ArabianEmpires&Caliphates
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States don't trust other states by default. Every state is on its own at the end of the day. When a state comes to the aid of state x or y it is always due to a carefully calculated analysis of whether such aid is in the best interests of the state that is providing it or not.
Also KSA is not the GCC or vice versa. Every state in the GCC has a different relationship with the US. KSA can obviously afford (for various reasons) to work in ways that the US finds problematic (for them) hence the very close and emerging KSA-China relationship. The thing here is that the US cannot afford to lose KSA. Throughout the last almost 80 years, there have been ups and downs but eventually both parties realize that they are better of when relations are stable rather than the opposite. Anyway only the future will tell what the relationship will look like in say 10 years but 1 thing is for sure, MBS is not messing about and the US has no say in the internal matters of KSA and its long-term policies. Which this development is a good example of or the very fact that MBS is the Crown Prince (and de facto ruler) and not MBN. MBS has also cleverly destroyed most House of Saud power circles (clans) in the country that used to speak with 2 different tongues and were governments within governments so to speak, making it much more difficult for a powerful country like the US to influence the inner power circles of KSA. Which was a huge problem given the size of the House of Saud and long-established factions. There has already been talk of MBS establishing a new "dynasty" with just his offspring and brothers line of the family having real relevancy, thus streamlining the royal house (like other royal houses historically).
Anyway a throwback to almost 4 year old threads talking about an open "secret".
Saudi Arabia has begun the transfer and localisation of ballistic missile technologies
King Abdul Aziz City for Science and Technology (KACST) is localizing techniques for guided short-range ballistic missiles and multi-purpose bombs, according to Dr. Khalid bin Abdullah Al-Hussan, the General Supervisor of Special Programs and Supervisor of the Aerospace Research Institute City...
defence.pk
Rocket-engine test stand at secret Saudi missile base resembles Chinese design, experts say
- Satellite images suggest that Saudi Arabia has constructed its first known ballistic missile factory, according to weapons experts and image analysts
https://www.scmp.com/news/world/mid...est-stand-secret-saudi-missile-base-resembles
Good. It should escalate further.
Continued:
Uranium and heavy metals in Phosphate Fertilizers
From book Uranium, Mining and Hydrogeology (pp.193-198)
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/226094606_Uranium_and_heavy_metals_in_Phosphate_Fertilizers
Saudis to Prospect for Uranium, Thorium with China – over US Objections
Mar 14, 2019 @ 19:34 DEBKA Weekly
Saudi Arabia is pushing ahead with a geological survey to explore and assess its uranium and thorium resources in the kingdom’s western Hail Province, in the face of US objections. Although this largely agricultural region was always thought to hold small supplies of these substances, Riyadh suddenly perked up of late to its potential after Chinese geologists turned up promising finds.
Hail produces large quantities of dates and fruit and most of the kingdom’s wheat and grain. It has historically derived its wealth as a wayside station on the camel caravan Hajj route to Mecca.
Most of the world’s uranium is found either in northern countries like Canada or Russia or the south in places like South Africa and southern Australia. Jordan is thought to have substantial reserves, up to 65,000 tons of uranium plus the potential to extract 140,000 tonnes from phosphates. Foreign firms have been given mining contracts.
However, DEBKA Weekly’s sources report that Chinese geologists hired by the Saudi government reported that Jordan’s uranium deposits extend south as far as Saudi Arabia’s Hail. Riyadh’s eagerness to co-opt Beijing to the start of its uranium mining project has raised suspicions, especially in Washington, that Saudi Arabia is secretly conducting a nuclear program a lot bigger than suggested by intelligence findings.
The project is going forward as a partnership between the King Abdullah City for Atomic Research and Renewable Energy (KACARE) and China’s National Nuclear Cooperation (CNNC) for the stated aim of “exploring uranium and thorium deposits for peaceful use.”
Last October, the KACARE president Hashim bin Abdullah Yamani said his agency was tasked with “nuclear plans” and proposed to “extract uranium domestically as part of its nuclear program” and a step towards “self-sufficiency in the production of atomic fuel.”
Five months ago, Crown Prince Muhammed bin Salman laid the cornerstone for the kingdom’s first nuclear research reactor. This posed a question: Why does the nation with the world’s largest reserves of oil need nuclear reactors for power? It also raised the suspicion that the Saudis wanted a possible infrastructure for manufacturing plutonium from the nuclear fuel produced by this research reactor.
In past negotiations with the Obama administration, the Saudis firmly refused to relinquish their right to enrich uranium for use as nuclear fuel for their power reactors project. The Trump administration, in contrast, is prepared to countenance uranium enrichment in Saudi Arabia under restrictions, despite strong objections in both houses of congress. Antagonism to Saudi Arabia among US lawmakers remains high over the suspicion that the crown prince engineered the death of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi last year.
Although Riyadh replies that putting nuclear energy to civilian use will free up more of its oil for export, no one doubts that its overriding motivation is in the realm of “security.” The Saudis deeply resent lagging behind Iran’s nuclear efforts and watch with covetous and suspicious eyes the rapid nuclear advances achieved by their ally, the United Arab Emirates. In 2018, the UAE completed the construction of its first civilian nuclear plant. In an agreement with the United States the UAE signed a commitment not to use the reactor for uranium enrichment in return for which it was granted international assistance. The Saudis refuse to undertake this commitment, maintaining that since Iran is allowed to enrich uranium, they too have this right.
Ali Shamkhani, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, on Wednesday, March 13, accused regional powers of “spending their petrodollars on suspicious nuclear projects” that could endanger security in the region and the world. He did not name those powers. Those new threats, Shamkhani said, would force Iran to revise its strategy depending on their nature and geography and the needs of “our country and armed forces.” Last month, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif accused the United States of hypocrisy for trying to wreck Iran’s nuclear program while seeking to sell nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia, Tehran’s regional rival. The Saudi government has so far, with unusual stubbornness, refused to turn over to Washington any information on the nuclear program it is running out of King Abdullah City, or explain what Chinese engineers and technicians are doing there. Therefore, the decision to prospect for uranium and thorium in the Hail province has widened the differences between Riyadh and Washington on the nuclear issue. In an effort to bridge the gap, the US was last week reported to be “encouraging Saudi Arabia to consider bids by American companies to build nuclear reactors.” Washington hopes that if US companies like Westinghouse win those contracts, the administration will have access to a much clear picture on what is going on inside the Saudi nuclear program.
https://www.debka.com/saudis-to-prospect-for-uranium-thorium-with-china-over-us-objections/
Saudi Arabia's first nuclear reactor nearly finished, sparking fears over safeguards
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2...early-finished-sparking-fears-over-safeguards
KACARE launches uranium program to train Saudis
http://www.arabnews.com/node/1464706/saudi-arabia
Saudi Arabia owns 5% of global uranium reserves
https://english.mubasher.info/news/3251245/Saudi-Arabia-owns-5-of-global-uranium-reserves
As Saudi Arabia Builds A Nuclear Reactor, Some Worry About Its Motives
Bomb Watchers Twitching as Looser Rules Weighed for Uranium
Countries encouraged to look at extraction from phosphates, providing potential new pathways to the nuclear material used in reactors and weapons
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti...xpand-phosphate-link-to-weapons-proliferation
Wa’ad El-Shamal: The capital of global phosphate
http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/article/551114
Wa’ad Al Shamal pivotal in development of KSA’s vast phosphate reserves
http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/arti...elopment-of-KSAsvast-phosphate-reserves?rss=1
Saudi crown prince warns it will build nuclear bomb if Tehran does the same
Prince Mohammed bin Salman is pressing the US to allow Saudi Arabia to enrich uranium in return for choosing American nuclear technology
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2...-iran-nuclear-bomb-threat-mohammed-bin-salman
Saudi missile program expanded with help from China, US intel said to show
Trump administration reportedly withheld information from Congress, raising concern it is tacitly approving move; fears raised Riyadh could be seeking nuclear weapons
https://www.timesofisrael.com/saudi...d-with-help-from-china-us-intel-said-to-show/
Exclusive: US intel shows Saudi Arabia escalated its missile program with help from China
Pakistan
https://edition.cnn.com/2019/06/05/...udi-arabia-ballistic-missile-china/index.html
Saudi Arabia, China have established ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’
http://www.arabnews.com/node/1534636/saudi-arabia
Saudi Space Agency Begins To Take Shape, Reported $1 Billion Budget In First Year
https://spacewatch.global/2019/04/s...hape-reported-1-billion-budget-in-first-year/
Connect the dots.
Saudi Arabia wants to enrich uranium for nuclear power: Energy minister
REUTERS
September 09, 2019 11:05
ABU DHABI: Saudi Arabia wants to have uranium production and enrichment in future for its planned nuclear power program that will begin with two atomic reactors, the kingdom’s new energy minister said on Monday.
- Saudi Arabia has said it wants to tap nuclear technology for peaceful uses
“We are proceeding with it cautiously ... we are experimenting with two nuclear reactors,” Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman said at a conference in Abu Dhabi.
Saudi Arabia has said it wants to tap nuclear technology for peaceful uses. But enrichment of uranium is a sensitive step in the nuclear fuel cycle because it can open up the possibility of military uses of the material, the issue at the heart of Western and regional concerns over Iran’s atomic work.
Prince Abdulaziz also told reporters the world’s top oil exporter would keep working with other producers to achieve market balance and that an OPEC-led supply-curbing deal would survive “with the will of everybody.”
He said there would be “no radical” change in the oil policy of Saudi Arabia, OPEC’s de facto leader, which he said was based on strategic considerations such as reserves and energy consumption.
The prince had helped negotiate the deal between the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and its allies, a group known as OPEC+, to cut global crude supply in order to support prices and balance the market.
He told reporters that the OPEC+ alliance was “staying for the long term” and called on OPEC members to comply with output targets.
“We have always worked in a cohesive, coherent way within OPEC to make sure that producers work and prosper together,” the prince said.
“It would be wrong from my end to pre-empt the rest of the OPEC members,” he said when asked whether there was a need for further oil production cuts to support the market.
https://www.arabnews.com/node/1551986/saudi-arabia
Mark Fitzpatrick@MarkTFitz
Associate Fellow
ABOUT MARK
ANALYSIS
27th August 2021
Saudi Arabia’s ballistic-missile programme: an overview
Having relied on missile imports from China since the late 1980s, in the last few years Saudi Arabia appears to have sought an indigenous production capability. Despite this concerning development, its missile programme does not elicit the level of concern sparked by Iran, argues Mark Fitzpatrick.If Iran were to enter into negotiations over its missile programme, it would be unlikely to accept limits that did not also apply to other countries. It is, therefore, useful to examine the ballistic-missile capabilities of Iran’s regional rivals.
For over three decades, Saudi Arabia’s ballistic-missile inventory consisted of large systems imported from China that exceeded range requirements to target regional adversaries. In the past couple of years, however, the Kingdom has supplemented these symbols of strength with capabilities that may prove to be more useful in practice.
In a defence parade on 29 April 2014, Saudi Arabia displayed publicly for the first and, so far, only time two of the Dongfeng-3 (‘East Wind’, DF-3) ballistic missiles it had secretly imported from China in 1988. Reportedly designated CH-SS-2 by the US Defense Intelligence Agency, but referred to as CSS-8 in many reports, the single-stage liquid-fuelled missiles may have a range of 2,500km with a 2,000kg payload, or up to 3,000km with a lighter warhead. They weigh 64 tonnes and are 24m long.
In 1983–84, China developed an improved version of the DF-3, increasing its range, payload and accuracy, and likely developed an export-only version intended for conventional payloads. Saudi Arabia has no nuclear weapons, but at the time of sale, it was widely believed that any ballistic missile that could deliver a warhead in excess of 500kg further than 300km was capable of delivering a nuclear warhead, and thus a proliferation risk. Chinese missile sales such as the DF-3A to Saudi Arabia were a major driver for the creation of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which was devised specifically to prevent sales such as this in the future.
One might ask why Saudi Arabia acquired such far-reaching missiles. Its main adversary, Iran, is about 250km at the closest point. Israel is even closer. The answer is probably that the Saudis wanted a land-based alternative to aircraft delivery to contribute to a nuclear hedging strategy, and the DF-3 was the only system then available on the market.
The inaccuracy of the DF-3 – estimated to have a circular error probable (CEP) of 1,000–4,000m, meaning it had a 50% chance of falling within a 1,000–4,000m radius of the target – contributed to speculation about Saudi intentions: at that level of imprecision, the missiles would have little military utility unless nuclear-armed. But even inaccurate systems can provoke terror among civilian populations and Saudi leaders may see symbolic importance in being able to respond in kind against any future missile attack.However, the Saudis reportedly assured the United States that they would not use nuclear or chemical warheads with the DF-3 and, in fact, acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in October 1988. While some sources indicate that 50 of the DF-3 were imported, others say ‘at least 30’. The IISS Military Balance estimates the current number of DF-3 launchers at 10+ and notes that their service status is unclear, given their age, the difficulties of maintenance, a lack of spare parts and likely general degradation of the systems. The Saudis have apparently never flight tested the DF-3, nor any other ballistic missile.
Seven years before the 2014 parade, Saudi Arabia had reportedly already acquired less cumbersome solid-fuel DF-21 missiles from China. According to a 2014 Newsweek articleby Jeff Stein, the US Central Intelligence Agency approved Riyadh’s acquisition of the DF-21, called CH-SS-5 or CSS-5 by the US, on condition that the nosecones were modified so as not to carry nuclear weapons. CIA analysts who reportedly examined the missiles after their import concluded that the modified nosecones did not have room to accommodate unsophisticated nuclear weapons of the kind that Saudi Arabia conceivably could acquire from Pakistan or China. How many of the missiles were imported is unclear, and a popular Chinese military analyst called these reports disinformation.
The DF-21 weighs about 15 tonnes and has a range of 1,700km. It also has a significantly higher accuracy than the DF-3, with an estimated CEP of 300m. A terminal speed of Mach 10 makes it difficult to defend against with common missile-defence systems. The Saudi government has never acknowledged possessing the DF-21, apart from displaying it in 2013 in a commemorative glass-encased set of three missile models, two of which appeared to be the Chinese systems and the third of which is a mystery. For the boost it gives to the Kingdom’s ambiguous deterrent posture, however, authorities cannot be unhappy to be thought to have such a weapon, even if it has never been revealed nor tested from Saudi Arabia. With a replacement nosecone, it would contribute to the clear Saudi intention to follow suit if Iran were to obtain a nuclear weapon.
Missile production
Saudi officials might not have been happy to see press reports in early 2019 featuring overhead imagery of the al-Watah missile base, which appeared to show a factory to produce solid-fuel motors. The key indicator was an apparent rocket-engine test stand that bore close similarities to a similar facility in China, although on a smaller scale. The evidence angered members of the US Congress at a time when the assassination of Jamal Khashoggi had frayed relations. How close Saudi Arabia is to being able to produce ballistic missiles is unknown. An observable sign of progress would be the depiction by infra-red satellites of ground engine testing, for which there have been no reports in the public realm.What role China had in building the apparent missile-production facility is unclear, although US intelligence agencies appear to have no doubt about Chinese assistance. While China is not an MTCR member, it has agreed – at least in principle – to apply the original MTCR guidelines, which would preclude any sale of such missiles and related technology, but especially manufacturing capacity such as this. The US assesses (without providing public detail) that China has not adhered to this commitment.
In 2018, Ukraine unveiled a new solid-propellant short-range ballistic missile that was said to have been covertly financed by Saudi Arabia. Based on Ukrainian efforts to produce an Iskander-class missile called Sapsan, the new system, called Grom-2 (Thunder-2) can reportedly carry a 500kg warhead and has a range of 280km – so as to keep it MTCR compliant. A US defence journal reported in 2019 that Saudi Arabia was expected to receive the Grom system in 2022. Interestingly, the Kingdom has not sought to purchase the US MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System ballistic missile (unlike Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates), and there is no public reporting that it has sought China’s short-range ballistic missiles (unlike Qatar).
Benign capability?
Other than a general desire to keep pace with Iran, Saudi Arabia’s motivations in acquiring ballistic missiles are not entirely clear. That said, Riyadh’s missiles do not elicit the level of concern sparked by Iran’s missile programme, and for good reason. While the DF-3 does have a longer reach than any of Iran’s current systems, Saudi Arabia is not known to have initiated any work to develop a nuclear warhead for its missiles, which are of questionable utility, and it does not engage in missile test launches. Its import of Chinese missiles was a challenging blow to the non-proliferation policies of Riyadh’s Western partners, however, as is its secret work on solid-fuel motor production. Non-proliferation norms should apply to all parties. And if ballistic missiles are to be constrained everywhere in the region, systems in Egypt, Syria, Turkey and the UAE, as well as those in the hands of rebel forces in Yemen, should also be taken into account.This article was updated on 13 September 2021 to include Chinese sourcing.
Saudi Gazette/ Home Page
Global News Website covers the latest and breaking news of saudi arabia and the world all the time, with politics, business, technology, life, opinion and sports news.
saudigazette.com.sa
Saudi Arabia Said to Produce Ballistic Missiles
January/February 2022
By Julia Masterson
Saudi Arabia is manufacturing ballistic missiles with China’s help, according to a U.S. intelligence assessment reported on Dec. 23 by CNN. Although Riyadh previously purchased missiles from Beijing, this is believed to be the first time it has produced them domestically, and the development is raising concerns about a new missile race in the Middle East.
View attachment 814357
Site at al-Dawadi near Riyadh, where Saudi Arabia is manufacturing ballistic missiles with China's help, according to a U.S. intelligence assessment reported by CNN. This satellite image was provided by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, where experts analyzed the data. (Source: James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute for International Studies at Monterey.)
Saudi Arabia is thought to be seeking to advance its missile capabilities to bolster its capabilities in Yemen, where the kingdom remains entrenched in a war against Iran-aligned Houthi rebels.
Satellite images of a site near al-Dawadmi, west of Riyadh, suggest that Saudi Arabia is producing solid-fueled ballistic missiles, as evidenced by signs of a “burn pit” that is used to dispose of solid-propellant leftover from the production line.
The burn pit is “a strong signature” that the facility is manufacturing solid-fueled missiles, according to experts Jeffrey Lewis and David Schmerler of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Compared to liquid-fueled missiles, which are generally filled with a liquid propellant prior to launch, solid-fueled missiles are considered a greater strategic risk because they can be fueled and concealed or transported in one piece and fired on a moment’s notice.
In an Arms Control Wonk blog post on Dec. 23 analyzing the images, Lewis and Schmerler assessed that the site “appears to have been built with Chinese assistance.” The fuel production and test site is near the al-Watah missile production facility. The missile facility was first publicly identified by Lewis and his team in 2019, and the U.S. intelligence community later that year publicly confirmed that Saudi Arabia had expanded the al-Watah plant to include the rocket engine production and test facility near al-Dawadmi. (See ACT, March and July/August 2019.) The engine test stand observed at the site in 2019 closely resembles those produced by China, leading the open-source analysts to identify Beijing as a likely supplier of the technology.
U.S. officials across multiple agencies reportedly have been briefed by the intelligence community on large transfers of sensitive ballistic missile technology from China to Saudi Arabia in recent months, according to CNN. The specific model of solid-fueled missile being produced at the al-Dawadmi site remains unknown, but given Beijing’s assistance, it could be of Chinese design.
Saudi Arabia already possesses ballistic missiles purchased from China, including the 3,000-kilometer-range Dong Feng-3, which the kingdom displayed in 2014, and other Dong Feng-class missiles transferred from Beijing in batches since 2018.
The new missiles will likely carry conventional weapons, given that Saudi Arabia does not have nuclear weapons and is a party to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). But Riyadh is seeking to expand its civilian nuclear power infrastructure and may be constructing a new uranium-processing facility, known as Al-Ula, to produce yellowcake, also with Chinese assistance. (See ACT, September 2020.) Saudi Arabia’s small-quantities protocol safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is outdated and would not permit the agency to inspect a yellowcake production facility. Riyadh has denied the existence of the Al-Ula facility, but any activity there would go unmonitored by the IAEA, thereby raising concerns about potential covert nuclear operations.
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman said in March 2018 that “if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible.” There is no indication that Iran intends to produce a nuclear weapon at this time, and negotiations to restore stringent limitations to Iran’s nuclear program under the 2015 nuclear deal are ongoing.
The United States has repeatedly refused to sell ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia, citing proliferation concerns and a commitment to remain within the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which seeks to limit the spread of ballistic missile technology. Although not illegal, China’s assistance to Saudi Arabia contradicts its vow to abide by the MTCR. China is not a member of the export control regime, but has pledged to voluntarily abide by its guidelines, which prohibit the export of missiles capable of delivering a 500-kilogram payload more than 300 kilometers.
Riyadh’s new ballistic missiles are likely to alter the power dynamics in the Middle East and stymie efforts by the United States and others to build on the Iran nuclear deal by negotiating limits on Iran’s missile program. The development highlights the contradiction that “while significant attention has been focused on Iran’s large ballistic missile program, Saudi Arabia’s development and now production of ballistic missiles has not received the same level of scrutiny,” Lewis told CNN.
Saudi Arabia Said to Produce Ballistic Missiles | Arms Control Association
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