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Not many people know it but India is a maritime nation. Yet, since a majority of her people, have not seen the sea, they fail to appreciate the importance of the Indian peninsula that majestically juts into the worlds largest, busiest and resource-rich Ocean.
Consider the significance of the seas for India: around 90 percent of Indias external trade, both imports and exports, annually worth over USD 230 billion and increasing, is transported by sea; the prevalence of maritime terrorism and piracy in the region is growing; nations in the Indian Ocean region (IOR) look to India as a democratic and strong maritime power able to maintain the stability and security of the sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) and ensure that coastal security is not threatened. India is also mandated by the United Nations International Maritime Organisation (IMO) to undertake Search and Rescue (SAR) efforts in 4.6 million sq km of the IOR, an area 50 percent more than that of Indias total landmass. Clearly then, the responsibilities that devolve on India call for her Navy and Coast Guard to possess maritime assets in adequate numbers.
Unfortunately, with the seat of power, New Delhi located 800km away from the seas maritime matters fail to get the attention they deserve. Even today, an assortment of ten ministries and agencies deal with maritime security issues all working in different directions without a single nodal point of control.
Early Neglect
For the first 35 years after Indias Independence, shipbuilding a capital intensive, risk- prone activity dependent on the vagaries of world trade was classified as a strategic industry which meant that licenses to build ships were denied to the private sector. Shortly after 1947, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) took over two large, privately owned shipyards, left behind by the British: Mazagon Docks Ltd (MDL), located in (then) Bombay, and Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers Ltd (GRSE), located in (then) Calcutta. In 1962, the Goa Shipyard Ltd (GSL) a facility left behind by the Portuguese was also taken over. The Ministry of Shipping on its part took over Hindustan Shipyard Ltd (HSL) at Vishakapatnam from the Scindia business group and later in 1969 built Cochin Shipyard Ltd (CSL) with help from Mitsubishi of Japan, primarily for merchant shipbuilding.
Typically, these huge public sector undertakings (PSUs) were controlled from South Block and Parivahan Bhavan in New Delhi. As the costs of building warships by these monolithic PSUs escalated, their manufacturing timelines too stretched interminably. This shortsighted policy to deny the private sector exists till today. Permission to construct warships are continuously given to PSUs, despite five private shipyards having come up and Defence Minister A.K. Antonys promise to allow a level playing field to both PSUs and private industry for naval and Coast Guard (CG) orders.
However, slowly a realisation has dawned that the nation needs many more platforms for the effective maritime security of its 7,211km coastline and far-flung islands. Oldmethods of shipbuilding need to be replaced by newer, faster modular methods, swifter and transparent ordering procedures and competition has to be urgently thrown open to private players. Besides, it has been established that competitive shipbuilding and ship exports boost the revenues of a nation and provides large-scale employment, a path taken by Japan, South Korea and China whose Governments have provided initial incentives and subsidies to encourage shipbuilding.
Jack of All Trades
The acronym, OPV, is given to any offshore patrol vessel which conducts offshore activities. Its size can vary from 45 metres in length to around 105 metres and it weighs between 300 tonnes (the minimum tonnage for an ocean-going vessel) to 3,000 tonnes.
Known as the Jack of all trades, OPVs have become the preferred economical choice of Navies and Coast Guards for the variety of roles they can perform. They can be engaged in SAR missions, in coastal antiterrorism and anti-piracy patrols, border and oil rig surveillance, coast along the undemarcated India-Pakistan border, are useful in anti-smuggling activities and protect the 2.1 million sq km Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) which currently extends upto 200 nautical miles. OPVs can also be fitted out with equipment to control oil spills, execute hydrographic and minesweeping duties and can be employed in low intensity conflict.
Designed for multiple roles, OPVs can also be fitted with sonar equipment, carry underwater unmanned vessels (UUVs) for mine-sweeping and anti-submarine duties.OPVs can also be design-built for hydrographic duties with UUVs.
Glaring Deficiency
Despite their criticality, the glaring absence of OPVs in Indias coastal patrol and security have been all too apparent particularly when Mumbai, Indias financial centre, bore the brunt of the 26/11 attack in 2008. Ten Pakistani suicide Laskar-e-Taiba attackers from the seas landed at Cuffe Parades fishermens beach in a rubber dinghy and held a city to ransom, killing 164 innocents. The 26/11 assault has tragically shown up the gap in the OPVs, intelligence and vigil efforts on land and at sea. There is a common consensus that the shortage of OPVs had escalated the situation.
The shortfall of this vessel has been detailed in many documents in the past. According to the Tenth Five-Year Plan (2002-2007 ), it requires 175 ships and 221 aircraft for effective patrolling of the EEZ and coastal and shallow waters. Against this, as of January 2008, the ICG has only 68 ships/vessels and 45 aircraft for the EEZ and International maritime Boundary Line patrolling. Compared to the force levels of 122 vessels envisaged in the Seventh Five- Year Plan (1985-1990), as of December 2010, the ICG possessed only 65 percent of that required force level.
The shortage of OPVs for patrolling further shrunk when India transferred three AOPVs to Sri Lanka in 2000. These included the Navys INS Sharayu (renamed SLNS Sayura), and Coast Guards ICGS Vigraha. (The SLNS Sayura has since returned last year to Kochi). Further, cutting into the inventory, the Navy has also converted two OPVs: The INS Subhadra, which doubled as the Presidents Yacht for the December 2011 Presidents Fleet Review and the INS Sukhanya used to fire single 300km Dhanush nuclear capable missiles by an ingenious vertically launched system devised by Larsen & Toubro (L&T) Ltd.OPVs have also been deployed for training duties with the Navys training squadron and cadet and midshipmen training ships.
When the glaring absences of OPVs in Bombay High patrols were questioned by the Oil Natural Gas Commission under whose account OPVs were sanctioned to protect crucial oil rigs, patrols were augmented by simply renting fishing boats and equipping them with naval crews and communications. (Post 26/ 11, all fleet ships have been ordered to transit and patrol Bombay High and display their presence every time they depart or arrive Mumbai for exercises).
Favoured Competition
Now a comprehensive plan to compete for orders for warships and OPVS has encouraged private shipyards to set up shipbuilding yards. Five modern private shipyards have arrived on the scene: ABG at Surat and Dabhol, Bharti Shipyard Ltd at Ratnagiri and Goa, Pipavav Shipyard Ltd (PSL) in Gujarat, L&T Ltd at Hazira and a new yard up at Tutapuli near Ennore. A level playing field for Naval and Coast Guard orders was announced and ABG, which had bagged orders for three, 3,300-tonne Pollution Control OPVs in 2004 with Rolls Royce propulsion, brought Swan Hunter facilities from the UK and set up a plant in Goa. Still, final ordering has been mired with a clear tilt towards PSUs, dilatory tactics and legal entanglements.
Between 1981 and 1989, MDL built seven 1,200 tonne Vikram-class OPVs for the ICG. Realising the need for bigger and more modern OPVs India has ordered and received its first three naval 2,000-tonne unarmed Sukanya-class Advanced OPVs (AOPVs) from Busan in 1989, and subsequently has built four more on that design at HSL, Vishakapatnam in two years flat, proving that there really is no rocket science involved in building AOPVs.
On its part, the IN is building four, 2,500-tonne anti-submarine warfare Offshore Patrol Vessels in Project 28 at GRSE and eight, 500-tonne Catamaran OPVs for hydrographic survey vessels at Alock Ashdown Ltd in Gujarat with Konsberg Huggins. (The IN plans to use UUVs in experimental and classified roles). DCNS of France, at its own cost, has designed and delivered the first economical multi-purpose OPV in the GOWIND series, named LAdroit, with a small Austrian Schibel Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (AUV) to the French Navy, which has employed the platform in anti-piracy operations off Somalia as a cheaper option than large warships. Malaysia has also ordered similar OPVs.
Clearly, the global OPV market is growing fast. In India, between the Indian Navy and the ICGS, they have 17 OPVs of varying sizes on order worth ` 12,000 crore (USD 2.6 billion); there is also a plan to place orders for 13 more large AOPVs for the Coast Guard which has already been approved by the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC), post-26/11. Five Naval OPVs, with 76mm Otto-Melara gun and systems for the Navy, have been approved by the Cabinet Council for National Security (CCNS) and the DAC for which a global tender was released last March.
Seven contenders responded with tender bids and by June, Pipavav Defence & Offshore Engineering Company Ltd, owned by SKIL Infrastructure, was selected as the preferred lowest (L1) bidder at ` 2,800 crore for the construction of five, 110-metre, 2,500-tonne displacement AOPVs designed by the St Petersburg-based Severnoye Design Bureau.
However, as this is the first warship order to a private yard the modalities of how the weapon supplies will take place and whether similar support like the Navy provides to PSUs will be forthcoming are posing challenges as is the escalation in the rupee-dollar value.
Growing Piracy
The need for OPVs to combat piracy is also growing. Increasing incidents of piracy in the Horn of Africa continue apace with pirates having moved operations to off the Lakshadweep group of islands in the southern Arabian Sea. ICGs OPVs have had to be called in and the Navy has begun a crash programme to upgrade all-weather maritime surveillance capabilities of its coastal maritime patrol aircraft and fast attack craft as there is a shortage of OPVs.
Naval platforms are already involved in pirate activities off the coast of Somalia and to escort merchant navy convoys along the IMOs Internationally Recognised Transit Corridor. Speaking at Naval War College late last year, Navy Chief Admiral Nirmal Verma stated that 1,800 merchant men have been escorted by the IN over the last few years and according to latest reports, 35 Indian seamen are still in the captivity of Somalian pirates.
To rectify its inability to patrol at night, the ICGS has begun procuring ELBIT Systems-built CoMPASS (compact multipurpose advanced stabilised system) for its seven, 270-tonne extra-fast patrol vessels (XFPV) and twenty, 260-tonne fast patrol vessels (FPV), all of which were built by Goa Shipyard Ltd. Twelve Griffon 8000TD hovercraft, to add to the six with the CG, have also been ordered from. The IN is also accelerating its efforts to raise the Sagar Prahari Bal (SPB) for force protection functions at naval harbours. The SPB force will comprise 1,000 personnel (61 officers and 939 sailors) and 80 fast interceptor craft (FIC), worth an estimated USD 500 million, from the Sri Lanka-based Solas Marine, of which 31 will be based in Mumbai, 12 in Kochi, 23 in Vishakhapatnam and 10 in Andaman and Nicobar.
Nearly two years ago, the MoD inked a contract with Frances Chantier Naval Couach to acquire 15 FIC-1,300 vessels, which will be in addition to the 80 FICs (Motomarine SA-built Hellraiser and Invader) approved earlier for the SPB. New CG stations have been sanctioned and a new Gujarat Regional Commander and organisaion set up at Ahmedabad.
A squadron of Israeli-supplied Heron and Searcher Unmanned Airborne Vehicles (UAVs) are operating from Porbandar. The CG has ordered the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO)- designed Nishant UAVs.
Legal Wrangles and Delays
Despite their criticality, at many levels ICG Headquarters, MoD and the Union Ministry of Finance there have been many legal and procedural delays in ordering OPVs. The non-utilisation of the Defence Budget due to the slow progress of construction of ships by the MoD-owned shipyards has been a major stumbling block forcing the surrender of ` 120 crore in 2008-2009. By the end of the Tenth Plan period, even though the ICG had activated 23 coast guard stations, a large number of these stations continue to function with infrastructural deficiencies. Post 26/11, the Government of India had sanctioned 14 new stations in a span of 18 months between June 2009 and November 2010 but shortfalls in vessels were yet to be made good as of December 2010 at most of the stations.
Legal cases have further hindered the OPV programme. Controversies were unleashed when, despite L&T being the L1 for 20 Coast Guard Offshore Fast Patrol Vessels (OFPVs) the order went to CSL. Justifying their decision the MoD stated L&Ts bid was non-responsive and had used exchange rate variation (ERV), which was not permitted, and since CSL was L2 it nabbed the contract.
The reality is that L&T had withdrawn its ERV clause. Four shipyards had succeeded in their technical bids and their quotes are revealing. While L&T quoted ` 66.68 crore per boat; CSL had quoted ` 69.89 crore; GRSE quoted ` 76.1 crore, GSL had quoted ` 94.17 crore and HSL quoted ` 109.41. The numbers showed how varied the bids were. They became public when L&T challenged the MoDs decision in the Delhi High Court. Losing their case after long arguments L&T had to pay legal costs of ` 700,00 to both the MoD and CSL. The case put a damper on the manner in which future orders were being handled by the MoD.
Arguably, the National Committee for Strengthening Maritime and Coastal Security the apex committee that monitors naval intelligence network, linking 51 nodes of the IN and ICG to achieve a "common operational picture and the acquisition of assets, has its work cut out.
Nearly four years after 26/11, we still have to achieve tangible results. Most likely, the Navy and Coast Guard, encumbered with its lack of platforms, will be red-faced yet again if another attack takes place.
DSI-Defence and Security of India
Consider the significance of the seas for India: around 90 percent of Indias external trade, both imports and exports, annually worth over USD 230 billion and increasing, is transported by sea; the prevalence of maritime terrorism and piracy in the region is growing; nations in the Indian Ocean region (IOR) look to India as a democratic and strong maritime power able to maintain the stability and security of the sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) and ensure that coastal security is not threatened. India is also mandated by the United Nations International Maritime Organisation (IMO) to undertake Search and Rescue (SAR) efforts in 4.6 million sq km of the IOR, an area 50 percent more than that of Indias total landmass. Clearly then, the responsibilities that devolve on India call for her Navy and Coast Guard to possess maritime assets in adequate numbers.
Unfortunately, with the seat of power, New Delhi located 800km away from the seas maritime matters fail to get the attention they deserve. Even today, an assortment of ten ministries and agencies deal with maritime security issues all working in different directions without a single nodal point of control.
Early Neglect
For the first 35 years after Indias Independence, shipbuilding a capital intensive, risk- prone activity dependent on the vagaries of world trade was classified as a strategic industry which meant that licenses to build ships were denied to the private sector. Shortly after 1947, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) took over two large, privately owned shipyards, left behind by the British: Mazagon Docks Ltd (MDL), located in (then) Bombay, and Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers Ltd (GRSE), located in (then) Calcutta. In 1962, the Goa Shipyard Ltd (GSL) a facility left behind by the Portuguese was also taken over. The Ministry of Shipping on its part took over Hindustan Shipyard Ltd (HSL) at Vishakapatnam from the Scindia business group and later in 1969 built Cochin Shipyard Ltd (CSL) with help from Mitsubishi of Japan, primarily for merchant shipbuilding.
Typically, these huge public sector undertakings (PSUs) were controlled from South Block and Parivahan Bhavan in New Delhi. As the costs of building warships by these monolithic PSUs escalated, their manufacturing timelines too stretched interminably. This shortsighted policy to deny the private sector exists till today. Permission to construct warships are continuously given to PSUs, despite five private shipyards having come up and Defence Minister A.K. Antonys promise to allow a level playing field to both PSUs and private industry for naval and Coast Guard (CG) orders.
However, slowly a realisation has dawned that the nation needs many more platforms for the effective maritime security of its 7,211km coastline and far-flung islands. Oldmethods of shipbuilding need to be replaced by newer, faster modular methods, swifter and transparent ordering procedures and competition has to be urgently thrown open to private players. Besides, it has been established that competitive shipbuilding and ship exports boost the revenues of a nation and provides large-scale employment, a path taken by Japan, South Korea and China whose Governments have provided initial incentives and subsidies to encourage shipbuilding.
Jack of All Trades
The acronym, OPV, is given to any offshore patrol vessel which conducts offshore activities. Its size can vary from 45 metres in length to around 105 metres and it weighs between 300 tonnes (the minimum tonnage for an ocean-going vessel) to 3,000 tonnes.
Known as the Jack of all trades, OPVs have become the preferred economical choice of Navies and Coast Guards for the variety of roles they can perform. They can be engaged in SAR missions, in coastal antiterrorism and anti-piracy patrols, border and oil rig surveillance, coast along the undemarcated India-Pakistan border, are useful in anti-smuggling activities and protect the 2.1 million sq km Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) which currently extends upto 200 nautical miles. OPVs can also be fitted out with equipment to control oil spills, execute hydrographic and minesweeping duties and can be employed in low intensity conflict.
Designed for multiple roles, OPVs can also be fitted with sonar equipment, carry underwater unmanned vessels (UUVs) for mine-sweeping and anti-submarine duties.OPVs can also be design-built for hydrographic duties with UUVs.
Glaring Deficiency
Despite their criticality, the glaring absence of OPVs in Indias coastal patrol and security have been all too apparent particularly when Mumbai, Indias financial centre, bore the brunt of the 26/11 attack in 2008. Ten Pakistani suicide Laskar-e-Taiba attackers from the seas landed at Cuffe Parades fishermens beach in a rubber dinghy and held a city to ransom, killing 164 innocents. The 26/11 assault has tragically shown up the gap in the OPVs, intelligence and vigil efforts on land and at sea. There is a common consensus that the shortage of OPVs had escalated the situation.
The shortfall of this vessel has been detailed in many documents in the past. According to the Tenth Five-Year Plan (2002-2007 ), it requires 175 ships and 221 aircraft for effective patrolling of the EEZ and coastal and shallow waters. Against this, as of January 2008, the ICG has only 68 ships/vessels and 45 aircraft for the EEZ and International maritime Boundary Line patrolling. Compared to the force levels of 122 vessels envisaged in the Seventh Five- Year Plan (1985-1990), as of December 2010, the ICG possessed only 65 percent of that required force level.
The shortage of OPVs for patrolling further shrunk when India transferred three AOPVs to Sri Lanka in 2000. These included the Navys INS Sharayu (renamed SLNS Sayura), and Coast Guards ICGS Vigraha. (The SLNS Sayura has since returned last year to Kochi). Further, cutting into the inventory, the Navy has also converted two OPVs: The INS Subhadra, which doubled as the Presidents Yacht for the December 2011 Presidents Fleet Review and the INS Sukhanya used to fire single 300km Dhanush nuclear capable missiles by an ingenious vertically launched system devised by Larsen & Toubro (L&T) Ltd.OPVs have also been deployed for training duties with the Navys training squadron and cadet and midshipmen training ships.
When the glaring absences of OPVs in Bombay High patrols were questioned by the Oil Natural Gas Commission under whose account OPVs were sanctioned to protect crucial oil rigs, patrols were augmented by simply renting fishing boats and equipping them with naval crews and communications. (Post 26/ 11, all fleet ships have been ordered to transit and patrol Bombay High and display their presence every time they depart or arrive Mumbai for exercises).
Favoured Competition
Now a comprehensive plan to compete for orders for warships and OPVS has encouraged private shipyards to set up shipbuilding yards. Five modern private shipyards have arrived on the scene: ABG at Surat and Dabhol, Bharti Shipyard Ltd at Ratnagiri and Goa, Pipavav Shipyard Ltd (PSL) in Gujarat, L&T Ltd at Hazira and a new yard up at Tutapuli near Ennore. A level playing field for Naval and Coast Guard orders was announced and ABG, which had bagged orders for three, 3,300-tonne Pollution Control OPVs in 2004 with Rolls Royce propulsion, brought Swan Hunter facilities from the UK and set up a plant in Goa. Still, final ordering has been mired with a clear tilt towards PSUs, dilatory tactics and legal entanglements.
Between 1981 and 1989, MDL built seven 1,200 tonne Vikram-class OPVs for the ICG. Realising the need for bigger and more modern OPVs India has ordered and received its first three naval 2,000-tonne unarmed Sukanya-class Advanced OPVs (AOPVs) from Busan in 1989, and subsequently has built four more on that design at HSL, Vishakapatnam in two years flat, proving that there really is no rocket science involved in building AOPVs.
On its part, the IN is building four, 2,500-tonne anti-submarine warfare Offshore Patrol Vessels in Project 28 at GRSE and eight, 500-tonne Catamaran OPVs for hydrographic survey vessels at Alock Ashdown Ltd in Gujarat with Konsberg Huggins. (The IN plans to use UUVs in experimental and classified roles). DCNS of France, at its own cost, has designed and delivered the first economical multi-purpose OPV in the GOWIND series, named LAdroit, with a small Austrian Schibel Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (AUV) to the French Navy, which has employed the platform in anti-piracy operations off Somalia as a cheaper option than large warships. Malaysia has also ordered similar OPVs.
Clearly, the global OPV market is growing fast. In India, between the Indian Navy and the ICGS, they have 17 OPVs of varying sizes on order worth ` 12,000 crore (USD 2.6 billion); there is also a plan to place orders for 13 more large AOPVs for the Coast Guard which has already been approved by the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC), post-26/11. Five Naval OPVs, with 76mm Otto-Melara gun and systems for the Navy, have been approved by the Cabinet Council for National Security (CCNS) and the DAC for which a global tender was released last March.
Seven contenders responded with tender bids and by June, Pipavav Defence & Offshore Engineering Company Ltd, owned by SKIL Infrastructure, was selected as the preferred lowest (L1) bidder at ` 2,800 crore for the construction of five, 110-metre, 2,500-tonne displacement AOPVs designed by the St Petersburg-based Severnoye Design Bureau.
However, as this is the first warship order to a private yard the modalities of how the weapon supplies will take place and whether similar support like the Navy provides to PSUs will be forthcoming are posing challenges as is the escalation in the rupee-dollar value.
Growing Piracy
The need for OPVs to combat piracy is also growing. Increasing incidents of piracy in the Horn of Africa continue apace with pirates having moved operations to off the Lakshadweep group of islands in the southern Arabian Sea. ICGs OPVs have had to be called in and the Navy has begun a crash programme to upgrade all-weather maritime surveillance capabilities of its coastal maritime patrol aircraft and fast attack craft as there is a shortage of OPVs.
Naval platforms are already involved in pirate activities off the coast of Somalia and to escort merchant navy convoys along the IMOs Internationally Recognised Transit Corridor. Speaking at Naval War College late last year, Navy Chief Admiral Nirmal Verma stated that 1,800 merchant men have been escorted by the IN over the last few years and according to latest reports, 35 Indian seamen are still in the captivity of Somalian pirates.
To rectify its inability to patrol at night, the ICGS has begun procuring ELBIT Systems-built CoMPASS (compact multipurpose advanced stabilised system) for its seven, 270-tonne extra-fast patrol vessels (XFPV) and twenty, 260-tonne fast patrol vessels (FPV), all of which were built by Goa Shipyard Ltd. Twelve Griffon 8000TD hovercraft, to add to the six with the CG, have also been ordered from. The IN is also accelerating its efforts to raise the Sagar Prahari Bal (SPB) for force protection functions at naval harbours. The SPB force will comprise 1,000 personnel (61 officers and 939 sailors) and 80 fast interceptor craft (FIC), worth an estimated USD 500 million, from the Sri Lanka-based Solas Marine, of which 31 will be based in Mumbai, 12 in Kochi, 23 in Vishakhapatnam and 10 in Andaman and Nicobar.
Nearly two years ago, the MoD inked a contract with Frances Chantier Naval Couach to acquire 15 FIC-1,300 vessels, which will be in addition to the 80 FICs (Motomarine SA-built Hellraiser and Invader) approved earlier for the SPB. New CG stations have been sanctioned and a new Gujarat Regional Commander and organisaion set up at Ahmedabad.
A squadron of Israeli-supplied Heron and Searcher Unmanned Airborne Vehicles (UAVs) are operating from Porbandar. The CG has ordered the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO)- designed Nishant UAVs.
Legal Wrangles and Delays
Despite their criticality, at many levels ICG Headquarters, MoD and the Union Ministry of Finance there have been many legal and procedural delays in ordering OPVs. The non-utilisation of the Defence Budget due to the slow progress of construction of ships by the MoD-owned shipyards has been a major stumbling block forcing the surrender of ` 120 crore in 2008-2009. By the end of the Tenth Plan period, even though the ICG had activated 23 coast guard stations, a large number of these stations continue to function with infrastructural deficiencies. Post 26/11, the Government of India had sanctioned 14 new stations in a span of 18 months between June 2009 and November 2010 but shortfalls in vessels were yet to be made good as of December 2010 at most of the stations.
Legal cases have further hindered the OPV programme. Controversies were unleashed when, despite L&T being the L1 for 20 Coast Guard Offshore Fast Patrol Vessels (OFPVs) the order went to CSL. Justifying their decision the MoD stated L&Ts bid was non-responsive and had used exchange rate variation (ERV), which was not permitted, and since CSL was L2 it nabbed the contract.
The reality is that L&T had withdrawn its ERV clause. Four shipyards had succeeded in their technical bids and their quotes are revealing. While L&T quoted ` 66.68 crore per boat; CSL had quoted ` 69.89 crore; GRSE quoted ` 76.1 crore, GSL had quoted ` 94.17 crore and HSL quoted ` 109.41. The numbers showed how varied the bids were. They became public when L&T challenged the MoDs decision in the Delhi High Court. Losing their case after long arguments L&T had to pay legal costs of ` 700,00 to both the MoD and CSL. The case put a damper on the manner in which future orders were being handled by the MoD.
Arguably, the National Committee for Strengthening Maritime and Coastal Security the apex committee that monitors naval intelligence network, linking 51 nodes of the IN and ICG to achieve a "common operational picture and the acquisition of assets, has its work cut out.
Nearly four years after 26/11, we still have to achieve tangible results. Most likely, the Navy and Coast Guard, encumbered with its lack of platforms, will be red-faced yet again if another attack takes place.
DSI-Defence and Security of India
