PeerPower : The origin of India's inflation problem February 10, 2011
An aggressive rise in government spending, which boosted consumption at a time when the credit crisis had pulled investments to GDP down, has been at the heart of the recent spiral in inflation.
Since the credit crisis unfolded, Indias policymakers have been aggressive in quickly returning growth to pre-crisis levels. We believe the ideal outcome for India would have been to manage GDP growth closer to its potential of 7.5-8% for the first 12 months immediately following the credit crisis and then gradually to push growth higher as investment growth accelerated, lifting potential growth.
However, as we have highlighted in this column earlier, this aggressive approach from policymakers to push growth with the support of fiscal and monetary policy has been accompanied by macro stability risks in form of: (a) rise in inflation; (b) high current account deficit; and (c) tight interbank liquidity and disruptive rise in short-term rates. We do believe that the loose fiscal policy is more to blame than monetary policy for these macro imbalances
As the policymakers continue to walk on a tight rope in a bid to push growth, avoiding any major instability risks would have required a supportive external environment. Unfortunately, the sharp rise in global commodity prices and food supply shocks have made the task of managing the macro imbalances even more difficult.
CRB metals and CRB food prices have increased by 49%, and 36% respectively since June 2010. Strong demand and rise in food and other commodity prices have ensured that headline inflation (WPI) has remained above the RBIs comfort zone of 5-5.5% for the past 13 months. Headline inflation averaged 9.2% during this period.
While loose fiscal policy, coupled with supply shocks, has been the key driver, a delay in monetary tightening only added to complexity of inflation management. We often hear the argument from investors that considering that WPI inflation is highly influenced by global commodity prices and food, why should the RBI respond to this supply-side inflation.
We believe that in an environment where domestic demand growth is strong, the chances of supplyside pressures translating into rise in inflation expectations are high.
Once inflation rises, the RBI needs to hike policy rates to ensure that banks hike deposit rates in time.
While policymakers have delayed policy rate hikes (resulting in banks delaying deposit and lending rate hikes) to avoid an adverse impact on growth, the rise in inflation expectations meant that households have shied away from bank deposit, eventually invoking a disruptive rise in cost of capital. For instance, bank deposit rates have risen by 150-200 basis points over the past two months compared with the 150 basis points rise cumulatively in the preceding 12 months.
In other words, policy rates needed to rise in response to the rise in inflation (even if it was driven by supply-side) to contain the rise in inflation expectations and ensure that domestic saving rate is maintained to fund domestic investment. In any case, we believe that, though late, the bulk of monetary policy tightening has now taken place with short-term market rates already at peak levels. We expect lending rates to follow the deposit rate hikes with the usual time lag.
Why fiscal policy reversal is more critical? An aggressive rise in government spending which boosted consumption at a time when credit crisis had pulled investments to GDP down has been at the heart of Indias recent inflation problem. As the global credit crisis impaired capital markets, investment declined from 38.1% of GDP in FY2008 to 34.5% of GDP in FY2009.
More importantly, the most productive investment component private corporate capex declined to 11.5% of GDP in FY2009 from a peak of 17.3% of GDP in FY2008. In the face of this decline in investment to GDP (read: production capacity), the central government pursued a massive 4% of GDP increase in total expenditure (read: consumption).
The Centres fiscal deficit has risen from 2.5% of GDP in FY2008 to 6.3% of GDP in FY2010. While the headline deficit has fallen in FY2011, thanks to one-off revenues, we estimate that central government expenditure relative to GDP in FY2011 will remain close to peak levels of 15.5% of GDP.
We believe that government expenditure in India tends to be less efficient and is biased towards boosting consumption by way of transfer to households. In F2011, we estimate that about 86% of total government expenditure is revenue expenditure. While investment to GDP has risen from the trough levels, it is still far from pre-crisis peak levels. Hence, the continuation of such high levels of government expenditure in nature of consumption in FY2012 will only add to inflationary pressures.
The government needs to follow its pre-guided deficit reduction plan. In its medium fiscal plan published in 2010, the finance ministry indicated that central government will aim to cut its deficit to 4.8% of GDP in FY2012 from an estimated 5% (Morgan Stanley estimate) of GDP [excluding one-off 3G and broadband wireless access (BWA) revenues the deficit will be 6.4%] in F2011. We believe achieving this reduction in deficit will be difficult without a meaningful cut in government expenditure growth in FY2012. Even at 4.8% of GDP, the governments overall borrowing programme will remain at broadly similar levels to FY2011.
Note the deficit numbers above do not include the potential rise in off-Budget subsidies in oil and fertiliser. In FY2011, the government had the support of $35.5 billion, including $23 billion from 3G and BWA licence fees and $12.5 billion of open market operations (OMO) involving buy back of government securities by the RBI. However, in the absence of this one-off support, the bond market may suffer badly if the government does not follow its pre-guided path on deficit reduction in FY2012, resulting in crowding out of private sector investments.
Some argue that the growth in government expenditure will remain high as there are five state elections this year. There is a possibility that the government will target high expenditure growth with one-off revenue ideas. However, boosting expenditure growth via one-off revenue growth will push consumption growth when capacity utilisation is already tight, keeping inflation pressures alive.
In this context, we believe the Budget announcement on February 28 will assume significance. We believe the government needs to target single-digit expenditure growth of 6-7% in FY2012, which would be the lowest in seven years.
A pretty well written, informative article, worth a read.