Enlightened Stupidity

[dabong1]

Enlightened Stupidity
Truth - In the Line of Fire
Kargil-Fact Sheet 1

Ahsan Iqbal

General Musharaf chose to write a book in violation of his constitutional oath and laws of the land to secure extension from foreign masters and to make money but at cost of the truth, national dignity, and interest. This was done at the expense of toiling taxpayers’ money, who are battling poverty and unemployment at home and committing suicide in extreme helplessness and despair while General Musharaf undertook lavish self & book promotional international tour with bandwagon of half a dozen Ministers and scores of journalists.
The book is a megalomaniac account of Pakistan’s history according to which in fifty-nine years of nation’s history except for the leadership of General Musharaf and his seven years of rule nothing right happened. It is an account of self-praise and self-deception that makes belittles all past leaders and national institutions to make General Musharaf look taller. There are several aspects of the book, which relate to various aspects of our national life that require correction and explanation. PML-N will bring out series of fact sheets to present facts before the nation so that it may judge for itself what the truth is and that it is truth itself which has been the principal victim of this book.

Kargil – In Line of Fire

Kargil was one of the most controversial chapters of our national history. General Musharaf has admitted in his book that it was the major reason of his differences with elected PM Nawaz Sharif and usurping power. “The Kargil episode created the biggest divide between the Prime Minister and myself”. (Page 136)

The centerpiece of the controversy is whether the General undertook this adventure with some ulterior motives without the approval of the lawful government of the day or the operation was formally authorized by the PM, the competent authority in this case. General Musharaf has narrated this fact in the book in following words:

“One myth is that the operation was launched without the army’s taking the political leadership into confidence…The army briefed the PM in Skardu on January 29, 1999 and in Kel on February 5, 1999. During these briefings our defensive maneuver was explained as response to all that was happening on the Indian side. Subsequently, the PM was also briefed on March 12 at the Directorate general ISI which included a detailed survey on the situation inside occupied Jammu & Kashmir and also along the LOC. As the operation developed he was briefed in detail by the DGMO on May 17. Later briefings were also arranged on June 2 and June 22”. (Page 95-96)

According to his account, he gave the PM briefings on following occasions. But even a cursory look at his narration of facts will show the inaccuracies of the facts and the fallacies of the analysis. Let’s examine his account of briefings:
a) January 29, 1999 at Skardu
b) February 5, 1999 at Kel
c) March 12, 1999 at Directorate General, ISI
d) May 17, 1999 by Director General, Military Operations.
e) June 2 and 22, 1999.

As regards first two briefings, he states “During these briefings our defensive maneuver was explained as response to all that was happening on the Indian side”. How does Kargil Operation, which according to him involved occupying 800 sq kilometers (Page 91) across LOC fall within the ambit of defensive maneuver. The fact is that the briefing at Skardu was on tourism promotion in Northern Areas of Pakistan whereas the Kel briefing was to give approval on site for the Mansehra-Balakot-Kaghan-Batakundi-Kel road in which Kargil figured nowhere.

The third briefing according to his account was at Directorate General, ISI that was a survey of the situation inside occupied Jammu & Kashmir and also along the LOC. How can this be construed to be a briefing on Kargil adventure. The fourth briefing on May 17, 1999 is, according to him, the first briefing when he admits that PM was briefed in detail about the operation by DGMO. Even the junior most officers know that DGMO is the competent office to brief on any operational matter like Kargil. According to his version the briefing on May 17, 1999 was the first ever briefing by DGMO to the PM. Now let’s look at the chronology of events according to his narration in the book, which categorically demonstrate that action in Kargil theatre had started much earlier:

“A plan calling for plugging the gaps-ranging from 9 to 28 miles- between our positions was formally presented and approved towards the middle of January, 1999”. (Page 90)

It is more than evident that Kargil Operation was under execution in January, 1999.

“By the end of April the unoccupied gaps along 75 miles of the LOC had been secured by over 100 new posts of 10-20 persons each”. (Page 90)

By end of April over 100 posts had already been established committing up to two thousand troops.

“The first confrontation between the two armies took place on May 2, when Indian troops bumped into our position in Shyok sector. The second encounter took place with freedom fighters in the Battalik sector on May 7. (Page 90). “Another skirmish took place with the freedom fighters in Dras sector on May 10,1999”. (Page 91)

If there were Mujahideen controlling the heights, how General Musharaf justifies describing confrontation between armies which took place according to him on May 2,7, and 10, 1999. It is amply clear that when the war had broken out between armies of two nuclear states only then General Musharaf panicked and decided to brief the Prime Minister for soliciting his support. This briefing on May 17, 1999 was not complete either as it became evident later from the recorded conversations between General Musharraf and General Aziz on the May 26, 1999 and May 29, 1999, which came to light in the first week of June 1999. It was only then the PM came to know that our troops were involved in the Kargil conflict.

“On May 15, I ordered FCNA to improve our defensive positions in coordination with the freedom fighters to deny access to the water shed by India. By now the freedom fighters occupied over 800 sq kilometers of Indian occupied territory.” (Page 91)

It is ridiculous to assert that defensive positions were improved while nearly 800 sq kilometers territory across LOC was occupied. This refutes his earlier assertion that it was improving defensive positions and also Mujahideen were occupying the posts as he claims:

“The positions held by our troops on July 4 are shown in Map 3-Page 92” (Page 93)

The map 3 shows that our troops were deployed across the LOC.

“The briefing given by me personally to the Defence Committee of the cabinet on July 2, 1999 actually laid out the entire military picture…That the Indians were in no position to launch an all out offensive on land, sea, and the air…That the Indians forces despite their massive strength, would never be able to dislodge the freedom fighters and NLI from the ingresses and positions held by them” (Page 96)

He clearly admits that the first comprehensive military picture of the operation was presented to the civilian leadership through Defence Committee on July 2, 1999 when in reality pressure had started mounting in the war zone with high casualities. This became evident later from the fall of Tiger Hill, the most strategic and fortified position, on July 4, 1999. Imagine the assessment of General Musharaf assuring the PM that India is not in a position to launch an all out offensive on land sea and the air after losing 800 sq kilometers of land showing that they learnt no lesson from Operation Gibralter, preceding September, 1965 war when GHQ had made similar plan and assessments. An average student of military history without attending any staff course and studying Klausweitz and Liddlehart can understand that an aspiring regional power with nuclear arsenal in election year will not pocket the insult of losing 800 sq kilometers under its control without fully stretching its military muscles on international borders. This narration also shows how General Musharaf was guilty of giving wrong assessment of the ground situation, which was markedly different from what he was presenting before the Defence Committee of the Cabinet as the later events would prove.

“At the briefing (July 2, 1999) the Prime Minister asked me several times whether we should accept a ceasefire and withdraw…Chaudhary Shujaat Hussain, the Interior Minister at that time,…said that whatever we did, we must stress that Kargil was “our joint effort and collective responsibility” (Page 97)

Even the trusted friend and saviour of General Musharaf, Ch Shujaat concedes here that General Musharaf had acted unilaterally without taking into confidence the elected government. When the PM showed his annoyance he tried to calm the situation by suggesting “Meetti Pao”. In the words “whatever we did, we must stress that Kargil was our joint effort” and suggesting that now the PM should bail out the military leadership by assuming collective responsibility it is abundantly clear that there was dissent. It was in the spirit of national interest and defending the honour of the national institution, that then the PM undertook initiatives to find a suitable exit strategy while there were calls to take disciplinary action against General Musharaf from within his Parliamentary Party.

“The other commanders were informed immediately on the unreasonably escalated Indian response…The foregoing should also explain why the naval and Air Force chiefs were ignorant about it until the Indian response bordered on war hysteria”. (Page 97)

It clearly shows lack of appreciation and imagination on the part of general Musharaf who saw no role for Corp Commanders and other forces in the operation but soon was desperately seeking support of air force to withstand the onslaught of Indian air force in Kargil. It was also too naïve on his part to rule out the possibility of this conflict escalating to a full scale war, which events proved was a near possibility, in which case our two main forces were neither in knowledge of nor prepared for such an emergency. Any strike by Indian Air Force and navy could have caught us totally by surprise like it happened on 6 September, 1965 at Lahore front.

“International pressure had a demoralizing effect on PM Nawaz Sharif” (Page 93)

It is absurd and a joke to allege that a Prime Minister who didn’t succumb to international pressure at the time of nuclear detonations in May, 1998 would now come under international pressure. It was not demoralizing effect of international pressure but thanks to General Musharaf, Pakistan faced isolation and was not finding the required international support even from its closest friends for this misadventure. The anxiety of the international community was understandable as two one of the largest armies of the world, with demonstrated nuclear capability, were eye ball to eye ball in Kargil. This fact was admitted by Lt General Asad Durrani in a recent TV talk show.

“I can also say with authority that in 1999 our nuclear capability was not yet operational”. (Page 97-98)

In any country with rule of law, any senior member of the security making such an irresponsible statement would face court martial and treason charges. What more can be said as it is universally believed that ambiguity is one of the fundamental pillars of the nuclear doctrine. This statement is factually incorrect as former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and former Army Chief General Aslam Baig have rebutted this in their recent statements and have asserted that Pakistan’s nuclear capability was operational much before General Musharaf became Army Chief.

“I went with all my family and some friends to the hill resort of Murree to relax over the weekend. At about 9 pm on Saturday, July 3, I received an urgent call from the prime Minister informing me to my consternation that he was flying to the US and that I should meet him at Islamabad airport immediately”. (Page 97)

It is unfortunate to note that while our soldiers were being subjected to ruthless and incessant bombing by India in Kargil, their Commander had time for relaxation in the company of family and friends at a hill resort just one day before the fall of Tiger Hill on July 4,1999. It reminds us of Neru of Rome. It is most shameful that General Musharaf has conveniently distorted the facts of Prime Minister’s visit to US and suggested to the readers that he came to know about it on July 3, 1999 when the PM called him. Here is an account of the events as narrated by his “close” friend General (Retd) Anthony Zinni of the United States Marine Corps in his book Battle Ready who has testified to this fact. Here is what the American General has written about the withdrawal from Kargil: “I was directed by the Administration to head a presidential mission to Pakistan to convince Prime Minister Sharif and General Musharraf to withdraw their forces from Kargil. I met the Pakistani leadership in Islamabad on June 24 and 25 and put forth a simple rationale for withdrawing: If you don’t pull back, you’re going to bring war and nuclear annihilation down on your country. That’s going to be very bad news for everybody. Nobody actually quarreled with this rationale. The problem for the Pakistani leadership was the apparent loss of face. Backing down and pulling back to the Line of Control looked like political suicide. We needed to come up with a face-saving way out of this mess. What we were able to offer was a meeting with President Clinton, which would end the isolation that had long been the state of affairs between our two countries, but we would announce the meeting only after a withdrawal of forces. That got Musharraf’s attention; and he encouraged Prime Minister Sharif to hear me out. Sharif was reluctant to withdraw before the meeting with Clinton was announced (again, his problem was maintaining face)…We set up a meeting with Clinton in July”.

This is General Musharraf’s friend, whom he calls Tony by his first name, testifying to the fact that it was General Musharraf who sought the withdrawal and the PM was reluctant as the honour of his army was at stake. On June 27, 1999 General Musharraf told the Pakistani press that the Kargil conflict would be discussed in the meeting between President Clinton and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. This was the first time any one had announced the PM was to meet President Clinton. General Zinni clearly writes that nobody quarreled with his argument that if Pakistan didn’t withdraw troops it will bring full war to the country. When General Musharaf didn’t challenge General Zinni’s assessment of the possibility of full scale war how could he present the analysis that there was no chance of India attacking Pakistan a few days later to the Defence Cabinet Committee on July 2, 1999, if he did then he was certainly misleading.

“I would like to state emphatically that whatever movement has taken place so far in the direction of finding the solution to Kashmir is due considerably to Kargil conflict”. (Page 98)

The fact of the matter is that this misadventure resulted into irreparable loss to the Kashmir cause on the following facts:
a) We were isolated on Kashmir issue.
b) Kashmir freedom struggle got linked with cross border terrorism issue, which General Musharaf himself conceded in Islamabad Declaration signed with PM Vajpayee making a promise to not to allow cross border terrorism either from Pakistan or any territory under control of Pakistan and accepted it to be a bilateral matter.
c) It sabotaged the honourable peace process between India and Pakistan set in motion by PM Nawaz Sharif in Feb 1999 resulting in Lahore declaration.
d) General Musharaf abandoned the historic position of Pakistan on Kashmir in respect of UN resolutions on plebiscite.
e) He has given unilateral concessions in the name of CBMs without getting anything in quid pro quo.
f) LOC has been allowed to be fenced changing its character.

“I am ashamed to say, our political leadership insinuated that the achievements of our troops amounted to a “debacle”.” (Page 95)

General Musharaf blames political leadership of insinuation while several senior retired military generals have pointed out to this effect that this operation was politically unsustainable, ill-conceived, and the worst debacle. According to Lt Gen Ali Kuli Khan, during East Pakistan war we still had some friends but in Kargil we were left friendless. It was a disaster bigger than East Pakistan tragedy(Oct 3, 2006)

It is abundantly clear from the above that General Musharaf falsified and concocted the facts to serve his personal interests at the cost of national interest. Not to speak of his violation of his constitutional oath prohibiting divulging any sensitive information which he comes to know during discharge of his office. Therefore, it is imperative to appoint an independent, neutral, and trustworthy national commission consisting of retired Judges of Supreme Court, eminent experts, and members from civil society to thoroughly probe into the Kargil Operation to fix the liability of all the actors involved leading to due process of Law so that history doesn’t repeat itself.


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[Majnun]

Nawaz Sharif is - to put it plainly - a liar. At first, he was denying the 1999 dismissal of Musharraf, saying it was all fabricated then he accepts it and says Musharraf should forget the past. He has made up a lot of things about Kargil as well. Musharraf says that Kargil was one of a series of maneuvers between Pakistan and India.
To make it clear, I accept Musharraf's version, yes. But to anyone opposing it, has any proper counter-version been given by anyone? No. So we must accept it.

 

[Energon]

Nawaz and Musharraf both have their versions of Kargil, and I honestly believe that the truth lies somewhere in between. That a rift has always existed between the executive branch of the PA (if we can call it that) and elected governments is common knowledge. But I find it very difficult to accept the notion that Nawaz was completely unaware of what was happening. He in fact rode the initial waves of success and rapidly changed his tune when the tide on the battlefield had turned. This to me clearly indicates his real time knowledge regarding the military operations (unless Nawaz was in the habit of running his administration by taking cues from 24 hour news channels).

Kargil was one of the biggest mistakes in Pakistan's recent history. Not only for the outcome of the war but the diplomatic and economic aftermath. The reason why Pakistan is treated like the red headed step child (something that will continue for many years to come) is directly related to the conflict. The nation's economy also damn near tanked after this war.

I am also shocked at how moronic this plan was from a military point of view. This is why I have always been of the belief that Musharraf is far more competent as politician and administrator than he ever was as a military leader.

 

[blain2]

Nawaz and Musharraf both have their versions of Kargil, and I honestly believe that the truth lies somewhere in between. That a rift has always existed between the executive branch of the PA (if we can call it that) and elected governments is common knowledge. But I find it very difficult to accept the notion that Nawaz was completely unaware of what was happening. He in fact rode the initial waves of success and rapidly changed his tune when the tide on the battlefield had turned. This to me clearly indicates his real time knowledge regarding the military operations (unless Nawaz was in the habit of running his administration by taking cues from 24 hour news channels).

Kargil was one of the biggest mistakes in Pakistan's recent history. Not only for the outcome of the war but the diplomatic and economic aftermath. The reason why Pakistan is treated like the red headed step child (something that will continue for many years to come) is directly related to the conflict. The nation's economy also damn near tanked after this war.

I am also shocked at how moronic this plan was from a military point of view. This is why I have always been of the belief that Musharraf is far more competent as politician and administrator than he ever was as a military leader.

I don't mean to turn this into another Kargil thread, however this conflict had no impact on Pakistan's economy. NS and BB had made sure that it had gone to hell before this happened. Pakistan was under sanctions and isolation due to the nuclear testing.

 

[roadrunner]

The sanctions weren't economic, but military. Following the 1998 tests, some economic sanctions were imposed in 1999. These sanctions did not affect the economy. But yes, the main thing that did affect the economy was the looting by the civilian leaders.

 

[blain2]

The sanctions weren't economic, but military. Following the 1998 tests, some economic sanctions were imposed in 1999. These sanctions did not affect the economy. But yes, the main thing that did affect the economy was the looting by the civilian leaders.

RR,

Sanctions were both economic and military. The only thing US allowed was some funding for the program with ANF funded out of DEA (for Drugs interdiction) as that was in the US' interest.

 

[roadrunner]

RR,

Sanctions were both economic and military. The only thing US allowed was some funding for the program with ANF funded out of DEA (for Drugs interdiction) as that was in the US' interest.

From 1999, the following sanctions were applied to India and Pakistan. These were broad, and obviously affected the economy.

"In May 1998, India and Pakistan each conducted tests of nuclear explosive devices, triggering sweeping U.S. economic sanctions as required by the Arms Export Control Act and the Export-Import Bank Act.2 Prior to the tests, for international treaty purposes, the two countries were classified as non-nuclear-weapon states; the tests put each country in jeopardy of world condemnation and sanctions. In the United States, the law required the President to impose the following restrictions or prohibitions on U.S. relations with both India and Pakistan: termination of U.S. foreign assistance other than humanitarian or food assistance; termination of U.S. government sales of defense articles and services, design and construction services, licenses for exporting U.S. Munitions List (USML) items; termination of foreign military financing; denial of most U.S. government-backed credit or financial assistance; U.S. opposition to loans or assistance from any international financial institution; prohibition of most U.S. bank-backed loans or credits; prohibition on licensing exports of “specific goods and technology;” and denial of credit or other Export-Import Bank support for exports to either country.

http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/6202.pdf

See also

CNN - U.S. outlines sanctions against India, Pakistan - June 18, 1998

From 1990, there were military sanctions and foreign assistance sanctions.

Since 1990, Pakistan had been under a sanctions regime that was mandated by another provision of U.S. law pertaining to U.S. foreign assistance. The Pressler amendment, added in 1985 to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, requires the President to determine that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device and that any proposed U.S. assistance would reduce the risk of obtaining such a device.3 President Reagan and President Bush issued determinations each year until 1990, when then- President Bush did not make the finding required to make assistance available.
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/6202.pdf

From 1995, only military sanctions were applied to Pakistan

In 1995, this requirement was changed to apply only to military assistance to Pakistan, making the country eligible for other foreign assistance.

http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/6202.pdf

Specifically, Pressler had nothing to do with economic sanctions on the country (like those that crippled Iraq). Pressler can be explained in this way

"Specifically, it prohibits sales or transfers to Pakistan of military equipment or technology pursuant to the authorities contained in the Foreign Assistance Act or any other Act, if the President is not able to make the required certification."
STATE DEPT. LEGAL ADVISER EXPLAINS PRESSLER AMENDMENT

So from 1990-1995, all foreign assistance mentioned in the Foreign Assiatance Act was cancelled. Between 1995-1998, some military assistance to Pakistan was allowed, 1999 there was a complete economic sanction on Pakistan for a couple of months (lifted after a couple of months).

Therefore the only way the Pakistani economy would have been negatively affected by such sanctions of the US, would have been in 1999 for those couple of months when a broad economic sanctioning was applied. Before this time it was only aid to Pakistan that was halted.

The Foreign Assistance Act makes clear that government aid[/B] was the only thing that it dealt with

"The Foreign Assistance Act (Pub.L. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424, enacted 1961-09-04, 22 U.S.C. § 2151 et seq.) is a United States Act of Congress. The Act reorganized U.S. foreign assistance programs and separated military and non-military aid. It also mandated the creation of an agency to administer economic assistance programs; on November 3, 1961, President John F. Kennedy established the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)." - wiki

I don't know much about the ANF, but the US did not impose an economic ban on Pakistan until 1999. However it did impose an economic aid ban at some points during the early 90's. This should not have affected Pakistan's economy.

 

[Neo]

I don't mean to turn this into another Kargil thread, however this conflict had no impact on Pakistan's economy. NS and BB had made sure that it had gone to hell before this happened. Pakistan was under sanctions and isolation due to the nuclear testing.

I concur, NS and Bibi (1987-99) both managed to ruin Pakistan long before Kargil conflict took place. As the world economies including most poor and developping nations enjoyed the boom in the nineties these impotent and corrupt leaders managed to shrink Pak economy by atleast 7.5%, the only thing that grew was poverty, up from 24% in 1987 to 33% in 1999!!!
Foreign debt doubled to almost $32 billion in ten years time!!!

 

[Energon]

I don't mean to turn this into another Kargil thread, however this conflict had no impact on Pakistan's economy. NS and BB had made sure that it had gone to hell before this happened. Pakistan was under sanctions and isolation due to the nuclear testing.

It certainly had a big impact, not just right then and there, but in the long term. Pakistan was since then seen as a warmonger and a proliferator of terror. Up until 1999, the west always had a policy of parity between India and Pakistan. But this changed, investors were now all excited about India and essentially uplifted it's economy by making radical changes in their foreign policy by first and foremost scapping the parity doctrine. Unfortunately Pakistan was branded as a bad apple and avoided like the plague by potential investors and their governments. As I said in my previous post, the reason Pakistan is treated like a red headed step child is specifically because of this conflict. Bill Clinton, the guy who was responsible for changing the dynamic of the entire region post 1999 wrote a lot about this in his memoir.

 

[blain2]

It certainly had a big impact, not just right then and there, but in the long term. Pakistan was since then seen as a warmonger and a proliferator of terror. Up until 1999, the west always had a policy of parity between India and Pakistan. But this changed, investors were now all excited about India and essentially uplifted it's economy by making radical changes in their foreign policy by first and foremost scapping the parity doctrine. Unfortunately Pakistan was branded as a bad apple and avoided like the plague by potential investors and their governments. As I said in my previous post, the reason Pakistan is treated like a red headed step child is specifically because of this conflict. Bill Clinton, the guy who was responsible for changing the dynamic of the entire region post 1999 wrote a lot about this in his memoir.

At least quote a neutral source when posting about something to do with Pakistan and Kargil.

There is not one mention of the impact of Kargil war on Pakistan economically which is what you had stated and I had countered.

During the 2002 build-up, Execs of the International firms with investment in India actually had asked the GoI to refrain from talking war as it was impacting their business so that concern has never really disappeared.

Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear weapons is the key thing in this entire episode of what you term as the "red haired child" phenomena. Post 9/11 scenario nullified most of the image problems with regards to the Kargil conflict for Pakistan.

Also contrary to your statement, the west never viewed the Indo-Pak relations from the lenses of parity. India being the bigger country always got the benefit of the doubt so things really did not change after Kargil.

 

[Energon]

At least quote a neutral source when posting about something to do with Pakistan and Kargil.

I posted a wiki link. The least you can do is look into the references.

There is not one mention of the impact of Kargil war on Pakistan economically which is what you had stated and I had countered.

Faced with the possibility of international isolation, the already fragile Pakistani economy was weakened further.

Diplomatically isolated and dependent on international goodwill to prop up its ailing economy --still reeling from the impact of sanctions imposed after its May nuclear tests- Pakistan could ill— afford to take on a militarily superior foe.

Asia Times reporting on how the post Kargil Coup affected the Economy negatively.

I have already stated clearly that the impact was not only short term but also long term. Do you think wars are free? How cost effective is it for a poor country to go to war and then not achieve it's objective? And what do you think was the impact upon potential investors on account of the political outfall of the conflict?

During the 2002 build-up, Execs of the International firms with investment in India actually had asked the GoI to refrain from talking war as it was impacting their business so that concern has never really disappeared.

True, the economic powers had a lot to do with stopping India from going to war, but the final decision was that of India whose leaders realized that the economic goals were more important.

Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear weapons is the key thing in this entire episode of what you term as the "red haired child" phenomena. Post 9/11 scenario nullified most of the image problems with regards to the Kargil conflict for Pakistan.

No it isn't. If it were, then only Pakistan would be slapped with sanctions in 1998 and in the future they too would be offered a "nuclear deal."

Also contrary to your statement, the west never viewed the Indo-Pak relations from the lenses of parity. India being the bigger country always got the benefit of the doubt so things really did not change after Kargil.

Are you kidding me? India was blackballed by the US for being seen as pro soviet. Pakistan on the other hand was infused with copious aid to maintain parity with India after joining CENTO and SEATO. Maintaining strategic balance has always been the USA's policy towards south asia, if anything it was tilted in Pakistan's favor for being a client state. The USA only started engaging India after 1999, and as I said, please read Clinton's memoir regarding why he changed the foreign policy towards India and Pakistan after the Kargil conflict.

 

[Munir]

The fact remains that India might be democratic and q/5th of the world population we still see more arrogance then real base for superpower. It has failed projects so often that no one believes in its superiority. It lost nuclear show down cause its opponent blasted some nukes just to show the reality. It did the same with its copied yakhunt while we see Babur as a far more intresting idea... Ok.. India did win IT sector and economical growth but just because it is intresting market for western companies... The same reason the same parties went to China... Which has bigger growth. So Blaim must be a but nationalistic oriented and started to throw hot air... We might have losers like Nawaz and BB but to be honest... Your history isn't gold plated... And the same democratic nation occupies Kashmir (see set of rules by UK in 1947), it terrorizes Sri Lanka (Tamil terrorists) and burned some muslims in Gujarat... Way to go...

 

[Energon]

First of all, as I've said many a times before, this is not a pi$$ing contest. It's about decision making. My point is that Kargil was a very poor decision made by the leaders of Pakistan which set the nation back on many fronts. And regardless of whose version of the story is more accurate (Nawaz or Musharraf) the end point remained constant. And it's ironic that neither one of these men (who are hoping to become elected leaders) have ever talked about this debacle in a sensible and objective manner. It has been more of a blame game as opposed to a critical analysis.

 

[blain2]

I posted a wiki link. The least you can do is look into the references.

Anything to do with Kargil on Wiki is essentially an Indian PoV. Obviously it points all things pertaining to Kargil as a negative for Pakistan and positive for India. I gave up posting Wiki as a ref. for discussions on boards such as these.

Asia Times reporting on how the post Kargil Coup affected the Economy negatively.

I have already stated clearly that the impact was not only short term but also long term. Do you think wars are free? How cost effective is it for a poor country to go to war and then not achieve it's objective? And what do you think was the impact upon potential investors on account of the political outfall of the conflict?

Valid point. Wars are not free, however unlike the 65 and the 71 war, the Kargil conflict was a localized one. The country went on doing what it was prior to and after the war in terms of economic activity etc. I can guarantee you that the impact of the Kargil war was nowhere close to the earlier wars.
The issue of foreign funding (loans/grants etc.) was already down to a trickle due to the nuclear testing so the country did not suffer on account of Kargil war.

True, the economic powers had a lot to do with stopping India from going to war, but the final decision was that of India whose leaders realized that the economic goals were more important.

The point was about gambling with your economy and FDI. The Indian buildup in 2002 was actually affected by the pressure brought upon by foreign investors and the realization that Pakistan could not be pressurized militarily by the buildup.

No it isn't. If it were, then only Pakistan would be slapped with sanctions in 1998 and in the future they too would be offered a "nuclear deal."

Pakistan was sanctioned "more" than India because there was nothing "country specific" like Pressler amendment applied to India. Pakistan had to essentially deal with "layers" of sanctions primarily due to going overt with our nuclear capability. As fas as the nuclear deal is concerned, its for anyone to realize that the idea is to cap Pakistan's capability and not allow it to develop further. Pakistani nuclear program is being run tighter than India's currently with all of the new safeguards and processes in place so the fact that the deal cannot be offered to Pakistan has more to do with what this program could become if allowed to get the deal vs. punishing for irresponsibilities in the past (in my opinion, the punishment is well worth it because had we not done what we needed to do, we would have been in a similar boat as Iran).

Are you kidding me? India was blackballed by the US for being seen as pro soviet. Pakistan on the other hand was infused with copious aid to maintain parity with India after joining CENTO and SEATO. Maintaining strategic balance has always been the USA's policy towards south asia, if anything it was tilted in Pakistan's favor for being a client state. The USA only started engaging India after 1999, and as I said, please read Clinton's memoir regarding why he changed the foreign policy towards India and Pakistan after the Kargil conflict.

This is a typical response with Indian-centric tinge (you may want to change that flag out with the Indian Tri-color, your posts do not do justice to the Stars and stripes that you have up currently ). Had US wanted to allow parity to Pakistan against India then it would not have shut off supply of hardware during the 65 war or llimit funding to raising only two additional divisions for the Pakistan Army or continued the embargo during the 1971 war. An example of US wanting to maintain parity and superiority is what the US was ready and able to do for Israel against the Arabs. So lets get this "feel sorry for India" factor out of the discussion.

Soviets more than ensured and US acquiesced in the status-quo with India always being considered as the major power in the region. CENTO and SEATO provided equipment and training to Pakistan to cater to a half-hearted Soviet attack across Pakistan to get to the warm waters. The equipment was never enough nor in constant supply to ensure that Pakistan could not only beat back India but prevail in a war against India.

One more thing about Clinton, what he did was nothing different than what LBJ had done during the 65 war. The democrats have their own views about South Asia and they always have preferred India in their calculations so what Clinton did was no different than what most democrat administrations have done wrt South Asia. There is a reason that Pakistani government prefers Republicans over Democrats (as do most Muslim countries in their dealings with the US).

 

[blain2]

First of all, as I've said many a times before, this is not a pi$$ing contest. It's about decision making. My point is that Kargil was a very poor decision made by the leaders of Pakistan which set the nation back on many fronts. And regardless of whose version of the story is more accurate (Nawaz or Musharraf) the end point remained constant. And it's ironic that neither one of these men (who are hoping to become elected leaders) have ever talked about this debacle in a sensible and objective manner. It has been more of a blame game as opposed to a critical analysis.

To end my piece, yes I can admit that there was a negative fall out of the Kargil conflict for Pakistan diplomatically to some extent, however Kargil conflict also brought about certain changes in the landscape which would not have been possible had this conflict not occurred. Hindsight is always perfect, however there was a major concern on the part of Pakistan at that time that India was not moving in the right direction or fast enough to resolve the Kashmir issue and this led to escalation.