Electronic Warfare: The Promise of Soft-kill

[knight11]

By Gp Capt Joseph Noronha
Issue Vol 26.2 Apr-Jun 2011 | Date : 20 Mar , 2015

EF-111A Raven Electronic Warfare Variant

Electronic Warfare (EW) is reckoned as one of the most technologically advanced branches of warfare today. Is it really so? In a world where electronic devices have invaded practically every field of human activity, tremendous vulnerabilities have arisen that are just waiting to be exploited by conventional and irregular forces alike. Many of the capabilities of the leading exponents of airborne EW like the USA and Israel, were fashioned decades ago. They were designed for a different threat, most importantly to jam high-powered ground radars. Nowadays, they suffer from a lack of flexibility and are expensive to deploy and the threats they were intended to counter have moderated in some parts of the world. Meanwhile, new dangers are multiplying.

The innovative tactics of insurgents and irregulars have sharply increased the variety and sources of low-tech asymmetric threats. Terrorists and jihadis have contributed to expanding the definition of hostile emitters to include low-power and low-band devices; even a commercial mobile phone cannot be ignored.

Even the USA, the worlds foremost military power, seems to be struggling to get to grips with a future fraught with stagnant airborne EW capabilities, shrinking budgets and a proliferation of threats.

From simple command-and-control equipment to advanced electronic attack devices, everything is becoming increasingly sophisticated yet easy to obtain off-the-shelf. This makes it an expensive and time-consuming proposition to locate, analyse and counter them.

Even the USA, the world’s foremost military power, seems to be struggling to get to grips with a future fraught with stagnant airborne EW capabilities, shrinking budgets and a proliferation of threats. Other countries that currently have far fewer EW assets are at still greater risk.

Global Threat
Perhaps nothing illustrates this better than the vulnerability of the Global Positioning System (GPS). GPS signals are feeble and easily interfered with. In March, strong jamming signals allegedly transmitted from North Korea succeeded in temporarily disrupting GPS services in Seoul. The electronic attack, purportedly, aimed at harassing the joint military exercises between South Korea and the US. Instead, it caused mobile phones and other electronic equipment to malfunction in Seoul and the adjoining areas. Such attacks can also interfere with the navigation systems of civilian aircraft and affect commercial and banking transactions.


Northrop Next Generation Electronic Warfare

The US government should be worried. Last November, it was reported that deliberate GPS disruption was becoming more common and that the systems in place to detect and counter jammers were insufficient. GPS jammers are illegal, but they are popular with truck drivers and others who try to prevent minute-to-minute tracking of their whereabouts. A hand-held GPS jammer can be bought through the Internet by truck drivers or jihadists—for as little as $30. A powerful enough jammer or a number of carefully coordinated smaller devices could dislocate GPS services over a large area. The US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) warned that the alarming rise in the availability of GPS jammers could have a devastating impact on national security. Yet, America is one of the few countries that already possess a military system able to spot GPS interference. The GPS Jammer Detection and Location (JLOC) system includes a network of receivers capable of detecting regions of higher-than-normal signal levels and low signal-to-noise ratios, either of which can signify interference. The size and accuracy of the system has been kept under wraps. But it may soon become necessary to deploy such methods on a large scale to protect against deliberate or accidental GPS interference.

EW is all about interference. According to Wikipedia, “Electronic warfare refers to any action involving the use of the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum or directed energy to control the spectrum, attack an enemy or impede enemy assaults via the spectrum. The purpose of electronic warfare is to deny the opponent the advantage of, and ensure friendly unimpeded access to the EM spectrum. EW can be applied from air, sea, land and space by manned and unmanned systems and can target communication, radar, or other services. EW includes three major subdivisions: Electronic Attack (EA), Electronic Protection (EP), and Electronic warfare Support (ES).” Readers in this part of the world may be more familiar with the terms Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) instead of EA; Electronic Counter-Countermeasures (ECCM) rather than EP and Electronic Support Measures (ESM) in lieu of ES.

America is one of the few countries that already possess a military system able to spot GPS interference.

According to Forecast International, nearly $25 billion will be spent globally on development of EW systems over the next decade. More than 37,000 ECM devices, radar warning receivers and other EW systems are likely to be produced by 2020.

Stealth versus Jamming
Yet, the current state of many major air forces, especially the USAF, seems to indicate a decline in active EW capability. For decades, the USAF’s main focus in the EA mission was defeating the networked radars and command-and-control systems that guide sophisticated surface-to-air missiles. However since 1997, when the EF-111 Raven fleet was retired without replacement, the force has lacked a dedicated platform for jamming radars. Perhaps it has no one to blame but itself. It poured billions of dollars into stealth technology in an attempt to make radar detection irrelevant.

But in 1999 Serbia shot down a stealthy Lockheed F-117 fighter, highlighting the need for effective jamming despite stealth technology. Stealth aircraft are becoming increasingly detectable by modern radars so airborne jammers are unlikely to disappear in a hurry. And what about the hundreds of non-stealthy aircraft whose very survival depends on jammers?

There are indications that the USAF is ready to remedy its neglect of EW and pursue advanced, long-range EA capabilities essential to penetrate the latest air defences. Its next bomber (expected 2024-26) will protect itself against enemy aircraft and air or ground-launched missiles with an EA weapon. This will probably be based on Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) technology which has the ability to detect small objects and differentiate among them. The same AESA radar or an additional one will also probably serve as a long-range, anti-electronic weapon to disable or degrade air defence surveillance and communications systems. The USAF will eventually operate about 150 of these “optionally manned” advanced bombers for about 50 years.

Stealth aircraft are becoming increasingly detectable by modern radars so airborne jammers are unlikely to disappear in a hurry. And what about the hundreds of non-stealthy aircraft whose very survival depends on jammers?

The US Navy seems more alive to the urgency of enhancing EW capabilities. The Next Generation Jammer (NGJ) is part of its current effort to refocus R&D on non-kinetic capabilities like information operations, network invasion and electronic attack. This will be its first all-new airborne jamming system since 1971, when the legendary AN/ALQ-99 entered service at the end of the Vietnam War. The NGJ (initial operational capability is expected 2018) is intended to counter advanced, integrated air defences, communications systems, data- links and non-traditional threats. With the EA-6B Prowler due to retire by 2012, the modular NGJ will enter service on the Boeing EA-18G Growler carrier-based EA aircraft, a specialised version of the F/A-18F Super Hornet. The NGJ transmitter will work together with Northrop Grumman’s ALQ-218 wide band Tactical Jamming Receiver which geo-locates emitters to guide onboard jammers; and Raytheon’s ALQ-227 Communications Countermeasures Set, for advanced communications jamming.

The NGJ, eventually planned for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and possibly a future UAV, will also feature a network invasion capability similar to Suter. This system which was demonstrated a few years ago by the USAF, creates a focused data-stream that can be filled with invasive algorithms and fired into the antenna of an integrated air defence system and its wirelessly linked missile launch vehicles. It has powerful sensors for detecting all types of electronic emissions, coupled with high speed computers and a large database of known threats. The system rapidly identifies the emitters and potential weak links in enemy communications networks. Its transmitters then monitor the enemy emitters, introduce misleading information, or shut them down.

Unmanned and Unparalleled
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have proved their worth in West Asia and Afghanistan and are high on the shopping list of militaries worldwide. According to a recent report by ASD Reports, over 450 different types of UAVs are being fielded or developed by 49 countries. And if the Teal Group is right, the world UAV market will double over the next 10 years, totaling $94 billion. In its UAV Market Profile and Forecast 2011, the Group says UAVs have been the most dynamic growth sector of the world aerospace industry over the past decade. The UAV electronics market is also growing steadily, with especially fast growth and opportunities in synthetic aperture radar and signals intelligence/electronic warfare technology. Tactical and mini/micro/nano UAVs will offer some of the best EW opportunities over the next decade.

According to a recent report by ASD Reports, over 450 different types of UAVs are being fielded or developed by 49 countries. And if the Teal Group is right, the world UAV market will double over the next 10 years, totaling $94 billion.

The USAF, based on the experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, is going slow on big aircraft with big budgets and focusing on UAVs in the irregular warfare role first. It is looking to induct a “low-cost, rapidly deployable, counter-communications” system, an EW pod that can be integrated on UAVs as well as on manned fighters. The US Army earlier expressed interest in a similar capability for its General Atomics MQ-1C Gray Eagle UAV. The USAF is also acquiring a new miniature air launched decoy (MALD) which is designed to mimic the signatures of actual combat aircraft.

The goal for these decoys is to fool or confuse enemy air defences into going after the MALDs or to present them with many potential targets, sparing the actual combat aircraft. The Raytheon-built expendable system and a later variant known as MALD-J to jam air defence radar, is expected to be crucial in enabling strike aircraft to penetrate sophisticated enemy air defences in future battles. Overall, the Air Force intends to procure MALDs and MALD-Js in large numbers, possibly 3,000.

The Israeli Air Force too favours UAVs in the EW role. Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) is a world leader in UAV technology. The Heron, its best-known product, is useful for strategic as well as tactical EW missions. An enhanced version, called Heron TP or Eitan, has also been developed. Now it is introducing a fresh line of tilt-rotor UAVs called Panther and Ghost. According to IAI sources, UAV-based EW and cyber warfare are a major emerging opportunity. Design goals will focus on how low-cost UAV systems can take on many different tasks and provide support to each other.

Libya is a third world country with relatively outdated assets. Think about China, which is rapidly upgrading its military including its cyber warfare and airborne EW potential and vigorously pursuing stealth and UAV-based EA capability.

These UAVs will have inbuilt EW capability, AESA technology and stealth. Quantity will be the main consideration in order to overwhelm enemy defences, the more UAVs fielded for a given investment the better. Israel’s Elbit Systems is another leading light of the global UAV market offering long-range drones like the Hermes 450 and the Hermes 900 that can carry a variety of EW and other payloads.

Consistency & Coordination Equals Capability
Basic EW equipment can now do things that earlier required very specialised electronic support equipment. Receivers are becoming more sensitive while transmitters add flexibility, power and broader frequency range. Digital RF Memory (DRFM) technology means that brute-force EA techniques are giving way to more sophisticated, precisely-targeted techniques. Broadband phased arrays are already indispensable because jamming systems have to cover a much broader frequency range than radars. The new generation of jamming and exploitation techniques will be driven by updated universal exciter modules. Further into the future there’s the prospect of integrating directed energy (DE) weapons like high-power microwave (HPM) and high-energy lasers (HEL) with jammers. This might make for not-so-soft kill.

And UAVs are destined to assume a far greater responsibility for EW. Investments in UAV technology over the last three decades or so are now reaching fruition. With further advancements in this field, new EW missions will constantly emerge. UAVs are also a cost-effective way of keeping pace with evolving EW threats so the mounting pressure to save money on defence is likely to spur development and deployment of UAVs all over the world.

For some decades now, airborne EW has been afflicted by the “feast or famine” effect, either assigned high priority or practically ignored. But its promise can be fulfilled only if there’s consistent investment and a coordinated strategy so that EA capability can keep pace with the changing threat.

The enforcement of an air exclusion zone over Libya in March 2011 began with the deployment of EA aircraft against the Libyan air defences. The attacking US, British and French air forces succeeded in neutralising the threat in quick time. However, Libya is a third world country with relatively outdated assets. Think about China, which is rapidly upgrading its military including its cyber warfare and airborne EW potential and vigorously pursuing stealth and UAV-based EA capability.

@PARIKRAMA @Nilgiri @Joe Shearer @nForce @Whazzup @Srinivas

 

[knight11]

By Lt General V K Saxena for India Strategic


Modern warfare is characterised by technological advances, rapid tempo of operations, increased range, accuracy and lethality of weapon systems, and increasing distance between forces. In this scenario, it becomes imperative, that forces spread over vast areas remain connected with one another in a web of net-centric communication. Such connectivity is considered to be a lifeline support for their smooth conduct of operations in an increasingly flatter hierarchy of command and control. In addition, the galloping technological complexities of weapons in today’s battlefield have one common thread, i.e. their ever increasing dependence on the electronics and EM spectrum. This dependence can also be interpreted in terms of their vulnerability, since higher the degree of dependence on the EM spectrum, higher will be the vulnerability of the system to an attack on the same. In combat, therefore, own and friendly forces would aim to secure for themselves, an optimal and unhindered exploitation of the EM spectrum, while trying to deny the same to the adversary.




From Hard towards Soft-kill

Spurred by the above dependencyvulnerability matrix, there is a paradigm shift from the ‘ultimate Hard-Kill’ to ‘multiple Soft-Kill options’. The defence forces must use a host of surveillance, fire control, communications, intelligence gathering, navigation, storing and processing equipment, etc, all thriving on the EM spectrum and hence, must throw themselves vulnerable to an adversary who could kill/degrade them by interfering with their commonthread i.e. EM spectrum. Interestingly for doing this, the most eminent and multi-dimensional option is not the HARD KILL but SOFT KILL - and that is the order of the day.

Implications of the EM Dependency on Air Defence Weapons

It follows from the above, that in the present day battle milieu, the side with the capability to degrade the opponent’s EM spectrum (Electronic System (ES), ECM and Electro Optical (EO) System), will have an upper edge. Since the entire canvas of the air defence weapons in general and GBADWS in particular, is deeply immersed in, and is heavily dependent upon, the said EM spectrum, its vulnerability to the soft-kill threat is very high, requiring suitable measures for ensuring their survivability and unhindered operation against electronic (soft) degradation/ destruction. In addition, there is a need to build the capability in the said weapons for carrying out offensive use of EM energy not only to ensure their own survivability/functionability, but also, to degrade/suppress/destroy any incoming aerial threat vehicle through soft-kill option. In sum, the capability desired in a typical Ground Based Air Defence Weapon Systems (GBADWS) to fulfill its role will include one or more of the following in the hard and/or soft-kill domain:-

• Destruction of the airborne intruder.
• Destruction/misguidance of the Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) released after launch.
• Degradation of the capability of the aircraft to guide its munitions to the target.
• Protection of own system against hostile electronic/EM attack

Concepts of Air Defence EW Operations

The Two Way Game

The essence of any offensive airborne EW operation is to employ all possible technologies of ECM/ECCM to ensure that either the weapons on board could carry out hard-kill or EW system on board could carry out soft-kill of GBADWS without the offensive platform getting degraded/ defunct by the ECM capability on board/ associated with the victim GBADWS. Faced with this threat, own air defence EW operations will mean strengthening the existing surveillance network for detection of airborne intruders and assisting the GBADWS by carrying out soft-kill of offensive airborne platforms using ECM, prior to hard-kill by actual fire. The above said soft-kill, could either mean degrading the mother aerial threat vehicle or to make the electronic/EM system on board the aircraft incapable of guiding weapons to our GBADWS/assets being protected.

Enhanced Capability Effect

Since the primary aim of air defence is to preserve specified Vulnerable Areas/ Vulnerable Points from critical damage or destruction by enemy aircraft, the use of EW (Non-Communication) equipment in conjunction with GBADWS works to enhance the capability of the latter, manifold. This is so, because in addition to the hard-kill by actual fire as the last operation available, the GBADWS gets added capability to carry out soft-kill of the aerial threat vehicles/munitions.

Enhanced Range Effect

While the hard-kill option is limited to the range of the GBADWS and modulated by the related Single Shot Kill Probability (SSKP)/Single Shot Hit Probability (SSHP)/Cumulative Kill Probability (CKP) etc, the soft-kill option makes itself available at the range of detection/identification/recognition. The latter in all probability, will be more than the former and will actually be a function of detection capability of the emitter, capability of the associated ESM equipment, efficacy of Identification of Friend or Foe (IFF) system available, etc. GBADWS in conjunction with EW (Non- Communication) capability therefore, enjoys an enhanced range effect.

Answer to the Contemporary Threat

With the ever-growing lethality and severity in the contemporary threat which has moved several notches forward of its erstwhile scalar aircraft dimension, the challenge is actually posed by smart/ intelligent ammunition, laser guided intelligence, PGMs, surface-to-surface Missiles (SSMs), cruise missiles, antiradiation missiles and the like. Killing such weapons (with active seekers on vulnerable point) is one of the prime challenges for the GBADWS. In most cases, the hard-kill option of killing/ degrading smart/intelligent ammunition with firepower alone, is remote and is rarely successful. The most potent option lies in soft-killing/degrading the mother vehicle guiding the intelligent ammunition or the intelligent ammunition itself. This option is eminently possible with the support of EW (Non-Communication) equipment to GBADWS.

In essence therefore, air defence EW (Non-Communication) capability is a Force Multiplier which can enhance both the survivability as well as the kill capability of GBADWS against the contemporary as well as the future air threat.

Scope of Air Defence EW Operations

Basic Purpose

The basic purpose of air defence EW (Non-Communication) operating can be summarised as under:-

• Survivability. To enhance the survivability of GBADWS, for operating in a hostile EW (Non-Communication) environment.
• Capability. To enhance the effectiveness and kill capability of GBADWS by providing them the means to achieve a soft-kill on aerial threat vehicles and/ or on directed/ guided ammunitions.
• Threat Library. To assist the GBADWS in building a dynamic threat library of the airborne threat including airborne EW threat.

Other Points of Relevace

• Range of Operation. The range of operations of air defence EW (Non- Communication) operations embrace all the EW (Non-Communication) dimensions, viz. ESM, ECM and ECCM.
• Air Defence EW (Non- Communication) Capability. The air defence EW (Noncommunication) capability of GBADWS can manifest itself in two patterns. Either the same can be inbuilt on board the weapon system itself by way of its design features, etc, or the same can be made available to GBADWS by the EW (Non-Communication) equipment associated with it in an outsourced fashion. The inbuilt capability will basically relate to ECCM capability while the outsourced capability is likely to provide the fullspectrum support (ESM, ECM and ECCM).
• Need for Integration. Save the capability built on board the GBADWS, there is a need for one-on-one integration between the EW (Non- Communication) equipment and GBADWS for provision of the support envisaged above. This integration is not deemed to be a ‘physical integration’ but ‘electronic integration’, wherein, the capability of EW (Non-Communication) equipment is made available to GBADWS with or without the physical proximity of the concerned equipment/infrastructure.
• Multi-Utility Dimension of EW (Non-Communication) Equipment. It is well understood that the EW (Non-Communication) equipment capability in all its dimensions of ESM, ECM and ECCM will not only be required by the GBADWS, but also, by a host of other weapon system platforms, i.e. (Infantry, Artillery, Army Aviation, Surveillance and Target Acquisition etc), main/intermediate Headquarters intelligence set up (Force Multiplier Command Post, intelligence cell, Formation Headquarters) etc. The requirement of integration will therefore have to be worked out by the general staff, keeping the full spectrum of users in mind.
• Existing AD EW (Non- Communication) Equipment in the World Today By realising the usefulness of air defence EW (Non-Communication) equipment in increasing survivability and effectiveness of GBADWS, several countries have fielded air defence EW(Non-Communication) equipment in their armed forces. Technical details of some of these systems are given in succeeding paragraphs.

Chinese Air Defence EW System

• Nomenclature. Model 970 radar jammer system. l Type. Mobile I/J band (8 to 20 GHz) radar jammer system.
• Description. Model 970 is a mobile, land-based radar jammer that is primarily designed to protect high value ground targets from air attack. The system operates in I/J band and uses noise-modulated ‘blanket’ jammer to produce a continuous interference sector on the screen of an aircraft’s surveillance radar. It can also be used to jam air-launched missile guidance radars, offers a range of jamming modes and can be operated either automatically or manually.

Israel’s AD EW System

• Nomenclature. Rattler radar jammer.
• Type. Multi-platform radar jamming system.
• Description. Rattler is a jamming system that is designed for use in ground, naval and airborne applications, either as part of an overall ECM system or in a stand-alone configuration. The system can operate in ‘stand-off’ as well as ‘stand-in’ mode and is designed to jam up to three surveillance, search and tracking radars simultaneously, using timesharing technology. It consists of four main units: a low-power microwave source, a high-power wideband amplifier, power supply Rattler Radar Jammer and a control unit. Range of the jammer is believed to be 20 to 30 kilometers.

Rusian Air Defence EW System

• Nomenclature. SPN Series radar jammer.
• Type. Family of ground-based airborne radar jammer system.
• Description. The five-man SPN-2 and the computer controlled SPN-4 radar jammer is designed to protect ground forces and ‘small size’ installations and is described as being effective against airborne pulsed side-looking radars (SL), air-to-surface weapon control (ASWC) systems and navigation radars. Functionally, they can operate as a standalone unit or as part of jamming network with overall control being exercised from a central control station.

United Kingdom Air Defence EW System

• Nomenclature. Type S-373 ECM System.
• Type. Radar frequency surveillance and jamming system.
• Description. The BAE system (Formerly GEC-Marconi) Type S 373 ECM system is a multi-band radar jammer system that incorporates autonomous surveillance sub-system for the detection, localisation and analysis of target radar emitters. The equipment makes use of a twin, horn-fed, parabolic dish reflector assembly that is housed in a ‘double-bubble’ radome and is deployed (using hydraulic jacks) from the roof of the system vehicle.

USA Air Defence EW System

• Nomenclature. MGARJS mobile radar jammer system.
• Type. Mobile detection analysis and jammer system.
• Description. The mobile groundto- air radar jamming system (MGARJS) is designed to provide EW protection support for high-value targets and installations. In particular, the system (which can be integrated into an air defence system) provides surveillance, acquisition and analysis of airborne radar systems; direct ECM against such emitters and radar tracking correlations. MGARJS consists of a mobile station strategically located around high-value installations, with the exact number and role of the station being tailored to the mission requirement.

Deductions

A broad review of the various air defence EW system the world over reveals the following relevant points:-

• Full-Blown Capability. EW (Non-Communication) equipment capability in support of air defence operations through soft kill/ degrading the airborne threat (aircraft/intelligence) is a full-blown capability with all the leading nations of the world.
• Integration. Though many details are not available of the specific integration of these systems with GBADWS in particular, their specific description of being able to defeat the airborne ECM threat and their stated capability to map the ESM signature of airborne threat, implies that viable integration between the EW (Non-Communication) equipment and GBADWS would have been achieved.
• Range. The domain of EW (Non- Communication) equipment indicates that it eminently covers the entire threat spectrum of EW; vis, ESM, ECM and ECCM.
• Technology. It is also evident that contemporary and cutting edge technologies are at play in various stated capabilities of EW (Non-Communication) equipment in support of air defence operations.
• On Multiple Utility. While specific details on the other multiple uses of EW (Non-Communication) equipment under survey are not available, it is logical to presume that such usage will be very much a reality and the required SOPs would be in place.

Conclusion

The task of GBADWS in protecting specified vulnerable areas/vulnerable points is becoming increasingly difficult, thanks to the growing lethality and severity in the air threat, every passing day. Not only, has the threat moved forward of its earlier scalar dimension of air craft into a full-blown spectrum of aerial threat vehicles consisting of UAVs, UCAVs, PGMs, Attack Helicopters, Cruise Missiles, SSMs, EW threat and the like, the range and reach capability, the stand off capability, the capability of intelligence to seek their targets; all have undergone a qualitative paradigm shift upwards.

In the above unenviable scenario, the EW (Non-Communication) equipment can act as a ‘Force Multiplier’ to GBADWS. The former cannot only increase the survivability of GBADWS in a hostile EW environment, but also, it can enhance their kill effectiveness by providing them the capability to carry out soft-kill on aerial threat vehicles/intelligence at their detection/identification/recognition ranges (which are likely to be much higher than their hard-kill ranges). Besides this, EW (Non-Communication) equipment could also aid the GBADWS in building up a dynamic threat library of the aerial threat vehicles.


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