jeypore
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Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee said at a conference in New Delhi on Wednesday that Pakistan is still sponsoring international terrorism and must be disciplined. India has reiterated this message on a near-daily basis ever since the November attacks in Mumbai, but the only action it has taken has been limited to issuing rhetoric.
There is no question that the Mumbai attacks outraged Indias decision-makers, the vast majority of whom maintain that there are clear and identifiable links between the perpetrators and Pakistans military establishment. As far as New Delhi is concerned, the Islamist militant proxies that Pakistans Inter-Services Intelligence agency long has supported are still well within the militarys reach and could be reined in if Islamabad had the will to do so.
In the wake of the attacks, India prepared for military action with possibilities ranging from surgical strikes and hot-pursuit operations in Pakistani-administered Kashmir to a full-scale war. Pakistan, nervous, redeployed troops from the Afghan border in the west to the eastern border with India. At that point, Pakistans best hope was to pressure the United States into holding India back, which it did by reminding Washington of the risk it would incur to its supply lines in Pakistan critical to fighting the war in Afghanistan if its forces confronted a military threat from India.
But it wasnt just U.S. pressure that could restrain India. The Indians recognized that they lacked good options for responding forcefully against Pakistan. Limited strikes in Pakistani-administered Kashmir would have mainly symbolic value, given that many of the militants there had already had time to relocate. And any such strike likely would end up working in Pakistans favor: The local population, united by an Indian threat, would have good reason to rally behind the Pakistani military and government.
Any plans New Delhi might have had to go beyond a limited war in Kashmir did not have the full support of Indias own military particularly the army, which lacked confidence in its capabilities and felt that stalemate was a far more likely outcome than victory. Indian policymakers also had to deal with the uncomfortable possibility that those who carried out the Mumbai attacks likely had sought to pull India into a military confrontation with Pakistan. The more Pakistan destabilized, the more room jihadists in the region would have to maneuver. Any significant military action by India could be seen as playing into the militants hands - and could intensify the jihadist focus on India for further attacks.
In short, Indias hands were tied, and as New Delhi spent time debating bad options and worse options, its window of opportunity to strike (when international outrage against Pakistan was at its peak) eventually closed.
But this is not to say that India is left without any options. On the contrary, New Delhi is keeping open the option of hot-pursuit strikes in Pakistani-administered Kashmir, and is moving forward with plans for covert operations inside Pakistan to target militant networks. The Indians also recognize that a follow-on attack would require them to take some level of military action. But there is another pressure tactic under consideration, which involves reaching into Afghanistan.
Afghanistan is essentially the extension of Pakistans western buffer against foreign threats. Without a foothold in Kabul, Pakistan runs the risk of being sandwiched between a hostile power to its west and its main rival, India, to the east a position it was in during the Cold War when the Soviet Union, then allied with India, invaded Afghanistan. As a result, Pakistan must rely heavily on its Pashtun ties to Afghanistan to secure its western frontier.
The Indians know what makes the Pakistanis jumpy, and they have spent recent years increasing their involvement in reconstruction work in Afghanistan to make good with Kabul, whose relationship with Pakistan has grown shaky due to the Taliban insurgency plaguing the country. So far, India has not ventured beyond its $86 million reconstruction commitment to Afghanistan, but has been weighing the rather contentious possibility of sending troops to the country to help fight the insurgency.
This would be a gigantic step for India to take, and one that would send the Pakistanis through the roof. India is extremely wary of deploying forces beyond its border. (It learned the pains of counterinsurgency the hard way, while engaged in a bloody war of attrition with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in the late 1980s.) New Delhi prefers to keep to itself in foreign policy matters, particularly when it comes to fighting other states wars. But sources in Indian defense circles say there are serious discussions going on among the political and military leadership over the Afghan option. Indian army chief Gen. Deepak Kapoor publicly raised the possibility Jan. 14, saying in a conference, Changing our strategic policy towards Kabul in terms of raising military stakes is one of the factors that is to be determined politically.
Kapoor was phrasing his statement carefully, essentially saying it is up to the politicians to give the military orders to deploy. But he also was deliberate in his message to Pakistan: If Islamabad continues to push India through its array of Islamist militant proxies, India could end up making a strategic decision to break through a few foreign policy barriers and shoulder some of the security burden on Pakistans western frontier. At a time when U.S. tolerance for Pakistan is wearing dangerously thin, and when the United States and India are exploring deeper, long-term and more strategic ties, this type of adversarial encirclement is a threat that potentially could shake Pakistan to its core.
That is, if India actually follows through. As mentioned earlier, this move would mark a significant shift in Indian foreign policy not to mention requiring the coordination and integration of Indian military efforts in Afghanistan with U.S. and NATO operations. And there is currently no indication that the discussions are anywhere near an implementation stage.
Also, the United States would probably prefer that India keep things as they are for now. An Indian military presence in Afghanistan would make a juicy target for jihadists in the region, and it would give Pakistan all the more incentive to redirect and intensify the insurgency in Afghanistan, putting both the United States and India in an even stickier situation.
However, the threat of sending Indian troops to Afghanistan would do a decent job of keeping Pakistan off-balance. And, at least for the moment, that is what New Delhi and Washington want, to intimidate Pakistan into giving up its militant proxies. Time will tell if the Indians actually put the Afghan option into practice, but the Pakistanis are certainly keeping watch.
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There is no question that the Mumbai attacks outraged Indias decision-makers, the vast majority of whom maintain that there are clear and identifiable links between the perpetrators and Pakistans military establishment. As far as New Delhi is concerned, the Islamist militant proxies that Pakistans Inter-Services Intelligence agency long has supported are still well within the militarys reach and could be reined in if Islamabad had the will to do so.
In the wake of the attacks, India prepared for military action with possibilities ranging from surgical strikes and hot-pursuit operations in Pakistani-administered Kashmir to a full-scale war. Pakistan, nervous, redeployed troops from the Afghan border in the west to the eastern border with India. At that point, Pakistans best hope was to pressure the United States into holding India back, which it did by reminding Washington of the risk it would incur to its supply lines in Pakistan critical to fighting the war in Afghanistan if its forces confronted a military threat from India.
But it wasnt just U.S. pressure that could restrain India. The Indians recognized that they lacked good options for responding forcefully against Pakistan. Limited strikes in Pakistani-administered Kashmir would have mainly symbolic value, given that many of the militants there had already had time to relocate. And any such strike likely would end up working in Pakistans favor: The local population, united by an Indian threat, would have good reason to rally behind the Pakistani military and government.
Any plans New Delhi might have had to go beyond a limited war in Kashmir did not have the full support of Indias own military particularly the army, which lacked confidence in its capabilities and felt that stalemate was a far more likely outcome than victory. Indian policymakers also had to deal with the uncomfortable possibility that those who carried out the Mumbai attacks likely had sought to pull India into a military confrontation with Pakistan. The more Pakistan destabilized, the more room jihadists in the region would have to maneuver. Any significant military action by India could be seen as playing into the militants hands - and could intensify the jihadist focus on India for further attacks.
In short, Indias hands were tied, and as New Delhi spent time debating bad options and worse options, its window of opportunity to strike (when international outrage against Pakistan was at its peak) eventually closed.
But this is not to say that India is left without any options. On the contrary, New Delhi is keeping open the option of hot-pursuit strikes in Pakistani-administered Kashmir, and is moving forward with plans for covert operations inside Pakistan to target militant networks. The Indians also recognize that a follow-on attack would require them to take some level of military action. But there is another pressure tactic under consideration, which involves reaching into Afghanistan.
Afghanistan is essentially the extension of Pakistans western buffer against foreign threats. Without a foothold in Kabul, Pakistan runs the risk of being sandwiched between a hostile power to its west and its main rival, India, to the east a position it was in during the Cold War when the Soviet Union, then allied with India, invaded Afghanistan. As a result, Pakistan must rely heavily on its Pashtun ties to Afghanistan to secure its western frontier.
The Indians know what makes the Pakistanis jumpy, and they have spent recent years increasing their involvement in reconstruction work in Afghanistan to make good with Kabul, whose relationship with Pakistan has grown shaky due to the Taliban insurgency plaguing the country. So far, India has not ventured beyond its $86 million reconstruction commitment to Afghanistan, but has been weighing the rather contentious possibility of sending troops to the country to help fight the insurgency.
This would be a gigantic step for India to take, and one that would send the Pakistanis through the roof. India is extremely wary of deploying forces beyond its border. (It learned the pains of counterinsurgency the hard way, while engaged in a bloody war of attrition with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in the late 1980s.) New Delhi prefers to keep to itself in foreign policy matters, particularly when it comes to fighting other states wars. But sources in Indian defense circles say there are serious discussions going on among the political and military leadership over the Afghan option. Indian army chief Gen. Deepak Kapoor publicly raised the possibility Jan. 14, saying in a conference, Changing our strategic policy towards Kabul in terms of raising military stakes is one of the factors that is to be determined politically.
Kapoor was phrasing his statement carefully, essentially saying it is up to the politicians to give the military orders to deploy. But he also was deliberate in his message to Pakistan: If Islamabad continues to push India through its array of Islamist militant proxies, India could end up making a strategic decision to break through a few foreign policy barriers and shoulder some of the security burden on Pakistans western frontier. At a time when U.S. tolerance for Pakistan is wearing dangerously thin, and when the United States and India are exploring deeper, long-term and more strategic ties, this type of adversarial encirclement is a threat that potentially could shake Pakistan to its core.
That is, if India actually follows through. As mentioned earlier, this move would mark a significant shift in Indian foreign policy not to mention requiring the coordination and integration of Indian military efforts in Afghanistan with U.S. and NATO operations. And there is currently no indication that the discussions are anywhere near an implementation stage.
Also, the United States would probably prefer that India keep things as they are for now. An Indian military presence in Afghanistan would make a juicy target for jihadists in the region, and it would give Pakistan all the more incentive to redirect and intensify the insurgency in Afghanistan, putting both the United States and India in an even stickier situation.
However, the threat of sending Indian troops to Afghanistan would do a decent job of keeping Pakistan off-balance. And, at least for the moment, that is what New Delhi and Washington want, to intimidate Pakistan into giving up its militant proxies. Time will tell if the Indians actually put the Afghan option into practice, but the Pakistanis are certainly keeping watch.
Free Preview of Members-Only Content | Stratfor
