ZeiTGeiST ASIA
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IT has been in the making for quite sometime but it started coming out in the open with the US military action against Osama bin Laden last year. The army, until then, had been perceived by the average Pakistani as the ultimate savior of the country and the United States as the bank which Pakistan could rely on for over-drawing any amount of cash and the ultimate source for all kinds of weaponry and defense-related equipment.
Pakistan has been paranoid about its security against India, particularly, since the separation of Bangladesh in 1971. The average Pakistani, therefore, tends to treat the army men as demi-gods who could be depended upon to secure the Pakistani state both against external invasions as well as against internal disorder and the depredations of the civilian political leaders who come into power from time to time. That is the reason why one does not see any popular upsurge against the army dictators whenever they choose to acquire power through a military coup.
All this changed with the unilateral US action against Osama bin Laden without the army even getting to know about it. Pakistanis were aghast that their saviours, whom they had been worshiping and supporting all these years against all odds, could have been so remiss. The civilian government at that time, worried that the army could take over again just to redeem itself by passing on the entire blame to the civilian administration, did probably beseech the United States to intervene to avert another coup.
When the so-called memo-gate came out into the open, the army went lived with rage and demanded the resignation of Ambassador Haqqani and, possibly, also of President Asif Ali Zardari himself. Ambassador Haqqani was an easy target but when the civilian government tried to assert its authority, the army appealed to the Supreme Court to appoint a judicial commission to investigate the entire episode.
What are the present equations and inter-relationships between the various formal institutions of the Pakistani state? The foremost among them is, of course, the army which wields real power. The army had always been uncomfortable with the US operations in Afghanistan even though General Musharaff had to go along with it when he was served the with us or against us ultimatum by George W. Bush in the wake of the al-Qaida attack on the World Trade Center in New York. He had no options then. In fact, the army had no other options even much later when the US drones started chasing the militants even on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line which defines the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Options developed, however, in 2009 for the Pakistani army when the US President Barack Obama announced the timetable for phased withdrawal from Afghanistan which was to be completed by 2014. Of course, President Obama's plan was to leave behind a politically stable Afghanistan under President Hamid Karzai or his democratically elected successor, protected by the US-trained Afghan security forces. But Pakistan saw it as an opportunity to more or less annex Afghanistan, practically, as its fifth province by installing a friendly Taliban government in that country.
Towards that end, the Pakistani army and the ISI resumed their covert support to the Afghan Taliban which is nothing much more than an extension of the Pakistani army without its uniform. The entire top leadership of the Taliban and al-Qaida is under the protection of the ISI and the siting of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad drove this point home to the United States. Being caught with its hands in the til, the Pakistani army was left with no option except to snap its links with the US in order to redeem its honour and its prestige with the Pakistani people. The 'friendly fire' that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers was only the latest excuse to snap these links and things had been moving in that direction ever since the killing of Osama bin Laden.
The civilian government knew all this and conveyed its willingness to contain the army's influence in the country and firm up its relationship with the US and India through that famous unsigned memo that landed up in the office of the ex-US army chief, Admiral McMullen. Admiral McMullen, however, messed it up by taking absolutely no notice of this memo. The least he could have done was to have passed it on to the State Department which, through its own diplomatic channels, could perhaps have taken the matter to its logical conclusion. If the United States today finds itself in such a deep mess over Pakistan, with its supply lines to Afghanistan so terribly interrupted, it has only Admiral McMullen to blame.
Coming back to Pakistan, however, the Pakistani army continues to bay for the blood of the civilian government though it does not want to or is not in a position to stage another coup. It has, therefore, approached the Supreme Court which has acceded to its request to set up a judicial commission to investigate the entire episode. The civilian government has also dug in its heels and is standing up to the army and the judiciary. Prime Minister Gilani has sacked the Defense Secretary, an ex-Lt. General of the army, who let the army affidavit asking for a judicial commission to be filed in the Supreme Court without keeping the civilian government and even the Defense Minister in the loop.
This month saw the spectacle of a crude power-play in Pakistan. The army chief, General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, held prolonged consultations with his top commanders at the same time as Prime Minister Gilani was addressing the special session of the parliament and the Supreme Court was issuing contempt notice against the Prime Minister. Prime Minister Gilani has been making it clear in the Parliament that there is no place in Pakistan's constitutional scheme of things for a deep state, meaning, the army. He has also called upon each of the institutions of the state to remain within the parameters laid down for it by the constitution.
Prime Minister Gilani did not say so but he was also definitely referring to the Supreme Court of the Pakistan as well, which has declared the National Reconciliation Order (NRO), issued by General Pervez Musharaff, that brought the present government into power through a general election, as illegal. The Supreme Court has said that an NRO cannot close the corruption cases against Pakistan's politicians and has ordered that those cases be reopened. Pakistan's civilian government has been refusing to comply with these orders of the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court, this month, issued summons to Prime Minister Gilani to remain present personally and explain why he should not be punished for contempt of court for not having complied with the orders of the Supreme Court for re-opening the old corruption cases against President Zardari and others which stood closed in terms of the NRO. Prime Minister Gilani appeared in the court but stood his ground, arguing that the President of Pakistan enjoyed full immunity against prosecution while in office and that he was, therefore, in no position to write to the Swiss authorities to supply information about Asif Ali Zardari's secret bank accounts, if any. The state of Pakistan cannot hand over its President, elected by a 2/3rd majority, to foreign courts for prosecution, added Gilani forcefully.
That matter of contempt proceedings has now been adjourned till February 4 and a constitutional crisis seems to have been averted, at least for the present. But inter-relationships between various institutions of the Pakistani state remain tenuous at best. The Supreme Court has acquired a new independence, particularly, after the sacking and the reinstatement under public pressure of its Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhary. But it remains to be seen whether this assertion of independence is only against the civilian government or whether it encompasses the army as well which wields real power in Pakistan. The Supreme Court has never been seen so far in the last six decades as asserting itself against the army. The political class has solidly backed Prime Minister Gilani, particularly, in the matter of asserting political supremacy over the armed forces though, in real terms, such assertions do not amount to much.
In the context of the army's reluctance to stage another coup, it seems to be in the process of striking up new equations with the judiciary and the maulvies in addition to its already pre-existing relationships with various terrorists groups. The army is also suspected to be directly or indirectly propping up former cricketer Imran Khan who has lately been addressing huge rallies in Karachi. The army's dream scenario would, perhaps, be to get the Supreme Court to pass strictures against the present government so that it could then help prop up some other politician like Imran Khan until fresh elections are held which are, in any case, due latest by next year. With Nawaz Shariff not playing ball, overtures to Imran Khan who has stayed at the periphery of national politics for more than a decade makes some sense.
What role the US plays in all this is not yet known. Its best interest would perhaps lie in propping up the present civilian government and help it in keeping the army confined to the barracks. But every Pakistani today is anti-America and the US may consider it politic, at least for the present, to lie low and let Pakistan resolve its own internal power equations. ·
Pakistan has been paranoid about its security against India, particularly, since the separation of Bangladesh in 1971. The average Pakistani, therefore, tends to treat the army men as demi-gods who could be depended upon to secure the Pakistani state both against external invasions as well as against internal disorder and the depredations of the civilian political leaders who come into power from time to time. That is the reason why one does not see any popular upsurge against the army dictators whenever they choose to acquire power through a military coup.
All this changed with the unilateral US action against Osama bin Laden without the army even getting to know about it. Pakistanis were aghast that their saviours, whom they had been worshiping and supporting all these years against all odds, could have been so remiss. The civilian government at that time, worried that the army could take over again just to redeem itself by passing on the entire blame to the civilian administration, did probably beseech the United States to intervene to avert another coup.
When the so-called memo-gate came out into the open, the army went lived with rage and demanded the resignation of Ambassador Haqqani and, possibly, also of President Asif Ali Zardari himself. Ambassador Haqqani was an easy target but when the civilian government tried to assert its authority, the army appealed to the Supreme Court to appoint a judicial commission to investigate the entire episode.
What are the present equations and inter-relationships between the various formal institutions of the Pakistani state? The foremost among them is, of course, the army which wields real power. The army had always been uncomfortable with the US operations in Afghanistan even though General Musharaff had to go along with it when he was served the with us or against us ultimatum by George W. Bush in the wake of the al-Qaida attack on the World Trade Center in New York. He had no options then. In fact, the army had no other options even much later when the US drones started chasing the militants even on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line which defines the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Options developed, however, in 2009 for the Pakistani army when the US President Barack Obama announced the timetable for phased withdrawal from Afghanistan which was to be completed by 2014. Of course, President Obama's plan was to leave behind a politically stable Afghanistan under President Hamid Karzai or his democratically elected successor, protected by the US-trained Afghan security forces. But Pakistan saw it as an opportunity to more or less annex Afghanistan, practically, as its fifth province by installing a friendly Taliban government in that country.
Towards that end, the Pakistani army and the ISI resumed their covert support to the Afghan Taliban which is nothing much more than an extension of the Pakistani army without its uniform. The entire top leadership of the Taliban and al-Qaida is under the protection of the ISI and the siting of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad drove this point home to the United States. Being caught with its hands in the til, the Pakistani army was left with no option except to snap its links with the US in order to redeem its honour and its prestige with the Pakistani people. The 'friendly fire' that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers was only the latest excuse to snap these links and things had been moving in that direction ever since the killing of Osama bin Laden.
The civilian government knew all this and conveyed its willingness to contain the army's influence in the country and firm up its relationship with the US and India through that famous unsigned memo that landed up in the office of the ex-US army chief, Admiral McMullen. Admiral McMullen, however, messed it up by taking absolutely no notice of this memo. The least he could have done was to have passed it on to the State Department which, through its own diplomatic channels, could perhaps have taken the matter to its logical conclusion. If the United States today finds itself in such a deep mess over Pakistan, with its supply lines to Afghanistan so terribly interrupted, it has only Admiral McMullen to blame.
Coming back to Pakistan, however, the Pakistani army continues to bay for the blood of the civilian government though it does not want to or is not in a position to stage another coup. It has, therefore, approached the Supreme Court which has acceded to its request to set up a judicial commission to investigate the entire episode. The civilian government has also dug in its heels and is standing up to the army and the judiciary. Prime Minister Gilani has sacked the Defense Secretary, an ex-Lt. General of the army, who let the army affidavit asking for a judicial commission to be filed in the Supreme Court without keeping the civilian government and even the Defense Minister in the loop.
This month saw the spectacle of a crude power-play in Pakistan. The army chief, General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, held prolonged consultations with his top commanders at the same time as Prime Minister Gilani was addressing the special session of the parliament and the Supreme Court was issuing contempt notice against the Prime Minister. Prime Minister Gilani has been making it clear in the Parliament that there is no place in Pakistan's constitutional scheme of things for a deep state, meaning, the army. He has also called upon each of the institutions of the state to remain within the parameters laid down for it by the constitution.
Prime Minister Gilani did not say so but he was also definitely referring to the Supreme Court of the Pakistan as well, which has declared the National Reconciliation Order (NRO), issued by General Pervez Musharaff, that brought the present government into power through a general election, as illegal. The Supreme Court has said that an NRO cannot close the corruption cases against Pakistan's politicians and has ordered that those cases be reopened. Pakistan's civilian government has been refusing to comply with these orders of the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court, this month, issued summons to Prime Minister Gilani to remain present personally and explain why he should not be punished for contempt of court for not having complied with the orders of the Supreme Court for re-opening the old corruption cases against President Zardari and others which stood closed in terms of the NRO. Prime Minister Gilani appeared in the court but stood his ground, arguing that the President of Pakistan enjoyed full immunity against prosecution while in office and that he was, therefore, in no position to write to the Swiss authorities to supply information about Asif Ali Zardari's secret bank accounts, if any. The state of Pakistan cannot hand over its President, elected by a 2/3rd majority, to foreign courts for prosecution, added Gilani forcefully.
That matter of contempt proceedings has now been adjourned till February 4 and a constitutional crisis seems to have been averted, at least for the present. But inter-relationships between various institutions of the Pakistani state remain tenuous at best. The Supreme Court has acquired a new independence, particularly, after the sacking and the reinstatement under public pressure of its Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhary. But it remains to be seen whether this assertion of independence is only against the civilian government or whether it encompasses the army as well which wields real power in Pakistan. The Supreme Court has never been seen so far in the last six decades as asserting itself against the army. The political class has solidly backed Prime Minister Gilani, particularly, in the matter of asserting political supremacy over the armed forces though, in real terms, such assertions do not amount to much.
In the context of the army's reluctance to stage another coup, it seems to be in the process of striking up new equations with the judiciary and the maulvies in addition to its already pre-existing relationships with various terrorists groups. The army is also suspected to be directly or indirectly propping up former cricketer Imran Khan who has lately been addressing huge rallies in Karachi. The army's dream scenario would, perhaps, be to get the Supreme Court to pass strictures against the present government so that it could then help prop up some other politician like Imran Khan until fresh elections are held which are, in any case, due latest by next year. With Nawaz Shariff not playing ball, overtures to Imran Khan who has stayed at the periphery of national politics for more than a decade makes some sense.
What role the US plays in all this is not yet known. Its best interest would perhaps lie in propping up the present civilian government and help it in keeping the army confined to the barracks. But every Pakistani today is anti-America and the US may consider it politic, at least for the present, to lie low and let Pakistan resolve its own internal power equations. ·
