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Imran Khan, Pakistan's 21st Prime Minister

I get the feeling it's not this election that's important for Pakistan, but the one after this.
It'll truly tell if anything really changed.
 
I have been following western media on Imran Khan. Most are just regurgigated crap that is typical of lazy journalists who just sing according the prevailing winds but I am noticing some re-calibration going on. Some are begining to slightly give a more nuanced reportage.



Imran Khan must tackle Pakistan’s overmighty army
Roger Boyes

If the former cricket star wins this week’s election, he needs to curb the power of the military

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Pakistan, like Frederick the Great’s Prussia, is an army with a state attached. Not just because of its large professional soldiery, the military sway over the political process, their grand segregated compounds, but also because the army comports itself as if it were the better version of the country. Generals behave as if they are the nation’s schoolmasters trying to bring to order an unruly classroom. This is a country of coups; the army has ruled directly for half of Pakistan’s 71-year existence and pulled strings for much of the rest of the time. It’s a habit that the army cannot break.

For today’s election the generals chose a different strategy: making clear their favourite for prime minister — the Oxford-educated cricket star Imran Khan — by making trouble for his rivals, the established ruling dynasties of the Sharifs and the Bhuttos. The army is putting 370,000 soldiers on the ground (more than the British and German armed forces put together) to monitor polling. That might be, as the generals claim, to prevent terror attacks. Or it could be a reminder to voters that the army has got Khan’s back.

Either way it’s a dirty game that involves the muzzling and intimidation of Khan’s critics. When the television commentator Gul Bukhari, a critic of the army’s political clout, was briefly abducted on a Lahore street dotted with military checkpoints the message was clear: we don’t like criticism. And when courts suddenly sentenced Khan’s rivals to jail before the election, blame was pinned on the unhealthy relationship between military intelligence and a politicised judiciary. Anonymous threatening calls, raids on offices and warehouses — all the stops have been pulled out to make the opposition to Khan look corrupt. He should have had no truck with it.

Of course a leader of Pakistan has to rule with the army and not against it. But he should listen more carefully to those on the street who call the Khan campaign “boot polishia”, boot lickers of the army. The army is hedging: it is counting on Khan emerging as a prime minister supported by an inherently unstable coalition. A fragmented government will ensure that the army’s interest in setting the terms of foreign policy and internal security is not challenged by Khan, who has little experience as a statesman.

If there is to be peace with the Taliban, the army wants it to be on the terms set by the spooks of the ISI, the Inter-Services Intelligence. It doesn’t want any talk of peace with India, it wants a good relationship with China, and Khan’s value in the first instance will be to charm and straight-talk the Trump administration into lifting the suspension of US military aid. It wants to recover the respect of America as an ally, without changing its spots. That is the task being set for Khan and it’s an impossible one.

This is the age of the political soldier. Generals call the shots in Thailand, where a military oligarchy rules on behalf of the monarchy, and in Burma where a timid civilian government struggles to justify or conceal the army’s ethnic cleansing of Rohingya Muslims. In the Middle East, Egypt is led by a former army chief who makes sure that his fellow officers cling to their charmed world of subsidised cars and apartments, military-only beaches, hotels and clubs.

Pakistan, then, is by no means an exception in its dealing with its army; the officers are treated as a khakistocracy, a uniformed nobility. For ordinary fit and bright Pakistanis it remains one of the surest paths to social mobility and a decent pension. They are well trained, highly motivated, and more battle-hardened than other armies in the region, having fought four wars and three counter-insurgency campaigns since independence. It invests in its military nuclear programmes, tests submarine-launched cruise missiles, and it occupies one of the most strategically volatile corners of the world, neighbouring not only its arch-enemy India but also Iran and Afghanistan.

That’s why the army’s steering of Pakistan is so sensitive. And why it is in the long-term interest of the region for a confident democratic Pakistani leader to set out the limits of the army’s political role. Khan entered Pakistani politics as a man eager to rejuvenate society, to engage and enthuse. But leadership also means recasting the relationship with India even if that is seen as a betrayal by the Pakistani officer corps. For too long the ISI has played the Taliban as a bargaining chip, a way of sapping Afghan central government so that it could not reach out to India. They call this strategic depth but in fact it is nothing more than toxic, ultimately self-defeating politics. If Khan is to leave a mark he will have to take on the ISI and not surrender foreign policy to the army.

The ISI is the biggest reason why the Trump administration considers Pakistan to be an unreliable ally. When US aid was suspended, Trump was in effect saying: prove your loyalty or we will reframe our priorities in the East and lean more towards India. The Pakistani response was: who needs the US? We can buy from France and in particular from China, our new big friend.

Khan is shrewd enough to realise he can’t play China off against the US. But, if elected, he needs to start setting a course which frees Pakistan from the fears that are kept alive by an army which, while kitted out for nuclear war, is stuck in an antiquated power-play with its neighbours. It is time for Imran Khan to act as a captain again.


https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/imran-khan-must-tackle-pakistan-s-overmighty-army-65bb6vf7f

BBC are also being slightly more easy going on IK.

_102627915_pakistan_prime_minister-nc.png




https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-44924384

These Satans are saying the same thing about Hafiz Saeed. They hate both Imran and Hafiz because they are good leaders who have the guts to stand for Pakistan on the international level and for Muslim unity. And they praise Zardari-Bhutto and Sharifs for decades of “democracy”.

According to them, a good leader is the one who is a puppet to the West, a ch*tiya, har*mi, kh*r.
 
pookhay jatt kitora labba
pee pee paani aaphariya

one more..

majh vech ke ghori layi
dudh peeno vi gye teh ledh vi suttni pyi
 
I have been following western media on Imran Khan. Most are just regurgigated crap that is typical of lazy journalists who just sing according the prevailing winds but I am noticing some re-calibration going on. Some are begining to slightly give a more nuanced reportage.



Imran Khan must tackle Pakistan’s overmighty army
Roger Boyes

If the former cricket star wins this week’s election, he needs to curb the power of the military

methode%2Ftimes%2Fprod%2Fweb%2Fbin%2F6eee5618-8f74-11e8-8c1a-b63727488402.jpg

Share
Save
Pakistan, like Frederick the Great’s Prussia, is an army with a state attached. Not just because of its large professional soldiery, the military sway over the political process, their grand segregated compounds, but also because the army comports itself as if it were the better version of the country. Generals behave as if they are the nation’s schoolmasters trying to bring to order an unruly classroom. This is a country of coups; the army has ruled directly for half of Pakistan’s 71-year existence and pulled strings for much of the rest of the time. It’s a habit that the army cannot break.

For today’s election the generals chose a different strategy: making clear their favourite for prime minister — the Oxford-educated cricket star Imran Khan — by making trouble for his rivals, the established ruling dynasties of the Sharifs and the Bhuttos. The army is putting 370,000 soldiers on the ground (more than the British and German armed forces put together) to monitor polling. That might be, as the generals claim, to prevent terror attacks. Or it could be a reminder to voters that the army has got Khan’s back.

Either way it’s a dirty game that involves the muzzling and intimidation of Khan’s critics. When the television commentator Gul Bukhari, a critic of the army’s political clout, was briefly abducted on a Lahore street dotted with military checkpoints the message was clear: we don’t like criticism. And when courts suddenly sentenced Khan’s rivals to jail before the election, blame was pinned on the unhealthy relationship between military intelligence and a politicised judiciary. Anonymous threatening calls, raids on offices and warehouses — all the stops have been pulled out to make the opposition to Khan look corrupt. He should have had no truck with it.

Of course a leader of Pakistan has to rule with the army and not against it. But he should listen more carefully to those on the street who call the Khan campaign “boot polishia”, boot lickers of the army. The army is hedging: it is counting on Khan emerging as a prime minister supported by an inherently unstable coalition. A fragmented government will ensure that the army’s interest in setting the terms of foreign policy and internal security is not challenged by Khan, who has little experience as a statesman.

If there is to be peace with the Taliban, the army wants it to be on the terms set by the spooks of the ISI, the Inter-Services Intelligence. It doesn’t want any talk of peace with India, it wants a good relationship with China, and Khan’s value in the first instance will be to charm and straight-talk the Trump administration into lifting the suspension of US military aid. It wants to recover the respect of America as an ally, without changing its spots. That is the task being set for Khan and it’s an impossible one.

This is the age of the political soldier. Generals call the shots in Thailand, where a military oligarchy rules on behalf of the monarchy, and in Burma where a timid civilian government struggles to justify or conceal the army’s ethnic cleansing of Rohingya Muslims. In the Middle East, Egypt is led by a former army chief who makes sure that his fellow officers cling to their charmed world of subsidised cars and apartments, military-only beaches, hotels and clubs.

Pakistan, then, is by no means an exception in its dealing with its army; the officers are treated as a khakistocracy, a uniformed nobility. For ordinary fit and bright Pakistanis it remains one of the surest paths to social mobility and a decent pension. They are well trained, highly motivated, and more battle-hardened than other armies in the region, having fought four wars and three counter-insurgency campaigns since independence. It invests in its military nuclear programmes, tests submarine-launched cruise missiles, and it occupies one of the most strategically volatile corners of the world, neighbouring not only its arch-enemy India but also Iran and Afghanistan.

That’s why the army’s steering of Pakistan is so sensitive. And why it is in the long-term interest of the region for a confident democratic Pakistani leader to set out the limits of the army’s political role. Khan entered Pakistani politics as a man eager to rejuvenate society, to engage and enthuse. But leadership also means recasting the relationship with India even if that is seen as a betrayal by the Pakistani officer corps. For too long the ISI has played the Taliban as a bargaining chip, a way of sapping Afghan central government so that it could not reach out to India. They call this strategic depth but in fact it is nothing more than toxic, ultimately self-defeating politics. If Khan is to leave a mark he will have to take on the ISI and not surrender foreign policy to the army.

The ISI is the biggest reason why the Trump administration considers Pakistan to be an unreliable ally. When US aid was suspended, Trump was in effect saying: prove your loyalty or we will reframe our priorities in the East and lean more towards India. The Pakistani response was: who needs the US? We can buy from France and in particular from China, our new big friend.

Khan is shrewd enough to realise he can’t play China off against the US. But, if elected, he needs to start setting a course which frees Pakistan from the fears that are kept alive by an army which, while kitted out for nuclear war, is stuck in an antiquated power-play with its neighbours. It is time for Imran Khan to act as a captain again.


https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/imran-khan-must-tackle-pakistan-s-overmighty-army-65bb6vf7f

BBC are also being slightly more easy going on IK.

_102627915_pakistan_prime_minister-nc.png




https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-44924384
You son of bitch take care of your country and leave us.Why our army might is painful to you people . The only hurdle for you in the region.
 

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