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The IAF could, in the face of Dassaults unrelenting series of unreasonable demands leading
to a total breakdown of the negotiations, take any of the following actions:
—1. IAF could quite easily close negotiations with Dassault citing the companys desire to
reverse all the conditions set out in the very first call for participation as being totally
unacceptable; and opt to enter into negotiations with any of the other contestants
(Eurofighter Typhoon, Boeings F-18E/F Super Hornet, Lockheed Martins F-16IN
Viper, SAABs JAS 39 Gripen or the Russian MiG-35) in the MMRCA competition.
From the point of view of costs alone; and also considering the larger strategic picture
given the increasing assertiveness and belligerence of the Peoples Republic of China
(PRC) as seen in the South China Sea, Senkaku Islands dispute with Japan and the more recent deep incursions by the Peoples Liberation Armys (PLAs) troops into Indian Ladakh near Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO), the Boeing F-18E/F Super Hornet may be the most suitable alternative aircraft to the Rafale in the long term interests of IAF and India.
2.
IAF could even forego the MMRCA altogether in favour of larger numbers of Su-
30MKIs and deeper upgrades to older types (Mig-29, MiG-27, Jaguar and Mirage-
2000), in order to extend their service life, as well as place larger orders of the LCA.
More Su-30MKIs would require just an extension of the license terms with Russia and
these aircraft would be built in India itself giving better control on technology
ownership while reducing the number of types in service. LCAs in larger numbers in
conjunction with more Su-30s would lead to a larger heavy and light end and a
relatively less populated medium force level; but all built in India with primarily
Indian acquired or owned technology. However, the weak middle end of the force
structure issue apart, in the long run this option is likely to give a major impetus to
indigenous design and development if for no other reason than there being no other
choice and for this reason this option may thus be in the longer term interests of the
country as well as the IAF.
3.
IAF could also forego the MMRCA in favour of larger numbers of Su-30MKI (including
the proposed deep upgrade of the Su-30MKIs to Super 3011 standard, which would
include several Fifth Generation features) and earlier induction of enhanced numbers
of the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA), based on Russias Sukhoi T-50
prototype, being developed jointly with Russia.
4.
Some of the funds currently earmarked for the Rafale purchase could be diverted
towards accelerating development of the LCAs later and more advanced variants
(LCA Mk-II/III etc)12 as well as towards accelerated induction of FGFAs.
The possible options available bring out that the IAF is by no means powerless in face of
the apparent bullying by Dassault in the negotiations to finalise the MMRCA contract.
Unnecessary delay tactics by Dassault can be countered by IAF. The possible options
available make clear that the IAF can ensure its force structure remains as potent as desired
even without the Rafale deal fructifying, though with some re working of the long term plans already in place along with a reallocation of available funding. As per reports in
magazines such as India Strategic IAF is planning its long term structure to include 272
Su-30MKI, 126 MMRCA, incremental orders of LCA and 144 FGFA, aiming to build up to
42 Squadrons by 202713. In case MMRCA does not fructify the funds earmarked for this
program could be diverted towards increased numbers of any of the other aircraft types.
While the seller does have some advantages over the buyer in the prevailing situation,
however, long term interests dictate that undue advantages will be detrimental to the
overall strategic relationship between France-India. Historically, Frances aircraft industry
has had its footprint in India ever since the IAF first bought fighters from Dassault in the
early 1950s.
It would be prudent for Dassault to keep the negotiations for finalising the contract within
the boundaries set out in the initial RfI, RfP and Tender.
Conclusion
The MMRCA deal has progressed from the initial RfP to selection on technical merits
with Rafale as the first choice. However, exclusive negotiations with Dassault have dragged
on for over a year with media reports suggesting that Dassault is trying to change the
initial terms to evade several crucial clauses regarding ToT, work share to be undertaken
by HAL and overall responsibility, etc. All these points were the initial requirements to
be met by the vendor. Hence Dassaults demand for changes is surprising. The IAF does
have several alternative options in case it becomes clear that Dassault is not really serious
about concluding the contract in line with the parameters set out from the beginning. In
the bargain it is possible that Dassault may lose out on this contract as well as vitiate the
atmosphere to the extent that in future the Indian military keeps the French arms industry
at arms length.
Vivek Kapur
Group Captain Vivek Kapur is Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence
Studies & Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi.
to a total breakdown of the negotiations, take any of the following actions:
—1. IAF could quite easily close negotiations with Dassault citing the companys desire to
reverse all the conditions set out in the very first call for participation as being totally
unacceptable; and opt to enter into negotiations with any of the other contestants
(Eurofighter Typhoon, Boeings F-18E/F Super Hornet, Lockheed Martins F-16IN
Viper, SAABs JAS 39 Gripen or the Russian MiG-35) in the MMRCA competition.
From the point of view of costs alone; and also considering the larger strategic picture
given the increasing assertiveness and belligerence of the Peoples Republic of China
(PRC) as seen in the South China Sea, Senkaku Islands dispute with Japan and the more recent deep incursions by the Peoples Liberation Armys (PLAs) troops into Indian Ladakh near Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO), the Boeing F-18E/F Super Hornet may be the most suitable alternative aircraft to the Rafale in the long term interests of IAF and India.
2.
IAF could even forego the MMRCA altogether in favour of larger numbers of Su-
30MKIs and deeper upgrades to older types (Mig-29, MiG-27, Jaguar and Mirage-
2000), in order to extend their service life, as well as place larger orders of the LCA.
More Su-30MKIs would require just an extension of the license terms with Russia and
these aircraft would be built in India itself giving better control on technology
ownership while reducing the number of types in service. LCAs in larger numbers in
conjunction with more Su-30s would lead to a larger heavy and light end and a
relatively less populated medium force level; but all built in India with primarily
Indian acquired or owned technology. However, the weak middle end of the force
structure issue apart, in the long run this option is likely to give a major impetus to
indigenous design and development if for no other reason than there being no other
choice and for this reason this option may thus be in the longer term interests of the
country as well as the IAF.
3.
IAF could also forego the MMRCA in favour of larger numbers of Su-30MKI (including
the proposed deep upgrade of the Su-30MKIs to Super 3011 standard, which would
include several Fifth Generation features) and earlier induction of enhanced numbers
of the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA), based on Russias Sukhoi T-50
prototype, being developed jointly with Russia.
4.
Some of the funds currently earmarked for the Rafale purchase could be diverted
towards accelerating development of the LCAs later and more advanced variants
(LCA Mk-II/III etc)12 as well as towards accelerated induction of FGFAs.
The possible options available bring out that the IAF is by no means powerless in face of
the apparent bullying by Dassault in the negotiations to finalise the MMRCA contract.
Unnecessary delay tactics by Dassault can be countered by IAF. The possible options
available make clear that the IAF can ensure its force structure remains as potent as desired
even without the Rafale deal fructifying, though with some re working of the long term plans already in place along with a reallocation of available funding. As per reports in
magazines such as India Strategic IAF is planning its long term structure to include 272
Su-30MKI, 126 MMRCA, incremental orders of LCA and 144 FGFA, aiming to build up to
42 Squadrons by 202713. In case MMRCA does not fructify the funds earmarked for this
program could be diverted towards increased numbers of any of the other aircraft types.
While the seller does have some advantages over the buyer in the prevailing situation,
however, long term interests dictate that undue advantages will be detrimental to the
overall strategic relationship between France-India. Historically, Frances aircraft industry
has had its footprint in India ever since the IAF first bought fighters from Dassault in the
early 1950s.
It would be prudent for Dassault to keep the negotiations for finalising the contract within
the boundaries set out in the initial RfI, RfP and Tender.
Conclusion
The MMRCA deal has progressed from the initial RfP to selection on technical merits
with Rafale as the first choice. However, exclusive negotiations with Dassault have dragged
on for over a year with media reports suggesting that Dassault is trying to change the
initial terms to evade several crucial clauses regarding ToT, work share to be undertaken
by HAL and overall responsibility, etc. All these points were the initial requirements to
be met by the vendor. Hence Dassaults demand for changes is surprising. The IAF does
have several alternative options in case it becomes clear that Dassault is not really serious
about concluding the contract in line with the parameters set out from the beginning. In
the bargain it is possible that Dassault may lose out on this contract as well as vitiate the
atmosphere to the extent that in future the Indian military keeps the French arms industry
at arms length.
Vivek Kapur
Group Captain Vivek Kapur is Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence
Studies & Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi.