India-China relations - Balance of Power and Containment policies

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Beyond the Nuclear Deal: India, China and the Asian Balance of Power

Dr. Bhartendu Kumar Singh

Indian Defence Accounts Service

IPCS – July 31, 2007

First, it was the statement by the US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice that India should abandon its association with the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and openly ally with the US that caused ripples among strategic experts. Now it is the Indo-US nuclear deal. If there is one country that should be concerned, if not worried by the recent developments, it is China.
It is well known that both India and China have always been at loggerheads on nuclear issues despite an improvement in their overall bilateral relations. When India went nuclear in 1998, Beijing's tone was akin to that of Washington. However, while the US subsequently followed up with a policy of 'engagement and accommodation' of India's legitimate interests on nuclear issues, China continued to demand a roll back of India's nuclear programme. Even as the Indo-US nuclear energy cooperation agreement was being negotiated, the Chinese official media attacked it, arguing that the bilateral deal would inflict a 'hard blow' upon the global non-proliferation regime and trigger a domino effect.

The nuclear deal embodies the US recognition of India as a quasi-nuclear state. China may not be comfortable with India's new status for a number of reasons, not excluding India's rising stature as a great power. China fears that the deal will open the possibilities of Indo-US cooperation on a number of other strategic issues. If India and the US are allowed to cooperate more closely, it is bound to redefine the Asian balance of power.

This was probably one of the guiding factors in the Chinese President Hu Jintao proposing a 'strategic partnership' with India during his trip to New Delhi last year. The Chinese were also instrumental in revitalizing the trilateral strategic cooperation with Russia and sought its institutionalization. China has sought to establish closer ties with India through a web of political, economic and military relations.

Suddenly, India has become the toast of all stakeholders in Asian security. No great game can succeed in Asia without India's active involvement. For example, the US proposal has come at a time when its superpower delusions have been challenged due to the Afghanistan and Iraq fiascoes. Its traditional allies, mostly from the NATO group, have been playing power games, thus prolonging the American agony. Further, there is an increasing resistance to American agendas in its relations with Russia and China. An alliance with India, formal or discreet, could provide the US a much desired pillar of support in the Asian continent.

Should India ally with the US? This is indeed a million dollar question. If India joins the US bandwagon, the balance of power in Asia could change overnight. The coming together of democratic US, Japan, India and Australia could send China into reverse gear. The ongoing Asian security discourse, responsible for forging a broad understanding on major issues in the region, would be thrown off course. Worse, the gradual expansion of Sino-Indian relations, much needed for stabilizing Asian security, may come to a halt.

The fundamental contradictions between India and China are too apparent to permit any 'strategic partnership.' Apart from the differences over the border, on the expansion of the UN Security Council and different perspectives on establishing a favourable world order, the two countries exhibit a basic conflict of values, besides mutual suspicions and misperceptions. The perennial competition for power and influence in Asia will prevent India and China from coming together on a permanent basis.

Fortunately, the Asian balance of power, as it is evolving, may not be based on any ideological considerations as during the Cold War. Instead, loose coalitions are likely to emerge on specific issues. So, while on many issues, India and China might have similar views, on others India and US may find themselves pitted against China. Similarly, there could also be Sino-US understanding against India.

As a rising power, India needs to build good relations with both the US and China. Alignment with one could invite a knee-jerk reaction from the other. Since all great powers have stakes in Asian security, India would do well to maintain good relations with all of them. Hence, issue-based cooperation and not alliances are the long term options for Indian foreign policy. India must develop innovative ideas and arrangements that would appeal to a wider fraternity in Asia. The Indo-US nuclear deal is an example of protracted but fruitful talks with tangible benefits for India. It also indicates how deals can be clinched without distorting the balance of power in Asia.

Note: The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Government.

http://www.ipcs.org/whatsNewArticle1.jsp?action=showView&kValue=2359&status=article&mod=b

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India and China on parade

It seems that these military exercises are signals from Delhi implying that it is uninterested in ‘containing’ China, as the United States might have hoped. Indeed, considering the Indo-US nuclear negotiations, some might argue that the United States is in favour of a possible containment of China. Yet this is unlikely to be an Indian strategy, as it is in the midst of assuring China that it desires better relations – even in spite of the repeated failures to resolve the border disputes and the occasional Chinese claims to Arunachal Pradesh, writes

Jagannath P Panda

New Age – August 2, 2007

The recent upsurge in military exchanges and cooperation between China and India has focused on two contentious issues: counter-terrorism and joint military exercises.
The decision to conduct a joint counter-terrorism drill next October was announced by Indian Army Chief of Staff J J Singh after his visit to China in May. By using the military exercise as the centrepiece of Sino-Indian defence ties, both countries seek to use it to improve upon their confidence in each other.

Just before leaving for China, Singh said, ‘In principle, the Chinese have agreed to hold such an exercise ... both armies are interested in expanding military-to-military ties.’
After Singh’s China tour, an Indian Defence Ministry statement announced that ‘the visit marked a decision in the engagement and mutual confidence-building mechanism by seeking to hold periodic joint military training exercises between the two armies’.

Though these initiatives are seen as a significant step toward improving bilateral relations, a strain of mistrust, stemming from long-standing unresolved border disputes and China’s arms sales to Pakistan, continues to pervade Sino-Indian military relations.

Two additional issues –– renewed Chinese claims to what it calls Zangnan or South Tibet, the Indian-administered state of Arunachal Pradesh on India’s northeast frontier, and China’s visa denial to an Arunachal Pradesh official –– have added a new kink to Sino-Indian relations. With this backdrop, observers question whether the proposed joint military exercise will bring any difference to the overall course of the bilateral relationship.

Moreover, there are doubts and questions regarding the significance of the joint military exercise. Where does it rank in comparison to the overall People’s Liberation Army (PLA) strategy of holding joint exercises with other major military powers in the region?

Chinese military diplomacy

From the Chinese perspective, a striking aspect of its military diplomacy in recent years has been to establish defence links through joint military drills. Chinese military leaders have given priority to a range of joint military exercises –– specifically to search and rescue and counter-terrorism operations –– to advance the interests of the PLA by providing its soldiers with exposure to foreign training and expertise and enhance its comprehensive modernisation programme.

As a result, the PLA’s annual defence consultations are conducted with both global and regional powers, including Russia, France, South Africa, Pakistan, Thailand and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation member states. The PLA hopes that by pursuing greater interaction with other well-trained soldiers, it might be able to obtain valuable lessons and intelligence as well as develop confidence-building measures.

These practices fall squarely within Beijing’s strategy to build a secure neighbourhood before gradually extending its influence throughout the world. Indeed, this is evident in China’s efforts to enhance confidence measures, reduce troops and military forces along borders, enforce disarmament in the border areas, and increase the transparency of border defence.

From the geopolitical perspective, China has increasingly relied on its military diplomacy –– establishing a wide variety of security dialogues, joint manoeuvres and military exercises –– to advance its strategic ambitions. China’s defence collaboration with India, however, started to improve only in 2006. The current joint exercise initiative is a carry-over of the first defence memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed last year.

The May 29, 2006, defence MoU between China and India explicitly mentions important contacts such as ‘frequent exchanges’, an ‘annual defence dialogue’ and ‘joint military exercises in the fields of search and rescue, anti-piracy and counter-terrorism’. This MoU insists on observing ‘balance and reciprocity’ in such military exchanges between the two countries. This does not mean, however, that there is a willingness from both the sides to build a bilateral framework to confront problematic issues. Moreover, the critical question remains whether the exercises reflect an evolving Sino-Indian security framework or they are simply a routine engagement at the defence level.

Despite these developments, it appears that serious obstacles to normal relations persist at multiple levels. Undoubtedly, many view these defence ties, and particularly Singh’s recent visit to China, as a positive development. One can see a greater emphasis on ‘pragmatism’ in defence exchanges between the two countries. In support of this, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson has stated, ‘We hope to work with India ... to improve and press ahead with the strategic partnership oriented toward peace and stability.’

Perhaps the significance of these exchanges is their unprecedented nature; not even in the prime days of the bhai-bhai (Indians and Chinese are brothers) Sino-Indian relations did this type of relationship exist. It seems that the proposed ‘joint military operations’ are intended to bridge the communications gap between the two militaries. Both armies are in favour of inviting observers to their exercises, which suggests a ‘degree of comfort’ with each other more than anything else.

Counter-terrorism as the locus

In the forthcoming October bilateral joint exercise, counter-terrorism drills will dominate the engagement. It is reported that 100 Indian soldiers will be sent to China to participate in the proposed training operation. This operation should be seen more as a reflection of China’s interests than as a bilateral initiative.

The first open suggestion to include counter-terrorism as an issue in Sino-Indian engagement came from China even before September 11, 2001, when former Chinese premier Li Peng visited India in January 2001. In an interview to The Hindu, he said, ‘China is willing to cooperate with all countries which are against terrorism. Of course, India is one of them. China supports every effort to combat international terrorism through the formulation of international conventions and hopes that the international community will take further steps to improve the anti-terrorism international legal framework.’

September 11 provided China with the opportunity to revisit the sensitive issue of terrorism and express its interest in cooperating with India on counter-terrorism efforts. On January 12, 2002, during his India visit, then-premier Zhu Rongji said, ‘China and India have much common ground on counter-terrorism. The Chinese side is ready to step up exchanges and cooperation with India and other relevant parties in this field.’

Since then, counter-terrorism has often been discussed as an issue in bilateral relations. The current proposal for counter-terrorism exercises, however, should be considered an important development from the Chinese perspective on two accounts: first, China’s own concerns regarding separatist activities in Xinjiang and Tibet, and second, China’s counter-terrorism preparations before next year’s Summer Olympics in Beijing.

Given these considerations, Chinese authorities have expressed an interest in learning from the Indian military’s tactics and methods in countering the insurgency in Kashmir. Concurrently, India appears eager to improve its counter-terrorism capabilities for its 2010 Commonwealth Games by gleaning lessons from China’s 2008 Olympics security preparations.

The impact of the exercises

Despite these complimentary interests and the increase in cooperation, it seems that the exercises are unlikely to bring about actual confidence at the bilateral level. This is partly because of the ambivalent stance China has taken on the issue of cross-border terrorism in Kashmir.

Since September 11, when both the Kashmir conflict and terrorism in the region came under severe international scrutiny, the region has become an area of international strategic significance. Nevertheless, the conflict in Kashmir is inextricably linked to inter-state relations. The issue is further complicated by the rivalry between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir dispute and, to an extent, the China-Pakistan nexus.

Moreover, counter-terrorism operations in the Kashmir Valley are further compounded by the constant tensions between India and Pakistan, leading to a continued anxiety with the occasional direct or indirect involvement of China. Whereas China’s role in the ‘war against terrorism’ after September 11 has been praiseworthy from the Western perspective, Beijing’s equivocal stance on the issue of ‘cross-border terrorism’ in Kashmir raises questions about its credibility and intentions as a counter-terrorism partner of India.

In addition, while terrorist incidents in Jammu and Kashmir have been termed a ‘cross-border’ issue –– attracting consistent condemnation from all major international powers –– China, though a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and an immediate neighbour to the region, has thus far avoided taking a clear stand. To China, the situation in Kashmir is a result of ‘ethnic problems and the sharp disparity between the rich and the poor, which offers soil for the long-term existence of terrorism’.

Competing concerns

China’s unwillingness to position itself on either side of the dispute stems largely from its conflicted interests. As terrorism and religious extremism remain major problems in the Kashmir Valley, Beijing’s strong stance against terrorism would be diplomatically useful, especially in shaping public perceptions in India that both countries have much in common in the fight against terrorism.

For example, international terrorist and jihadist groups have separately attempted to build separatist movements in various forms both in Xinjiang and Kashmir. Militants from Xinjiang fought with the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the porous mountain borders converging among Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and China make the region difficult to secure. A joint effort based on the common recognition of terrorist groups would encourage greater understanding between China and India. China would also benefit considerably from India’s counterinsurgency experience, given its own struggle against Uighur militants in Xinjiang.

Nevertheless, there is a great deal of reservation from China in taking a firm position on cross-border terrorism in Kashmir. China’s silence clearly stems from its interest in Kashmir, which is largely a result of the October 1963 Sino-Pakistani border agreement. An additional reason for China’s interest in Kashmir is ‘the restive Islamic population in its Xinjiang autonomous region bordering Kashmir, which creates both a geographical and Islamic connection between China’s internal security and both India and Pakistan’.

Historically, this larger region served as the crossroads of the evolutionary flow of Islamic influences among Central, South, and West Asian Islamic cultures. In fact, the constant indulgence of China in Kashmir affairs was aimed, on the one hand, at ensuring the security of the Xinjiang area bordering Kashmir by befriending the neighbouring Muslim countries and, on the other hand, to check India by supporting Pakistan on Kashmir affairs.

On the domestic front, China is known for its tight constraints on religious freedom, and this is clearly evidenced in its recent actions against the Muslim Uighurs in Xinjiang. It is important to reiterate that in Xinjiang, Islam is perceived by Chinese authorities as feeding Uighur ethnic identity, and so the subordination of Islam to the state is used as a means to ensure the subordination of Uighurs. Yet China does not want to take a stance against the Islamic issues that have always been the cornerstone of terrorism in Kashmir. Beijing’s challenges lie in its attempt to brand the Uighur separatists as ‘terrorists’, on the one hand, while avoiding any civil unrest that might occur in Xinjiang, on the other.

Chinese posture and Indian reluctance

While the two navies have previously conducted a handful of joint exercises, this will be the first time that the two armies have held drills with each other. It seems that these military exercises are signals from Delhi implying that it is uninterested in ‘containing’ China, as the United States might have hoped. Indeed, considering the Indo-US nuclear negotiations, some might argue that the United States is in favour of a possible containment of China.

Yet this is unlikely to be an Indian strategy, as it is in the midst of assuring China that it desires better relations –– even in spite of the repeated failures to resolve the border disputes and the occasional Chinese claims to Arunachal Pradesh.

Although there have been several contested issues in the current military MoU regarding the adjacent areas of the border, both nations have shown a substantial inclination to move in a ‘positive and forward-looking’ manner. At the moment, the current military exchange appears to be a progression toward greater pragmatic cooperation, regardless of any significant change at the bilateral level. Overall, the proposed ‘Sino-Indian military exchange’ is seen as a welcome development in the context of regional peace and stability.

Among Indian observers, however, there is also a consensus that regardless of the progress in military exchanges, there remains a need to monitor China’s joint military exercises with the countries within India’s proximity. Indian officials express anxiety regarding China’s efforts to modernise its military and supply arms to regional countries.

Though both India and China have adopted a unified stance on the need for a ‘multipolar world’, there remains a strain of suspicion that permeates the Sino-Indian joint military exercise. It is viewed as being more favourable to the interests of China, allowing it to gain a better understanding of India’s defence plans.

Moreover, the scope of the forthcoming joint exercises has its own limitations. This was proposed and initiated by the Chinese, despite India’s constant reservations regarding certain Chinese activities –– namely, the Chinese presence in the Coco Islands, where a Chinese listening post monitors India’s missile-testing centre at Balasore in eastern India.

Considering the instability of this defence engagement, a great degree of practicality governs both sides. There remain significant limitations in China’s relationship with India’s defence establishment in terms of the breadth and depth of potential exercises. Furthermore, the Indo-US nuclear deal and the changing South Asian strategic landscapes have led both Beijing and Delhi to proceed cautiously in building their strategic relationship. Since China’s ties with India involve boundary disputes –– especially given China’s recent claim to Arunachal Pradesh –– it is expected that the military ties will remain tenuous in the years to come.

Asia Times/HK Online, August 1, 2007

http://www.newagebd.com/oped.html

 

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INDIA-UNITED STATES STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP: THE REVERBERATIONS FROM CHINA AND RUSSIA.

By Dr. Subhash Kapila

SAAG – August 2, 2007

Introductory Observations

The India-United States Strategic Partnership for all practical purposes is still in an embryonic form. Once fully evolved, and there are many ifs and buts along that path, a substantive India-United States Strategic Partnership has the potential to alter the Asian regional power balance and so also the overall global power balance.

A substantive India-United States Strategic Partnership to emerge would call for the complete transformation of India’s foreign and strategic policies from its existing moorings. The big question is whether India as a whole is prepared to accept such structural overhaul and also whether the present Congress Government relying on support of coalition partners ideologically opposed to the United States can carry through such strategic reorientation.

Public opinion surveys showing a large majority of Indians as well-disposed towards USA should not be misconstrued and read as that India overwhelmingly would also support. US-India Strategic Partnership. The two are a different sets of equations. When it comes to a strongly embedded strategic partnership with the United States there is a certain hesitancy in India, as the same set of Indians (including a wide section of the strategic community) believe that the United States is not a benign power and does not believe in equal partnerships. Further the US-Pakistan strategic nexus and the torturous path that the US-India Civilian Nuclear Deal has taken despite the best of intentions of President Bush contribute to reservations in the Indian mind.

The rhetoric that emerges from New Delhi and Washington on this account cannot gloss over the underlying problems that would have to be confronted by any Indian Government both within the country and on the global stage on a restructuring of its foreign policy approaches and strategic orientation to forge a substantive India-United States Strategic Partnership
India’s Strategic Preferences Seem to be Transforming India- US Strategic Partnership was originated and fostered by the previous BJP Government, but in a graduated manner. It was proceeding towards enhanced strategic consultations at high levels, joint military training exercises and military-to-military contacts. The US-India Civil Nuclear Deal also originated then.

The major global players had begun noticing the tentative moves by India to evolve a strategic partnership with the United States. However, the reverberations then were muted, as India was perceived as in the quest for widening its strategic partnerships base with other countries too – France, Israel, the European Union, Japan etc.

In marked contrast, the present Indian Government, led by the Congress Party in the last two years or so, has noticeably transcended the threshold of the wider quest for new strategic partnerships to one of a monochromatic strategic partnership with the United States. The present Indian Government is being seen both within the country and abroad as virtually transforming India into a military alliance partner of the United States.

The above stands manifested in the following: (1) Trilateral naval exercises with Japan and USA in the Pacific (2) Tacitly subscribing to the ‘Axis of Democracies’ concept (oblivious to the fact that democracies do not forge an ‘Axis’ as that is the hallmark of fascist or dictatorial regimes) (3) USA- Japan-India Trilateral and (4) USA-Japan-Australia-India Quadrilateral.
It should be apparent to any discerning strategic analyst that the above concepts and initiatives sponsored by the United States are not politically or economically oriented but are patently strategic moves impelled by the balance-of power concept and to reinforce the status-quo in the global power balance under challenge in the Pacific.

In other words, the present Indian Government is allowing itself to be drawn and used for political signaling in the global strategic calculus. It is also sending out strong messages of an Indian strategic tilt.

Since such a development was a marked and significant departure from India’s foreign policy and strategic postures and depicting a discernible tilt, the reverberations have not been slow in coming.

China and Russia have both reacted in subtle signaling to indicate both their strategic concerns and displeasure to India.

China’s Strategic Displeasure on India-United States Strategic Partnership Emergence
China’s strategic analysts have been avidly following the strategic developments on the US-Strategic Partnership for the last few years. China is the one nation likely to be most affected by a substantive US-India Strategic Partnership. A number of analyses by China’s strategic community are available.

The above is not only because China has geographical contiguity with India and an unresolved border dispute but more importantly because the “Strategic Geometries” that India is being drawn into in the Pacific will upset Chinas strategic aims in its front yard.

China’s strategic displeasure reverberations on the above account have recently manifested in a number of ways: (1) Reassertion of the contentious Sino-Indian border dispute in relation to Arunachal Pradesh and Tawang (2) Reasserting that whole of Arunachal Pradesh is part of China (3) Refusal of visas to IAS officers from Arunachal Pradesh (4) Boundary negotiations being allowed to linger (5) Hardening of attitudes towards the Dalai Lama (6) Enhanced high level political visits between China and Pakistan.(7) China’s opposition to India’s candidature as Permanent Member of the UN Security Council has to be viewed in the same light.(8) China’s strong opposition to the passage of the US-India Civilian Nuclear Deal through the IAEA and the NSG can now be considered a certainty.

One can also expect in the near future some significant increase in China’s military aid/cooperation with Pakistan especially in the missiles field and launching of spy satellites for Pakistan. We can also expect considerable Chinese assistance to Pakistan in construction of additional nuclear reactors.

Should India be really concerned with China’s manifested strategic displeasures? Not really, one would think so, as India too has the right to indulge in counter-strategic pressures against China as China was doing so all along so far by using Pakistan against India.

Should India take note of it? Very certainly and absolutely it must do so. As India proceeds on its trajectory towards global power status, China must seriously and significantly figure in India’s strategic calculus, irrespective of what contours the US-India Strategic Partnership assumes.

China as it is was figuring in India’s threat perceptions because of its policies of strategic destabilization of India through proxy strategic use of Pakistan. It arose from a combination of factors of the India-China boundary dispute, fears of India using Tibet as a strategic pressure point against China and in recent years arising from impeding India’s rise as a global power.
India’s strategic planning establishment now needs to add to the above factors that the strategic reverberations from China on the evolving India-US Strategic Partnership would be forthcoming in multiple and enlarge ways.

The Strategic Reverberations from Russia

The India-Russia Strategic Partnership has been a long enduring and substantive one. In fact it is the only one existing because the India-US Strategic Partnership is yet to evolve. It is a partnership which has stood the test of time except for a very brief interregnum of the Yeltsin years when under United States pressure and influence he diluted the relationship.

Russia today is in a resurgent mode and consequently Russia-US relationship is under strain. Expectedly, any regional or global strategic development which has the potential to add weight to United States in the global strategic balance would not be welcome to Russia at this stage. The contours that the present Indian Government is allowing to be added in terms of the US sponsored “strategic geometries” in the Pacific fall in this category.

Russia’s initial displeasure on India’s strategic reorientations has already manifested itself in the form of Russian demands for re-negotiation of existing Indian military hard-ware contracts with Russia in terms of price escalations and a certain diffidence in negotiations with India for new vital military hardware.

More serious Russian strategic manifestations are likely to occur if the present Indian Government allots the $ 7 billion order for Indian Air Force fighter planes to the United States as a single vendor. This is a deal which can send out strong distorted strategic messages and the present Indian Government needs to tread seriously and with care when deciding on this deal.

In short, India should seriously recognize that Russia, if it wants to, can seriously cripple the Indian Armed Forces operationally, if it decides to freeze spare parts and related supplies of the 70% - 80% Russian-origin military inventories of the Indian military machine. This particularly applies to the Indian Air Force and the Indian Navy where lead times for materialization of alternatives take decades in terms of time.

The above is a very strong leverage that Russia can use as a pressure point against India to restrain India from a headlong rush and strategic embrace of the United States.

Concluding Observations

The India-United States Strategic Partnership needs to be viewed both in New Delhi and Washington as a “partnership only” and can never become a “military alliance”. The latter goes against the grain of a deeply embedded fixation in the Indian psyche that India cannot become any one’s satellite. It never took place when India was not that powerful earlier, and it will be resisted by the Indian people that much more when India-at-large is becoming highly conscious of the nation’s increasing military and economic power. India’s middle class is highly nationalistic on this account.

If that be so, then the important point that arises is that a flourishing and value-added India-United States Strategic Partnership can still exist without India being drawn into ‘strategic geometries’ which project a marked strategic tilt in India’s strategic postures and generates avoidable strategic reverberations.

India’s strategic and foreign policy establishment must recognize that India’s management of its strategic partnerships, both existing and evolving must be adroitly done. India’s strategic stances must not generate reverberations from other global power centers, until India reaches the culminating stage of emerging as an independent power center in the world.

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Indo-US nuke deal risks arms race

Says Pakistan

Afp, Islamabad

The Daily Star – August 3, 2007

Pakistan warned yesterday that a civilian nuclear accord between India and the United States threatens regional stability, saying it would allow its arch rival to produce more atomic bombs.
The caution came at a meeting of Pakistan's National Command Authority (NCA) chaired by President Pervez Musharraf, a statement said. The body oversees the country's nuclear strategy.

The long-delayed deal announced in July in Washington allows US exports of civilian nuclear fuel and technology to India for the first time in 30 years.

"The NCA noted that the US-India nuclear agreement would have implications on strategic stability as it would enable India to produce significant quantities of fissile material and nuclear weapons from unsafeguarded nuclear reactors," the statement said.

The deal has caused unease in Islamabad, which has firmly allied itself with Washington in its post-9/11 "war on terror" and is suspicious of growing US ties to neighbouring India.

Muslim majority Pakistan and mainly Hindu India have fought three wars since independence from Britain 60 years ago and they carried out tit-for-tat nuclear detonations in 1998 that alarmed the world.

The NCA said that peace in South Asia "would have been better served if the United States had considered a package approach for Pakistan and India", neither of which are signatories to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Pakistan would continue to pursue its military and civilian nuclear programmes, it added.
"While continuing to act with responsibility in maintaining credible minimum deterrence and avoiding an arms race, Pakistan will neither be oblivious to its security requirements, nor to the needs of its economic development which demand growth in the energy sector," the statement said.

President George W. Bush said last week he looked forward to working with the Democratic-controlled Congress to implement the nuclear deal, saying it was "another step" in ties with India, which he called "a vital world leader."

The accord also allows India to reprocess spent fuel under safeguards imposed by the International Atomic Energy Agency, going one step further than a law passed by the US Congress in December.

 

[BanglaBhoot]

American hug, Chinese frown

Will Beijing, piqued by perceptions of India letting itself be used by the US against China, treat India as a special case in the NSG and agree to lifting the restrictions on India without simultaneously lifting those on Pakistan, asks B Raman

The News Today - August 5, 2007

The US uses countries and leaders when it suits it and when it feels that such use is in its national interest. If a situation arises when it concludes that they are no longer of use to it, it has no qualms of conscience over discarding them. The history of the US’ bilateral relations with other countries is littered with such instances of its going back on its obligations in its national interest.

You don’t have to go far to find an example.Look at the US’ relations with Pakistan. So long as the US was engaged in a cold war with the USSR, Pakistan was Washington’s privileged ally. When the USSR collapsed and the cold war ended, Pakistan was downgraded in its importance. After 9/11, Pakistan and General Pervez Musharraf were toasted once again as front-line allies.If Pakistan fails to deliver on the terrorism front or in the unlikely event of the so-called war against terrorism losing its present importance, we will have another steep turn in the US policy towards Pakistan.

To maintain a balance, it is important to keep this in view in the current debate on the pros and cons of the recently-concluded agreement on Indo-US Civil Nuclear Co-operation, which is often referred to as the 123 agreement—a reference to the relevant section of the US law relating to nuclear co-operation.

Even if our agreement with the US is satisfactory in every respect from our point of view, it is no guarantee that there will not be another Tarapore trauma. After our first nuclear test of 1974, the US did not hesitate to break its solemn contractual obligations and starve the USaided power station of fuel to punish us for the test.

The US will observe the provisions of the 123 Agreement so long as it suits it and it looks upon India as of importance to it in its pursuit of its global designs and ambitions. If a day comes when the US decides that India is no longer of such importance to its national interests or when it fears that India’s indigenous nuclear projects are detrimental to its nuclear agenda, it will not hesitate to throw the 123 agreement into the waste paper basket and try to enforce its will on India.

What is called for is not an unwarranted euphoria generated by spins and wishful-thinking or counter-productive criticism, but a careful identification of the various scenarios in which the implementation of the agreement can turn sour and we are confronted with another Tarapore-like situation. The purpose of such an exercise should be to have a clear idea of the various fall-back options that would be available to us and to keep ourselves in readiness for being able to use them. One does not see evidence of such an exercise.

There is a need for a three-track approach. First, to keep pressing ahead in our quest for nuclear self-sufficiency so that we can produce one day all the nuclear power we need through our own resources and efforts. Second, to force open the doors to international nuclear commerce so that we can buy our requirements of power stations and related technologies till such time as we reach the goal of self-sufficiency. The recently-concluded agreement with the US is one of the initial steps in our attempt to break open the doors, which are till now shut against us. And third, to keep ourselves mentally and in other ways prepared to meet a situation in which the doors might again be closed against us before we reach the goal of self-sufficiency. A comprehensive exercise to cater to these three tracks is the need of the hour.

Unfortunately, the national debate on this subject has got stuck in a “for or against” syndrome. If one is for it, one can think of dozens of reasons for supporting it. If one is against it, one can equally find dozens of reasons for opposing it.

The question now is not just one of “for or against”, but how to protect ourselves from the vagaries of US perceptions and policy-making and any bad faith in its implementation by the US.

More than the agreement itself, the circumstances surrounding the negotiations which preceded its finalisation and the changing attitude to the US amongst the present political leaders in power in New Delhi and the small group of officials and non-official intellectuals advising them should be a matter of concern to public opinion. The negotiations and the background against which these were conducted brought out certain defining characteristics of the leaders and their advisers. Firstly, the lack of transparency. All governments in India have tended to be less transparent than they ought to have been, but none has been more opaque in policy-making than the present one. Second, the noticeable contempt for those expressing reservations about the present policy of the government towards the US in general and this agreement in particular. One could sense an orchestrated attempt to ridicule and discredit them. Even Indira Gandhi, during the emergency, had not indulged in such tactics to discredit her opponents. Third, an uncritical fascination for the US and a disquieting belief that India’s ultimate salvation and its emergence and recognition as a major power lie in close relations with the US and a readiness to be subservient to its policy goals. Fourth, a greater willingness to be sensitive to the views and concerns of American legislators and moulders of public opinion than to those of India.

The US is an important country. It is in India’s interest to maintain the closest of relations with it without damaging our sense of national dignity and the needs of our national interests. It is at the same time important to ensure that our pursuit of close relations with the US and the manner in which we are doing so do not create wrong perceptions of India in the minds of other countries such as China, in the Islamic world and in our own Muslim community, which has made us proud by keeping away from pan-Islamism and the global jihad of Al Qaeda brand.
Rightly or wrongly, there is a perception among large sections of thinking people in our own country that the pursuit of close relations with the US has been at the cost of the independence of our decision-making in matters concerning foreign policy today. It could be in matters concerning economic policy tomorrow. We have seen examples of this in our vote against Iran in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, our maintaining a studied distance from the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation, our discreet silence on the deaths of hundreds of civilians in Afghanistan and Iraq due to American air strikes, the welcome accorded to US naval ships which are engaged in the military operations in Iraq, and our letting ourselves be inveigled into a closer working relationship with the US,Japan and Australia.

There has been no proper examination of the likely impact of our US-induced policy changes on our relations with China and on the attitude of our Muslim community. There are already indicators of Beijing’s concern over the direction which our foreign policy has been taking at the nudge of Washington DC. The Chinese opposition to our becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council and the lack of American enthusiasm for the idea frustrated our ambitions. We no longer talk of our quest for this.

A consensus in the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG) on removing the restrictions on civilian nuclear trade with India would depend ultimately on the Chinese willingness to go along with it.

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