Facts on the durand line

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Facts on the Durand Line

On the fateful day of November 12, 1893, Amir Abdul Rahman Khan of Afghanistan and Sir Mortimer Durand, the foreign secretary of the British Indian government both agreed and signed upon the Durand Line Treaty, setting up the border between Afghanistan and then British India/present-day Pakistan. The nationalist Pashtuns have always resented this Line. When the country has more important issues to worry about, certain groups of ethno-centric Pashtuns refuse to let go of the Durand Line issue. This, of course, is just another way for them to further their own agendas in Afghanistan.



Politically-driven motives and agendas serve the interests of specific parties while harming everyone else involved—there is nothing new or even controversial about this statement. History as an overview is a record of these politically-driven agendas and the world today is nothing more than the outcomes of post-colonialism with the victors on one end and the defeated on the other. Artificially created states are the residues of the former colonialists being the fact that the state system was mostly a European creation, so to speak. Playing a game of geo-political hop-scotch, the European colonists set up states and upon leaving, they left successors and, in most cases, unpopular and unrepresentative regimes that ran each state. All of the states that were set up were multi-ethnic countries. In Afghanistan, every ethnic group is a minority whereas other states like Turkey, the leading ethnicity, Turks, made up about 70% of the country with the Kurds making up the minority. In Turkey, the Turks are the ruling class just like how the Arabs are the ruling class among countries like Iraq, Syria, etc. and like the Hindus in India, the Persians in Iran, and Punjabis in Pakistan.



Regardless of which group of successor was left in the countries by the Europeans, all the bureaucrats focused on the interests of their own ethnic group—whether it was the Turks, Pashtuns, Punjabis, etc.—instead of the interests of the pluralistic society as a whole. However, there is a difference between Afghanistan and the rest of the aforementioned countries. In Turkey, the Turks have established themselves politically, socially, economically, culturally, etc. They ran the Ottoman Empire, a once-powerful Empire, for a long period of time. As for the Persians, they have had thousands of years of culture and history, they ruled over great regions and their culture is recognized even to this day at the same time influencing other cultures. The Arabs have also conquered a great amount of land at one point, spreading their influence over the regions. The Hindus have an old culture that also still exists to this day and is very much respected and explored by others. Afghanistan, formed from parts of the Persian land of Khorasan, consists of different ethnic minority groups and has culturally, historically, and linguistically always followed the Persian culture. For Tajiks, Hazaras and the vast majority of Uzbeks and urbanized Pashtuns, their native tongue is Farsi/Dari. The nationalistic Pashtuns were threatened by this humiliating aspect because as the political successors, their culture and language was just an insignificant subculture of Khorasan and just limited to themselves. The tribes of Pashtuns are nomadic, underdeveloped, and to this day in order for them to be considered literate, they have to learn Farsi/Dari and even their ruling Pashtun elites have always adopted the Persian culture and language. Historically, for the most part they were always the subjects of Persians as well as the subjects of foreigners like the Turks, Arabs etc. It is interesting to note that Farsi is the lingua de franca in Iran just as Turkish is in Turkey and Arabic is in Iraq, etc. However, Afghanistan is Persian-dominated—speaking Farsi/Dari instead of Pashto as the nationalistic Pashtuns would like it to be. Schools, businesses, government, judicial systems—all use Farsi/Dari.



As expected, Pashtun groups such as the fascistic Afghan Mellat rose and opposed the adopted Persian culture and sought to Pashtunize the country through any means. However, not only did organization such as the Pashto Tolana which created the fraudulent Pota Khazana (Hidden Treasure) not have the desired results, they, in fact, caused greater problems because people made a mockery out of it and continue to make fun of it to this day. Forging their ethnicity percentage levels to reveal larger numbers did not prove to be a stabilizing factor and like everything else, it backfired on them, causing people to become infuriated with their tricky and devious tactics. And so, they turned once more to the Durand Line. The nationalistic Pashtuns continuously state that the Durand Line is void and that they should have full rights over the NWFP and Baluchistan.



As stated before, the Durand Line is simply a name for the border that separates Afghanistan and Pakistan; however, certain ethno-centric groups of Pashtuns have tried to exaggerate the subject to greater proportions by claiming that it is land rightfully due to them. What those nationalistic Pashtuns fail—or even refuse—to understand is that the Durand Line did not give or take any territory/land to British India or Afghanistan. Instead, it just demarcated the border between two countries; in other words, it is a line that separates Afghanistan and Pakistan, running from China to Persia. Even before the British came into the region, this border had already existed as a de facto border for almost a century with the Sikhs controlling the areas south of the line. Britain then basically replaced the Sikhs and invaded the regions of today’s Afghanistan (north side of the line) several times and took control of the whole region. Each time they retreated, they withdrew into British India—south side of today’s Durand line. The Durand Line treaty put an end to the fighting between the two oppositions, stating that neither side would try to interfere with the other. And most importantly, the treaty, agreeably signed by both parties, did not take property away from Afghanistan. Now, to raise their numbers and pursue their agendas, the nationalistic Pashtuns want to annex two of the four provinces of Pakistan, NWFP and Baluchistan (the other two provinces are Sindh and Punjab), and combine them with Afghanistan.



In a separate treaty with China, Britain gained control of Hong Kong for 99 years. Unlike the Durand Line Treaty, this treaty with China over the Hong Kong ports was indicated to last only 99 years. The Pashtun community of Afghanistan is mistakenly under the impression that the 1893 agreement between British India’s foreign minister, Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, and Amir Abdur Rahman Khan was for 99 or 100 years. This time limit is a rumor whose origins are unknown but repeated like a mantra by high-ranking politicians until they misled the country into thinking that the Durand Treaty was to be null and void in 1993. However, to date, no one has provided any sort of evidence that proves that the treaty was to last for 99 or 100 years. Over the years, the rumor became a myth due to the fact that there is not any valid documentation as proof. There are, however, documentations that prove just the opposite – that the Pashtun leaders had plenty of opportunities to invalidate the Durand Treaty but had instead chose to continuously uphold it. And the text of the Durand Treaty which provides proof to the legitimacy of the Durand Line’s existence is easily accessible in websites, encyclopedias and other various sources. Not to mention that two of the original copies of the Durand Treaty are still kept in the Museums of London, UK and in Rawalpindi, Pakistan.



The Durand Treaty as well as the documents created by the joint commissions of British India and Afghanistan from 1893 to 1896 regarding the physical demarcation of the border contained information on the border as well as the weaponry, ammunition, and annual payments that Amir Abdur Rahman would receive from Britain. It also stated that neither side would interfere with the other’s affairs. But there was no mention of a 99-100 year time limit placed on the treaty. The agreements were confirmed with both parties satisfied at the outcome. So it is perplexing as to how some members of one ethnic group came up with such a nonsensical allegation of a 100 year claim. All without any evidence. The only thing close to a time limit was the acknowledgement that the treaty was valid for however long Amir Abdur Rahman was king.



In 1901 Abdur Rahman died and his son, Amir Habibullah Khan, became king. For a while, Britain requested that Amir Habibullah Khan meet with their representative in Delhi, India so that they could go over the matters of mutual interests as well as the treaties that were upheld between Britain and Amir Abdur Rahman so that Amir Habibullah Khan, his son and Afghanistan’s new king, could go over the accords with them and sign them. Instead of meeting with Britain’s representative in Delhi, Amir Habibullah sent a message stating that there was no need for him to go to Delhi because he accepts and accredits all the agreements between his late father Amir Abdur Rahman and Britain. Britain, not satisfied with that response, insisted, and Amir Habibullah Khan, satisfied with the yearly payments of 1.8 million rupees, continuously refused. Britain was adamant, though, and they stopped their payments to Amir Habibullah. As soon as the funds stopped, Amir Habibullah immediately sent an invitation to Britain to set up a meeting with Britain’s representative. British viceroy in India, Lord Curzon, sent his foreign minister on an official visit to Kabul to meet with Amir Habibullah.



Instead of traveling to British India, Habibullah Khan was pleased to receive Sir Louis W. Dane, British India’s foreign minister, in Kabul. Toward the end of 1904 Dane arrived with new treaties and proposals which contained the same contents as the former documents i.e. the Durand Line, annual payments to the King, etc. The foreign minister of British India explained that though Abdur Rahman’s heir and successor was willing to accept his father’s past agreements, Britain was not willing to honor them because the death of the former king had nullified the original treaties. On March 21, 1905 Amir Habibullah had signed the documents and everything was re-instated. This was come to known as Dane Treaty which stated “In the words of His Majesty Amir Habibullah Khan: I hereby honor all the articles of Durand Treaty including all the other agreements and pacts that my late father signed with Britain’s representatives. I’ll act according to them and I’ll honor the pact of the Durand Line now and in the future.” The annual payments and weaponry was resumed and these new documents were valid until Amir Habibullah Khan’s assassination in 1919.



After the third Anglo-Afghan war, Afghanistan sent a team of diplomats headed by Ali Ahmad Khan, brother-in-law of King Amanullah Khan, to Rawalpindi, British India, on August 8, 1919 to sign a peace treaty with Britain. This team was to act fully on behalf of Afghanistan’s new government. A Peace Treaty was signed between the two parties. According to this new treaty, everything Britain had signed with the former governments of Afghanistan was null and void which included the Dane and Durand Treaty; Britain was no longer to provide annual payments and the shipments of weapons to Afghanistan’s leaders. However, in regards to the Durand Line, article five of the Peace Treaty recognized the legitimacy of the Durand Line as the accepted border between British India and Afghanistan, as it was recognized and accepted by Amir Habibullah Khan and by Amir Abdur Rahman before him. This was the first official and concrete recognition of the border between the two countries because it was accepted by the independent government of Afghanistan, the one that had fought against Britain, the one that was no longer dependant on Britain for money or weapons.



The Peace Treaty was just as its name suggested – an offering of peace between the warring sides. Article 4 of the Peace Treaty stated that if the new government of Afghanistan acts with sincerity and honesty with Britain for the first six months of the new treaty, the latter will then arrange for a diplomatic envoy to negotiate new accords. These meetings began in January of 1921 by Sir Henry R.C. Dobbs who headed a diplomatic team in Kabul to sign a new treaty as promised. On November 22, 1921, an establishment of commerce and declaration of friendly relations between Great Britain and Afghanistan was signed by Dobbs and Mahmud Tarzai, who was not only King Amanullah Khan’s foreign minister but also his father-in-law. Though this 1921 treaty replaced the Peace Treaty it still recognized the Durand Line as the international border between Afghanistan and British India as stated in Article 2 of the new treaty.



Interestingly enough Article 14 of the new agreement maintained that the authority was given to both countries that within three years of the treaty if either side wished to invalidate the treaty or any part of the treaty an official letter may be handed in by the party specifying so. Thus the treaty was signed by representatives of Britain and Afghanistan and within those initial three years and even after when King Amanullah was ousted and forced out of the country, neither side had submitted an official letter stating their dissatisfaction. During Nadir Khan’s reign, his brother Shah Wali, serving as Nadir’s ambassador in Great Britain, held a meeting in July of 1930 with Anderson Arthur, Britain’s foreign minister at that time in which a diplomatic agreement was signed stating that it was their honor to officially declare their understanding and full acceptance of the treaties of 1921 and of 1923.



It is plain to see that many opportunities had arose for the Afghan leaders to officially discredit and invalidate the Durand Line but they failed to do each and every time. Since the late treaty, the border has been internationally recognized and it would be irrelevant to continue to make it an issue today. Some people who act as experts in this field claim that the acceptance of the Durand Line was a price Amanullah Khan had to pay in order to get independence from Britain, that in order for Afghanistan to gain full independence from Great Britain they had to cede all future rights over that particular land. This weak excuse is not enough to discredit the legitimacy of all the documents that prove otherwise.



Some other self-proclaimed experts insist that Amir Abdur Rahman was forced into signing the original treaty which initiated the demarcation; according to such people, Amir Abdur Rahman was threatened by war or under threat of economic embargo and thus obligated to sign therefore nullifying the original treaty. However, the fact of the matter is that when Britain first suggested the demarcation, the Amir could not have been happier because the original intentions of the British were to build roads and railroads linking Kabul and Kandahar to other cities in British India. The Amir did not wish such roads to be built in Afghanistan and excitedly chose to have the demarcation instead.



As for the suggestion that the Amir might have regretted his decision, the original notes and diaries Abdur Rahman were found to show that he was very much satisfied with the treaty. In fact, afterwards, he had a grand party thrown in Kabul, celebrating his achievement on having stopped the British from entering Kabul and thus limiting their interference. To even suggested, now, that the Amir was forced to sign the treaty is preposterous because history has shown that the leaders after him have all signed documents and treaties that honored the original Durand Line agreement and it is unreasonable to think that all those other treaties were made under duress and force as well.



The border can not be changed or invalidated because the VCSSRT (Vienna Convention on Succession of States on Respect of Treaties) "world courts" have universally upheld uti possidetis juris—the concept that binding bilateral agreements with or between colonial powers are "passed down" to successor independent states. Afghanistan can not make the decision to invalidate the Durand Line nor can they spread misinformation that the treaty was only for 100 years. Though the original Durand Treaty did stipulate the conditions of the border on the reign of Amir Abdur Rahman, the fact that all the other leaders after Amir Abdur Rahman signed treaties and accords upholding the recognition of the border legitimized the Durand Line to the point where it no longer depended on the duration of the king’s reign. It thus was established as an international border like all of the world’s borders.



Today the Durand Line boundary remains in effect as the international boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and is recognized as such by most nations. Despite pervasive internet rumors to the contrary, US Department of State and the British Foreign Commonwealth Office documents and spokespersons have confirmed that the Durand Line, like virtually all international boundaries, has no expiration date, nor is there any mention of such in any Durand Line documents. Basically, by now trying to take over NWFP and Baluchistan (which constitute over half of Pakistan’s territory), the Pashtun nationalists are trying to break up Pakistan. It is unimaginable for Pakistan to give up such property to Afghanistan under any means. Pakistan is a populous state and a strong nation—militarily and economically—as well one of the seven declared nuclear states. Having the nationalistic Pashtuns argue about the Durand Line is not new for Pakistan because they have been over it for half a century but it has become a nuisance. As Pakistan continued to deny the nationalistic Pashtuns' cries for a "Pakhtunistan" or "Greater Afghanistan" by upholding the treaties Britain signed with Afghanistan, relations between the two countries became hostile to the point where Afghanistan's vote was the only one cast against Pakistan's admission to the United Nations in 1947. Afghanistan was also almost taken to the brink of war with Pakistan by the "crazy prince" Daud Khan, who was probably the biggest campaigner of capturing the NWFP.



Other ways of luring the Pakistani Pashtuns to Afghanistan have been employed. Western countries and the Eastern bloc during the Cold War were offering scholarships to the citizens of Afghanistan. The government of Zahir Shah and Daud Khan were distributing these scholarships to Pashtuns—dividing them between the Pashtuns of Afghanistan and the NWFP tribal areas. Non-pashtuns, although an absolute majority in Afghanistan, had no chance of receiving any of those scholarships. Zahir Shah had two schools built in Kabul by the names of Khoshal Khan High School and Rahman Baba High School. These schools were built primarily for the tribal Pashtuns of NWFP. At a time when Afghanistan couldn't even afford to build elementary schools in most parts of the country, the government was shamelessly building unnecessary schools for Pashtuns across the border and bringing them in by the thousands. They hoped the high schools would serve as an opening for the NWFP Pashtuns to become educated in Afghanistan and gain a sense of belonging because for the nationalistic Pashtuns, Afghanistan was the land of Pashtuns. However, once those Pakistani Pashtuns received their education in Afghanistan, they returned back to NWFP as loyal Pakistanis and became a part of the Pakistani establishments. They were opportunistic Pakistani Pashtuns and they just took advantage of the opportunity that was handed to them by Afghanistan's government, milking the country for all it was worth. For the most part of the second half of the twentieth century, the tribal Pashtuns used the government of Afghanistan in any way they could, having them financially cover their education expenses as well as receiving a steady salary from them.



A Ministry of Borders and Tribal Affairs was even established during Zahir Shah’s time and exists to this day. This Ministry solely concentrates on the Pakistani border even though Afghanistan shares its borders with five other countries: Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran, and China. The purpose of this Ministry is to give the tribes of the Pashtuns living around that border area a regular salary as well as weapons under the pretense of having them protect the border. Even the Pashtuns on the Pakistan side receive Afghanistani ID cards, a steady salary and weapons for the same purpose. Not surprisingly, 90% of the violence comes from that region. Now, if the government refuses to acknowledge that the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan exists, why bother having a Ministry dedicated to it as well as giving money and weapons for its protection?





If the Durand Line treaty is to be invalidated then every other British treaty is to be as well and that would ultimately mean that the name "Afghanistan" would cease to exist. The name "Afghanland" was first mentioned by the British in the Gadamak Treaty, set on May 26, 1879 between Sir Pierre Louis Napolean Cavagnari for the British and Amir Yaqub Khan of the "Afghans." Before that time, the region was known as Khorasan. Even the Pashtun Kings called themselves the Kings/Rulers/Amirs of Khorasan. So therefore, the name "Afghan/Afghanistan" would be just as invalid as the Durand Line. The name of "Afghanistan" has already had its own controversy and adding the Durand Line topic would only serve to the Pashtuns' disadvantage. The region of modern-day Afghanistan was a forceful occupation by Ahmed Shah Abdali and just as the ethno-centric Pashtuns want to claim that the Durand Line is illegal and invalid, one can also argue that Afghanistan's creation was illegal because of the fact that it was land belonging to the Safavids/Samanids which was basically stolen by Abdali and his tribes of Abdali and Gheljai.



Afghanistan being a multi-ethnic country would then have to disband if all notions of borders were dispelled. The British, along with the Russians, have created other borders and set up systematic states. Among them were borders between Iran and Afghanistan, Afghanistan and Tajikistan/Uzbekistan/Turkmenistan. Logically then, the arguments used to try and invalidate the Durand Line can also be used for those borders. Why should the Pashtun areas of Pakistan be the only areas that have to merge with Afghanistan? The ethnic countries of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan would rightfully lay claim to Tajik, Uzbek and Turkmen lands in Afghanistan and Iran would have rightful claim over the Western parts of Afghanistan. These ethnicities have much stronger claims over those lands because as non-Pashtuns, they would be the ruling majority. Also, why not have the Pashtuns merge with those regions of Pakistan instead of vice versa since the majority of Pashtuns live in Pakistan. It’s also noteworthy to point out that the Pashtuns have more in common with Pakistanis than they do with the other ethnicities of Afghanistan: Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, etc.



Trying to take away NWFP and Baluchistan is wishful thinking for the ethno-centric groups of Pashtuns. Baluchistan is the largest province of Pakistan and there are about six or seven million Baluchis living in that province. As a whole, Baluchis are divided between three countries: Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan, 70%, 20%, 10% respectively. Racially, culturally, linguistically, there are no commonalities between the Baluchis and the Pashtuns. So now, who are these nationalistic Pashtuns to decide the fate of the Baluchis especially when they are divided amongst three countries? For their part, the Baluchis have never had any movement to want to break away from Pakistan and join Afghanistan. There might be small groups of fighting with the Pakistani government but they are not fighting for independence but for greater autonomy within the state of Pakistan. Even among the Pakistani Pashtuns, there has been no movement since the creation of Pakistan sixty years ago that would indicate that they want independence or that they even want to join Afghanistan. There has never even been an arms struggle—they only wanted to take advantage of all that Afghanistan was handing over to them, milking the Zahir Shah, Daud Khan, and even communist government. Logically, the Baluchis would not achieve anything by leaving Pakistan and joining Afghanistan. If they truly wanted independence, they would break away from all three countries and start their own state instead of merging with Afghanistan. The ethno-centric groups of Pashtuns, however, feel that they are looking out for the interests of the Baluchis by trying to get them into Afghanistan, where they would still be a minority. Clearly, their best interest is not being looked out for by these nationalistic Pashtuns. In fact, the nationalistic Pashtuns of Afghanistan are strategically going after Baluchistan because that province holds a bit more importance. Baluchistan has coastal areas and is rich with natural resources like petroleum, is not overpopulated, has vast amount of land, making it desirable for the nationalistic Pashtuns of Afghanistan. NWFP, on the other hand is a landlocked province, has no natural resources and is vastly populated with illiterate and tribal people.



The border does, in fact, run through and divides Pashtuns and Baluchis on both sides, but that is true for every ethnic group. In northern Afghanistan, the borders run through and divide Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Turkmen between the countries of Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan and in Western Afghanistan, the province of Herat is cut off and separated from Iran. One would not be able to distinguish the differences racially, linguistically, and culturally, between the Heratis and the Khorasan region of Iran, that is how close they are to each other. So nationalistic Pashtuns are not the only group that can claim to be divided by a border. They want to keep the other ethnic groups separate while they merge with other Pashtuns across the border. The ethno-centric groups of Pashtuns do not even consider that the other ethnicities will come up with the idea of tearing down the borders that separate them. In fact, Persian is the binding factor between majority people of Afghanistan, namely the Tajiks and Hazaras, with the neighboring countries of Tajikistan and Iran. And if they even so much as discussed the idea of a cultural reunification let alone a physical merging, the nationalistic Pashtuns would tell them to pack up and move out of Afghanistan altogether. What they don’t realize is that those different ethnic groups have settled in the regions for thousands of years and reside in about 75% of the land so it’s not likely that they would just pack up and move from country to another. The Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks etc. are not seasonal settlers like the nomadic Pashtuns; if they decide to leave, they will take the land with them.



Another thing is that the non-Pashtuns would never agree or even allow the influx of new Pashtuns onto their land to happen. They would adamantly be against Afghanistan going from 30% Pashtuns to 75% Pashtuns. Afghanistan would fall deeper into despair with larger groups of Pashtuns. The interests of non-Pashtuns would continue to be pushed back and ignored and more of their land would be stolen and given away to the Pakistani Pashtuns. The Afghan Mellat would grow and continue to take advantage of the destitute country and its people to further their agendas. Nationalistic Pashtuns have always forced their goal of Pashtunization unto the country. When not even one third of the country spoke Pashto, the previous Pashtun government still enforced Pashto as an official and national language. They named a major square in Kabul as Pashtunistan Square which refers to the NWFP Province; changed the writings on the currency to Pashto, as well as the writings on passports and the national IDs and also forced businesses in Kabul to change their signs to Pashto, and the governmental and educational institutions to adopt Pashto signs as replacements of the Farsi signs. Think of how much more forms of oppression the non-Pashtuns will face if the nationalistic Pashtuns succeed in bringing more Pashtuns into the country.



Nationalistic Pashtuns of Afghanistan have basically signed the death warrant of Afghanistan and its people with their talks of taking over the NWFP and suspending the Durand Line. It is because of those Pashtuns that Pakistan even began interfering with Afghan politics. As Afghanistan kept threatening to "take" the provinces, Pakistan then had to react and they did so by counterattacking with their own threats via Taliban. Right now, the Durand Line is described as "porous" with little there to stop the terrorists from going back in forth between the regions. Hamed Karzai and his Afghan Mellat advisors need to stop pouting over this issue and take drastic measures in securing the country. They need to accept and acknowledge an internationally-recognized border. They need to start neutralizing those tribal people on their side of the border and stop funding the tribes on the other side of the border.



However, Hamed Karzai's Minster of Borders and Tribal Affairs, Karim Barahowie, (an ethno-centric Pashtun) stood up in Parliament during the swearing-in ceremony and publicly refused to recognize the internationally recognized border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, namely the Durand Line. At the same time, though, Karzai claims that most of the terrorist attacks are initiated by the other side of the Line (a Line he claims not to recognize) and wants Pakistan to step in and control the area. This is a miserable two-sided look at the situation. On one hand, Karzai refuses to acknowledge the Line and, on the other hand, he wants Pakistan to control the territory because he refuses to claim responsibility for those trouble maker tribal people. Those are the Pashtuns Karzai wants to admit into the country and so therefore he should be the one to be held responsible for them. But it is simple enough: If you do not recognize the border that separates you from Pakistan, do NOT blame Pakistan for terrorist actions.



When the whole world including the UN acknowledges something as simple as the border that separates Afghanistan and Pakistan and ethno-centric groups of Pashtuns in Afghanistan can not, then the country will never fully recover. Karzai and the ethno-centric Pashtuns groups need to stop thinking emotionally and recognize what is best for the country, instead of what is best just for one minority ethnic group that they descend from. They need to be practical and realize when they are wrong. If not, then the people of Afghanistan will continue to suffer from the Taliban and foreign interference from Pakistan which would lead to the partition of the Afghanistan.



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of American History, vol. 89, No. 2, September 2002. Henry S. Bradsher,

Afghanistan and the Soviet Union (Durham: Duke Press Policy Studies, 1983)



Amin Tarzai, ‘Afghanistan: Kabul's New Strategy Focuses On Pakistan’, in Radio Free

Europe Radio Liberty, 10 July 2006



Stanley Wopert, Roots of Confrontation in South Asia: Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and

the Superpowers, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982)



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American Speedy Press, 1999)



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Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries, Vol. XIII, Documents No. XII,

XIII, XIV, XV, XVI and XIX (Calcutta: Government of India Central Publication

Branch, 1933)



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Southern Asia, (London: Oxford University Press)



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confidential telegram from Mr. Bevin (Secretary of State) to Sir G. Squire (British Minister in Kabul), Foreign Office, London, 5 August 1947



United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1946



Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, Article 13,

http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/3_2_1978.pdf, 23

August 1978, Vienna, accessed 20 July 2006

 

[PakShah]

I decided to put this up, because members like Sher Maland keep saying that Afghanistan can claim Pakistani land, when we all know that is a lie.

This is the complete article from britannica:

Durand Line:


Durand Line, boundary established in the Hindu Kush in 1893 running through the tribal lands between Afghanistan and British India, marking their respective spheres of influence; in modern times it has marked the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The acceptance of this line—which was named for Sir Mortimer Durand, who induced ʿAbdor Raḥmān Khān, amir of Afghanistan, to agree to a boundary—may be said to have settled the Indo-Afghan frontier problem for the rest of the British period.After the British conquered the Punjab in 1849, they took over the ill-defined Sikh frontier to the west of the Indus River, leaving a belt of territory between them and the Afghans that was inhabited by various Pashtun tribes. Questions of administration and defense made this area a problem. Some of the British, members of the so-called stationary school, wanted to retire to the Indus; others, of the forward school, wanted to advance to a line from Kābul through Ghaznī to Qandahār (Kandahār). The Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–80) discredited the forward advocates, and the tribal area was divided into roughly equal spheres of influence. The British established their authority by indirect rule up to the Durand Line, at the cost of a number of tribal wars; the Afghans left their side untouched. In the mid-20th century the area on both sides of the line became the subject of a movement for Pashtun independence and establishment of an independent state of Pakhtunistan. In 1980 approximately 7.5 million Pashtuns were living in the area around the Durand Line.

Citation:

"Durand Line." Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica Online. Encyclopædia Britannica Inc., 2012. Web. 05 Jan. 2012. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/174128/Durand-Line>.

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