sudhir007
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Food for Thought: Optimising Defence Spending | Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
In contrast, India is set to purchase a whole host of ammunition, guns, assault rifles, Night Vision Devices (NVD), bullet-proof jackets, and many other low-tech defence equipment in addition to big ticket items such as aircraft, ships, submarines, tanks and artillery guns.
While such reports are not necessarily wholly authentic, the Indian Armys equipment shortfall includes some 200,000 close-quarter battle carbines to replace the outdated 9 mm carbines currently in use, 15,000 general-purpose machine guns, 1,100 lightweight anti-material rifles, 225 mine-protected vehicles, and 64 snow scooters for use at high altitudes. There is also reportedly a paucity of around 390,000 ballistic helmets, more than 30,000 third-generation Night Vision devices, 180,000 light-weight bullet-proof jackets, new-generation grenades and around 50,000 rounds of 84 mm rocket launcher ammunition.7 It is indeed surprising that even these relatively low tech defence items have to be purchased from abroad.
As an example of its continued prowess in defence it is noteworthy that Chinas AVIC Helicopter Co (Avicopter) is breaking away from Eurocopter, its partner, in the joint EC175/Z-15 medium helicopter programme, following a decision to re-engine the Chinese Z-15 variant with an indigenous power plant.8 The contrast with India is stark. The Indian Air Force does not have a basic trainer and has been forced to rely on the very few old Kiran Mk 1 jet trainers to train its pilot trainees with no signs of any improvement in the near future. The new AJT Hawk fleet is plagued with slow delivery and spares problems. HAL is reportedly suing BAE, its manufacturer, for these delays.
In light of these developments, it is perhaps time India reviewed its major acquisition plans to bring them in line with the current economic realities. While the latest defence budget has no doubt catered for a sizeable capital component, it may be prudent to reduce costs by switching to more affordable programmes. If, for example, SAAB can offer a cheap JAS-39 Gripen to Bulgaria then it can do so to India as well.
Similarly, if second-hand F-16s are going abegging in Europe and if Pakistan can get these at reduced costs because it is a Non-NATO Ally entitled to their purchase under the Excess Defence Article (EDA) scheme from the United States, why should India even consider these as possible candidates in the MMRCA competition. It is also worth noting that Boeing is closing the FA-18 E/F Super Hornet production line by 2014 which means that only an Indian order for 126 fighters would keep it open. In such circumstances, Indias bargaining power should automatically improve and it may become possible to prevail upon the prospective supplier to open manufacturing facilities in India rather that simply insisting on the offset provisions.
It is evident that the costs of modern defence equipment of Western origin are skyrocketing. Unless India can quickly build and expand its defence manufacturing base it cannot hope to meet the future needs of its defence forces even with a sizeable annual increase in the defence budget. This would in turn depend upon the continued steady growth of the Indian economy.
