Editorial: With General (retd) Pervez Musharraf out of the picture, what foreign policy options is Islamabad likely to exercise? The question is important given that at least one coalition partner, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, has criticised nearly the entire range of policies pursued by the previous government led by Gen (retd) Musharraf. The United States is already in the process of adjusting to the big change in Islamabad, praising Gen (retd) Pervez Musharraf for his efforts in the war on terror but welcoming the new army chief and democracy. India is less sure whether the process of normalisation started by Gen Musharraf will continue.
The fact is that decisions under a democratic dispensation are always difficult to take and democracies tend to be unwieldy even on issues of great importance. The manner in which the internal political struggle unfolded in India on the US-India civilian nuclear deal is a case in point. Equally, however, democratic governments, after trying long and hard to win adherents, can also go out on a limb and take risks that is exactly what the UPA government in India did and carried the day. Foreign policy contours do not change overnight; they are guided by a countrys core interests based on a number of determinants. What is different about democratic debate in theory is that it provides various forums for a debate on actual decisions. It is time consuming but allows crucial input at multiple levels. The debate also brings with it the vital element of buy-in for a policy. In other words, the policy is rooted in the public as far as this can be achieved and is desirable.
The PPP, which leads the government, has so far not changed the direction of foreign policy: the US, India, China, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan remain the central focus as does the war on terror that at one level binds all these entities to Pakistan. What has changed is its relationship with the public which misperceived the foreign policy pursued in the last eight years as the brainchild of one person. That misperception emerged from the legitimacy problem that Gen Musharraf suffered from. It grew worse when, after March 9, 2007, he also lost out on the liberal constituency that had supported many of his initiatives. Without a public support base, no policy can be implemented for long. Historically, when governments have sensed complete political opposition to a policy in the national interest, they have tended to use back channels and struck deals away from public glare. This has been generally the case on intractable issues between states inimical to each other. But even as deals are struck in the backroom, governments do everything to change public perceptions on the issue(s) in order to prepare them to face new realities for the final round.
Gen Musharrafs failure was not that he took the wrong direction but that he never worked hard to create a groundswell of support for the war on terror, for example, for reasons that, in the end, were only peripheral to the foreign policy itself. Therefore the current government, while travelling the same path, is obliged to keep the public on board. This is an important consideration especially in regard to tackling the insurgency in FATA, an internal security problem with huge foreign policy ramifications and vice versa. It is trying to talk to the tribes to isolate the militants but realises that it cant be shy from using force when necessary. The Bajaur and Swat operations are cases in point. Luckily, there is less difference of opinion on relations with China, Saudi Arabia and the European Union. Even India is not much of a problem now after four years of normalisation which remains on the rails despite recent jolts.
The biggest problem is relations with the United States and Pakistans war in the tribal areas. The government knows that the economys export sector is heavily dependent on trade with the United States and the European Union. Apart from the need to keep this relationship going, there is a need to attract as much economic assistance as possible to save the economy from collapsing on the heads of the most deprived half of the population. At the same time, it is important for people to understand the threat the country is facing from the insurgency. The government has held its ground on the issue of talking to the reconcilable elements in FATA despite US pressure; at the same time, however, it must use force against the irreconcilable elements as and when it becomes necessary. The last thing we want is for the US to become so frustrated with policy deadlock in Islamabad that it takes FATA into its own hands and creates a bitter blowback.
There is also consolation that the PPP and the PMLN have pledged to normalise with India and Afghanistan. But the Zardari government has gone further than General (retd) Musharraf was prepared to go with India in opening up trade. This is a good development and constitutes a needed break with the old Pakistani approach that was based on Kashmir first and then everything else. General Musharrafs out-of-the-box thinking effectively put paid to the UN Resolutions much like Nawaz Sharif did in the Lahore Summit in 1999 and Mr Zardari must move in the same direction in conformity with the aspirations of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. This is in keeping with the spirit of the dialogue framework with India, especially the back channel that General (retd) Musharraf opened with Dr Manmohan Singh. Both Mr Zardari and Mr Sharif have also announced that they would like to see an easing of visa restrictions with India. Good. It seems that the pressures of governance have induced a generous dose of pragmatism in their thinking to keep the foreign policy directed in favour of the national economy. *
