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An interesting read for all..
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By MATTHEW KAMINSKI
Islamist insurgencies in Afghanistan and, cue really scary music, Pakistan preoccupy Washington. But let's not forget that the elephant -- what else? -- in this neighborhood is India.
Once, India was part of the problem. François Mitterrand's old line about wanting to keep two Germanys after the Cold War got morphed in India into a revealing quip, "We like Pakistan so much we'd like to have five or six of them." Those attitudes are fading. "A stable, unitary Pakistan is in our interest," says G. Parthasarathy, former Indian ambassador to Pakistan. And a Pakistan torn apart from the inside is an existential threat to a new India defined by an economic might and with a recently forged alliance with the U.S.
Though Pakistan barely figured in the parliamentary campaign, the incumbent Congress-led alliance emerged Saturday with a strong mandate and the same pounding foreign-policy headache as the Obama administration -- how to save Pakistan from itself. India's election result gives President Barack Obama a pretext to drop his strange reluctance thus far to engage New Delhi, which got on famously with his predecessor. After all, most of the worst-case scenarios in Pakistan (including nuclear war) involve South Asia's leading power.
Start with Pakistan's nukes. From the Indian vantage point, Pakistani assurances, echoed by U.S. leaders, about the security of the arsenal are worth little to nothing. Imagine the Taliban, another extremist group or rogue elements in the Pakistani military get their hands on one or more of the country's nearly 100 warheads. Then what? If you're Washington, you brace for a pre-emptive strike by India or better yet coordinate with it.
woot
Compounding concerns are what Indian and U.S. officials believe are ongoing Pakistani efforts to enlarge and modernize its nuclear arsenal, including by developing plutonium warheads, as well as to improve delivery systems. The Chinese, who share Islamabad's dislike of India, "help us upgrade," says a Pakistani official. That only serves to heighten Indian anxieties.
The Taliban insurgency in Pakistan's western tribal regions spills over into Afghanistan and puts a chunk of Pakistan beyond Islamabad's writ. The insurgents recently came within 60 miles of the capital before the Pakistani military counteroffensive this month. But potentially more worrisome are signs of radicalization in the Punjab. Contagion in this traditionally moderate and most populous Pakistani province could encircle Islamabad and bring instability to India's borders. It also may mark the moment when an ideological Islamist uprising, predominantly among the Pashtun minority in the unruly tribal regions, mutates into a broader challenge to Pakistan's social order. For any Pakistani revolutionary, India is a convenient enemy and a fifth Indo-Pakistani war in 62 years a desirable goal.
Hoping to spark one, a Punjabi group called Lashkar-e-Taiba launched the terrorist attack on Mumbai in November. At least 173 people died. India's response was restrained. But next time? "One of my worst nightmares is a repeat of Mumbai," Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, said during a visit to New Delhi last month.
The Indians know as well as anyone that Pakistani military intelligence, or ISI, helped bankroll Lashkar, the Taliban and other extremist groups. To this day they are considered "strategic assets" in certain Pakistani quarters.
Without saying so, the U.S. will have to be an intermediary. With Indians, American officials insist the Mumbai attacks woke Pakistani leaders up to the true threat of extremism -- in particular Nawaz Sharif, the former prime minister who controls the Punjab. India still distrusts him for past ties to Islamists. President Asif Ali Zardari may be politically weak, but the U.S. points out that India won't get a friendlier Pakistani leader. In a recent interview with me and a couple other reporters in Islamabad, Mr. Zardari called problems with India "a land dispute" over Kashmir, implying it was less immediate or serious than the "ideological threat" from the Islamists in Pakistan's western regions.
Team Obama wants India to draw down along the frontier to give Pakistan's military cover to shift forces westward against the Taliban. Back have come lectures from Indians about Pakistan's superior force strength on the border. India won't take orders from Washington lightly.
The U.S. has to play a balancing act and start with relatively easy stuff, such as promoting talks to ease commercial ties between India and Pakistan. New Delhi and Islamabad could be encouraged to reopen a back channel to discuss Kashmir and "comprehensive peace." None of this will be easy. But the solution to the Obama administration's so-called "AfPak" problem runs through India.
____________________________________________________
By MATTHEW KAMINSKI
Islamist insurgencies in Afghanistan and, cue really scary music, Pakistan preoccupy Washington. But let's not forget that the elephant -- what else? -- in this neighborhood is India.
Once, India was part of the problem. François Mitterrand's old line about wanting to keep two Germanys after the Cold War got morphed in India into a revealing quip, "We like Pakistan so much we'd like to have five or six of them." Those attitudes are fading. "A stable, unitary Pakistan is in our interest," says G. Parthasarathy, former Indian ambassador to Pakistan. And a Pakistan torn apart from the inside is an existential threat to a new India defined by an economic might and with a recently forged alliance with the U.S.
Though Pakistan barely figured in the parliamentary campaign, the incumbent Congress-led alliance emerged Saturday with a strong mandate and the same pounding foreign-policy headache as the Obama administration -- how to save Pakistan from itself. India's election result gives President Barack Obama a pretext to drop his strange reluctance thus far to engage New Delhi, which got on famously with his predecessor. After all, most of the worst-case scenarios in Pakistan (including nuclear war) involve South Asia's leading power.
Start with Pakistan's nukes. From the Indian vantage point, Pakistani assurances, echoed by U.S. leaders, about the security of the arsenal are worth little to nothing. Imagine the Taliban, another extremist group or rogue elements in the Pakistani military get their hands on one or more of the country's nearly 100 warheads. Then what? If you're Washington, you brace for a pre-emptive strike by India or better yet coordinate with it.
wootCompounding concerns are what Indian and U.S. officials believe are ongoing Pakistani efforts to enlarge and modernize its nuclear arsenal, including by developing plutonium warheads, as well as to improve delivery systems. The Chinese, who share Islamabad's dislike of India, "help us upgrade," says a Pakistani official. That only serves to heighten Indian anxieties.
The Taliban insurgency in Pakistan's western tribal regions spills over into Afghanistan and puts a chunk of Pakistan beyond Islamabad's writ. The insurgents recently came within 60 miles of the capital before the Pakistani military counteroffensive this month. But potentially more worrisome are signs of radicalization in the Punjab. Contagion in this traditionally moderate and most populous Pakistani province could encircle Islamabad and bring instability to India's borders. It also may mark the moment when an ideological Islamist uprising, predominantly among the Pashtun minority in the unruly tribal regions, mutates into a broader challenge to Pakistan's social order. For any Pakistani revolutionary, India is a convenient enemy and a fifth Indo-Pakistani war in 62 years a desirable goal.
Hoping to spark one, a Punjabi group called Lashkar-e-Taiba launched the terrorist attack on Mumbai in November. At least 173 people died. India's response was restrained. But next time? "One of my worst nightmares is a repeat of Mumbai," Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, said during a visit to New Delhi last month.
The Indians know as well as anyone that Pakistani military intelligence, or ISI, helped bankroll Lashkar, the Taliban and other extremist groups. To this day they are considered "strategic assets" in certain Pakistani quarters.
Without saying so, the U.S. will have to be an intermediary. With Indians, American officials insist the Mumbai attacks woke Pakistani leaders up to the true threat of extremism -- in particular Nawaz Sharif, the former prime minister who controls the Punjab. India still distrusts him for past ties to Islamists. President Asif Ali Zardari may be politically weak, but the U.S. points out that India won't get a friendlier Pakistani leader. In a recent interview with me and a couple other reporters in Islamabad, Mr. Zardari called problems with India "a land dispute" over Kashmir, implying it was less immediate or serious than the "ideological threat" from the Islamists in Pakistan's western regions.
Team Obama wants India to draw down along the frontier to give Pakistan's military cover to shift forces westward against the Taliban. Back have come lectures from Indians about Pakistan's superior force strength on the border. India won't take orders from Washington lightly.
The U.S. has to play a balancing act and start with relatively easy stuff, such as promoting talks to ease commercial ties between India and Pakistan. New Delhi and Islamabad could be encouraged to reopen a back channel to discuss Kashmir and "comprehensive peace." None of this will be easy. But the solution to the Obama administration's so-called "AfPak" problem runs through India.
