INDIA: Building a Modern Arsenal in India

[desiman]

India's Medium Combat Aircraft

In August 2008, right about the time the Indian Air Force had decided to officially kickstart procedures to get the Medium Combat Aircraft (MCA) off the realm of theory, then Chief of Air Staff Fali Major happened to bump into DRDO chief M Natarajan and then HAL chairman Ashok Baweja at an industry suppliers function in Bangalore. The Chief was mildly irritated that both Baweja and Natarajan had provided media sound-bytes and interviews suggesting that the MCA would have "fifth generation technologies". He impressed upon both gentlemen, over tea, that if the MCA went the LCA way, it would be not just unacceptable to the air force, but an act of criminal disregard for the country's security. "Give the air force a bloody first-rate fourth generation aeroplane. That is the job before you," he said.

Two months later, in October 2008, the name of the MCA programme was changed (on recommendation to the Secretary, Defence Production) to "Next Generation Fighter Aircraft", though MCA continues to be used alternatively without any particular distinction.

As per official documentation by the IAF, it wants the MCA to be a twin-pilot configured multirole stealth aircraft capable of "close air support, all weather interception, air defence suppression, long-range strike, electronic attack, limited command & control and reconnaisance" -- that's the profile from an official IAF wishlist to the ADA last year. That might roll right off the air force's tongue, like off a brochure, but they're deadly serious. Putting all speculation to rest when it officially began dialogue about the MCA in 2008, the IAF said it was not willing to look at a strike aircraft with other capabilities. It wants a fully multirole (preferably, swingrole) aircraft for the job.

As we speak, a joint committee of several bodies involved with the NGFA is finetuning the configuration of the final jet, before work begins on building a tech demonstrator, three prototype vehicles and two production series trial jets -- the wind tunnel model unveiled at Yelahanka in February 2009 is largely what the aircraft will look like, though there are three other variants that have not been displayed yet. A twin-engine delta planfrom version, which was a direct derivative from the LCA, has since been shelved -- low observable requirements demanded a fully new airframe approach, which finally ended in the design that people got to see at Aero India 2009. While the wind-tunnel model, fabricated by a Bangalore-based engineering firm, is the product of an ADA/HAL study, there will be dramatic changes yet to the aircraft's intakes (utterly radar friendly, according to the IAF), vertical stabilisers and dorsal section, say sources.

Air Chief Marshal PV Naik, in his first interaction with the ADA last year, seemed to nitpick on indigenous radar capability, more than anything else when it came to the topic of the MCA. Sources say he was deeply incensed when given a brief on the Multi-mode Radar (MMR), pioneered by the Electronics Research & Development Establishment (LRDE) for the LCA Tejas programme. In a chat with the director of the ADA, he said the next aircraft that the agency designed and built, needed to be centred around an Indian active array combat radar. In fact, the LRDE has already proposed a second radar (deriving from the MMR) for the MCA, with technological spin-offs currently being gleaned from its partnership with Israel's Elta. But Naik didn't buy that. He said it didn't matter what the DRDO was learning from who at this stage. When it came down to putting the nails in, he said he wanted a fully Indian radar on the MCA.

While configuration fructifies, the following work has begun on the MCA in full earnest: DARE, Bangalore has appointed a special team to begin identifying avionics and cockpit packages for the first prototype vehicle, and will supply this in published form to the ADA by July 2010. This will include cockpit electronics, cockpit configuration, man-machine interface, mission console systems and computers/software with a focus on data fusion and modular architecture. The LRDE will, in about the same time frame, provide a separate project proposal for an all new radar, to be re-designated for the MCA, as a derivative of the MMR currently being completed with technology from Israel's ELTA. LRDE will independently look in the market for a partner for active array technology, though it communicated to ADA in June 2009 that it had sufficient R&D available to build a reliable AESA prototype with assistance from Bharat Electronics Ltd and two private firms based in Hyderabad.

There is a collossal amount of work going on as far as materials is concerned for the MCA/NGFA. With the IAF unmoving in its demand for an aircraft that has stealth characteristics built into it from the drawing board forward, the DRDO has powered teams within its materials laboratories in Pune and Hyderabad to come up with new composities, low observable materials fabrication techniques, and of course, radar-absorbent control surface aggregates, airframe materials and paints. This is, of course, completely separate from design characteristics, including internal weapons, fresh leading edge innovations and a sustainable stealth maintenance footprint.

The most crucial part of the programme is of course the engine. The Kaveri-Snecma turbofan is being counted upon vigorously to be ready to power prototypes of the MCA by the middle of this decade. There is no Plan-B just yet as far as engines go. However, technologies such as single crystal and nickel-based superalloys in turbofans are still some way off as far as Indian development is concerned -- the IAF wants the use of both to be a given in the engines that power the MCA.

According to the ADA, the government will look to purchase upto 250 MCAs when its done and ready -- not just as a replacement to the MiG-27s and Jaguars, but to complement the MMRCA fleet that will hopefully be half-inducted by then. A proposal in 2008 suggested that the MCA be used as a technology feeder platform to the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA), but after hectic representations by DRDO and HAL, with support from the IAF, it was finally decided that the MCA would continue as a fully separate aircraft programme.

 

[desiman]

US Receives Indian Letter Of Request For Ten C-17s

Boeing announced today that the US government has received a Letter of Request from India’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Indian Air Force regarding the potential acquisition of 10 C-17 Globemaster III advanced airlifters.

“Boeing is very pleased that the Indian government has expressed interest in acquiring the C-17 to modernize its airlift capabilities, and we look forward to working closely with them,” said Vivek Lall, vice president and India country head, Boeing Defense, Space & Security. “We believe the C-17 can fulfill India’s needs for military and humanitarian airlift to help it meet its growing domestic and international responsibilities.”

The C-17 conducted demonstration flights in February at Aero India 2009 in Bangalore, where members of the MoD and Indian Air Force had the opportunity to see the aircraft’s capabilities in action. The Indian Air Force wants to replace and augment its fleet of Russian-made An-32 and Il-76 airlifters.

There are currently 212 C-17s in service worldwide, including 19 with international customers. The U.S. Air Force, including active Guard and Reserve units, has 193. Other customers include the United Kingdom (which recently announced a contract for a 7th airlifter), Qatar, the Canadian Forces, the Royal Australian Air Force, and the 12-member Strategic Airlift Capability initiative of NATO and Partnership for Peace nations. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) Air Force and Air Defence announced Jan. 6 that the UAE has signed a contract for the acquisition of six Boeing C-17s.

 

[desiman]

Indian Army Wants Cornershot Weapon

The Indian Army is looking to procure an undisclosed number of "weapon systems for shooting around the corner without exposing the firer or with minimum exposure to the firer" according to a recent Request for Information (RFI). These are presumably for the Special Forces and some infantry units. The request calls for information on weapons that can engage targets effectively beyond 200-metres. The US-Israeli firm Cornershot LLC is currently the only firm with such weapons in its catalogue that would be open to doing such business with the Indian military (the other is an untested specimen from the Pakistan Ordnance Factory, and a third from Iran). The need for engagement beyond 200-metres means the Army will be looking for a cornershot weapon based at least on a 5.7-mm pistol-based, but this isn't specified in the RFI. The National Security Guard (NSG) recently tested a Cornershot pistol weapon and has ordered an undisclosed number for its anti-terror force.

 

[desiman]

Admiral Arun Prakash: The Arihant In Perspective

The following column, providing a robust and authentic account of India's ATV SSBN programme, the first by a former Navy Chief after the launch of the submarine in July, appears in FORCE Magazine:

Following close in the wake of India's nuclear submarine launch, former Navy Chief Sureesh Mehta's observations about the yawning gap between the militaries of China and India created a minor flutter in the media. But his candid admission revealed no secrets. In fact his remarks should serve to focus attention on the contrasting approaches of the two nations. We seem to have pinned all our hopes on high GDP growth triggering a Biblical “loaves and fish” miracle in India. The Chinese, on the other hand, adopting a multi-track approach, have ensured balanced growth of their nation by pursuing all constituents of Comprehensive National Power; economic, technological, diplomatic, social, cultural, and of course, military. It is in situations of asymmetry such as this, as Pakistan has repeatedly demonstrated to us, that a nuclear deterrent comes in handy if brandished noisily. Since that is not our style, let us at least dust off the cobwebs, mental and actual, and take stock of where our own nuclear deterrent stands after the launch of the Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) on 26th July 2009.

Obsessive Secrecy?
The ATV project has been probably one of India's worst kept secrets. A Google search for “ATV Submarine“ would, on any day, would throw up between 100, 000 to 200, 000 results ranging from news snippets, blog discussions and Wikipedia articles to learned analyses on the Federation of American Scientists website. Every aspect of the project has been discussed threadbare in cyber-space by self-appointed experts, amateur security analysts and plain nuts; sprinkled with inputs from retired scientists and an occasional press release by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO).

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) and Naval HQ have been content to maintain stoic silence about the ATV in the face of this tell-tale evidence and using, as a last resort, the “neither confirm nor deny” line to fend off the inquisitive media. Perhaps there was a method in all this secrecy and we did manage to befuddle everyone who tried to garner the truth from the heap of disinformation and half-truths available in the public domain on the ATV.

But the trouble with excessive secrecy is that while it may or may not deceive the enemy, it can certainly obfuscate the truth and lead you to the wrong conclusions; often with deleterious consequences. Now that the submarine is out of the closet, we need to discuss some aspects of this project which has a vital bearing on national security.

Project Management Paradigm

India must be unique amongst nations that undertake major expenditure on defence R&D in that; both timelines and cost ceilings are infinitely flexible and neither accountability nor responsibility for delays, or even failure, are ever affixed. Subjective in-house “peer reviews” can never be a substitute for hardnosed audits and progress-checks by independent experts, as well as end-users. The dismal story of projects like the Kaveri turbo-jet engine, the Light Combat Aircraft, the Arjun battle tank and the Trishul surface-to-air missile could have been very different, had they not been wrapped in furtive secrecy and been subjected, instead, to periodic scrutiny and oversight.

Of all the DRDO projects, to date, perhaps it is only the ATV which has forged ahead steadily, and, even after allowing for time and cost overruns as well as other shortcoming, can be called an outstanding success story. While we will dwell on some of the issues later, it can be stated up-front that this major achievement is mainly attributable to three factors, which should provide salutary lessons for the other two Services. The high level of synergy and co-ordination attained by the IN, DRDO and Department of Atomic Energy (DAE).

The tremendous good sense displayed by DRDO in placing the Navy in the driving seat, resulting in the intimate participation of the end-user in the project. The sustained and non-invasive support provided by successive Secretaries of DRDO to the project.

Genesis and Growth
The IN had begun to examine the viability of indigenous design and construction of a nuclear submarine as far back as 1967, and the initiative gathered momentum soon after the 1974 “peaceful nuclear explosion”. By 1978 a small IN-DAE team had been located at BARC to undertake serious design and feasibility studies. This study obviously brought home the magnitude of the colossal challenge posed by this undertaking, and it was decided to approach the USSR for assistance.

A decade after signing the 1971 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, the Soviet Deputy Defence Minister Marshal Ogarkov made an unprecedented offer, to lease a nuclear powered submarine to India along with a training and maintenance package. In 1988 a Charlie I Class (Project 670) Soviet nuclear attack submarine (SSN) arrived in Indian waters on a 3-year lease. Renamed INS Chakra, this SSN carried neither the weapons nor the systems for a strategic role, and therefore served a limited purpose; that of providing experience to IN personnel in the operation, maintenance and deployment of a nuclear-propelled submarine.

Tagged on to the lease offer had been an option for acquiring Soviet “assistance for design and construction of a nuclear-powered submarine” at a later date. Sometimes in the mid-1980s, in a far-sighted initiative, the IN and the DRDO joined forces, to constitute the Advanced Technology Vessel Project as an R&D venture. Funded by DRDO, the project was headed by a three-star Director General and manned largely by naval personnel.

On completion of preliminary concept studies, realization began to dawn on the ATV group, of the immense complexity of most disciplines involved in this ambitious project. The heart of this 6000 ton nuclear-powered vessel would be miniature low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuelled pressurized light-water reactor (PWR) delivering about 90 megawatts (120,000 horsepower) of power to drive it at 25 knots.

Unlike civilian power reactors which operate at a steady state, a naval reactor has to respond instantly to repeated variations in power for ship maneuvering. Nuclear safety, radiation, shock, quieting, and operating performance requirements in addition to operation in close proximity to the crew dictate exceptionally high standards for design, manufacturing and quality assurance. Once on patrol, a submarine's reactor remains inaccessible for inspection or replacement throughout its core life -- unlike a typical commercial nuclear reactor which can be shut down for refueling or repairs as required.

For scientists used to designing shore-based natural uranium/heavy water reactors spread over a couple of football fields, miniaturizing reactor components to fit inside a 20x20 foot compartment, with the whole assembly weighing no more than 300-400 tons, posed an insurmountable obstacle. No less daunting were the challenges of submarine design, hull fabrication and underwater missile launch, to name just a few.

ATV Spin-offs
The promised Russian assistance, both material and intellectual did come; albeit in fits and starts which accounted for most of the programme delays, and at prices which escalated at a breathtaking rate. However, Indians being quick learners, our scientists, engineers and designers too, rapidly gained proficiency in many of the complex technologies involved in nuclear submarine construction. In this process, DAE scientists also succeeded in building and fuelling a small shore-based reactor in Kalpakkam, which now serves as a useful training aid for submarine crews. In addition, there are many areas in which the tremendously beneficial fall-out of the ATV project has gone un-noticed by the public. Firstly, a large number of private sector companies have not just participated but contributed most significantly to the project by mastering esoteric techniques and technologies, to design and fabricate major systems for the vessel. Secondly, the ATV HQ has spawned a huge indigenization process in which small and medium ancillary industries all over the country have participated to contribute sub-systems and components manufactured to high precision and reliability specifications. Lastly, DRDO and other defence laboratories have come up trumps in developing some excellent products like combat-management systems, sonars, and electronic warfare systems for the ATV. The launch of the first ATV, whose correct current designation is S-2 (she will become INS Arihant only on commissioning in due course) is no doubt a most significant milestone in every respect and marks a major step in India's quest for a ballistic missile armed submarine, known in US parlance as SSBN. However, in order to tread the thin line between skepticism and euphoria, and retain a balanced perspective, it is necessary to note the fact the S-2 is only the first step in a long journey, and it may be a year or more away from becoming an operational sea-going submarine.

More importantly, she may remain a “technology demonstrator” for a long time before attaining the status of a ballistic missile nuclear submarine or SSBN due to three major factors.

Stealth

The reasons why nations place a significant part of their nuclear arsenals on board SSBNs is because of their supposed undetectability. Once at its patrol depth of a few hundred meters in the murky ocean deep, the SSBN is considered safe from prying satellites and risk of attack, and poses a continuous, threat to the adversary with her battery of submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).

The only way to detect an SSBN, or any submarine for that matter, is through acoustics. The noise generated by a submarine's hull, reactor, machinery, propeller and even her crew, across the full spectrum of frequencies can be picked up by the adversary's listening devices mounted on ships, helicopters or submarines. Known as low-frequency recording and analysis or LOFAR devices, these sensors can detect submarine noise at tens of miles and pinpoint an SSBN within minutes. The Hollywood movie “Hunt for Red October” typified the deadly serious Cold War cat-and-mouse game played out between US and Soviet navies to locate and mark each other's SSBNs, using LOFAR as well as sonar; with the Soviets usually at a disadvantage because of their traditionally noisier submarine designs. In our case, the first crucial test of the Arihant's design will be the careful calibration of her underwater noise signature, which will determine her degree of invulnerability and suitability as a SLBM carrying platform. This may call for extensive trials involving minor adjustments or major design modifications - if not for S-2, certainly for her successors.

Reactor Design

For the submarine leg of the nuclear triad to have significance, there must be one or more fully armed SSBNs on continuous patrol, which could last for months. Before one SSBN returns home she must be relieved on patrol by another one. This obviously requires, not just, that there should be a certain minimum number of SSBNs available in one's inventory, but also that at least 2-3 of them should be operationally available at any given time.

The most crucial factor in SSBN availability is her refueling cycle. Refueling, or replacing the enriched uranium fuel rods, of a submarine reactor is a complex dockyard operation which may take a submarine out of circulation for anything from 18-24 months.

The life of a reactor core is decided, apart from enrichment level of uranium fuel rods, by its operating regime. Since a SSBN has to travel long distances to its patrol area at high speeds, the power demand is invariably high and rapidly consumes reactor life. Reactor technology has been steadily advancing since the USS Nautilus first went to sea in 1954. Today the US Navy has 25 different types of reactors running into the 9th generation of development, many of such sophistication that, they do not require refueling throughout their lifetimes. The nuclear reactor installed on the S-2, according to open source information, is understood to be based on first or second generation Soviet era technology with a short re-fuelling cycle. The implications are that either her patrol areas will have to remain close to base, or that her endurance on patrol would be limited, and of course that there would be long gaps between patrols when refueling is under way. The shortcomings of this reactor design, demand larger submarine numbers at huge expense.

Missile Range

It is more than likely that Jin class SSBNs of the PLA Navy are, today, targeting both New Delhi and San Francisco with their 8000 km Ju-Long missiles from patrol areas in the home waters of the South China Sea. The effectiveness of the SSBN as an instrument of deterrence is obviously related to the range as well as number of SLBMs carried by her. While the SSBN does have the asset of mobility, her patrol areas must be chosen with great care to ensure that a valuable strategic asset of this nature is not placed in harm's way. In this context, the shorter the range of her SLBM, the closer she must position herself to a hostile shore. In India's case, the basic requirement is to deter China from threatening us with her considerable nuclear arsenal. This can only be achieved with SLBMs of inter-continental (5000-8000 km) range which have the warhead yield to threaten China's cities and nuclear forces located deep inland. Such a missile would enable the SSBN to take up operational patrols in safe areas in the Bay of Bengal or even Arabian Sea. Missile range would also compensate, to an extent, for shortcomings in reactor design. The weapon slated for fitment on the S-2 is understood to be a SLBM whose range is currently limited to 700-1000 km. The successful underwater launch and flight trials of this missile (variously named by the media as Dhanush or K-15) is certainly a big feather in the DRDO's cap, but its limited range constitutes a handicap for S-2. Moreover, this achievement needs to be assessed against the background that the DRDO's 25 year old guided missile programme has yet to deliver an inter-continental ballistic missile.

At the same time ISRO, having obviously mastered the propellant technologies, routinely launches rockets which can achieve linear ranges of up to 10, 000 km. And yet the invisible firewall between the two organizations seems to prevent transfer of technology, even in national interest. While work on more advanced SLBMs is no doubt in progress, it has to be borne in mind that longer range missiles will have to be powered by propellant motors of larger length and diameter, and the resultant weapon is unlikely to fit within the hull of an Arihant class SSBN, in sufficient numbers (16-24).

After Arihant; What?

The launch of the S-2 is, no doubt, a most significant and encouraging demonstration of India's technological skills and managerial expertise. But much more than that, this vessel will provide a trials platform which will enable us to learn from our own experience, what no one is going to teach us; the arcane disciplines of SSBN operations and maintenance. The main beneficiaries of this experience will be two submarines which follow S-2. The S-3 and S-4 are planned to be built on the same baseline design as S-2, in order to consolidate shipbuilding expertise and industrial capabilities. They will therefore incorporate only those capability enhancements which can be accommodated within the same hull-form and supported by the same nuclear power-plant. Therefore it is the fourth submarine in this series the S-5, still a few years ahead, which should be an object of sharp focus for not just the IN but even more so, the DAE and DRDO. In a 50-60 year perspective, India should be looking at a standing force of 4-6 SSBNs; accompanied, if possible by a smaller force of nuclear attack submarines or SSNs. While we are well on the way to achieving mastery over many of the technologies involved, there are three key areas which would need special focus: The acquisition of propellant technology for producing underwater launched ballistic missiles of inter-continental range. The length and diameter of the missile will decide the dimensions of the SSBN. These SLBM's should preferably be capable of carrying 4-6 multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV).

The indigenous design of a SSBN hull which will be able to accommodate a battery of 16-24 such SLBMs. The indigenous design of a nuclear propulsion plants of about 200 megawatt capacity, with a 6-8 years refueling cycle, to drive a SSBN of 10,000-12,000 tons at about 30 knots.

Having committed ourselves to fielding a credible deterrent in the form of a nuclear triad, we no longer have a choice but to go down this route at the earliest. This is one area where dependence on foreign sources, especially for hardware, must be minimised and autarchy aimed for. Once we acquire indigenous capability for design and production of naval reactors and LEU cores, as well as long range SLBMs, we would have achieved such autarchy.

Future Project Management

The PLA Navy sent its first (Han class) nuclear submarine to sea in 1974, and today the Chinese nuclear flotilla consists of 3-4 Xia and Jin class SSBNs as well as 5-6 Han and Shang class SSNs. Given that we are already 30 years behind China in this field, there is not a day to be lost in committing the necessary capital as well as human resources from the Navy, DAE and DRDO to commence design and development work.

This is going to be a complex, laborious and time consuming endeavour, and a period of even 10-15 years for attaining the capabilities listed above may be optimistic. So far, Russia has remained the main source of technology for us, but in the changing circumstances, we must not shy away from seeking advanced reactor technology from the US or France for our strategic programmes. There is no doubt that the DRDO-Navy synergy worked well during the developmental phase of the ATV. With the launch of S-2, this project now needs to transition rapidly and seamlessly from R&D mode to serial production mode. The time has therefore come to create a new management structure in which all the national capabilities created for the ATV (in the public as well as private sectors) can be brought under an umbrella corporation for serial production of nuclear submarines for the IN. Lifting the pall of secrecy will promote a better dialogue with operators and lead to design improvements.

Command & Control
The protracted trials period of S-2 should be used by the Navy to prepare itself to enter a new and uncharted era of SSBN operations, maintenance, and above all, nuclear safety. In this context, two important issues come instantly to mind.

From the time she sails out for a deterrent patrol, till her return to harbor, a SSBN will form part of the Strategic Forces Command (SFC) and remain under its direct operational control. However, for all other purposes, the submarine would be like any other naval unit. This duality of control, and the specific modalities of change of operational control (CHOP), would need to be meticulously worked out, ensuring failsafe communication between the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA), Chairman COSC, Commander SFC and Captain of the SSBN.

Nuclear weapon preparation/assembly on land has, so far, involved participation of SFC, DAE and DRDO personnel. SSBN operations will involve a new paradigm for India because the SLBMs carried on patrol would be fully assembled, and possibly containerized, nuclear weapons, ready for launch when required. The launch order, to be executed jointly by the Captain of the SSBN and his second-in-command, will need to be duly authorized through secure and authenticated means by the National Command Authority. In order to ensure instant launch when ordered, and to prevent unauthorized launch, a system of software permissive action links (PALs) will have to be devised, along with triple-redundant underwater communications. These are complex issues which require time and resources to resolve.

And the final thought; would a brand new nuclear war-head required to face the rigours of an underwater launch, not require a “hot” test to prove its design?

 

[desiman]

India Spent $50 Billion in Last Decade on Defence Purchases

In a recent analysis on the defence deals that India has made since the Kargil conflict in 1999, it has been revealed that over $50 billion has been spent on the acquisition of fighters, warships, tanks, missiles and other weapon systems.

According to Indian Defence Ministry officials, India spent $12.5 billion on `direct capital acquisitions’ in the 1999-2004 timeframe. In the time-frame of 2004-2009, this figure has doubled to $27.5 billion. In fact, the three services have entered into 465 contracts worth over $27 billion in the past three years alone. Recent acquisitions included Airborne Early Warning Systems, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, T-90 and MBT Arjun tanks, Advanced Light Helicopters, Sukhoi-30 MKIs and various weapon systems for the armed forces. Officials added that most of the defence acquisition has been from the international market and future imports worth $30 billion are expected in the next five years.
Amongst the major international acquisition deals that have occurred, are Israel for three Phalcon AWACS for $1.1 billion in 2004. Recently, an Rs $2 billion project to jointly develop medium-range surface-to-air missile systems has been linked with Israel as well. With the US, India struck a deal for six C-130J Super Hercules aircraft for $962 million in 2007. More recently, eight Boeing P-8I planes for $2.1 billion have been finalized for acquisition. In 2004, India inked the package deal for the ‘Gorshkov’ aircraft carrier and 16 MiG-29K, with Russia. The price has now escalated to $2.3 billion. As for the UK, India inked a deal for 66 Hawk AJTs in an Rs 8,000 crore project in 2004.

Recently, the Defence Expenditure Review Committee (DERC) report have pointed out the shortcomings in the acquisition process, which led to the inability of the three services to utilize $8.5 billion between 2000-01 and 2007-08.

However, the Indian Defence Ministry is confident of making the most of the opportunity since some of the big projects are in the offing. These include; the $10 billion project for the 126 medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA), $6 billion project for six new-generation submarines after Scorpenes and the artillery modernisation programme to acquire 1,580 towed guns, 814 mounted gun systems, 180 self-propelled wheeled guns, 100 self-propelled tracked guns and 140 air-mobile ultra-light howitzers. The artillery modernisation programme is to the tune of $4 billion. Another project for around 800 helicopters, ranging from VVIP and heavy-lift to attack and light utility helicopters worth $4 billion is also coming up.

 

[desiman]

MOD Committee Recommends Increase in Defence FDI


The Defence Expenditure Review Committee (DERC) of India has recently made recommendations for the Defence Sector, which includes an increase in the foreign direct investment (FDI) limit in the defence sector to 49 per cent and divestment of defence public sector units (PSUs).

The DERC is a high-level committee, headed by former Secretary (Defence Finance) Mr. V.K Misra, and comprises of three former senior officers representing each of the defence wing. The DERC was formed to look into the discrepancies in arms procurement and rectify time delays, as well as other contentious issues like scams and mismanagement of defence funds.
The DERC, whose report has not been made public yet, has criticised the procurement procedures of the three Indian defence services who, between 2001 and 2008, could not utilise funds to the tune of $8.53 billion.

The DERC report has clearly indicated that an across the board increase in FDI limit to 49% is needed, with the provision for a case by case enhancement to 74%-100%. The DERC report states that a clear-cut disinvestment plan is needed for the PSU to increase accountability and efficiency. The report has also emphasised that the Armed Forces and the Ministries must adopt Information Technology for futuristic network-centric operations.

The DERC also seeks a five-fold increase in the financial powers of the defence minister to roughly $100 million. This, in turn, will bring about effective change in structure and reforms pertaining to the Indian Defence Ministry. The DERC has urged the Indian government to apply the reforms in the Rama Rao Committee report, to bring about changes in the state-owned Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO). There must be complete synergy among DRDO, Ordnance Factory Boards, defence PSUs and the private sector to address design, manufacturing and maintenance concerns of India’s defence. “The private sector needs to be encouraged for participation”, the report added. The committee suggests that the government encourage the private sector to take over foreign defence firms, and look at setting up a sovereign wealth fund for this purpose.

Other committee recommendations include reduction of time lost between the request for information and final acquisition by way of efficient procurement processes. The DERC has clarified that, except in “strategic and operational” reasons, single source situation should be avoided. India has suffered setbacks in single vendor purchases which have led to price escalation and other contractual hazards. The DERC recommended the setting up of a defence regulatory authority to deal with a range of issues concerning offsets, defence industrialisation, capital acquisitions and potential reforms in defence sector.

 

[desiman]

India and China Resume Defence Dialogue


India and China are aiming towards a closer bilateral relationship, by initiating a defence dialogue at the beginning of 2010. Accompanied by high-ranking military officials, The Indian Defence Secretary, Pradeep Kumar, is currently on a visit to Beijing for the annual high level bi-lateral talks on defence issues.

Along with the Indian Defence Secretary, the Deputy Chief of General Staff of The People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Ma Xiaotian, have jointly presided over various negotiations and are holding a dialogue in Beijing with other military officials. The dialogue will enable both sides to clarify concerns, deepen mutual trust and coordinate stances. Indian Defence secretary Kumar said that, “India was keen to expand the scope of its defence and security cooperation with China.”
During Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to China in 2008, it was decided that dialogue on the Defence Secretary level must take place instead of other interactions to foster closer ties. The PLA’s Deputy Chief of General Staff Lt. Gen. Ma Xiaotian only visited India in December 2008 to meet, the then defence secretary, Vijay Singh. India reciprocated this move when the Indian Army’s Eastern Command chief, Lt Gen VK Singh, visited China and was taken to Tibet for a visit. In December 2009, The Chinese commander of the Tibetan region, Lt Gen Shu Yu Tai, met defence Secretary Pradeep Kumar in Delhi and was also provided hospitality by the Eastern Command.

The Indian Defence Secretary’s aim of the Chinese visit is to explore the nature of confidence building measures both nations could initiate to reduce tensions along the Line of Actual Control. The Defence Secretary and his team are expected to meet a range of top officials in the PLA. Expansion of the extent of joint exercises between both the militaries is also an issue to be discussed. “Trust building between the two country’s militaries is key to easing border disputes”, said the Indian defence Secretary.

All the major issues revolve around the increased threat perception from China in recent months. Besides the border disputes, China has accelerated infrastructure building in border areas causing an alarm to India. It also has an increasing naval presence in the Indian Ocean. The Chinese Navy has sent ships to the waters off Somalia, to protect its own and foreign merchant vessels from attacks by pirates.

 

[desiman]

“Is war around the corner?”

Few month’s back, Bharat Verma, Editor of the Indian Defence Review, in an article, had predicted that China may attack India by 2012. Frankly, at that time, I did not agree with this prophecy, because in my opinion China would not want a war till it becomes a true super power by 2050,and in any case the Chinese, in my opinion, would only go to war, if they had a 100 percent chance of success. Also China has now become India’s leading trade partner, and common sense dictates that good economic relations are a logical antidote against war. Finally, in the event of war in the next five years, the Indian Navy would be in a position to wreck havoc with China’s oil tankers, ferrying homewards, the Middle East oil, through the straits of Malacca, Sunda and Lombak straits. The IAF, too would be utilised, and the Chinese”cake walk” of 1962, would not be possible.

However, two recent events have caused me to rethink, though I still feel that an Indo–China war is not likely, specially if India urgently reverses the current decline in its defence capability. The first event was the recent early September 2009 Chinese firing across the LAC (the first since 1986, and the first since the 1996 “no firing agreement”), in Kerang (northern Sikkim) where two ITBF jawans were reportedly injured (this report has been denied by the Indian Foreign Ministry). The second event was the firing on 12 September 2009, of five 107 mm rockets, by the Pakistan based Lashkar e Toiba (LeT), across the international border at Indian villages near Amritsar. Are these two firing incidents linked, coming as they do on the background of very disturbing reports of border incursions by our two hostile nuclear armed neighbours? While the Pakistani terrorist based actions are not new, the Chinese activities, sound similar to the ominous activities prior to the disastrous 1962 war.

Another serious mistake we are making is assumimg that the United States will pull our chestnuts out of the fire, by deterring China and pressurising Pakistan. While our broad national interests do generally appear to coincide with Washington, we must remember that no country will go to war against nuclear armed foes, unless directly threatened. Given Pakistan’s undeniable geostrategic location, we should not expect the Americans to “take out” or “neutralise” Pakistani nuclear weapons, to prevent them from falling into the hands of the terrorists. Neither should we assume that America has joint control over Pakistani nuclear weapons. It is good to have close ties with the USA, but it’s prudent not to outsource our national security to any external power.

Musharraf’s latest admission on 14 September, about Pakistan diverting American aid to beef up its defences against India, and how he ensured Pakistan’s strategic weapons programme was “speeded up”, and China’s latest border incursions, should finally clear the cobwebs from the minds of India’s leadership. Why do we continue to suffer nasty surprises at the hands of Pakistan and China. Some 47 years after 1962, India has again been repeatedly surprised by China in Arunachal Pradesh, Ladakh and in Uttarakhand . About nine years after Kargill, and 15 years after the 1993 Mumbai bomb blasts, India was surprised by Pakistani terrorists taking the searoute to cause a bloodbath in Mumbai on 26/11 in 2008. The fact remains that India’s lack of strategic culture has been repeatedly exposed, and its military has been required to fight under very disadvantageous conditions because our politico–bureaucratic leadership, has allowed defence preparations to fall below critical levels, while following a policy of “passive , low reactive defence” which relies more on diplomacy than military strength. Hopefully the restrictions imposed on the Indian Army not being allowed to patrol some “sensitive areas” on the Indo–China border will now be lifted before the Chinese grab more of our territory. Also hopefully, the Government will think about inducting the long delayed 155 mm artillery, and raising more mountain divisions before it’s too late.

Their should be no doubt as to why Pakistan and its terrorists will always aim to cause mayhem in two places in India, viz Mumbai and Vadinar. Mumbai (its stock market turnover is four times Pakistan’s GDP) and Vadinar port in the Gulf of Kutch (it has three refineries with 99 million tons capacity and over two million tons of fuel storage). Yes, attacking foreign tourists in Goa will gain a lot of international publicity, but Mumbai and Vadinar are India’s economic jugular, and attacking these will keep India economically hyphenated to Pakistan. Fortunately the Coast Guard’s new North West Command, for Gujarat, headquartered at Gandhinagar has become functional, and is expected to be formally inaugerated by the Defence Minister in October. Hopefully, this new Command will urgently receive additional vessels and aircraft to ensure the safety of Gujarat, including Vadinar, because nothing can be more dangerous than creating a “paper force”.

What is the second best method to attack Mumbai and Vadinar,after terrorism? The answer is cruise missiles with land attack capability, launched from ships, submarines and Maritime Patrol aircraft like the P-3C Orion. Theoretically, the 120 km range, Harpoon anti-ship missile with a 250 kg warhead fits the bill perfectly for Pakistan as an interim system, while its ratcheting up the production of its larger Chinese gifted, 500 km range Babur cruise missiles to build an estimated stockpile of 450. The long term aim of the Pakistani Babur cruise missiles (these can be delivered by fighter or Maritime Patrol aircraft to extend their range) is to counter India’s over publicised Ballastic Missile Defence System (BMDS) and give Pakistan a “cheap”, massive first strike capabilty which may overwhelm India’s nuclear retaliation capabilty. Right now, Pakistan’s nuclear capability is designed to counter India’s superior conventional military power, but the Babur cruise missile along with new miniaturized plutonium warheads, will put Pakistan in a different league altogether.

The newer versions of the Harpoon, which Pakistan is hoping to acquire from the USA, already has a secondary land attack capability built in. What it has now apparently tested a few months back is the older anti-ship Harpoon, (about three dozen of these were acquired from the USA in the Reagan era). Given todays miniaturised Inertial Navigation Systems (INS) and Global Positioning Systems (GPS), any missile specialist should be able to convert the vintage anti-ship Harpoon to a land attack capable missile with reasonably accurate chances of hitting the Oil refineries at Vadinar and the various installations in Mumbai port. The only problem would be how to replace the 250 kg conventional warhead in the 53 centimetre diameter cylnderical Harpoon missile with a plutonium miniature nuclear warhead. Most Indian scientists will tell you that it is impossible for Pakistan to achieve this. In my opinion India should expect China to transfer the technology of a proven miniaturised nuclear weapon which would fit the larger Babur, and possibly the Harpoon cruise missiles.

What are the launch platforms for the modified land attack Harpoon missile ? The answer is simple. The two older French built Agosta 70 submarines and the half a dozen American P-3C Orion aircraft are the ideal launch platforms. The missile has sufficient standoff range to hit Vadinar and Mumbai.

Global experts believe that “low tech” nuclear powers would need 8 kg of Plutonium 239 (PU 239) to make a bomb, while “medium tech” powers would need about five kgs, and “hi-tech” powers (including China) would need 3 kg of PU 239.The media has given enough details of the new Khusab 2 and 3 reactors , which will be expected to produce about 15 to 30 kg of Plutonium for 3 to 10 miniaturised nuclear weapons per year to Pakistan. Latest media reports indicate that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons stockpile has now grown from 70 to 90. I have no idea about India’s nuclear weapons stocks, and am uncertain about how many Agni type missiles India can produce per year. China will take Indian deterrence seriously only after we induct the 5000 km Agni 5. The recent controversy about the 1998 thermonuclear tests “fizzzle” has not cleared the air. I am not a nuclear weapons designer, but as a nuclear specialist, it is my opinion that lots of luck would be needed to get a complex thermonuclear prototype device to function properly the first time, and even if it did, it would need atleast two more successful, confirmatory tests in a rugged militarised form. Detterence works best, when it’s based on hard realty, and not ambigious discussions. Also deterrence works best when the enemy leadership is itself threatened with annihilation by a politically firm Indian Government.

The Chinese, as expected have kept the pressure on India, with the latest news of its forces violating Indian territory in Ladakh, Sikkim and Uttarakhand. Being masters of the art of long term strategic planning, the Chinese game plan is obviously to keep India tied down by the triple threats from China, Pakistan and Pakistani sponsored terrorists. India’s foreign ministry should stop justifying China’s daily incursions by talking about “the differing perceptions on the Line of Actual Control”. China will stop its incursions only when it’s deterred by India’s conventional and strategic defence capability. We will need to change our “no first use” nuclear policy, and increase our defence expenditure from the present measely 1.99 percent of the GDP to atleast three percent of the GDP.

Ofcourse, the immediate threat to India is from terrorism by land, air and sea. In August, I was pleasantly surprised to see that the normally chaotic fishing vessel traffic in Mumbai port was now more disciplined. It was also heartening to see the Navy and Coast Guard maintaining round the clock vigil from boats and helicopters. Numerous visitors, enquiring about my health, also assured me that there was now unprecedented co-ordination and co-operation between the Navy, Coast Guard, Police, Customs, Intelligence Agencies and the port authorities. The real threat from the sea will come after early October, when the monsoon subsides, and the seas become calmer for permitting small boat terrorist operations. The recent 12 September rocket attacks from Pakistan on Indian villages near Amritsar, along with terror strikes in Srinagar, are pointers that things will only get worse, unless India responds firmly.

Given the decades of neglect, national security (including strategic deterrence) will need sustained funding for the next decade. The Prime Minister, while focussing on 9 percent GDP growth, and countering drought, will need to keep a very watchful eye on national security. The only insurance against any future disastrous, though unlikelym wars with China or Pakistan lies in deterrence, based on India investing heavily in conventional, counter terrorism and nuclear defence. If India fails to invest sufficiently on national security and displays palpable lack of political will, then there is a risk of minor border incidents spiralling out of control, and tensions escalating. The only danger this time, lies with Pakistan and its terrorists, also joining this unlikely doomsday scenario. We must have excellent economic and diplomatic relations with China, but we must also keep our powder dry. Our foreign policy should be backed by sufficent military power — something akin to a steel fist in a velvet glove.

 

[desiman]

Pinaka Launcher From Commissioning Unit At Army Day Parade

The soldier in the first picture was kind enough to give me a nice demo of this Pinaka's launcher hydraulics. This is from the 1880 Rocket Regiment (Pinaka), the first of two units armed with the indigenous MBRL system.

 

[desiman]

Fire Power At Army Day 2010

Arjun tanks, Smerch MBRL at the 62nd Army Day Parade.

 

[desiman]

Indian Para Commando With A TAR-21 Rifle

The cover of the brochure just released at the 62nd Army Day Parade. The Arjun tank has made a reappearance this year. Stay tuned for photos.

 

[desiman]

Indian Army To Buy Specialized Weaponry

India has initiated a fast-track programme for the procurement of of $300 million worth of weaponry and equipment for the elite special forces. Under the program, around 10,000 elite troops will be provided weaponry and equipment in the next 15 months which will be bought from the global market.

Indian Defence Ministry officials said that India’s Defence Acquisition Agency (DAC), the highest weapons acquisition agency has recently cleared the $300 million fast-track modernization program for the infantry. The global bids for this specialized weaponry will be floated in a couple of months.

Indian Army sources said that the 10,000 elite troops will be trained with the advanced weapons and equipment with the help of Israel. The intensive training will be held at an Infantry Training School, in the state of Madhya Pradesh.
The weapons and equipment to be procured under the program will include Helmut Mounted Display systems, anti tank rifles, anti mine boots, software embedded communication systems, Global Positioning System (GPS), thermal imaging sights, precision guided ammunition, protective clothing and other equipment. The Helmut subsystem would be light and will also house the microphone unit for the radio and Head Up Display and a Nuclear Biological and Chemical (NBC) gas mask. The soldier’s personal computer would be attachable. The radio sub system would enable soldiers to transmit and receive complex voice and data signals.

The Indian Army had already envisaged a multi-billion dollar modernization programme for the infantry soldier called the F-INSAS (Futuristic Infantry Soldier as a System) in 2006. The objective of the programme is to enhance the capabilities of infantry soldier in terms of lethality, mobility, survivability, sustainability, situational awareness and battle command and make him a multi-mission war fighter.

Under the F-INSAS program the Indian Army plans to buy new Anti-tank Guided Missiles (ATGM) launchers, bullet proof vehicles, anti-material rifles, new generation carbines battle surveillance radars, Thermal Imaging Sights for ATGM launchers, ground sensors, secured communication systems, precision guided ammunition, laser rangefinder to provide the soldier with range and direction information and light clothing and bullet proof jackets. The Indian Army would commence trials for the F-INSAS prototype from 2011 and aims to equip its entire infantry troops comprising 500,000 by 2020.

The F-INSAS programme was jointly conceived by the Indian Army and the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO). However, the Indian Army has virtually rejected the involvement of DRDO in the F-INSAS project estimated to be over $3 billion. The Army has termed the 25-kilogram weight of the entire personal system for the soldier as too heavy. This includes his uniform, the boots, handheld GPS system, night vision equipment, helmet, personal weapon, etc.

The prototypes and concepts were conceived by the DRDO and were deemed unfit by the Indian Army. Most of the weaponry will now be sourced internationally.

While the procurement for the F-INSAS programme is yet to begin, the Indian Army is relieved that some of the hi- tech weaponry is coming their way through the latest fast-track acquisitions.

 

[desiman]

The Future of India’s Defense Industry

As India rises to become a key defense market, and a future market player, a number of DID features have examined various aspects of its industry and procurement structure. To become a future market player, however, and to hold pace with rivals like China who are outspending India by ratios around 5:1, India will have to improve a defense industry and acquisition process that have delivered far more spectacular failures over the past 30 years than successes. See esp: “India’s Defense Industrial Base: Personnel”; “India’s Defense Market: Obstacles to Modernization”; and “India’s DRDO Rethinking the Way it Does Business.”

Some backlash has even begun, as demonstrated by the de facto cancellation of the indigenous Arjun tank program. Nevertheless, India’s reform process remains incomplete. On Sept 11/08, Lt. Gen. (Retd) Vinay Shankar, PVSM, AVSM, VSM wrote “Defence Industry” for Indian Defence Review, examining the current state of India’s defense industry, and of ongoing efforts to reform its low productivity:

“Our process of reforms in the management of the Government controlled defence research and production establishments, have regrettably floundered. Many studies have been done, yet-to all intent and purposes-the drift continues. Over the last three to four years the Government has been pushing for public private partnership. The idea being that such association would bring about the desired efficiencies in the public sector. But the problem is that such forced marriages do not really work. Driven by expediency, some private companies, may consider coming to an under-standing with PSUs for the short term, but such arrangements are not likely to be conducive to the real growth of the defence industry….”

Lt. Gen. Shankar outlines what he sees as the strengths and weaknesses of that industry, the efforts and challenges faced by reform efforts to date, the role and effects of foreign firms in India, and the measures he believes will be necessary to make Indian industry a future player in the global defense market.

 

[desiman]

India to buy 29 more MiG-29Ks from Russia

Navy is all set to procure additional 29 naval fighter jets from Russia for Admiral Gorshkov and indigenous aircraft carriers, with the government recently giving an "in principle" nod to the purchase.

"The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) has recently given an in principle approval to the proposal to buy 29 additional MiG-29K naval fighter aircraft," Naval officers said on Monday.

India has already purchased 16 MiG-29K aircraft from Russia for $536 million. The total deal, including the warship, was for $1.5 billion in 2004.

The first three of the 16 aircraft landed in Goa naval airbase from Russia in the first week of December last, though the warship, rechristened INS Vikramaditya, is expected only by 2012-13.

The additional MiG-29Ks would cost $1.2 billion and the deal would seal Russia's position as the number one arms supplier to India with defence purchases touching $35 billion since 1960s.

"There are a few issues in the deal on which the CCS wants clarification, which will be provided soon. A final approval will come later," officers said.

A team from Russia is expected to be in New Delhi this week to fine-tune the contract, they added.

India had recently issued a Request for Information to major aircraft manufacturers for a new naval fighter jet, which could be a stand-by in case the indigenously built naval version of the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) is not ready soon.

 

[desiman]

India poised to become major defence sourcing hub: Study


NEW DELHI: The government should establish a dedicated defence-specific Special Economic Zone, apart from tax equalisation subsidy, as fiscal
regime played a critical role in the defence market growth, an industry study on Wednesday said.

It also sought exemption from Research and Development Cess for joint ventures implementing the offset obligations under the Defence Procurement Procedure introduced a couple of years ago to energise the defence market.

"The government is urged to consider the establishment of dedicated defence-specific SEZs, establishment of a tax equalisation subsidy linked to value of goods and services supplied to the defence sector, and exemptions to offset JVs from R&D Cess," a joint study by industry association CII and audit and advisory firm KPMG released here said.

"The fiscal regime plays a critical role in any defence market in creating an environment that incentivises and supports the long term risk taking, investment and R&D required by the industry," the report said, adding the general view of global defence industry was that India currently has a comparatively aggressive and complex tax regime.

It said with skilled intensive manufacturing capabilities and a world class IT base, India had the "right ingredients to become a key link in the global defence supply chain.

Welcoming the changes made in the DPP-2009 that provided for direct Indian industry participation in Defence tenders on par with PSUs, the study also sought new initiatives such as improving visibility of government defence order book, increasing industry output and feedback into the tender process and reduction in bidders' costs.

It, however, noted that the defence procurement policy (DPP) had evolved significantly since its first edition in 2002.

"For India to realise its objectives of building a military capability it requires, the government needs to develop a comprehensive industrialisation strategy for defence," it said noting that the country currently procured about 70 per cent of the armed forces' needs from abroad.

"But India aims to reverse this balance and manufacture 70 per cent or more of its defence equipment in India," it added.

"There is strong support (within industry) for extending the use of offset credit banking, allowing offset credit trading, and introducing the use of multipliers," it said.

The DPP stipulated that any deal for defence equipment with foreign suppliers worth over Rs 300 crore would attract the offset clause under which about 30 per cent to 50 per cent of the contract costs would have to be ploughed back into Indian defence industry.

On Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) cap of 26 per cent, the study said though the opinion was divided on increasing the FDI limit due to security considerations, there was clear expectation from the industry that it would be hiked from the present level.