OrionHunter
ELITE MEMBER
- Joined
- May 28, 2011
- Messages
- 13,818
- Reaction score
- -5
- Country
- Location
Is the much vaunted 5th generation F-35 heading to become the costliest disasters in aviation history? Check it out .
'Fifth-generation' and other myths
The much-vaunted fifth-generation capabilities are not only a misnomer; they are, in fact, much inflated if not over-hyped. First of all, todays F-35 can barely fly, so all of its claimed capabilities actually refer to what it might eventually achieve IF its development program is entirely successful which, given its history over the past decade, is far from certain.
US Air Force generals, the Canadian Auditor-General and the Rand Corporation provide shorter, boiled-down definitions of what fifth-gen is supposed to mean than whats included in Lockheed martins web site.
From these definitions, it appears that what makes a so-called fifth-gen fighter is a combination of:
-- stealth;
-- high maneuverability;
-- advanced avionics;
-- networked data fusion from sensors and avionics; and
-- the ability to assume multiple roles.
That doesnt really sound like much of a return for a $400 billion investment, and even less so once one realizes that most of these capabilities are already in service today. In fact, once its magic P.R. cloak is stripped away, fifth-gen looks a lot less impressive than it sounds.
Heres a reality check on how these so-called fifth-generation capabilities compare to whats already available today:
Stealth: The F-35s low radar cross-section and radar-absorbent surface coatings (i.e., paint) make it more difficult to detect by radar, but they do not make it invisible. In any case, detection by radar matters less and less because by switching on its radar a fighter becomes as visible as someone turning on a flashlight in a dark room.
So the preferred detection sensors are optical, like Infra-Red Scan and Track (IRST), and in this case the large and very hot exhaust plume of the F-35s 45,000-lb thrust engine is as visible as a blowtorch in the same dark room!
Furthermore, the F-35 will only be stealthy if it carries nothing under its wings. This means no pylons, so no gun (except for the F-35A, which has an internal gun); no extra fuel tanks; and no large weapons, as the small dimensions of its two bomb bays allow internal carriage of only two Amraam missiles and two JDAM guided bombs. That is not an impressive weapon load for an aircraft that is intended to penetrate ever-more formidable growing anti-access, area-denial capabilities in hostile territory.
A final word on the F-35s stealth: its design makes it less detectable by radar in its frontal sector, but not from the side, nor from the rear, where the laws of physics dictate it will be easier to detect than face-on.
The JSF operational concept is that this wont matter, since enemy ground defenses will be taken out at stand-off ranges, before they can detect incoming F-35s. But taken out with what: the two bombs each F-35 can carry?
High Maneuverability:
Contrary to some existing aircraft, the F-35 has no special maneuverability-enhancing design features such as canard forward surfaces, vectoring nozzles or supercruise capabilities that exist on other fighters already in service. Its thrust-to-weight ratio is limited and unlikely to improve since the F135 engine has limited growth potential.
Advanced Avionics:
Full sensor fusion and networking capability already exist, and was notably demonstrated in combat by French Rafales and Royal Air Force Typhoons during the 2011 operations in Libya. This is a capability that the F-35 will deliver at the turn of the decade, if all goes well, so it is hardly revolutionary.
The pilots Helmet-Mounted Display System (HMDS) stubbornly refuses to work despite a decade of design and testing. The Pentagons Quick-Look Review (QLR), leaked late last year, rated the HMDS a program-level high development risk because it is plagued by faulty displays, night vision and image jitters, and latency issues: in short, it is not fit for the purpose.
One of many things the F-35 should but cant do: its HMDS helmet
is designed to project flight data and night vision imagery onto the pilots
helmet visor, but it just doesnt work, and theres no head-up display as
back-up. (JSF PO photo)
So dire is the situation, in fact, that Lockheed has asked BAE Systems to adapt its existing Eurofighter helmet display as an interim solution.
This leads to a much bigger problem: since the HMDS was going to provide all the information that the pilot would ever need, no Head-Up Display was fitted to the F-35. So if whatever helmet display is finally selected cannot provide the same functionalities as HMDS, F-35 pilots will end up having inferior, old-generation situational awareness, which is somewhat ironical given what the F-35 promised.
Data Fusion:
Again, the idea of fusing data from all on-board sensors is nothing new, as it has been operational for several years on the latest European fighters, Rafale and Typhoon. If, in a decade, the F-35 enters service with a modern data fusion capability, any improvement in terms of data fusion will be a matter of degree, not of nature.
Multirole Capability:
There is no modern combat aircraft that doesnt claim to be capable of carrying out multiple roles, but even legacy US fighters routinely carry out widely diverse missions: F-15C interceptor and F-15E multirole/strike; F-18E Super Hornet (Air-to-air; strike/attack and electronic attack), and of course the F-16, whose latest versions are far more capable strike aircraft than the lightweight interceptor it was initially designed to be.
So, again, there is nothing revolutionary in the capabilities the F-35 will bring to the party - a decade from now, if all goes well, and at a cost of over $400 billion.
But there are considerable limitations to the F-35s own vaunted multirole capabilities. To remain stealthy, it can carry only internal weapons (two bombs and two air-to-missiles), which severely limits its combat firepower.
So, there it is. The much hyped fifth generation F-35 seems to be a disaster in the making. It is becoming increasingly difficult to convince the tax payers of the $400 billion spent on producing an aircraft that promises the world but in reality would be a legacy fighter by the time it enters operational service a decade from now.
More