Egypt's quiet weapons build-up

[The SC]

U.S., Russia, others gather data on development of WMDs


NEW YORK — A number of documents NBC News has obtained from the United States, Russia and Israel — some of it public, some declassified under the Freedom of Information Act — help shed some light on Egypt's steady development of several weapons of mass destruction programs over the past decade and a half, including its nuclear potential and details of a joint North Korean-Egyptian missile development agreement.

The overall impression of officials in the United States, as well as those in Israel and Russia, is that Egypt has quietly been developing weapons, in particular biological weapons and missiles.

Much of Egypt’s superweapons development, of course, is aimed at countering Israel's long standing and large-scale superweapons programs, as well as establishing itself as the leading power in the Arab world.

Israel's weapons of mass destruction program is daunting, even to the first Arab state that signed a peace treaty with the Jewish state. With an estimated 200 nuclear warheads, more than Great Britain, and 100 medium-range missiles, Israel is in a world of diminishing nuclear programs, a regional superpower, at least.

Still, while Egypt continues to point an accusing finger at Israel's nuclear weapons capability, there is considerable evidence that Egypt has been quietly building up its own superweapons programs, including some evidence of interest in nuclear and radiological weapons.

In other words, Egypt may not have clean hands.

The United States has growing concerns that Egypt is working on several weapons programs it sees as destabilizing to Middle East peace.

During the past decade and a half, both the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) and the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) have publicly noted the existence of programs previously unknown. The following is a breakdown of what the documents say about Egypt’s weapons systems development programs.

Evidence of nuclear build-up

The most revealing document is the Russian intelligence document, produced by the KGB's successor organization, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service or FIS. An extraordinary public document, it was issued at a time of extraordinary public openness and has not been updated since.

In the document, "Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction," issued on Jan. 28, 1993, the Russians noted that although there is "no special program of military-applied research in the [Egyptian] nuclear sphere," there are some developments of note.

• The development of the 22-MW research reactor at Inshas, north of Cairo, built with help from Argentina;
• Egypt has contracted with India to upgrade a 30-year-old Soviet research reactor from 2-MW to 5-MW;
• Egypt has contracted with Russia to supply a MGD-20 cyclotron accelerator which would be helpful in exploring uranium enrichment technologies;
• Egypt has begun building a facility at its Inshas research center, which the Russians noted "in its design features and engineering protection could in the future be used to obtain weapons-grade plutonium from the uranium irradiated in the research reactors.”

In addition, NBC News obtained the U.S. Customs Service debriefing of Abdel Kadr Helmy, an Egyptian spy, jailed in the 1980's for trying to obtain various missile technologies, including Pershing-II guidance packages.

Helmy said in the debrief — which he now disavows — that Egypt had an active nuclear weapons development program that included sending uranium to Pakistan for enrichment to bomb-grade levels. Helmy said that an Egyptian Brigadier, Ahmad Nashet, ran both the civilian nuclear establishment in Cairo, as well as the nascent bomb program.

Development of chemical weapons

The Egyptians are also interested in chemical weapons. The Russian FIS document specifically noted, "Techniques of the production of nerve-paralyzing and blister-producing toxic agents have been assimilated."

Furthermore, the FIS report stated: "There is information to the effect that Egypt is displaying interest in purchases overseas of warheads intended for filling with liquid chemical warfare agents. The stockpiles of toxic substances available at this time are insufficient for broad-based operations, but the industrial potential would permit the development of the additional production in a relatively short time."

It may very well be that the warheads the Russians discussed were ultimately bound for Iraq.

Confirmation of biological weapons program

Similarly, the Egyptians have a biological weapons program, according to recent statements by the Russian FIS, as well as the U.S. CIA andArms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA).

“At the start of the 1970's," the FIS document stated, "President Sadat confirmed this, announcing the presence in Egypt of a stockpile of biological agents stored in refrigerating plants. Toxins of varying nature are being studied and techniques for their production and refinement are being developed at the present time in a [unnamed] national research center."

In response to a question during a U.S. Senate Government Affairs Committee hearing on Feb. 24, 1993 regarding proliferation concerns, then CIA Director R. James Woolsey confirmed that Egypt is counted as a nation with biological weapons capability.

Annual U.S. ACDA reports on treaty compliance similarly listed Egypt as a probable biological weapons state.

In three annual reports to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee since 1995, ACDA has used the same language to assess the Egyptian program: "The United States believes that Egypt had developed biological agents by 1972. There is no evidence to indicate that Egypt has eliminated this capability and it remains likely that the Egyptian capability to conduct biological warfare continues to exist."

What is also interesting about these subsequent reports is that unlike a similar report in 1994, ACDA did not include this sentence: "The United States however has not however obtained recent information on this program," the implication being that the U.S. did receive damning information about the program starting in 1995.

The Russian FIS was less circumspect in its 1993 report, stating: "The country has a program of militarily applied research in the area of biological weapons, but no data have been obtained to indicate the creation of biological agents in support of military offensive programs. The research program in the area of biological weapons date back to the 1960's."

Strides in missile development, thanks to North Korea

The area where Egypt excels is in missile development.

The Russians FIS report noted: "By 1990, Egypt's missile forces were armed with a regiment each of Soviet Scud-B [approximately 186 miles] and Frog 7 [approximately 43 miles] transporter-erector-launchers and also a certain quantity of Sakr 80 and Sakr 365 Egyptian-Iraqi-North Korean short-range missiles. It is technically possible to fit the Scud and Frog warheads with chemical weapons.

“An agreement was concluded in 1990 on military cooperation with China in accordance with which Beijing is to assist in the modernization of the Egyptian Sakr plant and help establish the production of new modifications of the Scud B-class missiles and three domestic types of Egyptian surface-to-surface missiles."

A 1992 Israeli Defense Force (IDF) memorandum on Mid East missile programs provided this appraisal of the Egyptian program: "Egypt attaches great importance to the acquisition of GGM [Ground-to-Ground Missile] and to the building of a congruent technological infrastructure. During the 1950s, and aided by German Nazi scientists, a concerted effort was made to build factories which would manufacture missiles. This effort continued over the years; at present the Egyptian army diverts resources to this endeavor.

"Egypt's principal GGM [Ground-to-Ground Missile] focus is on the Scud, at source a Russian ballistic missile. Cairo would like to build the infrastructure which would enable it to assemble its own Scuds, with the aid of foreign countries and companies. North Korea is Egypt's main ally in this regard.

“At the beginning of the 1980s North Korea bought tens of Scud-B missiles from the Egyptians. The Scud-B is a medium range missile (approximately 174 miles), originally Russian, capable of carry a warhead of up to one ton.

“In return, the North Koreans helped the Egyptians set up the infrastructure for missile production and assembly. This was done via North Korean scientists and the transfer of North Korean technology. Work is continuing in these factories at present; they are said to begin active production in 1993.”

Similarly, the FIS noted, "Using technology obtained from Egypt the DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea] is upgrading the Scud-class missiles purchased earlier in the USSR and exporting them to countries of the Near and Middle East."

Condor-II missile development

In addition, testimony by U.S. Customs Service agent Daniel Burns before the House Ways & Means Oversight Subcommittee during an April 18, 1991 hearing about “Administration & Enforcement of U.S. Export Controls" bolstered the belief in Egypt’s sophisticated missile development program.

Burns testified about conversations he had with Abdelkader Helmy, an Egyptian-American rocket scientist who had pleaded guilty to helping Cairo obtain equipment and material for the Condor-II missile. The missile was a joint project of Egypt, Argentina and Iraq. In his testimony, Burns said Helmy discussed with him several projects including:

• “The financing of the [Condor-II] program by Iraq and Saudi Arabia, and the roles of Egypt and Argentina and Iraq;"
• "the Egyptian effort to develop a nuclear warhead, including the Cobalt-60 effort and the purchase of uranium from France;"
• "the outline of the Scud missile joint development program between Egypt and North Korea;"
• "the details of an Iraqi chemical warhead and its planned utilization;"
• "the knowledge of President Mubarak of the Condor program and the fact that he approved it in 1984;" and
• "the modification of the SCUD and SS-10 missile."

Furthermore, Burns testified that, "I also developed information in some of the other corporations that he had been in contact with during this investigation — that he had approached the Coleman Research Corp., located down in Huntsville, about obtaining Stinger guidance systems….early in our wiretap investigation we overheard him being asked to check on the remotely piloted vehicle, known as the "Scarab" that was being built by Teledyne Ryan, which is, essentially, for the lack of a better word, the poor man's cruise missile."

Helmy, in his own testimony that day, discussed the North Korean-Egyptian Scub-B upgrade program. Helmy said, "The Scud-B, I knew everything...from the Egyptian official...the other relationship with the Koreans, I knew it."

The Cobalt-60 comment is particularly revealing since Cobalt-60 is an ideal warhead for a radiological bomb or "dirty" bomb, that is, a bomb which disperses a radioactive material on detonation.


http://www.nbcnews.com/id/7206187/print/1/displaymode/1098/

 

[Foxtrot Delta]

I guess they need them to protect their sovernity. I hope they don't use them as aggressive weapons rather defensive. I hope.

 

[The SC]

..

Even though Egypt’s strategic partnership with the United States stigmatizes overt displays of cooperation with North Korea, the Cairo-Pyongyang diplomatic partnership has survived due to ongoing communication between leaders of both countries and shared economic interests. The establishment of person-to-person contacts between the Egyptian and North Korean governments, consolidated by Mubarak’s four visits to Pyongyang from 1983-1990, laid the foundation for subsequent Egyptian investments in the North Korean economy.

The most striking demonstration of Cairo’s willingness to invest in North Korea was Egyptian telecommunications giant Orascom’s establishment of Koryolink, the DPRK’s only 3G mobile phone network, in 2008. This business deal, which was authorized by Egyptian billionaire Naguib Sawiris, gave Orascom 300,000 new North Korean customers. This deal highlighted the potential for mutually beneficial economic links between the two countries, and Sawiris’s subsequent visits to Pyongyang facilitated further Egyptian investments in the North Korean economy.

In spite of the political turmoil that followed Mubarak’s ouster in 2011, the Cairo-Pyongyang economic partnership has remained intact. As Egypt’s Port Said remains a critical trans-shipment point for North Korean arms exports to Africa, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has upheld his predecessors’ North Korea policy and refused to enforce UN sanctions against Pyongyang.

Egypt’s Interest in North Korean Military Technology

In addition to maintaining diplomatic ties and valuable trade links with the DPRK, Egyptian policymakers have viewed North Korea as a critical supplier of military technology since the 1970s. To reward North Korea for its contributions to Egypt’s 1973 war effort, President Anwar el-Sadat authorized the sale of Soviet-made Scud-B missiles to the DPRK from 1976-1981. The North Korean military responded to Cairo’s missile sales by technologically assisting Egypt’s Scud-B missile production efforts.

Despite the establishment of a cold peace between Egypt and Israel in 1979, and a strengthened U.S.-Egypt alliance under Hosni Mubarak, Cairo remains a major purchaser of North Korean military technology. Egypt’s decision to maintain security links with North Korea can be explained by two strategic factors.

First, the North Korean government has helped train Egyptian scientists to produce their own missile systems, in exchange for hard currency provisions from Cairo. This arms-for-hard currency trade agreement helps reduce Egypt’s reliance on foreign arms imports, and allows Egypt to modernize its military without being solely reliant on the United States and Russia.

Egypt’s missile industry has particularly benefited from close military links with North Korea. During the 1990s, Egypt’s defensive capabilities were enhanced by Mubarak’s purchases of Scud-C missiles from North Korea. These procurements encouraged North Korean scientists to assist Egypt’s Scud-C missile production program during the late 1990s and early 2000s.

More recently, Iran’s ballistic missile tests have caused Egyptian military officials to express interest in purchasing new surface-to-surface missile systems, for defensive and retaliatory purposes. As North Korea continues to export air defense systems and satellite-guided missile technologies across the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa, Pyongyang has re-emerged as a useful security partner for Cairo, as Egypt seeks to help its leading ally, Saudi Arabia, militarily balance against Iran.

Second, the Egyptian government’s continued refusal to accept comprehensive international inspections of its nuclear energy program, has increased concerns in Washington that Egypt could seek its own nuclear deterrent, if Iran violates the 2015 nuclear deal. This theory is substantiated by the IAEA’s discovery of highly enriched uranium at Ishas in 2007 and 2008, which occurred in spite of Mubarak’s rhetorical commitment to a nuclear-free Middle East.

As the United States and Russia both oppose Egypt’s procurement of nuclear weapons, North Korea could be a useful supplier of nuclear material to Egypt, if Cairo seeks to revive its uranium enrichment program. As many defense analysts believe that rising tensions between the U.S. and Egypt under Sisi increase the risk of Egypt procuring its own nuclear deterrent, Trump’s decision to cut aid to Egypt could convince Sisi to expand Cairo’s long-standing defense partnership with North Korea. This outcome would underscore the inefficacy of international sanctions against the DPRK and lead to a profound political backlash against Trump’s use of coercive diplomacy with Egypt.

Even though the United States has been Egypt’s principal great power ally for four decades, Egypt has refused to give up its long-standing economic, diplomatic and military partnership with North Korea. Therefore, Trump’s unexpected decision to cut foreign aid to Egypt leaves Sisi with an uncomfortable choice between reluctantly kowtowing to U.S. demands and risking a long-term suspension of the Washington-Cairo security partnership.

https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/the-egypt-north-korea-connection/

I guess they need them to protect their sovernity. I hope they don't use them as aggressive weapons rather defensive. I hope.

The Egyptian doctrine is defensive in essence.. Although it has an offensive sub-doctrine now..

 

[Sabretooth]

Free hand to procure whatever you want from whomever you want without worrying about the bills. Egypt is living the dream.

 

[bsruzm]

U.S., Russia, others gather data on development of WMDs


NEW YORK — A number of documents NBC News has obtained from the United States, Russia and Israel — some of it public, some declassified under the Freedom of Information Act — help shed some light on Egypt's steady development of several weapons of mass destruction programs over the past decade and a half, including its nuclear potential and details of a joint North Korean-Egyptian missile development agreement.

The overall impression of officials in the United States, as well as those in Israel and Russia, is that Egypt has quietly been developing weapons, in particular biological weapons and missiles.

Much of Egypt’s superweapons development, of course, is aimed at countering Israel's long standing and large-scale superweapons programs, as well as establishing itself as the leading power in the Arab world.

Israel's weapons of mass destruction program is daunting, even to the first Arab state that signed a peace treaty with the Jewish state. With an estimated 200 nuclear warheads, more than Great Britain, and 100 medium-range missiles, Israel is in a world of diminishing nuclear programs, a regional superpower, at least.

Still, while Egypt continues to point an accusing finger at Israel's nuclear weapons capability, there is considerable evidence that Egypt has been quietly building up its own superweapons programs, including some evidence of interest in nuclear and radiological weapons.

In other words, Egypt may not have clean hands.

The United States has growing concerns that Egypt is working on several weapons programs it sees as destabilizing to Middle East peace.

During the past decade and a half, both the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) and the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) have publicly noted the existence of programs previously unknown. The following is a breakdown of what the documents say about Egypt’s weapons systems development programs.

Egyptian government can't keep it a secret, the state structure is like a swiss cheese there. Especially under Sisi, Egypt is no threat to Israel.

 

[Aspen]

I hate Sisi but he is a shrewd man

 

[The SC]

I hate Sisi but he is a shrewd man

No need to hate him .. He is really good for Egypt..

======================================================


Basically the topic is simply chronological..
It starts from the beginning of the eighties to the past two years ..... This is what we know only..

1- A number of Egyptian Scud missiles were transferred to North Korea to reverse engineer and know how to manufacture them, and this was done.

2- Triangular cooperation between Egypt, Iraq, and Argentina to develop a medium-range missile, and this was done, and Egypt obtained the cookbook to produce the missile.

3 - The Egyptian attempt to develop a medium-range missile and the smuggling of carbon-carbon, which is used to protect the ballistic missile when it enters the atmosphere, thus increasing the accuracy ..... Egypt obtained about 1,000 kg of this material .... Because of the American pressure, Egypt announced its abandonment About its missile program.

4 - In the late nineties, the North Korean ambassador to Egypt defected from the regime in Korea, .... He fled to the West and announced that the joint missile program between Egypt and Korea is still ongoing.

5- The early 2000s reached the CIA information that Egypt had acquired 24 Nodong missiles from North Korea with the know how to manufacture it.

6- Two years ago, the American administration pressed again on Egypt because of information about Egyptian-Korean cooperation, later on Egypt announced the cutting of military relations with NK (after ICBMs' and The Hydrogen Bomb tests), and signed CISMOA with the US and strengthened relations with South Korea.

Thus, as we see in the history of relations between the two countries .... it was announced that it ended several times, but it continues in secret until it is discovered after another 10 years.

..
For a country with limited resources (its estimated GDP last year was about $28.5 billion, less than that of the state of Vermont), how has North Korea’s ballistic missile program progressed so far?

How it all began

When relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated in the mid-1970s, North Korea began eyeing a ballistic missile program as a way to ensure its security. It wasn’t until the late ’70s and early ’80s that the country obtained an unknown number of short range Scud missiles from Egypt. These were reverse engineered and became the foundation of North Korea’s ballistic missile program.

Between July and September 1984, North Korea carried out six flight tests of its own versions of these missiles in remote Musudan-ri, located in the country’s northeast corner. Of these tests, experts believe half exploded on or shortly after launch.

The program had a rocky start, but North Korea learned from its failures. As it perfected its own version of the Scud (or as North Korea calls it, the Hwasong-5), it worked to extend its range. The Scud can only hit targets about 186 miles (300 kilometers) away but North Korea modified it to reach as far as 310 miles (500 kilometers).

'Bigger and better'

But to target U.S. bases in Japan, North Korea needed to do better. It took the basic Scud and made it bigger. The U.S. refers to North Korea’s enlarged version of the Scud as the “Nodong,” named after the village of No Dong where U.S. analysts first spotted the missile.

Photo from September 2003 shows a truck carrying a long range Iranian Shahab-3 ballistic missile in... [+]

North Korea appears to have developed these early missiles in cooperation with Iran and possibly Pakistan. Both countries employ their own versions of the Nodong, and likely provided North Korea with technical experts, money, materials or some combination of the above in exchange for North Korea’s missiles. Diffusing costs between the three would significantly increase the chances of success and ease the financial burden on North Korea.

Deals have been made before

North Korea’s missile development has not always been a straight drive towards an ICBM. In fact, the country has been willing to halt the program in exchange for a few carrots in the past.
In 1998, North Korea launched a missile the U.S. refers to as the Taepodong-1. Much like the recent test on August 28, the missile flew over Japan and traveled several thousand miles before blowing up spectacularly and crashing into the Pacific Ocean. While it was considered a failure, the test still rattled the international community.
It jump-started U.S. missile defense systems such as the ground-based midcourse defense system, and led to a U.S.-North Korea agreement that halted further missile tests in exchange for the relaxation of sanctions. This deal -- which policy makers would jump for now -- lasted until 2006 it collapsed after talks between the two countries stalled. North Korea resumed missile testing with a seven-missile volley.

The push by Kim Jong-un

This undated picture released by KCNA on September 2, 2017 shows Kim Jong-in attending a photo... [+]

Despite the revival, it wasn’t until Kim Jong-un assumed power at the end of 2011 that North Korea’s missile program really took flight.

Kim Jong-un has carried out 84 missile tests (as of September 1, 2017), more than twice the number of his father and grandfather combined. And in the past two years, we’ve seen not only more tests, but brand-new innovations in North Korea’s missiles.

SLBMs

In 2015, North Korea began flight tests of its submarine-launched ballistic missile, the Pukguksong-1. By August 2016, North Korea successfully tested the system at sea.

While the missile itself can only travel about 620 miles (1,000 kilometers) and so far appears only workable on a single North Korean sub, this system greatly complicates U.S. missile defense plans. With an SLBM, North Korea can launch missiles from unexpected directions with very short warning times. U.S. ballistic missile defense systems might only have a minute to intercept the missile or might miss its launch altogether.

Solid-fueled missiles

North Korea’s SLBM added another complicating factor: solid fuel. Solid-fuel missiles, in contrast to their liquid-fueled counterparts like the Scud and Nodong, are built with the fuel cast into them. This drastically reduces prep time, making them a lot harder to spot prior to launch.

This photo taken on February 12, 2017 and released by KCNA shows the launch of a surface-to-surface... [+]

These advantages were not lost on North Korea. Following the successful August 2016 SLBM test, North Korea took that missile and mounted it on a tracked vehicle and created a land-based version of it, the Pukguksong-2.

The Musudan
Musudan
by JamesMartinCNS
on Sketchfab

The Musudan was first revealed in a 2010 military parade and bore a striking resemblance to a Soviet SLBM, the R-27. North Korea reportedly deployed it before it was ever flight-tested. When it was finally flight tested in 2016, the missile failed five times before its first (and to date only) successful launch.

Images released following the test showed that the Musudan’s engine featured a complex design, probably meant to demonstrate North Korea's advancing technical capabilities. However, we have yet to see another successful Musudan test and the shift to the significantly different Hwasong-12 and Hwasong-14 designs, suggests that the country has halted work on this engine design or abandoned it altogether.

IRBMs and ICBMs

The biggest innovation we’ve seen in North Korea’s missile program came this year with the successful testing of North Korea’s new intermediate-range ballistic missiles -- the Hwasong-12 -- and its intercontinental ballistic missiles -- the Hwasong-14.
Hwasong-12
by JamesMartinCNS
on Sketchfab

The first three tests of the Hwasong-12 test were unsuccessful, however the fourth on May 14, was. Following the test, North Korea released detailed images of its new missile. Analysis revealed it used an engine configuration first tested in March 2017 which propelled it to an altitude of 1,304 miles (2,100 kilometers), significantly outperforming all previous ballistic missile tests. Experts speculated that with the addition of a second stage, North Korea could modify the Hwasong-12 to build an ICBM.

Shortly after the first successful Hwasong-12 test, the North Koreans revealed that very missile, the Hwasong-14. On July 4, North Korea successfully tested it.
Hwasong-14
by JamesMartinCNS
on Sketchfab

To date, the missile has been tested twice, with its second test reaching an altitude of around 2,300 miles (3,700 kilometers), almost 994 miles (1,600 kilometers) higher that the single stage Hwasong-12. While range estimates vary, they go from the entire West Coast to Chicago.

What’s next?

We’ve seen huge advancements in North Korea’s missile program over the past 18 months. But even with the successful test of an ICBM, things could still get worse.
In order to ensure its missiles can reliably hit the U.S., North Korea will have to conduct overflights of Japan. The August 28 test that did just that could soon become the new normal.

North Korea’s missiles still lack the capability to hit Washington, DC, but bringing the U.S.... [+]

North Korea’s missiles also still lack the capability to hit Washington, but bringing the U.S. capital within range is doubtless a major strategic goal for Kim. We still don't know how accurate North Korea's missiles are, however after claiming to have successfully developed a hydrogen bomb, this isn't as important. Armed with a weapon that can flatten any civilian structure at least within two miles, North Korea doesn’t need to worry about accuracy as much to destroy an American city.

North Korea’s solid-fuel program will probably also expand significantly. The country has ordered the mass production of its land based solid-fuel missile and is believed to have units deployed and equipped with nuclear warheads. Developing longer ranged versions of these missiles and increasing their reliability is also certainly a goal.
A solid-fueled North Korean ICBM is probably a ways off given that North Korea is still becoming acquainted with the technology. However, given the willingness of North Korea’s leadership to pour everything it has into its missile program, it likely won’t be long before North Korea can reliably strike anywhere in the U.S. with nuclear weapons.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/inside...oreas-ballistic-missile-program/#3a010d74244f

I can bet Egypt has most of these technologies or at least their blueprints and those of the plants to manufacture them..

 

[Stryker1982]

As long as Israel borders Egypt, thier will never be a missile program unless Egypt is willing to pay a high cost. Just bordering Israel means you must be at their mercy because that's how the Americans and EU like it.

..


The Egyptian doctrine is defensive in essence.. Although it has an offensive sub-doctrine now..

You can't have both an defensive and offensive "sub-doctorine". either you develop offensive weapon to use in a defensive posture or you shift to offense, you can go both ways and split your objectives & priorities.

 

[The SC]

As long as Israel borders Egypt, thier will never be a missile program unless Egypt is willing to pay a high cost. Just bordering Israel means you must be at their mercy because that's how the Americans and EU like it.



You can't have both an defensive and offensive "sub-doctorine". either you develop offensive weapon to use in a defensive posture or you shift to offense, you can go both ways and split your objectives & priorities.

WOW so much BS.. like if Egypt did not know this..but still went for it.. read the articles again and see from where they came..
And yes one can have a defensive doctrine and an offensive one at the same time.. just think about the air defence systems and the interceptors for defence and missiles and more for offence.. So don't play genius when you don't know what you are talking about..

 

[Gomig-21]

6- Two years ago, the American administration pressed again on Egypt because of information about Egyptian-Korean cooperation, later on Egypt announced the cutting of military relations with NK (after ICBMs' and The Hydrogen Bomb tests), and signed CISMOA with the US and strengthened relations with South Korea.

This was pretty much the main reason for the lack of certain weapons being transferred to Egypt and even the AIM-120 missile. It wasn't only Israel's objection and temper tantrum that kept that and other weapons from coming to Egypt, but it was Hillary Clinton making a HUGE fuss about the Egyptian military supposedly allowing a Chinese delegation to intimately observe one of the very early EAF F-16s in a closed setting. That was when the US began to push CISMOA on Egypt and demand it to sign it. What's even stranger than anything else was Egypt's refusal to sign the agreement which was essentially a promise not to share sensitive, American-built equipment to anyone. Why Egypt refused to sign that for almost 2 decades was the biggest mystery to everyone. None of us could come up with any viable and worthy reason to decline that since it didn't really impose any big or damning restrictions at all. If anything, it would've possible opened the door to the AIM-120 and even the Apache Long Bow radar as well as several other weapons systems. Till today, there has never really been a good explanation as to why they didn't sign it. Until they finally did a year or two ago. Knowing they were embarking on a huge, military shopping spree, I think they saw it in their best interest to go ahead and sign it by then and even so, it still created issues with certain weapons such as the SCALPs until the French were able to resolve that on their own and supply all 50 cruise missiles to Egypt. Still doesn't explain why they never signed it for all those years, though. Can't believe they had nefarious intentions of selling or exchanging US weapons information for other things in return! That seems very silly unless there were other restrictions the US wanted to impose that the EA felt very uncomfortable with at the time.

 

[The SC]

This was pretty much the main reason for the lack of certain weapons being transferred to Egypt and even the AIM-120 missile. It wasn't only Israel's objection and temper tantrum that kept that and other weapons from coming to Egypt, but it was Hillary Clinton making a HUGE fuss about the Egyptian military supposedly allowing a Chinese delegation to intimately observe one of the very early EAF F-16s in a closed setting. That was when the US began to push CISMOA on Egypt and demand it to sign it. What's even stranger than anything else was Egypt's refusal to sign the agreement which was essentially a promise not to share sensitive, American-built equipment to anyone. Why Egypt refused to sign that for almost 2 decades was the biggest mystery to everyone. None of us could come up with any viable and worthy reason to decline that since it didn't really impose any big or damning restrictions at all. If anything, it would've possible opened the door to the AIM-120 and even the Apache Long Bow radar as well as several other weapons systems. Till today, there has never really been a good explanation as to why they didn't sign it. Until they finally did a year or two ago. Knowing they were embarking on a huge, military shopping spree, I think they saw it in their best interest to go ahead and sign it by then and even so, it still created issues with certain weapons such as the SCALPs until the French were able to resolve that on their own and supply all 50 cruise missiles to Egypt. Still doesn't explain why they never signed it for all those years, though. Can't believe they had nefarious intentions of selling or exchanging US weapons information for other things in return! That seems very silly unless there were other restrictions the US wanted to impose that the EA felt very uncomfortable with at the time.

It is all true.. and there are many reasons for Egypt not wanting to sign the CISMOA until very recently, most important one..is the inherent unfairness in the US military aid to Egypt and Usrael..where the later get almost 4 times what Egypt is getting since the Camp David accord, not mentioning the types and techs of the weapons..Second, CISMOA imposes US military visits to Egyptian air bases.. and that was a no no..for obvious reasons, since it would have been like opening those bases to Usrael itself .. now with new bases all over Egypt.. it is much easier to go visit some old bases..Also Egypt needed to complete the "Mechwar" with North Korea till the end..with designs and technologies not available anywhere else..that alone was worth even losing the trust of the US..There is also the fact that the Russians have something called "adapter" that can translate computer languages between western fighter aircrafts and Russian missiles.. so China might have the same or was hiding Russia..Because Egypt could have not just sit like a duck in case of war..The F-16s needed to be ready for any eventualities..There is more..but these are already very legitimate reasons..