Defining Strategic Depth

[oceanx]

When has the Pakistan Army outlined 'Strategic Depth in Afghanistan' to reflect the above arguments/tactics?

If the PA has not defined Strategic Depth in this manner, then the entire article is nothing but an exercise in advancing a Strawman argument - the author comes up with his own 'definition' of strategic depth, ascribes it to the PA and then proceeds to roundly criticize it.

If any of you follow Kamran Shafi's writings, he is anti-Army to the core, and nowhere close to objective in a lot of his critique of the Army.

There was a far more 'enlightening' discussion of 'Strategic Depth' from the Pakistani perspective between S-2, Xeric and I on the Rah-e-Nijaat thread I believe.

Now I'd like to learn something here Agnostic. Would you be kind enough to point to the relevant pages of your discussions on "strategic depth" in that thread? I searched out the thread but it's too big and I have too little time.

Anyways, one should not entirely discount the concept of "strategic depth", IMHO, especially in light of history. History - be it from Napoleon's Russian Campaign, to the Soviet experience in WWII, to the KMT resistance of Japanese invasion, to the deeper Israeli calculations behind the 1967 war all lend serious weight to at least a consideration of "strategic depth" in the classic sense of the phrase.

And even for someone with zero military background and not particularly well-versed in military history, I recognize that the chance of Pakistan relocating "strategic assets" to Afghanistan the way Soviets moved factories to the Urals is remote, if not downright impossible.

But again, this talk of "strategic depth" has to be interpreted in the context of history - recent history. The central contention of the article is that Pakistan's possession of sovereign nuclear umbrella and India's acknowledged multifaceted progress have rendered some of the calculus on "strategic depth" stale.

Surely the author has a point - even if just scoring a "strawman"-type self-serving point. But OTOH, in the immediate aftermath of the 1971 Indo-Pak War, or Pakistani Civil War, such thinking around "strategic depth" made a great deal of sense - to me at least.

Such "strategic thinking" is by necessity a product of time and circumstance. When nukes were nowhere in sight, and the possibility of maneuvering panzers and relatively primitive fighter jets into some "strategic recess" undetected by satellites and non-existent drones was real, Pakistani generals couldn't be faulted for thinking along this line.

If they indeed thought along this line.

Even later history could prove them right. Israel may have captured Sinai in 1973. But they still had to give it back under the pressure of the superpowers. So if a Pakistani general or two thought that under the worst case scenario, some of their assets, given the 1970s technological milleu, could regroup across some inhospitable borders while waiting for the "powers" to intervene - as outlandish as it sounds - can one really blame them?

Then came the Soviet invasion of 1979. If previously the dream of "maneuvering depth" was but a "self-comforting" long shot, the nightmare of having a "strategic adversary" to the North, not the least because of the Indo-Soviet allying at the time became much more real.

And "strategic depth" took on a new meaning, and a "new urgency" to Pakistan, by most people's reckoning.

Fast forward to the 90s - things took unexpected turns - assets morphed into liabilities. And the tail that grew fat and vicious began wagging the K9. Here Pakistan is unfortunately the rule rather than the exception, as I see it.

We can think of India and its "cultivation" of LTTE, PRC's "unstinting" support of the Viet Con, and supposedly how Israel raised Hizbos to diminish the secular PLO.

Anyways, not all analogies are equally applicable. The key thing here is that I could see why it is unacceptable to Pakistan's "strategists" to have a hostile Afganistan on their Northern door step.

The definition of "strategic depth" evolves with time and with the recent availability of certain strategic hardware. But the geopolitical reality above hasn't.

Of course, if genuine Indo-Pak rapprochement takes place, then the military/security dimension of all of this will be largely rendered moot.

Even then, just as I am convinced that the US will not accept a hostile Canada or Mexico under any system of government, Pakistan would not want to see a hostile Afghanistan if it could help it at all.

In that vein, yes - a functional, eventual government of Afghanistan would have to be "acceptable" to Pakistan to some degree.

Exactly to what degree is surely beyond my ability to know.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

OceanX:

The gist of our discussion (and we had a rare consensus) was that for Pakistan 'Strategic depth' involved both economic and security implications. Economic in the sense that Pakistan wished to have a stable Afghanistan so that it could tap into the CAR's and use its location to serve as a major gas/oil transit route/hub.

Security implications in the sense that the historical role of the Afghan State in fomenting rebellions in Pakistan (Pashtun areas as well as reportedly sheltering the early Baloch insurgents) and its irredentist ambitions (refusing to accept the Durand Line as a border and claiming large parts of Pakistani territory), meant that Pakistan would like to see a Pakistan friendly or at the least neutral Afghan government that respected Pakistan's territorial integrity.

Security implications also in that an unstable Afghanistan imposed a huge cost upon Pakistan through refugees and crime.

But then the above implications are not isolated to Pakistan are they? What country in the world would not want a stable neighbor?

What country would not want to take advantage of trade through that neighbor, and would not want to see friendly regimes in that neighbor, especially when the history of that neighbor has been one of supporting rebellion in our lands and claiming large parts of it?

If this is Strategic Depth then almost every nation in the world is guilty of it - heck, US crimes against nations in Latin America are numerous and have been recounted time and time again. The earthquake in Haiti has brought up another one of those instances from history - the US occupation of Haiti and its support for cruel dictators in Haiti for the sake of its own 'strategic depth' against Communism.

 

[Xeric]

@oceanx

i think you have taken this SD thing too seriously. No one around here (execpt the author himself) has disregarded this strategy. Though i personally feel that alterations have to be made to this strategy in today's environment, but no one has out-rightly negated the concept. The russians did it against the germans and it is workable in our case also, but the way the author whom i call a Deserter portrayed the strategy in his emotional and unbalanced piece was downright nasty and illogical, that's what bother most around here, nothing else.

Strategies can be validated and negated just like that, i can favor this strategy in one paragraph and kill it in the next one, so that was not the case which we are discussing here currently, it is the (usual) rant-ish writings and the way the writer have bastardized the strategy itself that we must discuss.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Sir, you may be right in your above assertion. But that does not mean that Mr. Shafi is wrong.

Well actually he is wrong, as I clearly pointed out.

Please also see my response to OceanX.

 

[oceanx]

OceanX:

The gist of our discussion (and we had a rare consensus) was that for Pakistan 'Strategic depth' involved both economic and security implications. Economic in the sense that Pakistan wished to have a stable Afghanistan so that it could tap into the CAR's and use its location to serve as a major gas/oil transit route/hub.

Security implications in the sense that the historical role of the Afghan State in fomenting rebellions in Pakistan (Pashtun areas as well as reportedly sheltering the early Baloch insurgents) and its irredentist ambitions (refusing to accept the Durand Line as a border and claiming large parts of Pakistani territory), meant that Pakistan would like to see a Pakistan friendly or at the least neutral Afghan government that respected Pakistan's territorial integrity.

Security implications also in that an unstable Afghanistan imposed a huge cost upon Pakistan through refugees and crime.

But then the above implications are not isolated to Pakistan are they? What country in the world would not want a stable neighbor?

What country would not want to take advantage of trade through that neighbor, and would not want to see friendly regimes in that neighbor, especially when the history of that neighbor has been one of supporting rebellion in our lands and claiming large parts of it?

If this is Strategic Depth then almost every nation in the world is guilty of it - heck, US crimes against nations in Latin America are numerous and have been recounted time and time again. The earthquake in Haiti has brought up another one of those instances from history - the US occupation of Haiti and its support for cruel dictators in Haiti for the sake of its own 'strategic depth' against Communism.

Well thanks for the recap of your previous in-depth on this. Fundamentally we don't disagree on what you have stated.

 

[S-2]

The author has lost sight of, or fails to understand strategic depth in Pakistani terms. It's not a "final redoubt". Its securing a favorable pro-Pakistani afghan government that precludes any ability of India to envelope Pakistan and, MORE IMPORTANTLY, deny Pakistan its own ambitions with CAR.

He is accurate in suggesting that the GoP shall learn (again) the limits of that pro-Pakistan sentiment once the afghan taliban are again in power.

Thanks.

 

[pak-yes]

Although the author has lost his mind but the idea is hmmmm

Ok.here comes a stupid theory.

Developing all of Afghanistan is impossible but why not develop some parts of it.At least those which can be used in War as an Asset.

For Example develop an Air Base there.Develop the associated Infrastructure.And Put your Air Crafts There so when INDIA wants to attack those Air crafts it will have to go through Pakistan and there will be a more possibility of Interception.

Another Example.Secure some large Area and Instead of Launching Ballistic Missiles from Pakistan.Launch them from Afghanistan.

Another Example.Why don't build Weapons Factories in the Mountains of Afghanistan instead of Pakistan.So when in War When INDIA tries to Bomb Them they will be Protected.

 

[karan.1970]

Although the author has lost his mind but the idea is hmmmm

Ok.here comes a stupid theory.

Developing all of Afghanistan is impossible but why not develop some parts of it.At least those which can be used in War as an Asset.

For Example develop an Air Base there.Develop the associated Infrastructure.And Put your Air Crafts There so when INDIA wants to attack those Air crafts it will have to go through Pakistan and there will be a more possibility of Interception.

Another Example.Secure some large Area and Instead of Launching Ballistic Missiles from Pakistan.Launch them from Afghanistan.

Another Example.Why don't build Weapons Factories in the Mountains of Afghanistan instead of Pakistan.So when in War When INDIA tries to Bomb Them they will be Protected.

And to set all this up, would you take the land from Afghanistan on a 10 year lease or an annual one??

 

[naved_kam]

Self Delete

 

[third eye]

Although the author has lost his mind but the idea is hmmmm

Ok.here comes a stupid theory.

Developing all of Afghanistan is impossible but why not develop some parts of it.At least those which can be used in War as an Asset.

For Example develop an Air Base there.Develop the associated Infrastructure.And Put your Air Crafts There so when INDIA wants to attack those Air crafts it will have to go through Pakistan and there will be a more possibility of Interception.

Another Example.Secure some large Area and Instead of Launching Ballistic Missiles from Pakistan.Launch them from Afghanistan.

Another Example.Why don't build Weapons Factories in the Mountains of Afghanistan instead of Pakistan.So when in War When INDIA tries to Bomb Them they will be Protected.

This approach & attitude is at the root of probs. Thought ppl here will deny it, this was part of the ' strategic depth' plan.

Now, consider Iran using parts of Baluchistan as its S Depth. Will it be acceptable ?

 

[EjazR]

The main theme is not legitimate. From the Indian side one could point to Kargil as being an example of a limited conflict being fought under a nuclear umbrella, whereas the Pakistani side could point to the Indian mobilization for war under Operation Parakram.

There is also the matter of the Indian COAS's own comments on the issue:

http://www.defence.pk/forums/strate...ed-war-possible-indian-army-chief-kapoor.html

As I said, Shafi is far from an objective commentator on the military, and that can be seen from his articles. This particular one has 'more holes that Swiss cheese' to use an oft used cliche.

Correct me if I'm wrong but the "strategic depth" concept was also a counter to the sundarji doctrine. The idea of the sundarji doctrine was that in response to a PA attacks, IA would attack on multiple places across the IB and basically cut Pakistan in two halves north and south and reaching the supposedly friendly pashtun areas of Pakistan.

This is no longer possible for many reasons especially post nuke tests in 98. We saw that with the failure of implementing this doctrine in Kargil and Operation Pakaram. Hence the new focus on a cold start doctrine.

Now afaik, the strategic depth was to provide a backup base to run for example guerrilla war against any occupation forces in a worse case scenario. It was not a preferred option. The proxy war methodology was used successfully against the superior soviets and it proved the viability of such an option. This was later turned against India in Kashmir. Interestingly, General Zia did not any full fledged Kashmir proxy war till he was alive. It was only later under Hamid Gul et al that it was launched. By 93-94 when Bush govt. invoked the Pressler act and threatened to declare Pakistan as a terrorist sponsor state, Nawaz Sharif negotiated and toned down militant support and most of the training camps were moved to Afghanistan close to the FATA border.

In fact, one the missile strikes ordered by Clinton to get Bin laden hit one such training facility where Harkat members (a Kashmir centred group) were killed in Khost in 98.
Pak cries foul over US revenge strike

So Taliban controlled Afghanistan obviously did not provide economic or political strategic depth to Pakistan, but from the "security" pov, it was not threatening to the Pakistani security establishment and moreover, it provided a convenient place were Kashmir-directed militants could be trained. Obviously 9/11 put an end to this. Hamid Gul et al describe this period as a sort of golden period where everything was so good for Pakistan from his perspective until Musharraf did his U-turn. Even though clearly Taliban takeover of Pakistan was a net loss in the long term. Neither the Durrand line issue was resolved, and as you mentioned the smuggling of duty free goods across the Border destroyed indigenous Pakistani industry. Not to mention the growth of extremism in Tribal areas and resentment against Pakistan among the general populace.

Of course now I don't see any sane person pursuing such a strategy again. A state policy has to converge all these interests political/security/economic and just allowing the army or security establishment to handle it will not give the full balance.

If you describe the strategic depth concept as being used by the security establishment to be benign and just to have a Pakistan friendly or at least neutral govt. in Afghanistan. Then no one would see a problem with that. In fact, with such a definition, even India would like to have strategic depth with Pakistan and Afghanistan as at the worst they would like to have at least a neutral establishment that does not provide covert support by not cracking down on militants crossing over the LoC in Kashmir, or terrorists wrecking havoc in Indian cities.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Correct me if I'm wrong but the "strategic depth" concept was also a counter to the sundarji doctrine. The idea of the sundarji doctrine was that in response to a PA attacks, IA would attack on multiple places across the IB and basically cut Pakistan in two halves north and south and reaching the supposedly friendly pashtun areas of Pakistan.

In what universe were the Pashtun areas of Pakistan friendly to India? Even at the height of KAGK's popularity there was little 'friendliness' towards India amongst the larger Pakistani Pashtun population (borne out by the overwhelming choice of Pakistan in the NWFP referendum, and the Pashtun tribal invasion of J&K to overthrow the Maharajah).

The 'India friendly Pashtun areas' would not have started until the Durand was crossed into Afghanistan. If this was actually a premise behind the Sunderji doctrine then I can only shake my head in disbelief at how poorly internal Pakistani dynamics were analyzed by Indian policy makers.

Secondly, even assuming that such 'friendly Pashtun areas' existed, and the IA was able to bifurcate Pakistan, how exactly does retreating into Afghanistan through a very rugged mountain range help counter that? As I argued elsewhere, the PA is primarily set up as a military to battle it out in the plains and deserts of Punjab and Sindh, and it has always been set up that way. To retreat into Afghanistan through the Hindukush and fight from there would suggest that the PA act counter to the tactics, training and equipment it invests in. That alone should have been an indicator that the idea of 'strategic depth' representing some sort of withdrawal into Afghanistan made no sense.

Now afaik, the strategic depth was to provide a backup base to run for example guerrilla war against any occupation forces in a worse case scenario. It was not a preferred option. The proxy war methodology was used successfully against the superior soviets and it proved the viability of such an option.

A successful guerrilla war can only be fought from within a population and with support from it. In the case of an Indian invasion and occupation of Pakistan, there would be no shortage of local support and access to resources to wage such a guerrilla war from within Pakistan. Retreating to Afghanistan to do so makes no sense since it only places a greater distance between the plains of central and southern Pakistan where a large part of the Indian occupation force would be based.

If you describe the strategic depth concept as being used by the security establishment to be benign and just to have a Pakistan friendly or at least neutral govt. in Afghanistan. Then no one would see a problem with that. In fact, with such a definition, even India would like to have strategic depth with Pakistan and Afghanistan as at the worst they would like to have at least a neutral establishment that does not provide covert support by not cracking down on militants crossing over the LoC in Kashmir, or terrorists wrecking havoc in Indian cities.

I do describe Strategic Depth that way and I have yet to see a credible reference that attributes the alternate interpretation of Strategic Depth so in vogue with Western and Indian commentators to a credible policy making source in the PA.

All we appear to have supporting the alternate definition is speculation and opinion pieces by commentators such as Kamran Shafi.

 

[Patriot]

This guy is a bad mark on Army.They made this kind of officer.I hope he was court martialled.He is full of bullshit.Anyway Strategic Depth was no longer a problem after 28th May 1998.It's null and void now.

 

[EjazR]

In what universe were the Pashtun areas of Pakistan friendly to India? Even at the height of KAGK's popularity there was little 'friendliness' towards India amongst the larger Pakistani Pashtun population (borne out by the overwhelming choice of Pakistan in the NWFP referendum, and the Pashtun tribal invasion of J&K to overthrow the Maharajah).

The 'India friendly Pashtun areas' would not have started until the Durand was crossed into Afghanistan. If this was actually a premise behind the Sunderji doctrine then I can only shake my head in disbelief at how poorly internal Pakistani dynamics were analyzed by Indian policy makers.

Secondly, even assuming that such 'friendly Pashtun areas' existed, and the IA was able to bifurcate Pakistan, how exactly does retreating into Afghanistan through a very rugged mountain range help counter that? As I argued elsewhere, the PA is primarily set up as a military to battle it out in the plains and deserts of Punjab and Sindh, and it has always been set up that way. To retreat into Afghanistan through the Hindukush and fight from there would suggest that the PA act counter to the tactics, training and equipment it invests in. That alone should have been an indicator that the idea of 'strategic depth' representing some sort of withdrawal into Afghanistan made no sense.

The sundarji doctrine was applicable for different set of circumstances around the 60s and 70s. This was part of Indira Gandhi's war plans for '71 for West Pakistan. However, a mole had leaked this to the US and enormous pressure was put on IG to leave W. Pakistan alone. In their assessment KAG was only part of the reason for the Pashtun being friendly. KAG had already pledged oathed to the Pakistani constitution so he was in no way rebelling against the state of Pakistan. However, he was still jailed for most of his life and this cuased resentment among his followers. Similarly in Balochistan, the third insurgency had started after '63 even though the Khan of Kalat had acceded to Pakistan. I would agree that this might not indicate widespread or even popular rebellion against Pakistani establishment but enough to cause discomfort.

It was those circumstances that led to this doctrine. It would hardly be applicable now or even in the 80s when massive Western and Arab presence was present in the tribal areas to aid the fight against the soviets. And especially post nuke tests. Hence why it could not be implemented either in Kargil or Operation Pakaram. The sundarji doctrine should have been shelved long time ago. And IA have realized that and thus the new focus you hear on cold start.

Hence the statement, that the "strategic depth" as a counter is not applicable as IA no longer poses the risk that it did with this doctrine.

A successful guerrilla war can only be fought from within a population and with support from it. In the case of an Indian invasion and occupation of Pakistan, there would be no shortage of local support and access to resources to wage such a guerrilla war from within Pakistan. Retreating to Afghanistan to do so makes no sense since it only places a greater distance between the plains of central and southern Pakistan where a large part of the Indian occupation force would be based.


I do describe Strategic Depth that way and I have yet to see a credible reference that attributes the alternate interpretation of Strategic Depth so in vogue with Western and Indian commentators to a credible policy making source in the PA.

All we appear to have supporting the alternate definition is speculation and opinion pieces by commentators such as Kamran Shafi.

Strategic Depth is used usually as a sort of defense in depth tactic where the first line of defense breaks and is followed by a second further away and so on.

For example during WWII, the soviets and communists based in Poland used their strategic depth to withdraw to the outskirts of Moscow and launch their attack against the Germans. Contrast this to the French who lacked the strategic depth because of being surrounded by water and fell to the Germans.

If this is not the sort of strategy that was being envisaged here by the Pakistani security establishment then probably strategic depth is not the right phrase to use. They can very well use good or neutral bilateral relations as a term instead of strategic depth.

 

[blain2]

For example during WWII, the soviets and communists based in Poland used their strategic depth to withdraw to the outskirts of Moscow and launch their attack against the Germans. Contrast this to the French who lacked the strategic depth because of being surrounded by water and fell to the Germans.

The concept is that of "strategic" depth and not "Tactical" depth.

Pakistan never had the intention of redeploying forces in Afghanistan. We have fought enough wars to know what is possible in light of the challenges with trafficability of our military assets in plains, let alone rugged terrain between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Not having a substantial air lift capability to tactically withdraw our assets into Afghanistan is another reason that explanations such as those provided by the likes of Kamran Shaffi are misplaced and misread.

Having a friendly government in Afghanistan, which will not work to destabilize Pakistan's northwest is the desired strategic depth in Afghanistan.