CONTRIBUTION: REFLECTION ON THE ALGERIAN MILITARY DOCTRINE

[Ceylal]

By Tewfik Hamel

Consultant and Researcher in Military History & Defense Studies

"The military doctrine, as a whole, is the result of an intellectual, cultural and civilizational depth, which is perpetuated from generation to generation, drawing its principles from the historic legacy of the struggle of the Nation, from its merciless fight against the colonialism and supreme values and state legislations, which is reviewed and updated, whenever necessary, to adapt to variations in geopolitical data. It is therefore the foundation of National Defense policy and an essential foundation in the development of military strategy ".

Lieutenant-General Ahmed Gaïd Salah

The Doctrine :

How does the doctrine evolve? What are the forces and processes that lead an army to refound the way it intends to fight? Several hypotheses have been advanced on the origin of the doctrine, and the debate continues on the influence of the various variables on doctrinal development. At the center of this debate is the concern to explain the differences and similarities in the development of military doctrine by military organizations. Theoretically, the political project of a State defines the terms of reference of its military strategy, which his turn dictates the type of his military doctrines. In defining a national security strategy, a nation equips its military with a framework for organizational development and equipment, that is, the development of a doctrine. Military strategy should theoretically provide details for the strategic use of the instrument of military might. Defining military strategy is defined as "the direction and use of force and the threat of force for policy purposes" (Colin Gray). In " Sources of Military Doctrine, "Barry Posen argues that military doctrine is the" component of the grand strategy that explicitly addresses military means. " Two questions become important in any discussion of military means 1.) What means should be used? 2) how should they be used?

Without political support and public opinion, it will be difficult to implement the necessary but sometimes difficult reforms that are crucial for preparedness and armed services for the new century. The doctrine of non-intervention outside the borders requires a subtle refinement towards a kind of strategic ambiguity. A very difficult exercise because strategic ambiguity also implies efficiency, credibility, firmness, determination

However, US commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, have tended to focus on how to fight rather than on the reason for fighting, on doctrine rather than strategy, on the military rather than on the military. on the political level.

In practice, the doctrine evolves like any other complex of ideas. It constitutes the set of "institutionalized beliefs about what works in war and military operations," the "software of military might," and includes three essential elements: theory, culture, and authority. Doctrine needs an element of theory because "doctrine must be based on assumptions about what works and what leads to victory". It also needs the cultural element because it must "fit into the military discourse of the moment".

Finally, it requires an element of authority, because it can not be "just one of the many voices on the military market of ideas and concepts" if it is to have an integrating effect. The balancing of the three elements can be done in different ways and thus produce three "ideal types" of doctrine: doctrine as a

• Command tool; the authority to say what to do
• Change tool; the authority to say what it needs to be
• Educational tool; the authority to say what we do, and why, and who we are for now.

Framed in this way by its historical and strategic context, the military doctrine aims to prescribe the way in which an armed force will fight. Ideal doctrine should be joint. The ideal military doctrine would be truly joint (that is, integrating land, air, maritime and special operations in an aligned fashion) and flexible enough to deal with all kinds of predictable and unforeseen scenarios and threats, as well as a whole range of political objectives. Military, political, economic or social considerations influence operations and strategies, and doctrine should therefore be adapted to the strategic context. In the 1920s, John Frederick Charles Fuller wrote: "The central idea of an army is known as its doctrine which, to be healthy, must be based on the principles of war, and which, to be effective, must be elastic enough to allow a change in accordance with changing circumstances. In its ultimate relationship with human understanding, this central idea or doctrine is no more than common sense - that is, an action adapted to the circumstances. In itself, the danger of a doctrine is that it is likely to ossify in a dogma [...]. In the past, many armies were destroyed by internal discord, and some were destroyed by the weapons of their opponents, but the majority perished by adhering to dogmas born of their past successes - self-destruction or suicide by inertia of the mind ". must be elastic enough to allow a mutation in accordance with the changed circumstances. In its ultimate relationship with human understanding, this central idea or doctrine is no more than common sense - that is, an action adapted to the circumstances. In itself, the danger of a doctrine is that it is likely to ossify in a dogma [...]. In the past, many armies were destroyed by internal discord, and some were destroyed by the weapons of their opponents, but the majority perished by adhering to dogmas born of their past successes - self-destruction or suicide by inertia of the mind ". must be elastic enough to allow a mutation in accordance with the changed circumstances. In its ultimate relationship with human understanding, this central idea or doctrine is no more than common sense - that is, an action adapted to the circumstances. In itself, the danger of a doctrine is that it is likely to ossify in a dogma [...]. In the past, many armies were destroyed by internal discord, and some were destroyed by the weapons of their opponents, but the majority perished by adhering to dogmas born of their past successes - self-destruction or suicide by inertia of the mind ". the danger of a doctrine is that it is likely to ossify in a dogma [...]. In the past, many armies were destroyed by internal discord, and some were destroyed by the weapons of their opponents, but the majority perished by adhering to dogmas born of their past successes - self-destruction or suicide by inertia of the mind ". the danger of a doctrine is that it is likely to ossify in a dogma [...]. In the past, many armies were destroyed by internal discord, and some were destroyed by the weapons of their opponents, but the majority perished by adhering to dogmas born of their past successes - self-destruction or suicide by inertia of the mind ".

Organizational culture :

The determination to change the mentality of the armed forces in favor of joint and expeditionary campaigns to deal with the chaos at the borders seems to be at the heart of the efforts of the modernization of the Algerian forces. The nature of equipment and armaments acquired in recent years clearly reveal that state threats are at the heart of the security concerns of Algerian leaders. Doctrine is also determined by the strategic context and the nature of the threats: what is the enemy? It must be an operational response to the question "who, when, where and how the opponent could attack-strike back". However, military thinking is very technical. It has the appearance of a rational calculation of means-ends,

The sources of military cohesion lie in two factors: 1) the persuasive force of the regime's ideology and coercive powers; 2) the ability of the army to train its troops free from political interference. There is a constant debate in the army and a high number of military intellectuals, officers whose main task is intellectual activity.

Several officers conducting the search are scattered across the country. They work in professional military education, training, development of doctrines and military concepts, units of central administration, preparation of plans and policies. They write for military magazines like El-djeich, Strategia, etc.

One set of theories has as a common foundation the idea that all organizations resist costly changes. Major change rarely comes from within the military establishment. Human institutions - especially the day-to-day bureaucracies - are in themselves an obstacle to effective adaptation because they do not exist to adapt to a changing and uncertain world. Few institutions revitalize themselves without enormous external pressures. The goal of organizations is to create stability and continuity. Change creates uncertainty, produces winners and losers, and disrupts standard processes and operations. Organizations aim to impose order on an inherently chaotic and ambiguous world. They exist to act as a brake on important changes that disrupt existing behaviors. Most bureaucrats oppose change as it poses a direct threat to their position. Sir Michael Howard explained: "The military profession is, like other professions, a bureaucracy, and bureaucracies have difficulty accommodating exceptional original thinkers. These people tend to be tough colleagues. "

Indeed, many organizations and professions develop esoteric knowledge. A profession is more than a group of specialized skills acquired through intensive training. Generally, the assumptions and logics of the functioning of a profession are not shared by the rest of society. They define problems in their own specific ways and are firmly linked to a set of standardized procedures.

As such, a professional group develops a sense of group identity and an internal administration system. Self-administration - often supported by state intervention - implies the growth of a body of ethics and performance standards. The members of these organizations and professions socialized in the norms of their domain come to accept these cognitive, symbolic and emotional frameworks as natural and obvious. Its members develop "habitus", in the words of Pierre Bourdieu. This is true to an unusual degree for soldiers who embrace without reserve the philosophy of the body, driven by cultural indoctrination.

Organizational culture is a mediating variable between the environment (national and international) and the doctrine. It serves both normative and functional purposes, helping the organization to understand the frequently flooded environment of ambiguous information in which it operates. It also helps to link organizations by providing shared values to members of the organization. In this way, culture enhances an organization's ability to respond to certain challenges by linking members and filtering useful information. However, it can also lead the organization to respond poorly to other challenges by filtering and discarding potentially important information. Historians identify aversion to adaptation being one of the causes of organizational inefficiency in conflict. However, the military internally generates changes that help them achieve their goals when they perceive changes in the strategic environment. The military can change with a certain speed when confronted with a threat likely to defeat existing doctrine. Doctrinal change often requires a long period of gestation before materializing. At the end of the 1980s, the doctrine of Algerian army was mainly focused on threats and state wars. Therefore, at the beginning of the asymmetrical war waged by Islamic terrorists in the 1990s, it took time for the Algerian forces to know the enemy, adapt in an extremely difficult context and then take the initiative.

Organizational theory emphasizes the importance of "the culture of the military institution, the relationship between culture and strategic doctrines, and the influence of this organizational culture on the interpretation of the external environments in which the military operates". It is not surprising that military organizations - with their powerful assimilation mechanisms - develop strong and lasting cultures. A military organization must stifle to a certain extent societal values that could threaten the integrity of the group, such as equity, equality, independence and individual rights. Because war is a group exercise; it requires that decisions are made, understood, accepted and executed in a rapid and instinctive manner. Collective understanding makes this possible. A common framework reduces uncertainty in the war and increases the ability of its members to react quickly. The inculcation of values and beliefs such as integrity, obedience, loyalty, trust, etc. allows to develop a common framework. Although the concept of cohesion is multifaceted, group cohesion is essential to military effectiveness. Indeed, there is a positive relationship between cohesion and performance. The culture of a military organization is largely functional. Efforts to develop a strong culture also contribute to the sustainable quality of military cultures. allows to develop a common framework. Although the concept of cohesion is multifaceted, group cohesion is essential to military effectiveness. Indeed, there is a positive relationship between cohesion and performance. The culture of a military organization is largely functional. Efforts to develop a strong culture also contribute to the sustainable quality of military cultures. allows to develop a common framework. Although the concept of cohesion is multifaceted, group cohesion is essential to military effectiveness. Indeed, there is a positive relationship between cohesion and performance. The culture of a military organization is largely functional. Efforts to develop a strong culture also contribute to the sustainable quality of military cultures.

The culture of any military organization is complex, with a wide variety of mutually reinforcing and contradictory aspects. Military organizational culture includes identities, norms and values (encompassing assumptions, ideas and beliefs) that are both deeply internalized by a military organization and simultaneously frame how the organization perceives the world, its role and its functions.But without an understanding of what is happening, why it occurs (including the historical context), how did it happen, and what an actor seeks to achieve, there is no strategy. In other words, to understand something, and try to change it according to a desired policy, those who develop the strategy must know the context in which they act and how it can be channeled to reach the desired end state. Given that the responsibilities of the military high command chain must be overseen by the political authority usually civilians, it should be quite obvious that the powerful concept of the strategic effect must be dominated by political calculations. In this sense, the latest constitutional changes have clearly established the primacy of the civilian, which the various statements of senior military officials have repeatedly confirmed. In this sense, it is logical to expect that change will have implications for the military institution and civil-military relations. A question that needs to be seriously considered.

Army and society

The army is an integral part of a society; and the essence of a soldier, the citizen in uniform, is a reflection of that society. Since the military reflects their own societies and each army has a special relationship with the society it defends, it is not surprising that the military institution is also the subject of fierce debates on many subjects. With the trend towards democratization, the challenge of reform is not about integrating new technologies, but about adapting the military to the current landscape of political realities. Admittedly, the army is more or less a "total institution", but it is concerned by the dynamics shaking the society from which it emerged. It is not possible to discuss military belief systems outside the broader political and cultural context in which these systems are developed and in which the armed forces operate. But the army apprehends the physical and social environment through its own prism, institutional belief system and organizational culture. Every social group conveys a vision of the collective world that corresponds to the historical situation that defines it. This "vision of the world", as a coherent ideological form, expresses the more or less vague consciousness that the group has of itself and - when confronted with other groups - gives it an identity. Examine one's worldview to elucidate the social, political and moral problems that guide and structure the work of a given actor.

The way in which changes in society affect the work and mission of the soldier and the military profession has aroused the interest of sociologists. Hence the interest of having serious studies on the implication of the profound changes of the Algerian society since its independence on the Algerian military institution notably its link with the civil society. The context in which the strategist exposes his work is as important as the language he uses. Without the context, ie the final political and strategic state sought by policy makers (ends), the other elements of the strategy (means and methods) lose their value. The strategy is a process of negotiation between those who develop the ends (the decision makers) and those who execute, by means and methods. This exchange creates a story to use force to achieve the desired effect. To a large extent, the military is limited by the decisions made by civilian political leaders. In any case, it is the new framework in which the Algerian army is brought to work. Can one evoke the strategy of the defense of Algeria without taking into account this evolution in the civil-military relations and the change of the Algerian society?

Military thought and action are partly autonomous from, partly in touch with, and partly subordinate to the broader society in which they are inscribed. In summary, military organizations face a series of tensions: The military must (1) ensure military effectiveness to respond to changes in the strategic context; and 2) be sensitive to broader social values and therefore to the society in which they are located and who pays for them.

The tensions stemming from this dual framework have been brought to light since the end of the cold war and the fight against Islamist asymmetrical warfare since the beginning of the 1990s. Do not take into account the changes underway in Algerian society, is wrong. It would be a strategic mistake. The army is finding its place in this new, broader context. Hence the interest in making change in a progressive, concerted and negotiated way. The tracks emphasizing the stagnation of the Algerian regime have a superficial vision and can not grasp the heavy forces of history. The feminization of the Algerian army, for example, is the culmination of deep demographic trends and changes in social norms.

There is a tendency to think of the army as a rather homogeneous and largely "total" institution. Although the military operates with a degree of autonomy and distance from the rest of society, it is not a fully enclosed hermetic system. The actions of military forces can not be fully understood without taking into account their cultural or ideological conceptions of the situation. However, any large organization like the army is required to be very diverse. Algerians are composed of several sub-organizations, the most important of which are the services: the Army, the Air Force, the Navy, the Air Defense of the territory. In addition to these four main armed forces: the National Gendarmerie and the Republican Guard. Each strives to maximize its own role. To be able to function effectively on the battlefield, Algerian forces are organized into hierarchies of authority. The president, responsible for all final decisions, is the commander-in-chief. The Ministry of Defense controls all the forces and each service. Although armed services share common attributes, each retains its own "identity and personality" and is influenced in its actions by a culture and "command structure" inherent in the service. Organizational culture is a product of the service history and personality types of its key leaders. Service culture manifests itself in a variety of ways - budget priorities, doctrine, training, and so on. To be able to function effectively on the battlefield, Algerian forces are organized into hierarchies of authority. The president, responsible for all final decisions, is the commander-in-chief. The Ministry of Defense controls all the forces and each service. Although armed services share common attributes, each retains its own "identity and personality" and is influenced in its actions by a culture and "command structure" inherent in the service. Organizational culture is a product of the service history and personality types of its key leaders. Service culture manifests itself in a variety of ways - budget priorities, doctrine, training, and so on. To be able to function effectively on the battlefield, Algerian forces are organized into hierarchies of authority. The president, responsible for all final decisions, is the commander-in-chief. The Ministry of Defense controls all the forces and each service. Although armed services share common attributes, each retains its own "identity and personality" and is influenced in its actions by a culture and "command structure" inherent in the service. Organizational culture is a product of the service history and personality types of its key leaders. Service culture manifests itself in a variety of ways - budget priorities, doctrine, training, and so on. responsible for all final decisions, is the commander-in-chief. The Ministry of Defense controls all the forces and each service. Although armed services share common attributes, each retains its own "identity and personality" and is influenced in its actions by a culture and "command structure" inherent in the service. Organizational culture is a product of the service history and personality types of its key leaders. Service culture manifests itself in a variety of ways - budget priorities, doctrine, training, and so on. responsible for all final decisions, is the commander-in-chief. The Ministry of Defense controls all the forces and each service. Although armed services share common attributes, each retains its own "identity and personality" and is influenced in its actions by a culture and "command structure" inherent in the service. Organizational culture is a product of the service history and personality types of its key leaders. Service culture manifests itself in a variety of ways - budget priorities, doctrine, training, and so on. each retains its own "identity and personality" and is influenced in its actions by a culture and "command structure" inherent in the service. Organizational culture is a product of the service history and personality types of its key leaders. Service culture manifests itself in a variety of ways - budget priorities, doctrine, training, and so on. each retains its own "identity and personality" and is influenced in its actions by a culture and "command structure" inherent in the service. Organizational culture is a product of the service history and personality types of its key leaders. Service culture manifests itself in a variety of ways - budget priorities, doctrine, training, and so on.

In recent decades, societies (including Algeria) are moving more and more into a liberal phase, an evolution that increases certain aspects of the military's distance from the rest of society. For liberalism is in contrast with military ethics. Indeed, Southern societies in recent decades have undergone significant changes in social values and attitudes. They came to adopt "a system of self-centered values, based on individualism", diametrically in contrast to the demands of the armed forces. This gap means a decline in the prestige and attractiveness of the military institution. The army is not the only one to be in contradiction with social values. In addition to the growing rejection of blind obedience and subordination to institutional authorities, loyalty is not automatic. Other institutions, including the family, the school and political institutions, have also seen their influence gradually erode. Existing institutions seem less relevant. The contemporary era has seen the evolution of the military to a professional establishment, distinct from civil society, which should adhere to democratic principles and be subordinated to civilian control.

The problem of the gap between military culture and society became more visible in the era of volunteer strength. There will always be a discrepancy between the required discipline of a fighting force and the individualism of the society it is charged with defending. An effective army has its own distinct culture, which emphasizes honor, courage and sacrifice under a command structure. Attempts to erase this division by "civilizing" the military, or by serving as a social experiment, undermine the effectiveness and morale of the soldiers. The relations between the army and civil society are both problematic and complex, starting with a fusional relationship during the war of independence, that is, without distinction between soldiers and the rest of society. After independence, the Algerian People's Army, being its central role in the revolution, played an important role in building the nation-state of Algeria and was the backbone of the Algerian state. Many executives in different ministries came from the army. The war has become increasingly technical and cut off from civilian life and the Algerian army has embarked on a process of professionalization. The 1990s marked a new phase in this relationship. For most of the population, the army is the last defense against Islamist obscurantism, the guardian of the "Algerian State-Nation Temple". The fight against terrorism has provided the military with new legitimacy, but it remains to be revitalized in an increasingly liberal context. This trend seems difficult to reverse. the Algerian People's Army, being its central role in the revolution, played an important role in building the nation-state of Algeria and was the backbone of the Algerian state. Many executives in different ministries came from the army. The war has become increasingly technical and cut off from civilian life and the Algerian army has embarked on a process of professionalization. The 1990s marked a new phase in this relationship. For most of the population, the army is the last defense against Islamist obscurantism, the guardian of the "Algerian State-Nation Temple". The fight against terrorism has provided the military with a new legitimacy, but which remains to be revitalized in an increasingly liberal context. This trend seems difficult to reverse. the Algerian People's Army, being its central role in the revolution, played an important role in building the nation-state of Algeria and was the backbone of the Algerian state. Many executives in different ministries came from the army. The war has become increasingly technical and cut off from civilian life and the Algerian army has embarked on a process of professionalization. The 1990s marked a new phase in this relationship. For most of the population, the army is the last defense against Islamist obscurantism, the guardian of the "Algerian State-Nation Temple". The fight against terrorism has provided the military with new legitimacy, but it remains to be revitalized in an increasingly liberal context. This trend seems difficult to reverse. being its central role in the revolution, played an important role in building the nation-state of Algeria and was the backbone of the Algerian state. Many executives in different ministries came from the army. The war has become increasingly technical and cut off from civilian life and the Algerian army has embarked on a process of professionalization. The 1990s marked a new phase in this relationship. For most of the population, the army is the last defense against Islamist obscurantism, the guardian of the "Algerian State-Nation Temple". The fight against terrorism has provided the military with a new legitimacy, but which remains to be revitalized in an increasingly liberal context. This trend seems difficult to reverse. being its central role in the revolution, played an important role in building the nation-state of Algeria and was the backbone of the Algerian state. Many executives in different ministries came from the army. The war has become increasingly technical and cut off from civilian life and the Algerian army has embarked on a process of professionalization. The 1990s marked a new phase in this relationship. For most of the population, the army is the last defense against Islamist obscurantism, the guardian of the "Algerian State-Nation Temple". The fight against terrorism has provided the military with new legitimacy, but it remains to be revitalized in an increasingly liberal context. This trend seems difficult to reverse. played an important role in building the nation-state of Algeria and was the backbone of the Algerian state. Many executives in different ministries came from the army. The war has become increasingly technical and cut off from civilian life and the Algerian army has embarked on a process of professionalization. The 1990s marked a new phase in this relationship. For most of the population, the army is the last defense against Islamist obscurantism, the guardian of the "Algerian State-Nation Temple". The fight against terrorism has provided the military with new legitimacy, but it remains to be revitalized in an increasingly liberal context. This trend seems difficult to reverse. played an important role in building the nation-state of Algeria and was the backbone of the Algerian state. Many executives in different ministries came from the army. The war has become increasingly technical and cut off from civilian life and the Algerian army has embarked on a process of professionalization. The 1990s marked a new phase in this relationship. For most of the population, the army is the last defense against Islamist obscurantism, the guardian of the "Algerian State-Nation Temple". The fight against terrorism has provided the military with a new legitimacy, but which remains to be revitalized in an increasingly liberal context. This trend seems difficult to reverse. Many executives in different ministries came from the army. The war has become increasingly technical and cut off from civilian life and the Algerian army has embarked on a process of professionalization. The 1990s marked a new phase in this relationship. For most of the population, the army is the last defense against Islamist obscurantism, the guardian of the "Algerian State-Nation Temple". The fight against terrorism has provided the military with new legitimacy, but it remains to be revitalized in an increasingly liberal context. This trend seems difficult to reverse. Many executives in different ministries came from the army. The war has become increasingly technical and cut off from civilian life and the Algerian army has embarked on a process of professionalization. The 1990s marked a new phase in this relationship. For most of the population, the army is the last defense against Islamist obscurantism, the guardian of the "Algerian State-Nation Temple". The fight against terrorism has provided the military with new legitimacy, but it remains to be revitalized in an increasingly liberal context. This trend seems difficult to reverse. For most of the population, the army is the last defense against Islamist obscurantism, the guardian of the "Algerian State-Nation Temple". The fight against terrorism has provided the military with a new legitimacy, but which remains to be revitalized in an increasingly liberal context. This trend seems difficult to reverse. For most of the population, the army is the last defense against Islamist obscurantism, the guardian of the "Algerian State-Nation Temple". The fight against terrorism has provided the military with a new legitimacy, but which remains to be revitalized in an increasingly liberal context. This trend seems difficult to reverse.

The twentieth century saw a significant change in the conduct of war including in the objectives, strategies and structures of military organizations. This military change - mainly due to strategic, technological and societal factors - has reduced the ability of states to end conflicts decisively. Societal factors as increased media coverage (the example of the In Amenas hostage-taking) and changing norms have caused major changes for the military. The place of society in war has profoundly changed. Contemporary culture has eroded the warrior ethos. Societies become a skeptical society of those who adhere to the warrior code. Admittedly, this phenomenon is recent in the South, but risks for many reasons to develop in the years to come. The demand for striking doctors to abolish military service is only a symptom of this phenomenon, and is one of the challenges that the Algerian military institution has to deal with. How to continue to attract the best skills of society in a world marked by the "compression of time and space" How to fill the gap and build bridges between the army and society? The involvement of the army in development projects (industrial partnerships) and its intervention during natural disasters, etc. help maintain this already strong connection. How to continue to attract the best skills of society in a world marked by the "compression of time and space" How to fill the gap and build bridges between the army and society? The involvement of the army in development projects (industrial partnerships) and its intervention during natural disasters, etc. help maintain this already strong connection. How to continue to attract the best skills of society in a world marked by the "compression of time and space" How to fill the gap and build bridges between the army and society? The involvement of the army in development projects (industrial partnerships) and its intervention during natural disasters, etc. help maintain this already strong connection.

Algeria's non-intervention outside its borders is a political doctrine, that is, a doctrine designed to mobilize political support for the non-military objectives of the state. This type of doctrine could at the same time partially or completely satisfy each of the two branches of government: the armed forces in search of reasonably structured forces and political leaders seeking to legitimize or strengthen foreign or domestic policy. The international environment has changed a lot and the strategic context is extremely volatile. The overthrow of the Libyan regime, the destabilization of Syria, the rapid deterioration of Russia's relations with the West, the support provided by members of the Atlantic Alliance, an organization considered terrorist by Turkey while a NATO ally, etc. are all events that leave each observer perplexed and cautious. The case of Turkey is striking for the countries of the South (including Algeria) which engage in security partnerships with the United States.Certes, are better to have the United States a friend / ally than a enemy, but it is necessary to have in mind the Turkish case when it comes to appreciate the nature of the relationship with America.

The question that arises today is whether we can talk about Algeria's defense and military strategy without taking into account the political project: what are the main objectives and fundamental values of the nation? What is the economic model of Algeria? In addition to the strategic context and a careful diagnosis of the dangers, threats and enemies facing the country, the evolution of the defense strategy will also be shaped by the evolution of civil-military relations and the liberal trend that drives Algerian society. As such, it seems that the two bills passed by the deputies to the NPC on the obligation of military reserves do not contribute to boost strategic thinking in Algeria. The military institution needs dynamism, a constant debate especially in a world that knows fast and fluid changes. Particularly in a volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous world, General Beaufre was right when he said: "In the armies, the disciplinemust be strict but thought must be free . The Algerian army needs to strengthen its links with society and help promote strategic culture and thinking. Building bridges with society is essential.