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Date Posted: 14-Oct-2009
Jane's Defence Weekly
India keeps shooting itself in the foot
Despite the provision by the Indian government of huge defence budgets, the country's armed services have yet to achieve the desired modernisation, states Rahul Bedi
The long-delayed modernisation of the Indian military remains hindered by persistent bureaucratic vacillation on the part of the services and the Ministry of Defence (MoD).
Internecine service rivalries, ambiguous, complex and constantly changing procurement policies as well as recurring corruption scandals also contribute to blocking the renovation of the country's defence materiel.
With defence purchases projected to double to more than USD30 billion by 2012 and to climb further to around USD80 billion by 2022 as India continues to import its requirements, officials have admitted that the operational competence of its nearly 1.4 million-strong armed forces would remain "compromised" by equipment deficiencies and long-stalled modernisation programmes.
"Even though our government is earmarking huge budgets, it is not being fully reflected in our modernisation efforts," Defence Minister A K Antony declared in New Delhi earlier this year. Allocation of money has never been a problem. The issue has rather been the timely and judicious utilisation of money allocated, he conceded.
The inability of the services and MoD to take timely decisions led to INR42.17 billion (USD878 million) earmarked for purchases, upgrades and modernisation in Fiscal Year 2007-08 (FY07-08) being returned unspent to the federal fund. Earlier, INR183 billion had similarly reverted unused from FY02-07 as tenders were issued, withdrawn and then re-issued, contributing to overall delays that resulted in operational shortcomings.
"Under such conditions increased budgetary support each year makes little or no difference to military capacity building," said former Lieutenant General V K Kapoor. The entire procedure for gainfully expending the capital account needed overhauling to be effective, he declared, adding that the gap between the desired and existing military capability was rapidly widening.
Military planners said all these adverse factors were also impinging negatively on the military's overall aim of becoming network-enabled by 2009 and network-centric a year later.
Meanwhile, trials for the import of 197 light utility helicopters (LUHs) for the Army Aviation Corps (AAC) and Indian Air Force (IAF) to replace obsolete HAL-manufactured HSA 316B Chetak and HSA 315B Cheetah helicopters, which were due to take place in mid-2009, were rescheduled, replaced by winter try-outs expected to begin in February 2010. Summer trials will then follow.
These trials follow the MoD's scrapping in November 2007 of the USD500 million-USD600 million off-the-shelf acquisition of Eurocopter AS 550 C3 Fennec light observation helicopters in support of this requirement on the grounds of unexplained "discrepancies" in the evaluation process.
AAC sources concede that, even in the best-case scenario, it would take at least three years before the LUH trial reports were finalised, price negotiations concluded and the deal inked. Thereafter it would be another three to four years before the first batch of LUHs began arriving, leaving a massive operational shortfall.
Procurement by the Indian Army of around 3,600 varied 155 mm lightweight, towed, wheeled and tracked howitzers for around 180 of its 220 artillery regiments - as part of a long-pending modernisation drive under the Filed Artillery Rationalisation Programme - also stands deferred by at least a decade. Under this programme the artillery, which currently operates six different calibres, aims by 2020-25 to acquire a mix of 155 mm/39 cal lightweight and 155 mm/52 cal guns for an estimated USD5 billion-USD7 billion.
Additionally, the procurement, development and upgrade programmes for the army's main battle tanks - such as the T-90S, the domestically designed Arjun and the T-72M1 - are also in a state of flux, plagued by technological shortcomings and postponed decisions. For example, the majority of around 1,800 T-72M1s still await night sights after years of tendering and trials, with the latest round recently ending inconclusively.
In addition, the bulk of the army's air-defence guns - Bofors L-70s and Soviet Zu-23-2s and Zu-23-4s - and missiles such as the Russian Osa-AK and Kvadrat date back 30 to 40 years and need replacing.
The ambitious Future Infantry Soldier as a System (F-INSAS) programme to upgrade 465 infantry and 'dedicated' paramilitary battalions by 2020 is also deferred. F-INSAS includes a fully networked, all-terrain, all-weather personal equipment platform as well as enhanced firepower and mobility for the digitised battlefield of the future.
The IAF, for its part, is preoccupied with restoring its depleted assets, which will shortly decrease from approximately 30 combat squadrons to around 26 after the retirement of large numbers of Soviet and Russian MiG-21, MiG-23 and MiG-27 fighter aircraft.
The IAF has repeatedly warned the federal government to implement "corrective measures" to acquire additional fighters or risk losing air superiority over its neighbouring nuclear rival, Pakistan - but to little avail.
Trials to acquire 126 Multirole Combat Aircraft are continuing, but analysts do not expect a contract to be finalised and awarded before 2013-14, with inductions predicted to begin some time during the following four years and to continue until 2020-21.
The contract for the upgrade of the IAF's 51 Mirage 2000H aircraft is yet to be inked despite years of negotiation following price differences, while the agreement to retrofit 63 MiG-29B/S aircraft, including seven MiG-29UB trainers, has been delayed. The IAF's transport squadrons, air and ground missile capability as well as its helicopter fleet also need urgent augmentation.
Antony recently admitted that the IAF's air-defence ground environment systems, dating back to 1970-71, were "inadequate" for effective surveillance despite major changes in the security scenario and in technology, and the growing magnitude of sophisticated aerial threats.
The Indian Navy's six Scorpene submarines, under construction at Mazagon Dockyard in western India since 2006, face a cost escalation of INR20 billion over the original INR187.98 billion contract signed in October 2005, official sources said. Consequently their delivery dates of between 2012 and 2017 have been postponed as talks continue over the price hike.
The dispute over the threefold price increase - from USD974 million to nearly USD3 billion - for the retrofit of the 44,700-ton former Russian aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya (ex-Admiral Gorshkov), whose arrival has been delayed by four years to 2012-2013, also awaits resolution.
The navy also faces a grave shortage of combat aircraft to operate from its sole existing, and recently retrofitted, aircraft carrier INS Viraat, while its anti-submarine warfare helicopters are well past retirement age. Additionally, 63 per cent of its already deficient submarine fleet will be due for retirement by 2012.
Rahul Bedi is a JDW Correspondent, based in New Delhi
Date Posted: 14-Oct-2009
Jane's Defence Weekly
India keeps shooting itself in the foot
Despite the provision by the Indian government of huge defence budgets, the country's armed services have yet to achieve the desired modernisation, states Rahul Bedi
The long-delayed modernisation of the Indian military remains hindered by persistent bureaucratic vacillation on the part of the services and the Ministry of Defence (MoD).
Internecine service rivalries, ambiguous, complex and constantly changing procurement policies as well as recurring corruption scandals also contribute to blocking the renovation of the country's defence materiel.
With defence purchases projected to double to more than USD30 billion by 2012 and to climb further to around USD80 billion by 2022 as India continues to import its requirements, officials have admitted that the operational competence of its nearly 1.4 million-strong armed forces would remain "compromised" by equipment deficiencies and long-stalled modernisation programmes.
"Even though our government is earmarking huge budgets, it is not being fully reflected in our modernisation efforts," Defence Minister A K Antony declared in New Delhi earlier this year. Allocation of money has never been a problem. The issue has rather been the timely and judicious utilisation of money allocated, he conceded.
The inability of the services and MoD to take timely decisions led to INR42.17 billion (USD878 million) earmarked for purchases, upgrades and modernisation in Fiscal Year 2007-08 (FY07-08) being returned unspent to the federal fund. Earlier, INR183 billion had similarly reverted unused from FY02-07 as tenders were issued, withdrawn and then re-issued, contributing to overall delays that resulted in operational shortcomings.
"Under such conditions increased budgetary support each year makes little or no difference to military capacity building," said former Lieutenant General V K Kapoor. The entire procedure for gainfully expending the capital account needed overhauling to be effective, he declared, adding that the gap between the desired and existing military capability was rapidly widening.
Military planners said all these adverse factors were also impinging negatively on the military's overall aim of becoming network-enabled by 2009 and network-centric a year later.
Meanwhile, trials for the import of 197 light utility helicopters (LUHs) for the Army Aviation Corps (AAC) and Indian Air Force (IAF) to replace obsolete HAL-manufactured HSA 316B Chetak and HSA 315B Cheetah helicopters, which were due to take place in mid-2009, were rescheduled, replaced by winter try-outs expected to begin in February 2010. Summer trials will then follow.
These trials follow the MoD's scrapping in November 2007 of the USD500 million-USD600 million off-the-shelf acquisition of Eurocopter AS 550 C3 Fennec light observation helicopters in support of this requirement on the grounds of unexplained "discrepancies" in the evaluation process.
AAC sources concede that, even in the best-case scenario, it would take at least three years before the LUH trial reports were finalised, price negotiations concluded and the deal inked. Thereafter it would be another three to four years before the first batch of LUHs began arriving, leaving a massive operational shortfall.
Procurement by the Indian Army of around 3,600 varied 155 mm lightweight, towed, wheeled and tracked howitzers for around 180 of its 220 artillery regiments - as part of a long-pending modernisation drive under the Filed Artillery Rationalisation Programme - also stands deferred by at least a decade. Under this programme the artillery, which currently operates six different calibres, aims by 2020-25 to acquire a mix of 155 mm/39 cal lightweight and 155 mm/52 cal guns for an estimated USD5 billion-USD7 billion.
Additionally, the procurement, development and upgrade programmes for the army's main battle tanks - such as the T-90S, the domestically designed Arjun and the T-72M1 - are also in a state of flux, plagued by technological shortcomings and postponed decisions. For example, the majority of around 1,800 T-72M1s still await night sights after years of tendering and trials, with the latest round recently ending inconclusively.
In addition, the bulk of the army's air-defence guns - Bofors L-70s and Soviet Zu-23-2s and Zu-23-4s - and missiles such as the Russian Osa-AK and Kvadrat date back 30 to 40 years and need replacing.
The ambitious Future Infantry Soldier as a System (F-INSAS) programme to upgrade 465 infantry and 'dedicated' paramilitary battalions by 2020 is also deferred. F-INSAS includes a fully networked, all-terrain, all-weather personal equipment platform as well as enhanced firepower and mobility for the digitised battlefield of the future.
The IAF, for its part, is preoccupied with restoring its depleted assets, which will shortly decrease from approximately 30 combat squadrons to around 26 after the retirement of large numbers of Soviet and Russian MiG-21, MiG-23 and MiG-27 fighter aircraft.
The IAF has repeatedly warned the federal government to implement "corrective measures" to acquire additional fighters or risk losing air superiority over its neighbouring nuclear rival, Pakistan - but to little avail.
Trials to acquire 126 Multirole Combat Aircraft are continuing, but analysts do not expect a contract to be finalised and awarded before 2013-14, with inductions predicted to begin some time during the following four years and to continue until 2020-21.
The contract for the upgrade of the IAF's 51 Mirage 2000H aircraft is yet to be inked despite years of negotiation following price differences, while the agreement to retrofit 63 MiG-29B/S aircraft, including seven MiG-29UB trainers, has been delayed. The IAF's transport squadrons, air and ground missile capability as well as its helicopter fleet also need urgent augmentation.
Antony recently admitted that the IAF's air-defence ground environment systems, dating back to 1970-71, were "inadequate" for effective surveillance despite major changes in the security scenario and in technology, and the growing magnitude of sophisticated aerial threats.
The Indian Navy's six Scorpene submarines, under construction at Mazagon Dockyard in western India since 2006, face a cost escalation of INR20 billion over the original INR187.98 billion contract signed in October 2005, official sources said. Consequently their delivery dates of between 2012 and 2017 have been postponed as talks continue over the price hike.
The dispute over the threefold price increase - from USD974 million to nearly USD3 billion - for the retrofit of the 44,700-ton former Russian aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya (ex-Admiral Gorshkov), whose arrival has been delayed by four years to 2012-2013, also awaits resolution.
The navy also faces a grave shortage of combat aircraft to operate from its sole existing, and recently retrofitted, aircraft carrier INS Viraat, while its anti-submarine warfare helicopters are well past retirement age. Additionally, 63 per cent of its already deficient submarine fleet will be due for retirement by 2012.
Rahul Bedi is a JDW Correspondent, based in New Delhi
