Why India holds true to its Afghan ambitions - The Globe and Mail
Mar. 31, 2010
In the middle of a dry plateau, the main problem for India's mission in Afghanistan was marked with a line in the desert. A ragged edge of pavement marked the spot where Indian road crews stopped after paving most but not all of a highway through southeastern Kandahar. The final kilometres of the road sat unfinished for years, after threats against the Indian workers forced them to halt.
Security concerns have dogged everyone who tried to make a difference in Afghanistan, but India faces additional risks. It sends thousands of aid workers, diplomats, and other staff into the war zone without any regular troops to protect them. Despite the risk, India has been reluctant to pull its people back. Its rivalry with Pakistan is ample reason to maintain a presence in the country, no matter how dangerous it gets.
But as the violence steadily increases, that policy is proving difficult to maintain. The killing of nine Indians in Kabul in February sparked speculation about whether the country would leave Afghanistan, and some Indian medical staff did in fact leave Kabul after the attack. It is a trend that has been quietly developing for months. Despite committing $1.2-billion (U.S.) and building some of the most successful projects in Afghanistan, the worsening situation has forced India to scale down its ambitions in Afghanistan.
After the fall of the Taliban in 2001 New Delhi doled out money for major infrastructure in Afghanistan. The biggest projects were highways, which ran into trouble as the insurgency grew. In Nimroz province, one stretch of tarmac cost the lives of 10 Indians and an estimated 50 Afghan security guards.
Since the highway formally opened last year, India has concentrated on smaller, less-visible projects, mostly items that can be completed within six months or a year and costing less than $1-million. Taliban attacks on Indian nationals have escalated, raising costs, delaying projects and jeopardizing further development, said a paper published last month by the Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi.
India has strong reasons to tough it out, despite the risks. Plans by Canadians and Dutch to reduce their military presence in the coming 18 months are viewed with concern in India. Even more worrying are plans by the United States to begin drawing down their forces in July, 2011.
Indian analysts say their country cannot afford a similar move; insurgent activities in Afghanistan are usually interpreted in New Delhi as the result of conspiracies hatched in Pakistan an idea occasionally backed by Western intelligence. Any slowdown in the pace of Indian construction projects, any cut in the work force of 3,500 to 4,000 Indians in the country, would be viewed as a victory for Pakistan.
India cannot afford to move out, said Vikram Sood, a former head of India's Research and Analysis Wing, the country's leading intelligence agency.
It's not just for Afghanistan's sake, Mr. Sood said. Once we pull out, the Pakistanis will get even bolder. Not just in Afghanistan, but also in Kashmir. It will give them a base to operate. Afghanistan is a piece of real estate to Pakistan, and they will use it against us.
Of course, Pakistan says the same thing about India's mission. New Delhi likes to portray itself as a purely humanitarian donor in Afghanistan, but it has toughened its contingent with hundreds of paramilitary forces from the Indo-Tibetan Border Police. Those security forces keep a low profile in Afghanistan, and even stay out of the spotlight after returning to India. Nor has India properly explained why it requires consulates in Jalalabad and Kandahar, two cities in Afghanistan near the Pakistan border with little demand for Indian consular services.
During a conversation at an empty restaurant in New Delhi, a serving Indian intelligence officer acknowledged the obvious reason. Gesturing at a map of the region, he pointed to Pakistan's eastern border. We watch them from this side, he said. Then, indicating the Afghan-Pakistan border, he added: But we have to keep an eye from this other side, too.
Such activities raise hackles in Pakistan, which gets nervous about Indian agents operating so close to its western flank. Some Pakistani officials even accuse India of using its outposts in Afghanistan to foment rebellion in its border provinces. Those concerns would only get worse if, as some commentators are now suggesting, India were to increase its paramilitary forces or even deploy regular troops.
The question now is, how do we keep momentum? said Vishal Chandra, an associate fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi. Some say we should send in troops, but I personally feel that's not possible. You have the supply and logistics problems, but also sending troops to a neighbouring country would create a whole new dynamic.
So if India cannot pull back from the dangerous parts of Afghanistan, but also feels understandably reluctant to escalate the situation by sending in troops, what options remain? Mr. Sood suggested that India needs to talk with the de facto rulers of Afghanistan's rural areas, maintaining relations with the northern warlords who received Indian support in previous decades but also forging new connections with the southern Taliban groups. A Taliban spokesman was quoted in recent days saying the insurgents want normal relations with India, and newspaper reports in New Delhi this week described senior government officials opening dialogue with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the leader of an insurgent militia and major ally of the Taliban.
For his part, Mr. Chandra said he's young enough to remain optimistic that Pakistan and India might some day sit together and assist with peace talks in Afghanistan. But like many observers in India, he remains skeptical that negotiations will end the war.
If you leave, he said, gesturing with his tea cup at his Canadian visitor, you will have to come back eventually.
