When you hear news about explosions occurring in nuclear and other strategic sites in Iran, or about dubious fires and so on, you may suspect hidden hands of hostile intelligence agencies at play within the country.
Equally mysterious and incompletely elucidated to this very day are some of the high profile terrorist attacks against some of the founding figures and partisans of the Islamic Republic in the Revolution's early years, namely the assassination of revolutionary ideologue Morteza Motahari at the hands of the ominous Forqaan group, the Haft-e Tir event i. e. the bombing of the headquarters of the Islamic Republic Party killing dozens including ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, and the terrorist attacks against President Mohammad-Ali Rajaai and ayatollah Ali Qoddusi.
One of the ways in which hostile intelligence agencies have been operating in Iran is through the covert infiltration of state administrations, including in the field of security, through on agents planted inside those departments.
Sometimes, these agents had been recruited prior to the Revolution either by SAVAK or directly by foreign agencies (as opponents to the shah regime "flipped" and recruited after their arrest by SAVAK, or sometimes as exiled opponents returning to Iran after 1979) and then took up bureaucratic or government positions in the IRI. Once in charge, they spun their own covert networks.
Under the Pahlavi monarchy already, the zionist regime's Mossad had established a secret network in Iran known as Zeytoon (Olive). According to Keyhan newspaper, one of the leading members of the Zeytoon network, Masood Aalikhaani, who had completed his studies in agricultural science in Isra"el", turned out to be in close kinship with Mehrdaad Aalikhaani, general director of the Ministry of Intelligence and one of the three main culprits in the 1988-1998 chain murders affair, when a series of intellectuals, authors and former political activists who hardly constituted a threat to the IR, were murdered in suspiciously brutal ways on orders of a rogue circle within the Ministry of Intelligence, which achieved nothing but giving the Islamic Republic a negative image, but also sustainig the newly formed reformist current's discourse about a supposed "need" for greater democratization and secularization.
When revolutionaries seized and confiscated the SAVAK archive of classified documents, they noticed that alongside the names of ordinary informants and regular agents, there was a group of collaborators whose members were only referred to by code numbers. The identities of these SAVAK assets could thus never be established with certainty. It is thus suspected that some survived the revolution and made it to administrative positions within the Islamic Republic, acting as agents of influence or as spies for hostile foreign intelligence services.
Parviz Saabeti, one of the former directors of SAVAK who fled to Isra"el" and settled in Tel Aviv after the Islamic Revolution, surely took with himself his list of "code numbered" contacts. In this way, the Mossad, which used to enjoy great influence over SAVAK's bureau for internal security which it had helped set up, could establish a spy network inside Iran.
This whole topic raises another question, that of maranos (aanosi in Persian) Jewish Iranians linked to the Mossads spying networks. Indeed, maranos Jews / aanosis have a long history in Iran. From Shiraz to Kashan, from Hamadan to Mashhad, from Isfahan to Rasht and from Kermanshah to Babol and Sari, Jewish Iranian communities gave birth not only to sincere converts to Islam but also to a number of false converts or anoosis. It is suspected that anoosis figure among the Mossad's spy networks in Iran.
Listen to this and other great conferences by Poor-Masood dealing with all the topics surrounding the undercover infiltration network for influence and sabotage working against the IRI while hiding in its midst:
