Monday, April 30, 2007
India-Pakistan relations in a changing world
By Dr Ayesha Siddiqa
Although India has a long way to go in perfecting the Cold Start concept, the model does change the military-strategic scene and poses the question to Pakistan regarding signalling to India about its threshold in response to the latterâs new military doctrine
General Pervez Musharraf has hailed Indian prime minister Manmohan Singhâs recent statement about a plan to divide the Indian-held Kashmir into three parts as recognition of Pakistanâs proposed solution of the dispute. Discussions are already underway regarding a possible de-militarisation (reduction or re-location) of Jammu & Kashmir, which will, hopefully, improve relations between India and Pakistan.
Although the talks are highly secretive, one can already guess that a solution is not likely to involve any territorial adjustments favouring Pakistan. During my two recent visits to Delhi I met a few Kashmiri people who were equally upset with Pakistan for willingly surrendering a claim, which in their view, was never Pakistanâs to decide. However, what the Kashmiris feel is a different issue. More important is the fact that many in Pakistan will also classify a deal as a sell-out.
Whatever might be the perception of the Kashmiris, an administrative-cum-political adjustment on both sides is likely to put an end to the territorial dispute between the two South Asian neighbours. The question, however, is: will the solution naturally result in normalising relations and ushering in a new era of peace and tranquillity between them?
Leaving aside the issue of analysing the rights and wrongs of Islamabadâs approach, it is interesting to evaluate the argument regarding a deal with India as signifying a paradigm shift by the Pakistan army. Many analysts believe this policy indicates the re-structuring of the armyâs strategic vision. Is that correct?
From a tactical perspective, a possible deal might not necessarily indicate a policy shift. After all, the Pakistan army has politically conceded more to India than it ever did during a war. Incidentally, territorial concessions were always made after defeat in a war or a major military operation. For instance, the defeat in 1971 led to the Simla agreement. Another situation in which the army has conceded territory to India without fighting for it is in situations when the GHQ Rawalpindi was up till its eyes in politics. The best example is General Ziaâs period when India managed to make territorial gains in the Qamar sector without Pakistan really batting an eyelid. It is worth noting that throughout his reign Zia did not really mention Kashmir in his discussions with India.
So, there is nothing queer about General Musharraf willing to write-off the political claim on Kashmir after he had undertaken the Kargil operation. Every time the Pakistan army fights a war on the territory, it realizes that military operations are hardly the way to change the status quo.
Does this mean Pakistan will begin to look at India differently? Will the states and the militaries now consider each other as long-lost distant cousins who must live peacefully? From Pakistanâs perspective, there is no fundamental paradigm shift as far as perception about India goes. The larger neighbour remains an enemy and will continue to be mistrusted.
However, what is different is the appreciation of the changed strategic and geo-political environment. The fact is that since the nuclear tests, and as the two countries negotiate the nuclear CBMs, they realise that a conventional medium-intensity war cannot be fought in the region. Even though both India and Pakistan continue to maintain large armed forces, the fact remains that war in South Asia has changed. This is not the age where two traditional rivals will be able to fight a 10-15 days war or hope to gain territories to be mutually exchanged during peace talks. They cannot even afford to fight wars of direct contestation over territories.
India has announced its future battle plans through its strategy of Cold Start in which the aim will be to remain grouped for a short and swift attack across the boundary to eliminate targets and withdraw rather than taking territory which would then give Pakistan cause to push the nuclear button. The four scenarios given by Lt. General Khalid Kidwai have caught the military-strategic imagination in Delhi even though General Kidwai has often said that he was misunderstood by the two Italian analysts who spoke with him.
Although India has a long way to go in perfecting the Cold Start concept, the model does change the military-strategic scene and poses the question to Pakistan regarding signalling to India about its threshold in response to the latterâs new military doctrine.
Two issues are worth considering; they also seem to point to the fact that what we are witnessing may be are military-strategic adjustments rather than a paradigm shift.
First, since the competition between India and Pakistan is no longer territorial and has become increasingly ideological, the generals in Rawalpindi would like to stress strategic equality. The confusion in the minds of military personnel regarding parity and equality makes them nervous about Indiaâs growing strategic prowess and also motivates them to compete.
What the generals have definitely understood is that a competition will not be possible without building sufficient economic muscle for which they are willing to create âcontrolledâ conditions in the country and the region at large which might make it possible for capital to flow from India as well. However, the movement will have to be select and controlled by the state bureaucracy. It is uncertain that the discussions on trade will eventually lead to a situation where the common people of India and Pakistan will freely build financial stakes in each otherâs countries.
Second, Pakistan would like to define or carve out a role for it self in the world not entirely dominated by India. Resolving the Kashmir dispute will not mean that Islamabad will give up the claim over its share of Afghanistanâs geo-politics and Central Asia or not want to play the role as a key between two strategic regions that is the Persian Gulf/Middle East and Central Asia. This statement does not mean that Pakistan is already playing that role or that it will seek to do so through military means alone.
What is being argued is that these two factors are critical to the evolving strategic vision, supposedly in sync with the changing realities of the India-Pakistan bilateral linkage. A power-play between the two rivals on issues not directly impinging on their core interests might be less likely to provoke a direct conflict. Therefore, while the competition and rivalry will continue alongside cooperation and confidence building, the fundamental character of the relationship might not change.
It could then be argued that the region is looking at a paradigm shift as far as strategic objectives and the nature of war is concerned. That might not necessarily be construed as a fundamental alteration in the nature of the relationship. Like in the US-USSR Cold War, this is a case of technology being the driver in determining the perimeters of conflict and competition.
The writer is an Islamabad-based independent defence analyst and author of the book, Military Inc, Inside Pakistanâs Military Economy
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\04\30\story_30-4-2007_pg3_2
India-Pakistan relations in a changing world
By Dr Ayesha Siddiqa
Although India has a long way to go in perfecting the Cold Start concept, the model does change the military-strategic scene and poses the question to Pakistan regarding signalling to India about its threshold in response to the latterâs new military doctrine
General Pervez Musharraf has hailed Indian prime minister Manmohan Singhâs recent statement about a plan to divide the Indian-held Kashmir into three parts as recognition of Pakistanâs proposed solution of the dispute. Discussions are already underway regarding a possible de-militarisation (reduction or re-location) of Jammu & Kashmir, which will, hopefully, improve relations between India and Pakistan.
Although the talks are highly secretive, one can already guess that a solution is not likely to involve any territorial adjustments favouring Pakistan. During my two recent visits to Delhi I met a few Kashmiri people who were equally upset with Pakistan for willingly surrendering a claim, which in their view, was never Pakistanâs to decide. However, what the Kashmiris feel is a different issue. More important is the fact that many in Pakistan will also classify a deal as a sell-out.
Whatever might be the perception of the Kashmiris, an administrative-cum-political adjustment on both sides is likely to put an end to the territorial dispute between the two South Asian neighbours. The question, however, is: will the solution naturally result in normalising relations and ushering in a new era of peace and tranquillity between them?
Leaving aside the issue of analysing the rights and wrongs of Islamabadâs approach, it is interesting to evaluate the argument regarding a deal with India as signifying a paradigm shift by the Pakistan army. Many analysts believe this policy indicates the re-structuring of the armyâs strategic vision. Is that correct?
From a tactical perspective, a possible deal might not necessarily indicate a policy shift. After all, the Pakistan army has politically conceded more to India than it ever did during a war. Incidentally, territorial concessions were always made after defeat in a war or a major military operation. For instance, the defeat in 1971 led to the Simla agreement. Another situation in which the army has conceded territory to India without fighting for it is in situations when the GHQ Rawalpindi was up till its eyes in politics. The best example is General Ziaâs period when India managed to make territorial gains in the Qamar sector without Pakistan really batting an eyelid. It is worth noting that throughout his reign Zia did not really mention Kashmir in his discussions with India.
So, there is nothing queer about General Musharraf willing to write-off the political claim on Kashmir after he had undertaken the Kargil operation. Every time the Pakistan army fights a war on the territory, it realizes that military operations are hardly the way to change the status quo.
Does this mean Pakistan will begin to look at India differently? Will the states and the militaries now consider each other as long-lost distant cousins who must live peacefully? From Pakistanâs perspective, there is no fundamental paradigm shift as far as perception about India goes. The larger neighbour remains an enemy and will continue to be mistrusted.
However, what is different is the appreciation of the changed strategic and geo-political environment. The fact is that since the nuclear tests, and as the two countries negotiate the nuclear CBMs, they realise that a conventional medium-intensity war cannot be fought in the region. Even though both India and Pakistan continue to maintain large armed forces, the fact remains that war in South Asia has changed. This is not the age where two traditional rivals will be able to fight a 10-15 days war or hope to gain territories to be mutually exchanged during peace talks. They cannot even afford to fight wars of direct contestation over territories.
India has announced its future battle plans through its strategy of Cold Start in which the aim will be to remain grouped for a short and swift attack across the boundary to eliminate targets and withdraw rather than taking territory which would then give Pakistan cause to push the nuclear button. The four scenarios given by Lt. General Khalid Kidwai have caught the military-strategic imagination in Delhi even though General Kidwai has often said that he was misunderstood by the two Italian analysts who spoke with him.
Although India has a long way to go in perfecting the Cold Start concept, the model does change the military-strategic scene and poses the question to Pakistan regarding signalling to India about its threshold in response to the latterâs new military doctrine.
Two issues are worth considering; they also seem to point to the fact that what we are witnessing may be are military-strategic adjustments rather than a paradigm shift.
First, since the competition between India and Pakistan is no longer territorial and has become increasingly ideological, the generals in Rawalpindi would like to stress strategic equality. The confusion in the minds of military personnel regarding parity and equality makes them nervous about Indiaâs growing strategic prowess and also motivates them to compete.
What the generals have definitely understood is that a competition will not be possible without building sufficient economic muscle for which they are willing to create âcontrolledâ conditions in the country and the region at large which might make it possible for capital to flow from India as well. However, the movement will have to be select and controlled by the state bureaucracy. It is uncertain that the discussions on trade will eventually lead to a situation where the common people of India and Pakistan will freely build financial stakes in each otherâs countries.
Second, Pakistan would like to define or carve out a role for it self in the world not entirely dominated by India. Resolving the Kashmir dispute will not mean that Islamabad will give up the claim over its share of Afghanistanâs geo-politics and Central Asia or not want to play the role as a key between two strategic regions that is the Persian Gulf/Middle East and Central Asia. This statement does not mean that Pakistan is already playing that role or that it will seek to do so through military means alone.
What is being argued is that these two factors are critical to the evolving strategic vision, supposedly in sync with the changing realities of the India-Pakistan bilateral linkage. A power-play between the two rivals on issues not directly impinging on their core interests might be less likely to provoke a direct conflict. Therefore, while the competition and rivalry will continue alongside cooperation and confidence building, the fundamental character of the relationship might not change.
It could then be argued that the region is looking at a paradigm shift as far as strategic objectives and the nature of war is concerned. That might not necessarily be construed as a fundamental alteration in the nature of the relationship. Like in the US-USSR Cold War, this is a case of technology being the driver in determining the perimeters of conflict and competition.
The writer is an Islamabad-based independent defence analyst and author of the book, Military Inc, Inside Pakistanâs Military Economy
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\04\30\story_30-4-2007_pg3_2
