F-35’s can knock down whole PAF & IAF: Pervez Hoodboy

[SaffronBandit]

Fifth generation aircraft — such as the F-35 stealth fighter — have tilted an already tilted playing field much further. In Atlantic war exercises these fighters have been repeatedly tested against the kind of third- and fourth-generation fighters like those currently in the Pakistani and Indian air fleets. While kill ratios are secret, they are sometimes leaked. Assuming the leaks are correct, in some hypothetical war just two squadrons of American F-35s could knock down the combined might of the PAF and IAF fleets fighting together for the loss of just one F-35 — or perhaps none.


https://www.dawn.com/news/1475818

What is he smoking these days ?

Some folks have delusional beliefs that if they have expertise in one field they can casually comment on other areas as well. Hoodbhoy thinks himself to be this great sage who can say nothing wrong and he is symptom of an international problem. Having said that, he's got some points here that are correct specifically concerning BVR. Today's aerial combat has become about the first shot BVR. Abhininandhan didn't see it coming while the SU-30, according to radar signatures was taking evasive actions but still got shot down because there was no idea from where the missile was coming from. And that's BVR - first look, first kill. Hoodbhoy is also right about technology taking over the battle field but he's far too simplistic in his assertions.

 

[gambit]

Today's aerial combat has become about the first shot BVR. Abhininandhan didn't see it coming while the SU-30, according to radar signatures was taking evasive actions but still got shot down because there was no idea from where the missile was coming from. And that's BVR - first look, first kill. Hoodbhoy is also right about technology taking over the battle field but he's far too simplistic in his assertions.

The PERSISTENT issue/problem is if the target is aware that he is a target, the farther the shot, the less likely it is for a successful kill. Simply put, distance equals to response time PLUS response tactics. Compress the distance and you compress the time and the options of tactics.

But if you are able to target without your objective becoming aware of his status as a target, then distance is in your favor. You want a kill from as far away as possible, if anything, for you, that distance equals to increased time to prioritize other issues such as situational awareness, potential threats, or actual threats.

No air force have ever strayed from this belief. Bringing up past failures of the BVR missile to justify even criticisms of that tactic missed the fundamental factor: The need for self preservation.

 

[SaffronBandit]

The PERSISTENT issue/problem is if the target is aware that he is a target, the farther the shot, the less likely it is for a successful kill. Simply put, distance equals to response time PLUS response tactics. Compress the distance and you compress the time and the options of tactics.

But if you are able to target without your objective becoming aware of his status as a target, then distance is in your favor. You want a kill from as far away as possible, if anything, for you, that distance equals to increased time to prioritize other issues such as situational awareness, potential threats, or actual threats.

Ok help me understand this scenario:
I'm in an F-16 and I lock on to a SU-30 and fire an AMRAAM at lets say 15 miles out. The combatants are at different heights and approaching each other at an angle. The SU-30 alerts go off and realizes he's being 'painted'. Now what happens to the SU-30 since he knows there is a radar lock and a missile. Does he know what direction the missile is coming from? and how the missile is approaching him,like low to high, straight-on, high to low? ... If he doesn't know those things how does he know what evasive action to take? then he's just guessing and following training as to the best probability maneuvers

 

[gambit]

Ok help me understand this scenario:
I'm in an F-16 and I lock on to a SU-30 and fire an AMRAAM at lets say 15 miles out. The combatants are at different heights and approaching each other at an angle. The SU-30 alerts go off and realizes he's being 'painted'. Now what happens to the SU-30 since he knows there is a radar lock and a missile. Does he know what direction the missile is coming from? and how the missile is approaching him,like low to high, straight-on, high to low? ... If he doesn't know those things how does he know what evasive action to take? then he's just guessing and following training as to the best probability maneuvers

In a closing scenario, if not a head-on, 15 m is within the NEZ of the AMRAAM. Remember, you are positing a CLOSING scenario, in which the NEZ actually improves. With the AMRAAM-D that have greater range capability than the A version, a tail chase scenario distance of 15 m is within the missile's NEZ.

Your points...

- Yes, the Su pilot would know the approach direction of the missile.

- At 15 m CLOSING distance, it would not matter the altitude angular difference between launch and target. The missile would have an initial altitude gain immediately after launch, but the data link would have to final target solution for the missile's approach. So if necessary, the missile would impact the target from below.

- The radar warning receiver (RWR) would provide different degrees of threat. At 15 m CLOSING distance, the threat warning would be high enough that the Su pilot would react immediately. Since the warning is from radar, immediate maneuvers are intended to increase the odds of breaking a radar lock. Not guarantee, just an attempt to break that lock.

The problem for the Su pilot is the CLOSING situation and that he is reacting to a threat. Reactive, not proactive. Assuming a data link, the missile's radar does not come active until about 5 secs before intercept point, which does not have to be an actual collision.

With the advent of radar guided missiles, for the fighter that finally detect a radar boresight signal, a closing situation is really no better than a tail chase situation. A boresight type of signal is when the radar beam does not sweep from side to side but nutates or moves in a circular fashion.

http://firecontrolman.tpub.com/12404/css/Nutating-Waveguide-26.htm

See figure for the 'nutating' lobe.

http://www.avitop.com/interact/radar.htm

The boresight uses a pencil beam positioned at 0-deg azimuth and minus 3-deg elevation to "spotlight" a target for acquisition.

A boresight scan indicates %99 radar certainty by the fire control computer. A boresight scan have unique behaviors that maybe identified by the RWR set. Assuming the boresight scan is identified by the Su's RWR set, the Su pilot would know missile launch has already occurred. His only response is extreme maneuvers as much as his aircraft allows and release countermeasures.

 

[SaffronBandit]

In a closing scenario, if not a head-on, 15 m is within the NEZ of the AMRAAM. Remember, you are positing a CLOSING scenario, in which the NEZ actually improves. With the AMRAAM-D that have greater range capability than the A version, a tail chase scenario distance of 15 m is within the missile's NEZ.

Your points...

- Yes, the Su pilot would know the approach direction of the missile.

- At 15 m CLOSING distance, it would not matter the altitude angular difference between launch and target. The missile would have an initial altitude gain immediately after launch, but the data link would have to final target solution for the missile's approach. So if necessary, the missile would impact the target from below.

- The radar warning receiver (RWR) would provide different degrees of threat. At 15 m CLOSING distance, the threat warning would be high enough that the Su pilot would react immediately. Since the warning is from radar, immediate maneuvers are intended to increase the odds of breaking a radar lock. Not guarantee, just an attempt to break that lock.

The problem for the Su pilot is the CLOSING situation and that he is reacting to a threat. Reactive, not proactive. Assuming a data link, the missile's radar does not come active until about 5 secs before intercept point, which does not have to be an actual collision.

With the advent of radar guided missiles, for the fighter that finally detect a radar boresight signal, a closing situation is really no better than a tail chase situation. A boresight type of signal is when the radar beam does not sweep from side to side but nutates or moves in a circular fashion.

http://firecontrolman.tpub.com/12404/css/Nutating-Waveguide-26.htm

See figure for the 'nutating' lobe.

http://www.avitop.com/interact/radar.htm

A boresight scan indicates %99 radar certainty by the fire control computer. A boresight scan have unique behaviors that maybe identified by the RWR set. Assuming the boresight scan is identified by the Su's RWR set, the Su pilot would know missile launch has already occurred. His only response is extreme maneuvers as much as his aircraft allows and release countermeasures.

So let me ask you this as well: how do jammers work? So can the SU pilot apart from releasing countermeasures like chaff, decoys can an aircraft actually jam a missile like an AMRAAM? What is the effectiveness of firing multiple missiles at one target at an interval? does it even work that way? I'm asking because there was this silly news in the Indian side of the media that an SU-30 'shot-down' 4-5 AMRAAM's; sounds really absurd to me or probably they meant that 'you didn't shoot anything down but our SU ran into the missiles and thus shot them down'; the F-16's that engaged and shot down those aircraft were from the No. 5 squadron block 50/52+ so possibly at most carrying 4 AMRAAM's each, so its absurd but how long would an engagement have to be for an F-16 without the AESA radars to engage a single target and fire that many missiles?

 

[GriffinsRule]

In a closing scenario, if not a head-on, 15 m is within the NEZ of the AMRAAM. Remember, you are positing a CLOSING scenario, in which the NEZ actually improves. With the AMRAAM-D that have greater range capability than the A version, a tail chase scenario distance of 15 m is within the missile's NEZ.

Your points...

- Yes, the Su pilot would know the approach direction of the missile.

- At 15 m CLOSING distance, it would not matter the altitude angular difference between launch and target. The missile would have an initial altitude gain immediately after launch, but the data link would have to final target solution for the missile's approach. So if necessary, the missile would impact the target from below.

- The radar warning receiver (RWR) would provide different degrees of threat. At 15 m CLOSING distance, the threat warning would be high enough that the Su pilot would react immediately. Since the warning is from radar, immediate maneuvers are intended to increase the odds of breaking a radar lock. Not guarantee, just an attempt to break that lock.

The problem for the Su pilot is the CLOSING situation and that he is reacting to a threat. Reactive, not proactive. Assuming a data link, the missile's radar does not come active until about 5 secs before intercept point, which does not have to be an actual collision.

With the advent of radar guided missiles, for the fighter that finally detect a radar boresight signal, a closing situation is really no better than a tail chase situation. A boresight type of signal is when the radar beam does not sweep from side to side but nutates or moves in a circular fashion.

http://firecontrolman.tpub.com/12404/css/Nutating-Waveguide-26.htm

See figure for the 'nutating' lobe.

http://www.avitop.com/interact/radar.htm

A boresight scan indicates %99 radar certainty by the fire control computer. A boresight scan have unique behaviors that maybe identified by the RWR set. Assuming the boresight scan is identified by the Su's RWR set, the Su pilot would know missile launch has already occurred. His only response is extreme maneuvers as much as his aircraft allows and release countermeasures.

Thanks for the information. I had read that another way to defeat a BVR missile was to fly perpendicular to it. In a tail chase situation even, unless there is plenty of distance between the aircraft and the missile, the latter will eventually catch up still. The reason to flying at a 90 degrees vector was about making the missile use up more fuel and energy in constantly adjusting its course on its way to the target. The idea was that if the fuel was spent before it got to its target, the missile would not be able to maneuver in the last seconds of the flight and give the plane a chance to jinx and get away

 

[Pakstallion]

This is why atheists in general are deluded. They adamantly refuse to believe in an unseen greater power but believe in unseen quarks and dark matter. Every calculation leads to our existence being an impossibility but they believe in the impossible.

In this case its a simple case of mathematics. How many jets in a squadron - max 20. How many missiles on each jet? 8 Total number of missiles available 8 x 40 = 320. This is assuming a 100 percent hit rate. Thats just the number of Su 30's. Even if he has somehow taken in to account availability go jets, it barely gets just the Pakistani or Indian airforce. Just foolish.

 

[gambit]

So let me ask you this as well: how do jammers work?

There are two main categories of interference: active and passive.

Active interference is exactly that -- active. The countermeasures contains sustained energy levels. Examples are dedicated platforms like the EF-111 and EA-6 aircrafts, and 'jammer' pods. Active interference is controllable, meaning they can be focused and their energy outputs are flexible as needed to exclude certain parties like friendlies in the immediate area.

Passive interference is essentially chaff that merely reflect. The energy outputs are usually omnidirectional and loses strength over time and range.

Countermeasure interference signals -- regardless of method -- do not need to overpower the transmitted signals. A simple example is listening to music on the radio. The intention is to enjoy a CONTINUOUS stream of a song, which is a finite container of musical notes unique to that song. Obviously, a song from Brittney Spears is different than a song from Wolfgang Mozart. Interference signals -- intentional or accidental -- disrupt that enjoyment. The sources of the interference can come from bolt of lightning, a stray signal from a passing aircraft, or reflections from buildings.

For this discussion, a seeking radar is 'enjoying' a continuous stream of reflected signals reflected from a target. The longer the duration, the more secure the seeking radar in determination that there is a body in front.

Active countermeasure DESTROYS the integrity of that data processing of that signal stream.

Passive countermeasure DEGRADES the integrity of that data processing of that signal stream.

The difference is significant in that tactical situations generated the need to design dedicated countermeasure platforms like the 'E' versions of current platforms. No different than there are 'strike' or 'attack' or 'superiority' versions of the base platform to suit different tactical situations.

In attacking a ground target that is defended by a network of air defense missile stations, dispensing chaff is not a viable option. The air defense network produces high EM traffic and not only that, that traffic is often coordinated because each transmission come from a different source location. A chaff cloud always loses altitude and its mass integrity can be affected by local weather condition, so it loses efficacy quickly. An attacking force would be foolish to rely on passive countermeasure alone, such a plan would be a desperate plan of final resort.

So can the SU pilot apart from releasing countermeasures like chaff, decoys can an aircraft actually jam a missile like an AMRAAM?

A 'decoy' is a seduction/distraction method.

A chaff cloud can be a decoy in the sense that momentarily, the combined effects of individual chaff strings presented a more attractive EM alternative than the target. But a decoy is usually a more EM structurally coherent method OVER TIME. This is a crucial difference. A gust of wind will affect the physical mass of a chaff cloud but will do nothing to the physical structure of an antenna. So with these choices, a seeker will focus on the steady EM state of the antenna.

A fighter is unlikely to carry something larger like a decoy which should be constantly powered to maintain that steady EM state.

What is the effectiveness of firing multiple missiles at one target at an interval? does it even work that way?

Realistically -- no.

What is that interval? What is the missile to start?

A radar guided missile have a different intercept program than an IR guided missile.

A starting point for the interested layman are the navigation laws and one of them is 'proportional navigation'...

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proportional_navigation

...Then there is the 'pursuit navigation'...

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pursuit_guidance

Radar guidance is predictive, meaning base upon programming sophistication, the radar system can give target speculative locations (plural) in continuous time-space calculations. That is usually proportional navigation.

Pursuit navigation is much more simplistic and based upon sensor capabilities. An IR sensor is passive and do not provide much target information other than an IR tensity in contrast to background. If that IR intensity moves, the sensor follows. Hence, the word 'pursuit'.

So based upon this knowledge alone, launching multiple missiles at a moving target is already problematic. Not impossible, just problematic. A radar guided missile maybe focusing on the previous missile instead of the target. Same concern for the IR guided missile.

The ground launched air defense missile is larger, which can have more discrimination capabilities due to larger computation power, so launching multiple missiles against a single target is more likely an operation. Even so, it is not without issues. Look at the single F-117 loss over Yugoslavia. That F-117 evaded at least two ground launched air defense missiles before damaged by the proximity explosion from the third.

I'm asking because there was this silly news in the Indian side of the media that an SU-30 'shot-down' 4-5 AMRAAM's;...

Bunk. That is all am going to say about it.

 

[tarrar]

This Hoodboy jabroni knows oy how to bark

 

[CriticalThought]

Thanks for the information. I had read that another way to defeat a BVR missile was to fly perpendicular to it. In a tail chase situation even, unless there is plenty of distance between the aircraft and the missile, the latter will eventually catch up still. The reason to flying at a 90 degrees vector was about making the missile use up more fuel and energy in constantly adjusting its course on its way to the target. The idea was that if the fuel was spent before it got to its target, the missile would not be able to maneuver in the last seconds of the flight and give the plane a chance to jinx and get away

Flying perpendicular to the main lobe of any radar means it cannot utilize Doppler effect to guage your velocity. In turn, it cannot predict your future location, and cannot guide a missile towards your future location.

 

[LeGenD]

This is why atheists in general are deluded. They adamantly refuse to believe in an unseen greater power but believe in unseen quarks and dark matter. Every calculation leads to our existence being an impossibility but they believe in the impossible.

In this case its a simple case of mathematics. How many jets in a squadron - max 20. How many missiles on each jet? 8 Total number of missiles available 8 x 40 = 320. This is assuming a 100 percent hit rate. Thats just the number of Su 30's. Even if he has somehow taken in to account availability go jets, it barely gets just the Pakistani or Indian airforce. Just foolish.

Refer to the math part: https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/f-35...af-pervez-hoodboy.613519/page-8#post-11369035

Where I’m from got nun to do with what we are discussing here and for your information I’m a Brooklyn born and raised Pakistani. So I represent both countries.
Back to the the topic.. with data collected from USAF and the apartheid state AKA IAF together shows that from Vietnam war upto 2005 632 BVRs were fired and only four resulted in Kills. During same period 528 air to air kills were made at closer range 144 with guns and 384 with missiles fired at opponents within visual range debunking your claim. Now that’s about 1% success rate of BVRs.

You need to be more clear about this because statistics can be misleading or misinterpreted.

Source: https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/Air-to-Air-Report-.pdf

---

Now take a look at the statistics of Air-to-Air kills in the Gulf War (1991): https://www.rjlee.org/air/ds-aakill/

AIM-7M and derivatives = BVR
AIM-9M and derivatives = WVR

USAF and USN did not experience significant airborne clashes in any war after 1991 but they schedule and host incredibly sophisticated RED FLAG simulations in the US mainland from time-to-time as substitute.

 

[python-000]

i think they forget there TITANIC...