Screening programmes
Pakistan has set up screening procedures to ensure the loyalty and mental balance of personnel serving in the most sensitive
positions. These procedures were established in the early 2000s, took two years to set up and required overcoming various
forms of resistance.
Two different programmes exist: a Human Reliability Program for civilian personnel and a Personnel Reliability Program for
military personnel. They have been applied to up to 4000 people (although the numbers vary), including about 2000 scientists
or engineers working in particularly sensitive areas or who have critical knowledge, and who continue to be monitored after
retirement.
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The Strategic Plans Division (SPD) plans to extend these programmes to 10*000 personnel with access to sensitive
information. The screening process can take up to a year and involves four different agencies: the Intelligence Bureau, the
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the Military Intelligence and the SPD. There are clearance rechecks every two years.
Unsurprisingly, checks are said to focus on finances and religious beliefs. Punjabis (who make up two-thirds of Pakistans
officers) are reportedly privileged over people of other origins. There have been reports of attempts by militant groups to
infiltrate the nuclear complex through Pakistani scientists trained abroad.
SPD officials estimate that 7000 to 10*000 people out of a total of 70*000 people in the nuclear and missile complex are
nuclear scientists and engineers.
Physical security and surveillance
Three levels of nuclear security exist. The first level (or inner ring) is managed by the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), which
controls around 9000 personnel dedicated to this task.
The SPDs directorate in charge of nuclear security is led by a two-star
general and is endowed with its own counter-intelligence team. It has a cell in each of the four laboratories controlled by the
National Command Authority (NCA), each headed by a one-star general. The second level is physical, including fencing, sensors
and so on. The third level (or outer ring) is surveillance and monitoring of suspicious activities around the sites, with InterServices Intelligence (ISI) involvement. The SPD has a system of sensitive material control and accounting, which involves
regular and surprise inspections. It has reportedly adopted inventory systems to track individual components of warheads.
Theft- and tamper-proof containers and vehicles are used for storage and transport. The SPD has set up a Special Response
Force presumably to deal with nuclear incidents.
On the civilian side, the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA), created in 2001 and including 200 experts, is in
charge of the physical security of fissile material and radioactive sources. The military is strongly involved and the SPDs
director general is a member of the PNRA. A five-year Nuclear Security Action Plan, designed to enhance the safety and
security of nuclear materials and radioactive sources, was adopted by the PNRA in 2006. Special border controls have been set
up. In 2011 a safety review of existing and planned facilities was conducted. All known sources have reportedly been registered,
orphan sources have been recovered and two secure storage sites have been set up.
Pakistan cooperates with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to improve nuclear safety.
It ratified the 1980
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) in 2000 and participates in the Global Initiative to
Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Pakistan has not, however, ratified the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM and is not a party to the
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.
SPD officials give numbers ranging from 8000 to 10*000. A 2011 report by Rezaul Laskar claims that over 8000 new
personnel will be trained by 2013 at the SPD Training Academy. A report by Andrew Bast mentions two army divisions, or about
18*000 troops, with the source being the former President Musharraf in a 2011 on-the-record interview with the author. This
number may refer to the total of the current and future force.
According to Michael Krepon, in 2006 the Stimson Center began hosting fellows from the PNRA