French Navy Commander isn’t worried by the threat of the Chinese DF-21/DF-31D

[GeraltofRivia]

We (GB, Italy, France) have a perfect missile to do so : ASTER.
The Horizon frigates, and the future Belharra frigates will have the radar capacity to fired medium range missile thanks to ASTER.

Facts is that the chinese carrier killer missile wasn't tested really against a moving target....

Sure thing, Aster 30 block 1 NT, which is capable of this task. Is that still in development？ Have you had any news that it performs intercept test?

Naturally Chinese missile can only aim for a stationary target like Scud class.

 

[BON PLAN]

Sure thing, Aster 30 block 1 NT, which is capable of this task. Is that still in development？ Have you had any news that it performs intercept test?

Naturally Chinese missile can only aim for a stationary target like Scud class.

The design phase of the block1 NT was inked in december 2016.
A block 2 BMD is also on early study phase.

 

[GeraltofRivia]

The design phase of the block1 NT was inked in december 2016.
A block 2 BMD is also on early study phase.

Thanks but would it mean it is still a few years away to be operational, let alone navalized?

 

[ghazi768]

If its all that easy and cheap to counter, why is China long term investing in major CBG infra (including carriers themselves)? Wouldn't they follow the logic that its not a good idea to invest into things that only make sense in a conflict among other CBG-owning peers...but can be so easily and cheaply countered? Like wouldnt they just invest massively into DF missiles and skip the useless easily destroyed expensive CBG stuff?

/QUOTE]
By your logic than all armies should have given up tanks as they already maintain large arsenals of ATGMs.. Carriers are for power projection while AshMs are defensive weapons both have different purposes.

 

[Nilgiri]

@ghazi768

Thats basically what I was hinting at lol....my sarcastic drift might be little hard to pick out.

The ATGM vs Tank analogy is good one actually, because obviously there are no black and white eternal foolproof counters in that either. Cat and mouse always in this stuff over time.

 

[Dante80]

There are many misconceptions listed in Prazuck's response.

First of all, ASBMs like the DF-21 or the - rumored - DF-26B (not the DF-31D listed in the response) are designed as conventional warfare defensive weapons. The whole idea is to have them as an active deterrent against offensive CSG operations in a theater that is inside their range. They are not "attacking, offensive weapons" as he described.

Secondly, the argument that China would not build CVs if said weapons worked is ludicrous, I think posters in the thread have already explained that fallacy.

Thirdly, this is not the 60's where BM CEP was described in hundreds of meters and trajectory was set when the RV was released from the stage.

I could go on, but reading the official DoD yearly CMPR helps a lot more..since it lists and describes said ASBMs as active. https://media.defense.gov/2018/Aug/16/2001955282/-1/-1/1/2018-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT.PDF

 

[BON PLAN]

The design phase of the block1 NT was inked in december 2016.
A block 2 BMD is also on early study phase.

I don't know the real entry date.
Navalized is not a special problem : ASTER was studied from the beginning to be used on sea.

There are many misconceptions listed in Prazuck's response.

First of all, ASBMs like the DF-21 or the - rumored - DF-26B (not the DF-31D listed in the response) are designed as conventional warfare defensive weapons. The whole idea is to have them as an active deterrent against offensive CSG operations in a theater that is inside their range. They are not "attacking, offensive weapons" as he described.

Secondly, the argument that China would not build CVs if said weapons worked is ludicrous, I think posters in the thread have already explained that fallacy.

Thirdly, this is not the 60's where BM CEP was described in hundreds of meters and trajectory was set when the RV was released from the stage.

I could go on, but reading the official DoD yearly CMPR helps a lot more..since it lists and describes said ASBMs as active. https://media.defense.gov/2018/Aug/16/2001955282/-1/-1/1/2018-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT.PDF

defensive, offensive.... the border line is all but clear.

Even now, a medium ballistic missile CEP is of some dozen meters. and the flight travel os of some minutes. Without seeker, you only can hit a moving target, even as big as a carrier, with luck.
All the problem is : is there a homing seeker in this kind of missile? How is it effective?

 

[gambit]

is there a homing seeker in this kind of missile?

We are safe to assume that there is/are.

How is it effective?

The answer have two parts.

1- How effective is the sensor package against a cooperative target? The word cooperative here means the target does not offer up any type of resistance.

2- How effective is the sensor package against a NON-cooperative target? Moving makes the target non-cooperative. So does launching flares (infrared) and chaff (radar).

An aircraft carrier produces clear infrared contrast against the cool sea surface and its large flat metal deck produces strong specular radar returns, so item 1 is not a problem for any sensor package on the DF-21D's warhead.

Item 2 is the real mystery.

A volley of flares against infrared sensor can cover an area of several hundreds of square meters of intense and long duration infrared energy contrast against the sea surface.

A volley of chaff against radar can cover an area of several hundreds of square KILOMETERS of intense, long duration, and variable radar returns.

https://journals.ametsoc.org/doi/10.1175/JTECH-D-12-00158.1

In a country such as South Korea where very frequent aerial military exercises are held in a relatively confined air space, chaff clutters with a sizeable volume and coverage area (several hundred square kilometers) were observed on 231 out of 365 days in 2010...

The target will maneuver under that cover.

Being non-cooperative is not restricted to technical issues but includes creativity in tactics and this is where China do not have much intelligence on how the US Navy conduct such operations. The warhead's nosecone will have limited internal volume which will make for a smaller radar antenna which will result in a broad beam which will not have the high quality of target resolutions common in aircraft's radar. The wider the beamwidth, the more vulnerable to jamming tactics. So now the warhead's radar must contend with active ECM against it from the fleet's escorts as well as chaff cloud. This is not a simulation that China can easily produce to test the DF-21D whereas US Navy's countermeasures tactics have been battle tested for decades.

 

[BON PLAN]

We are safe to assume that there is/are.


The answer have two parts.

1- How effective is the sensor package against a cooperative target? The word cooperative here means the target does not offer up any type of resistance.

2- How effective is the sensor package against a NON-cooperative target? Moving makes the target non-cooperative. So does launching flares (infrared) and chaff (radar).

An aircraft carrier produces clear infrared contrast against the cool sea surface and its large flat metal deck produces strong specular radar returns, so item 1 is not a problem for any sensor package on the DF-21D's warhead.

Item 2 is the real mystery.

A volley of flares against infrared sensor can cover an area of several hundreds of square meters of intense and long duration infrared energy contrast against the sea surface.

A volley of chaff against radar can cover an area of several hundreds of square KILOMETERS of intense, long duration, and variable radar returns.

https://journals.ametsoc.org/doi/10.1175/JTECH-D-12-00158.1

The target will maneuver under that cover.

Being non-cooperative is not restricted to technical issues but includes creativity in tactics and this is where China do not have much intelligence on how the US Navy conduct such operations. The warhead's nosecone will have limited internal volume which will make for a smaller radar antenna which will result in a broad beam which will not have the high quality of target resolutions common in aircraft's radar. The wider the beamwidth, the more vulnerable to jamming tactics. So now the warhead's radar must contend with active ECM against it from the fleet's escorts as well as chaff cloud. This is not a simulation that China can easily produce to test the DF-21D whereas US Navy's countermeasures tactics have been battle tested for decades.

A IR seeker seems not suitable, because the last stage of the missile is far too hot when re entering in the atmosphere.
so the only solution is a radar homing. The flat deck of a carrier only offer a nice radar return if the seeker is at 90°, ie arriving at full vertical. It's not the case. And as you said, a volley of chaff is easy to create. Add all the electronic couter measures a 1st rank carrier can generate (if the ballistic threat is really feared, and it's not the case I think by USN, French N or others Navy)