangalyaan mission. No one will ever accept that a supersonic stealth fighter can be made with a budget of just USD 300m which is less than the development budget of world’s cheapest car called Tata Nano. It is a completely re-designed HF-24 aircraft with single engine. HF-24 all metallic airframe weighed 2.85tons with a length of 15.87m giving it an OWE of 6.25 tons with four 30MM Aden Cannons. LSA design is 13.75m long with one GSH-30mm gun and mid wing Delta-Tail planform with lots of composite construction and avionics far lighter compared to HF-24. I have calculated an empty weight of 5.75 tons for LSA including Internal bay launchers, bay door opening systems. The OWE of this aircraft is expected to be 6 tons. The weapon load is 5.75 tons with internal fuel volume of 3.5 tons giving it MTOW of 15.25 tons. The 3D TVC of this aircraft will be based on the principles of Sea Harrier as this aircraft will have stable design. A switch on HOTAS will engage TVC and merge the movement of elevators and rudders to TVC giving the pilot ability to use TVC on demand during combat and switch between stable to unstable flight regimes on demand. 3D thrust vectoring nozzles will also act as additional control surface and its twin rudders as V-tail will augment the control authority of Tail plane based on a combination of speed + Alpha + Pilot demand. This design uses off-the-shelf technologies presently available within India developed for LCA program and does not need any R & D for any of its systems. The FOC will be achieved for those weapon systems which are operational on Mig-21 and LCA MK1. Any additional weapons integration will be done post FOC. The internal bays will be certified for full weapon configuration for SEAD/DEAD ops as part of FOC. LSA will have a seamless entry into service as it will use the infrastructure and support equipment created for Mig-21 for operating from any air base of IAF. LSA will have a total of 16 stations for carrying a variety of loads comprising six internal, six under wing, two wingtip and two CFT stations. LSA uses air foil of HF-24 which was the first ever supersonic, supercritical air foil of the world. The HF-24 airfoil round LE will be converted to sharp LE for better subsonic /supersonic performance with addition of LE maneuver Flaps and double slotted TE Flaps. Even the fuselage has been shaped as per this airfoil. The modified pure Delta planform with LERX has the Reynolds number of Mig-21 wing. I have enumerated below the changes I had made to the HF-24 design to make it LSA and attached the superimposed images of LSA & HF-24 to highlight them.

• The nose has been shaped to become a lifting surface and also provide very predictable vortex shedding with a very small boundary layer to help reduce the size of air intakes as the gap between the boundary layer diverter and the intake will be 8 cms only which is lesser than any other design with similar intakearrangements.
  
• The fore body shape coupled with LERX will also provide a wing-body AC which will be of special use during super cruise. The LERX will provide a very strong vortex to pull the airflow towards the fuselage by increasing the span efficiency & overall lift. They will also increase resistance to spin and provide very effective high AOA stability.
  
  
• LSA nose is shaped as a hexagonal and has a maximum width of 1.4m compared to 1.2m width of HF-24. The width at intakes is 2.25m. Length of the nose has been reduced and will have same drag polar as that of HF-24.
  
  
• The nose provides space for IRST, OLS-K EOTS and 0.45 sqm area for AESA radar. The gun will be accessed from main weapons bay for loading and unloading including servicing.
  
  
• The cockpit is very spacious and offers same comfort level and equipment fit as that of Jaguar aircraft and provides 360* visibility.
  
  
• HF-24 had 4x30mm guns with 130 rounds each internally. This space has been converted to avionics bay which will be lowered down like the HF-24 rocket pack for maintenance purposes and to access various LRUs. This will also ensure that we can upgrade LSA avionics anytime without the need for changing the internal set up. The 50x68mm Rocket pack will now house the 150 rds of ammo for one GSh-30mm cannon to be fitted in the nose.
  
  
• LSA is a mid-wing design compared to low-wing HF-24. Raising the wing on the fuselage and lowering the engine to have a thrust line below the wing line will provide a nose pitch up moment due to thrust which will assist the Tail plane in providing very high control authority and outstanding pitch rate ability far superior to any RSS design presently flying in India. This combination will also help reduce Trim Drag.
  
  
• The circular intakes have been converted to wing root like intakes and allow for airflow of 84kgs/second with 8cms left for boundary layer bleed off on each side.
  
  
• LSA wing has a sweepback of 57* and area of 31.7sqm with 8.5m span and 2.95m long LERX & Aspect ratio of 2.28 which is best figure for an interceptor aircraft. HF-24 quarter chord sweepback was 45* while LSA is 49*. The wings will have LE slats & TE double slotted 67% exposed span flaps borrowed from Jaguar. The Ailerons design is borrowed from Mig-21. Primary FCS will be controlled by EHSAs and will have Power-by-Wire architecture which is same as FBW in Direct Law. The secondary flight controls & weapons bay doors will be actuated by Hydraulics & rotary electrical actuators.
  
  
• LSA provides for 50% additional internal fuel volume compared to HF-24.The additional fuel capacity is a result of single elliptical air duct and 10cm thicker fuselage compared to HF-24 which had 1.45m thick fuselage.
  
  
• LSA will have Gripen like fully internally housed telescopic IFR probe to maintain low RCS.
  
  
• The main weapons bay is 4.3m long, 62.5cms deep and 1.1m wide. HF-24 had a 35cms deep fuel tank below the fuselage which has been converted into main weapons bay by increasing the fuselage thickness by 10cms and reshaping the air duct to elliptical shape like that of F-16. The main bay is capable of carrying 2xK77M or 2xAstra or 2xHarpoons or 2xKH35UE or 2x1000lb bombs or 8xSPICE250 and every weapon designed for Pak-Fa.
  
  
• Large internal weapons bay of LSA can be adopted to carry multiple payloads for specialist missions like F-18SH Growler for exclusive EW/Recce role and can be converted to carry directed energy weapons of the 6th Gen fighters in future.
  
  
• Each side bay can carry one 1xK-77M/Astra and 1xK-74M2/ASRAAM. The Lower side bays are 3.9m long while the upper side bay is 3.25m long and their combined width is 70cms and depth is 55cms.
  
  
• The outstanding wing-body blending will add a large part of overall lift besides drastically reducing the Interference drag. LSA has the best wing-body blending compared to any other aircraft of similar nature anywhere in the world and it is nearly as good as a flying wing in mid fuselage section.
  
  
• The rear part of the fuselage has been tapered inwards at an angle of 7.5* to give it a Boat tail shape to reduce drag at all stages of flight. Tail plane has sweepback of 57* with span-5.25m, tail arm-4.3m, Vbar-0.34.
  
  
• The use of twin rudders positioned out of LERX wake, will provide much superior directional control with extremely high yaw stability besides acting as a V-tail to provide increased nose pitch up authority at extremely low speeds and extremely high AOA. This helps to raise the combined Vbar to 0.44 for tail plane and V-tail. The twin V-tail shaped rudders will also lower the overall stance of the aircraft which will reduce its visual & radar cross section to increase its stealth capability.
  
  
• The wheel base is 5m, wheel track-2.6m, Topple angle-30*, Nose wheel weight-15%, main wheel weight-85%. The nose gear is same as Mig-21 and the main gear is borrowed from LCA. The main gear doors will also be the airbrakes.
  
  
• The tail clearance angle is 20* which allows this aircraft to fly 15 Alpha approach to exploit the full potential of LERX. LSA will have approach speeds of less than 115 kits and can be easily adopted for Carrier operation.
  
  
• The engine of choice is EJ230 with 72KN dry thrust and 108KN wet thrust giving it a TWR of 0.79 at loaded weight on dry thrust and a TWR of 1.32 in Combat weight configuration on wet thrust. LSA will have a sea level stall speed of 88 kits at 1.6Cl in combat flap settings & load giving it Cat-1 ITR & STR at sea level conditions of 37*/sec & 30*/sec for 9G & 6G loads respectively with 700 feet radius of turn. These figures are same as that of F-22.
  
  
• The equipment fit will have Central Mission Computers which will integrate all weapons, sensors, communication equipment, navigation equipment and on board systems to provide a composite fused picture to pilot on touch screen based glass Cockpit with cockpit speech recognition and voice command system. LSA will have ELTA designed GaN based AESA. A chin mounted EOTS system based on OLS-K pod components configured for internal fitment providing limited capabilities like F-35.
  
  
• LSA will have a fault detection, display & diagnosis system like A-320 to shorten turnaround inspection time. I have spoken to Israeli Aircraft Industry and they are willing to provide full support to create tailor made solutions for LSA.
  
• Mig wing LSA is the least risk design and can be created in two years.
  
  
• Shown below is the RCS diagram of LSA created using ANSYS software at 500MHz frequency with all metallic skin. The frontal RCS is -36dbsm and side RCS is -22dbsm which is same as that of F-22 and superior to the RCS of F-35. The X-band RCS with composite skin & RAM coating is likely to be even better than what has been calculated. The internal weapon load and overall Stealth of LSA is superior to even under development AMCA.

 

[randomradio]

Congratulations on rediscovering the results of the Mig-21 Analog which the Russians tested back in the mid 60s. Basically "reinventing" the wheel.

This is among the reasons why the gestation period is so low for this aircraft. It's all tried and tested, with proven tech.

But you forget that what's important about the LSA's design is stealth. It is VLO compliant.

The future lies in the MCA. Light fighters and stealth DO NOT HAVE COST EFFECTIVE RESULTS

The LSA gives MCA level electronics capabilities, with the payload, range and endurance of a HCA, and the logistics imprint of the LCA. Too good to be true, but it is true.

Also, most of the information that has been posted has taken into consideration that the LSA is all metal, and not the new materials that's actually planned to be used. Plus, the aircraft itself will undergo a block upgrade that will bring it up to true spec, the information given is only for the Block 1.

 

[AMCA]

Whats this all about ? Is that a Govt of India funded project or Private?

 

[banvanaxl]

Advantages of Light Fighters

"The F-22 costs 10 times as much as an early model F-16 fighter and, due to its huge maintenance load, can fly only half as many sorties per day. Thus, for equal investment, the F-22 delivers only one-twentieth as many airplanes over enemy territory as the F-16."- Pierre Sprey

The single strongest design feature in favor of the light fighter in air-to-air combat is the element of surprise, since about 80% of kills do occur by surprise, thus dominating all other factors. A small fighter like the F-5 with a planform area of about 300 square feet or the F-16 at about 400 square feet, compared to about 1050 square feet for the F-15, has a major advantage in visual combat. The small fighter is typically invisible to opposing pilots beyond about 4 miles, whereas a larger fighter such as the F-15 is visible to about 12 miles, and much farther if the engines smoke. This is a non-linear advantage to the light fighter in terms of detection area (similar altitude) and even more so in sky volume (if altitudes are different). Additionally, smaller targets take longer to visually acquire even if they are visible. This is particularly so if the Pilots of Heavy fighters have only been practicing air combat with heavies only and do not have DACT experience with small Light Fighters. These two factors together give the light fighter pilot much better statistical odds of seeing the heavy fighter first and setting up a decisive first shot. Once the small fighter sees and turns towards the opponent its very small frontal area reduces maximum visual detection range to about 2.0 to 2.5 miles. This allows the light fighter to set up a high reliability short range heat-seeking missile shot by ambush while still invisible to the target (heat-seeking missile range being about 6 to 20 miles depending on the particular missile).

Unless complete air superiority allows AWACs aircraft to dominate the battlespace, radar cannot be counted upon to give the large fighter a winning advantage, as modern light fighters have radar range nearly as far as heavy fighters. This is further offset by the fact that larger fighters with typical radar cross sectional area of about 10 m² are detectable by radar at about 50% farther range than the 2m² to 3m² x-section of the light fighter. For example, the F-15 actually presents about 20m² radar cross sectional area, and has been typically defeated by opposing F-16 forces not only in close dogfighting combat, but also in extensive Beyond Visual Range (BVR) trials. Also, airborne fighter radars are limited in coverage zone (front only) and are far from perfect in detecting enemy aircraft. Despite extensive use of radar in the Vietnam War by the United States, only 18% of North Vietnamese fighters were first detected by radar of any kind, and only 3% by air-to-air radar on board a fighter aircraft. The other 82% were visually acquired, which explains why visual signature favoring the light fighter has remained a significant advantage.

Not even taking into account the sometimes superior combat capability of lighter aircraft based on surprise and maneurverability, the pure numbers issue of lower cost and higher reliability also tends to favor light fighters. It is a basic outcome of Lanchester’s Laws that a larger number of less-sophisticated units will almost always be successful over a smaller number of more advanced ones; the damage dealt is based on the square of the number of units firing, while the quality of those units has only a linear effect on the outcome. This argues that air forces should use larger numbers of cheaper aircraft instead of smaller number of expensive aircraft, and this is a major argument for the light, as in inexpensive, fighter.

Lighter designs also have the advantage of covering more area. Assuming an aircraft can patrol an area roughly defined by its radar coverage (or visible range in the case of pre-radar designs), and given that in the radar equation range varies with the fourth power of energy, a larger number of less-powerful radars will provide more coverage than a smaller number of more powerful radars. This same basic outcome also means that response to on-call ground attack missions will be more rapid, as, on average, an aircraft will be closer to the action if there are more aircraft in the air. Additionally, the complex systems in larger aircraft tend to be less reliable, so it has been argued that a larger number of less capable aircraft with nevertheless produce a greater overall combat capability.

Disadvantages of Light Fighters

Two additional considerations have a strong bearing on the smaller-is-better argument. One is that the total load carried by an aircraft is often defined more by its total power than its extra power; this implies that smaller aircraft will have less payload and/or fuel and thus be less effective than a larger design when these considerations are important. This is, of course, offset by the fact that a heavier aircraft requires more energy to keep aloft, and thus burns more fuel. Generally, however, the advantage is on the side of larger designs. It is precisely this consideration that led to the WWII concept of the heavy fighter, normally twin-engined designs that were specifically intended to carry more fuel for longer range while carrying heavier weapons.

However, this assumed advantage does not always hold up when lighter fighters are intentionally designed for longer range. The equations for range of both propeller and jet aircraft show in general how minimizing drag and maximizing engine efficiency and fuel fraction allow smaller aircraft to match or beat the range of larger aircraft. This was demonstrated in practice during WWII by the light ZERO with range of 2010 miles, and the lightweight P-51 with range of 1650 miles, compared to the heavy twin engine P-38 with range of 1300 miles and the German Me 210 with range of 1400 miles. In the age of modern jet fighters, the lightweight F-16A not only had longer range than the heavy F-15A, but longer range than any other fighter in the USAF inventory.

Another more minor concern in performance terms is that designs with more power generally go faster. For subsonic designs, maximum speed is strongly defined by total power. This is due to the effects of wave drag, which becomes extremely powerful as the aircraft enters the transonic regime, and its effect rises so rapidly that the normally lower drag of a smaller aircraft is rapidly offset by even minor increases in speed. Overcoming this drag requires power, so designs with more powerful engines almost always have higher top speed. For supersonic designs this equation no longer holds, at least not as directly, but limitations on engine performance, especially due to intake design considerations, again favour larger designs with more powerful engines. This is not always the case; the F-104, considered a light fighter by some definitions, was capable of a highly credible Mach 2.0. But light fighters are generally slower; the F-5 was capable of M1.4, the T-50 about M1.5, and the F-16 about M2.0.

The top speeds of modern light fighters are more a matter of deliberate design trade-offs to make the fighter more combat effective than aerodynamic limits in the concept. Modern engines and aerodynamics generally allow for lighter fighters to have top speeds that match similar technology heavy fighters, as it is a simple matter of thrust to drag ratio. In fact, the single engine configuration typical of light fighters has lower wave drag. But, the question is whether very high top speeds should even be attempted when full combat effectiveness considerations and trade-offs are taken into account. It is well known in the literature that, unlike the importance of top speed in WWII to close with or escape enemy fighters, there are strong limits to the benefit of very high (>M2) top speeds in jet fighters. The aerodynamic requirements to operate at such speeds add considerable complexity, weight, and cost to the aircraft (thus limiting numbers) by requiring more exotic materials, more expensive engines, and complex structures such as variable engine inlets and bellmouths. Even in aircraft that have these features, such as the claimed Mach 2.5 top speed of the F-15, they are in practice unusable. The F-15 top speed when carrying a weapons load is under Mach 1.8. Taking the weapons off (even the cannon must come out to reduce weight) to allow Mach 2.5 requires an aerial refueling at altitude, and more than 5 minutes at that speed will destroy the engines. As an example of a poor trade-off for higher top speed, smaller and more streamlined canopies also limit the key parameter of visibility out of the cockpit to maximize surprise. But, after paying all these penalties attempting get greater than Mach 2 speeds, it is found they have zero utility in combat. Combat speeds have never been known to exceed Mach 1.8 and seldom 1.2, for two reasons. First, it requires extensive use of the afterburner, which typically increases fuel consumption by about a factor of three or even four, and rapidly reduces operational radius or even runs the fighter out of fuel. Second, speeds even above Mach 1 so widen the turn radius in maneuvering combat that the fighter is thrown too wide to get a tracking solution on an opponent, such that typical fighting speeds are in the range of 0.5M to 1.0M. This reality is why even subsonic fighters like the F-86 and MiG-17 can often defeat supersonic fighters if the supersonic fighter does not use its superior speed to flee the combat (the only supersonic F-8 losses in Vietnam were to the subsonic MiG-17). Speed has reached the limit of its practical combat value, such that optimum fighter design requires understanding the penalties the endless search for higher speed imposes, and sometimes deliberately choosing not to accept those penalties.

In contrast to the very limited value of high top speeds, acceleration to regain energy rapidly in an energy bleeding subsonic dogfight is highly valuable, and the lightweight fighter with high thrust to weight ratio excels in that practical performance parameter. Also, unlike the highest of top speeds, high cruise speed in order to maximize surprise instead of being surprised by being overtaken from the rear, is even more valuable. The tail-less delta configuration like the light Gripen with a typical cruise speed of about 0.9M to 1.1M (super-cruise) as compared to the typical 0.7-0.9M for standard configurations, maximizes this advantage.

A more subtle argument, but much more powerful in real world purchasing policy, is the overall cost of operating an aircraft. While it might seem that a less expensive aircraft will allow more to be purchased and operated, this ignores the fact that the majority of an aircraft's lifetime costs are related to pilot training. For instance, F-18 purchased in the early 1980s had a total unit cost of $35 million per aircraft, and have been in service since 1982 – 34 years as of 2016[update] - for a yearly cost of just over $1 million. In comparison, training a pilot in the US currently costs about $6 million. Given these sorts of numbers, the cost benefit of the light fighter may be minimal or nonexistent. Consider a two aircraft, the Hawk 200 at ~$25 million compared to the current F-18E at ~$61 million. Assuming the Hawk has a quality (in Lanchester's terms) of 0.5 and pilots have an active duty "tour" of 5 years, over the 30 year lifetime of the aircraft:

When one adds the additional considerations of logistics, and especially the increased number of bases needed to support larger number of aircraft, the disparity increases. In the opposite case where the total fleet numbers are fixed by external factors, like the size of an aircraft carrier's decks, the advantage of the more expensive aircraft may become overwhelming. It is primarily this consideration that leads to the generally unfavourable opinion of less expensive designs in western air forces, and was also the primary reason that the original Lightweight Fighter, a day fighter as original conceived, was dramatically changed to a multi-mission aircraft during its development.

However, the above analysis for total cost only takes into account basic pilot training, and not the fact that far more cost occurs from long term operational training where there is a widely different operating cost of light/lightweight fighters as compared to heavy fighters. For example, as of 2013, total heavy F15C operating cost is reported at $41,900 per hour, and light F-16C cost at $22,500 per hour. The much lower operating cost of light fighters is usually regarded as a significant strength in allowing adequate training to maintain expert pilot proficiency. More accurate equations than the above that do take long term operational training costs into account are available in the literature. Additionally, this example assumes a lower combat effectiveness for lightweight fighters, thus requiring more fighters, whereas some lightweight fighters are actually superior plane for plane to heavier fighters. A key example of lower cost combined with higher effectiveness is the F-16 vs. the F-15, as shown by the U.S. Air Force's own trial results as well as combat results.

Modern era of Air Combat

The advent of the air superiority fighters such as the F-15, meant that high value assets (HVAs) like tankers, AEW&C, command platforms, bombers and attack aircraft would need to be protected by air superiority fighters, sometimes flying far afield and ahead of them, engaging distant enemy air units, rather than by direct escorts staying in sight nearby. The development of the multirole fighters such as F-18, Rafale, Typhoon, also decreased the need for escorts, as the aircraft on air strike mission became capable of effective self-defense. However the need to protect HVAs will remain a cause of concern and costly multirole fighters will be a waste of assets if required to be used to protect these HVAs. These HVAs will remain a necessity if the full potential of these costly heavy multirole fighters is to be exploited optimally. The small numbers of such costly assets and their limited sortie generation rate further complicates the equation and tilts it decisively in the favor of Light Fighters specifically designed for the particular roles of Interceptor/Air Superiority fighter/ Escort/ Penetration fighter roles with secondary Strike/CAS/Interdiction roles.

Just to clarify a few terms here, a penetration fighter is used for a long-range Fighter aircraft designed to penetrate enemy air defenses and attack defensive interceptors/point defense fighters. The concept is similar to the escort fighter, but differs primarily in that the aircraft would not operate in close concert with bombers. This is also at times referred to as, “Fighter Sweeps”. Their aim is to lure and force enemy fighters to get airborne and engage them in air combat. This was, in effect, the same role played by the P-51 during WW2, whose presence above Germany allowed USAAF bombers to fly at will over the country.

Air interdiction (AI), also known as deep air support (DAS), is the use of preventative aircraft attacks against enemy targets, that are not an immediate threat, in order to delay, disrupt, or hinder later enemy engagement of friendly forces. It is a core capability of virtually all military air forces, and has been conducted in conflicts since WW1. A distinction is often made between tactical and strategic air interdiction, depending on the objectives of the operation. Typical objectives in tactical interdiction are meant to affect events rapidly and locally, for example through direct destruction of forces or supplies en-route to the active battle area. While strategic objectives are often broader and more long-term, with less direct attacks on enemy fighting capabilities, instead focusing on infrastructure, logistics and other supportive assets.

The term deep air support, relates to CAS and denotes the difference between their respective objectives. Close air support, as the name suggests, is directed towards targets close to friendly ground units, as closely coordinated air-strikes, in direct support of active engagement with the enemy. Deep air support or air interdiction is carried out further from the active fighting, based more on strategic planning and less directly coordinated with ground units. Despite being more strategic than close air support, air interdiction should not be confused with strategic bombing, which is unrelated to ground operations.

The latest air combat tactics have moved away from pure stealth to a mix of stealth for air superiority & Interdiction to non-stealth for destruction of enemy assets using “Arsenal Aircraft” for large scale combat. This has happened due to the validity of Lanchester’s laws for modern combat including stealth. In the posts so far I have stated that stealth is costly and needs heavy fighters but if we look at nature and learn from it, we realise that small size, agility, camouflage and strong punching power defines a “Predator”. These attributes of nature’s laws will remain valid as long as we have human on Earth. The latest example of F-15 & F-16 is supposed to act as “Arsenal Aircraft” capable of carrying nearly 18 missiles to combat in non-stealthy mode. Where does LSA stand with respect to such aircraft?

How designer created LSA

HOW I CREATED LSA

My aim was to create a combination of Mig-21 and Mig-27 which relies on low cost stealth like shaping, small size, composites and Radar absorbent paint to achieve a degree of stealth which will allow it to move within WVRAAM firing range. I am one of those few pilots who have done DACTs with Ajeet (Folland Gnat). That small bird used to send chill down our spine as we always detected it when it was aligning itself in our rear quarter for gun shot. Ajeet, due to its small size also was difficult to detect on radar even though it did not have any kind of stealth shaping.

I wanted an interceptor with good range and endurance which cud act as escort and penetrative fighter with ability to perform as an air superiority fighter at mid-high altitudes. This meant that Mig-21 planform became the first choice. A stealth aircraft is not required to fly and fight at low levels to avoid radar. Its stealth does that job for it, so mid & high altitude performance became paramount. Over a period of time, Mig-21 added lot of weight which resulted in poor performance due to increased span & wing loading while nothing was done to improve the Oswald span efficiency factor and span efficiency which resulted in much higher induced drag. I also studied HF-24 Marut design during this time and to my surprise I found that combining HF-24 & Mig-21, we have a home grown Light Stealth Aircraft.

This is just noisome wind ... very noisome wind.

For once I am with @Oscar and Co. Delete this thread and gag this merry chap for a week.

I have a bloody headache

Whats this all about ? Is that a Govt of India funded project or Private?

Just a crap load of hot air mate ..

 

[jha]

I also studied HF-24 Marut design during this time and to my surprise I found that combining HF-24 & Mig-21, we have a home grown Light Stealth Aircraft.

This is the crux.

 

[AMCA]

Just a crap load of hot air mate ..

Thanks mate!! I'd have almost believed it.

 

[jha]

Whats this all about ? Is that a Govt of India funded project or Private?

It seems the aim is to combine HF-24 Marut and Mig-21, to build a Stealth fighter.Why would the govt not fund it ?

 

[AMCA]

It seems the aim is to combine HF-24 Marut and Mig-21, to build a Stealth fighter.Why would the govt not fund it ?

lol .. The Germans and the Russians would be all over them if those designs are mated.

 

[SecretMission]

It seems the aim is to combine HF-24 Marut and Mig-21, to build a Stealth fighter.Why would the govt not fund it ?

They couldn't properly develop Tejas from one design which is more than 70 years old and calling it indigenous and make in india....So combining 2 different aircrafts desgin maybe they end up making a helicopter

 

[MULUBJA]

This is just noisome wind ... very noisome wind.

For once I am with @Oscar and Co. Delete this thread and gag this merry chap for a week.

I have a bloody headache



Just a crap load of hot air mate ..

Why donot you stay away from the thread? Many people has interest and they will discuss. Your input is not required. GO and read other threads you like.

They couldn't properly develop Tejas from one design which is more than 70 years old and calling it indigenous and make in india....So combining 2 different aircrafts desgin maybe they end up making a helicopter

China made JF 17 from MIg 21 and you call it your own. Evenif we do that , it will be better.

 

[AMCA]

They couldn't properly develop Tejas from one design which is more than 70 years old and calling it indigenous and make in india....So combining 2 different aircrafts desgin maybe they end up making a helicopter

Burn baby !! Build a cycle dynamo the least before accusing others. Besides this is a private project.

 

[SecretMission]

China made JF 17 from MIg 21 and you call it your own. Evenif we do that , it will be better.

You should have knowledge that what JF 17 stands for which is Joint Venture 17. China & Pakistan both worked on it. So we are not calling it indigenous as India is doing by copying design.

 

[AMCA]

You should have knowledge that what JF 17 stands for which is Joint Venture 17. China & Pakistan both worked on it. So we are not calling it indigenous as India is doing by copying design.

Whats Pakistani in JF-17? When you call it a JV you should probably be able to explain it to us. Which design did India copy by the way?

 

[MULUBJA]

You should have knowledge that what JF 17 stands for which is Joint Venture 17. China & Pakistan both worked on it. So we are not calling it indigenous as India is doing by copying design.

But what about the JF 17 which itself is a coppied design?

 

[SecretMission]

Whats Pakistani in JF-17? When you call it a JV you should probably be able to explain it to us. Which design did India copy by the way?

We are not calling it JF 17, it's offical name of aircraft. LOL You even don't know from where tejas been copied.... Pity

But what about the JF 17 which itself is a coppied design?

Grow Up Child...whole world know JF 17 is made from Mig 33 Project with assistance from Gurmman & Mikhail its self. So its not been copied from mig 21 when its original owner worked aswell on the project.