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Cordoba Centre and the crumbling of American strategy
By Steven Metz
The furore over plans to build an Islamic centre near Ground Zero in New York City is a reminder of the anger and hostility towards Islam, which has long simmered in America. While this has existed since 9/11, it is now changing from a simmer to a boil with immense implications.
The American public has little understanding of Islam. This is exploited by propagandists such as Pamela Geller, the denizens of right-wing talk radio, and by the talking head du jour on Fox News, who ominously warn of Muslims imposing sharia law in the US and the potential for every mosque to be used to hatch terrorist plots. More importantly, public anger and hostility towards Islam is now being whipped to frenzy by Republican leaders, who smell political blood in the water. They realise that reviving the passions of 9/11 will work to their favour in the upcoming elections. That a significant portion of the American public believes Obama is a secret Muslim only helps them. As a result, people such as Newt Gingrich, Sarah Palin, Rick Lazio, John Cornyn, and Ed Rollins have used the Cordoba Centre issue for an assault on Obama and Democrats in general.
Attitudes and actions within the Islamic world enable this. Americans are frustrated by having expended trillions of dollars and thousands of lives to control extremism and build democracy there only to be repaid with intense and growing hostility. They are angered by widespread sympathy and support for terrorist organisations. And they are angered by what they see as a desire on the part of Muslims to impose their values on non-Muslims witness by public demonstrations a few years ago following the publication of caricatures of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) in European newspapers. To many Americans, particularly those who are influenced by propagandists, Islam seems threatening, even evil. While this was relegated to the fringe of US public opinion, it is now moving to the mainstream.
Those stoking anger and hostility are either unaware of the impact this will have on the US security strategy or simply dont care. But it attracts extensive attention in the Islamic world and validates extremist claim that America is at war with Islam. Domestic electioneering has global implications. Broadly, the growing anger and hostility towards Islam reveals fundamental fissures in American strategy that have been papered over for the past decade.
This strategy was created by the Bush administration in the months after 9/11 and largely adopted by the Obama administration. It is based on the belief that the conflict with extremists will be won or lost in the psychological realm. It is based on the belief that a forward defence is best that extremism should be stifled at its source. And it is based on the belief that the best way to do this is by mobilising support and strengthening partners in the Islamic world rather than by direct military action.
This strategy was shaky from its inception. It assumed that most governments and publics in the Islamic world shared the US belief that extremism was illegitimate and should be crushed. It assumed that governments and publics would see that Americas objective was to control extremism. And, most importantly, it assumed that what Americans consider misperceptions that the US sought to exploit the Islamic worlds resources, to impose its values, or to promote Israels security could be changed by strategic communications and assistance. Americans, in other words, saw their power as benign and positive, and assumed others did as well.
Unfortunately, these assumptions were false. Partners in the Islamic world have steadfastly demonstrated different priorities than the US, often tolerating extremism that only threatened America. Pakistans hosting of the Taliban and al Qaeda is the starkest examples. Anti-Americanism has proven deep and pervasive. It cannot be fixed through better strategic communications and more foreign assistance, particularly while the US remains Israels staunch supporter. And, the more democratic a government in the Islamic world, the more it reflects anti-American and anti-Israel sentiments of its public.
It doesnt matter whether these perceptions are accurate in some objective sense. In struggling with extremism, perceptions matter more than reality. Hostility, anti-Americanism and misperception are parts of the strategic terrain, as immutable as mountains or swamps. Nine years of failing to change them should have taught America that. Changing these deep-set perceptions and attitudes is like changing physical terrain: it may be possible over time and at great cost and effort, but is normally not a wise course of action.
For nearly 10 years after 9/11, the fissures and faulty assumptions in Americas global strategy were papered over and held in check. Islamic partners were willing to cooperate with the US to a point, giving the impression of progress, but it was fragile. Yet, for nine years, the US was able to rumble forward with a flawed strategy because opposition from the element of the US public most likely to oppose partnerships in the Islamic world the political right was held in check by Republican control of the White House. As long as it was the Bush administration making a case that extremists werent representative of Islam, the right muted its instinctive anger and hostility. But with a Democratic president, the right was no longer interested in constraining anger and hostility towards Islam. Now the fissures in US strategy can no longer be papered over.
There are only two solutions. One would be recreation of the fragile edifice of the nine years. This would require Republican leaders to return to the Bush administrations messages extremism doesnt represent or reflect Islam and that despite recurrent anti-Americanism, US partnerships in the Islamic world are making progress and can be sustained. Republican leaders would have to abandon a theme that energises and excites their political base, and give up on the notion of reviving the emotions of 9/11 as elections approach. Its unlikely.
The alternative is to accept that irresolvable differences exist between the US and the Islamic world that hypocrisy, such as criticism for American opposition to the Cordoba House at the same time that Islamic nations prevent the building of churches, and vehement anti-Americanism combined with a demand for more US assistance can no longer be tolerated. The misinformation that abounds in the Islamic world, no matter how bizarre, will find a ready audience, even among the educated.
If so happens, the US would be forced to abandon cooperation and craft a new global strategy based on disengagement from the Islamic world and close rather than forward defence against terrorism. While a solid argument can be made for this, it is important to think it through. It would require disengagement from Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Persian Gulf. Iran would become more influential. Most nations in the Islamic world would be anti-American. Some would allow an al Qaeda presence, which would grow in prestige and popularity claiming that it drove the US out of the Islamic world. Much of the public would believe it. Al Qaeda would welcome many new recruits eager to be part of the perceived victory.
The US might be able to fend off even a strengthened al Qaeda. After all, Americas defences are far superior to what they were in September 2001.
There is little doubt that American hostility toward Islam will grow. But Americans cant have it both ways. Americans cant simply continue to ignore the fissures and contradictions in their global strategy and hope to paper them over with a bit more foreign assistance and adept strategic communications. Unfortunately, neither of the strategic options is appealing.
Steven Metz is a national security analyst and the author of Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy
By Steven Metz
The furore over plans to build an Islamic centre near Ground Zero in New York City is a reminder of the anger and hostility towards Islam, which has long simmered in America. While this has existed since 9/11, it is now changing from a simmer to a boil with immense implications.
The American public has little understanding of Islam. This is exploited by propagandists such as Pamela Geller, the denizens of right-wing talk radio, and by the talking head du jour on Fox News, who ominously warn of Muslims imposing sharia law in the US and the potential for every mosque to be used to hatch terrorist plots. More importantly, public anger and hostility towards Islam is now being whipped to frenzy by Republican leaders, who smell political blood in the water. They realise that reviving the passions of 9/11 will work to their favour in the upcoming elections. That a significant portion of the American public believes Obama is a secret Muslim only helps them. As a result, people such as Newt Gingrich, Sarah Palin, Rick Lazio, John Cornyn, and Ed Rollins have used the Cordoba Centre issue for an assault on Obama and Democrats in general.
Attitudes and actions within the Islamic world enable this. Americans are frustrated by having expended trillions of dollars and thousands of lives to control extremism and build democracy there only to be repaid with intense and growing hostility. They are angered by widespread sympathy and support for terrorist organisations. And they are angered by what they see as a desire on the part of Muslims to impose their values on non-Muslims witness by public demonstrations a few years ago following the publication of caricatures of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) in European newspapers. To many Americans, particularly those who are influenced by propagandists, Islam seems threatening, even evil. While this was relegated to the fringe of US public opinion, it is now moving to the mainstream.
Those stoking anger and hostility are either unaware of the impact this will have on the US security strategy or simply dont care. But it attracts extensive attention in the Islamic world and validates extremist claim that America is at war with Islam. Domestic electioneering has global implications. Broadly, the growing anger and hostility towards Islam reveals fundamental fissures in American strategy that have been papered over for the past decade.
This strategy was created by the Bush administration in the months after 9/11 and largely adopted by the Obama administration. It is based on the belief that the conflict with extremists will be won or lost in the psychological realm. It is based on the belief that a forward defence is best that extremism should be stifled at its source. And it is based on the belief that the best way to do this is by mobilising support and strengthening partners in the Islamic world rather than by direct military action.
This strategy was shaky from its inception. It assumed that most governments and publics in the Islamic world shared the US belief that extremism was illegitimate and should be crushed. It assumed that governments and publics would see that Americas objective was to control extremism. And, most importantly, it assumed that what Americans consider misperceptions that the US sought to exploit the Islamic worlds resources, to impose its values, or to promote Israels security could be changed by strategic communications and assistance. Americans, in other words, saw their power as benign and positive, and assumed others did as well.
Unfortunately, these assumptions were false. Partners in the Islamic world have steadfastly demonstrated different priorities than the US, often tolerating extremism that only threatened America. Pakistans hosting of the Taliban and al Qaeda is the starkest examples. Anti-Americanism has proven deep and pervasive. It cannot be fixed through better strategic communications and more foreign assistance, particularly while the US remains Israels staunch supporter. And, the more democratic a government in the Islamic world, the more it reflects anti-American and anti-Israel sentiments of its public.
It doesnt matter whether these perceptions are accurate in some objective sense. In struggling with extremism, perceptions matter more than reality. Hostility, anti-Americanism and misperception are parts of the strategic terrain, as immutable as mountains or swamps. Nine years of failing to change them should have taught America that. Changing these deep-set perceptions and attitudes is like changing physical terrain: it may be possible over time and at great cost and effort, but is normally not a wise course of action.
For nearly 10 years after 9/11, the fissures and faulty assumptions in Americas global strategy were papered over and held in check. Islamic partners were willing to cooperate with the US to a point, giving the impression of progress, but it was fragile. Yet, for nine years, the US was able to rumble forward with a flawed strategy because opposition from the element of the US public most likely to oppose partnerships in the Islamic world the political right was held in check by Republican control of the White House. As long as it was the Bush administration making a case that extremists werent representative of Islam, the right muted its instinctive anger and hostility. But with a Democratic president, the right was no longer interested in constraining anger and hostility towards Islam. Now the fissures in US strategy can no longer be papered over.
There are only two solutions. One would be recreation of the fragile edifice of the nine years. This would require Republican leaders to return to the Bush administrations messages extremism doesnt represent or reflect Islam and that despite recurrent anti-Americanism, US partnerships in the Islamic world are making progress and can be sustained. Republican leaders would have to abandon a theme that energises and excites their political base, and give up on the notion of reviving the emotions of 9/11 as elections approach. Its unlikely.
The alternative is to accept that irresolvable differences exist between the US and the Islamic world that hypocrisy, such as criticism for American opposition to the Cordoba House at the same time that Islamic nations prevent the building of churches, and vehement anti-Americanism combined with a demand for more US assistance can no longer be tolerated. The misinformation that abounds in the Islamic world, no matter how bizarre, will find a ready audience, even among the educated.
If so happens, the US would be forced to abandon cooperation and craft a new global strategy based on disengagement from the Islamic world and close rather than forward defence against terrorism. While a solid argument can be made for this, it is important to think it through. It would require disengagement from Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Persian Gulf. Iran would become more influential. Most nations in the Islamic world would be anti-American. Some would allow an al Qaeda presence, which would grow in prestige and popularity claiming that it drove the US out of the Islamic world. Much of the public would believe it. Al Qaeda would welcome many new recruits eager to be part of the perceived victory.
The US might be able to fend off even a strengthened al Qaeda. After all, Americas defences are far superior to what they were in September 2001.
There is little doubt that American hostility toward Islam will grow. But Americans cant have it both ways. Americans cant simply continue to ignore the fissures and contradictions in their global strategy and hope to paper them over with a bit more foreign assistance and adept strategic communications. Unfortunately, neither of the strategic options is appealing.
Steven Metz is a national security analyst and the author of Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy
